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Note de la Présidente du Conseil de sécurité

Au paragraphe 2 de sa résolution 2515 (2020), le Conseil de sécurité a demandé au Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution 1874 (2009) de lui présenter un rapport contenant ses conclusions et recommandations.

La Présidente communique donc ci-après le rapport émanant du Groupe d'experts (voir annexe).

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Annexe

Lettre datée du 2 mars 2021, adressée à la Présidente du Conseil de sécurité par le Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution 1874 (2009)

Le Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution 1874 (2009) a l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint, conformément au paragraphe 2 de la résolution 2515 (2020), le rapport final sur ses travaux.

Ce rapport a été présenté le 5 février 2021 au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 1718 (2006), qui l'a examiné le 24 février 2021.

Le Groupe d'experts vous serait reconnaissant de bien vouloir porter le texte de la présente lettre et du rapport à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité et de le faire publier comme document du Conseil.

Le Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution
1874 (2009) du Conseil de sécurité

Pièce jointe

Lettre datée du 5 février 2021, adressée à la Présidente du Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 1718 (2006) par le Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution 1874 (2009)

Le Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution 1874 (2009) a l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint, conformément au paragraphe 2 de la résolution 2515 (2020), le rapport final sur ses travaux.

Le Groupe d'experts vous serait reconnaissant de bien vouloir porter le texte de la présente lettre et du rapport à l'attention des membres du Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 1718 (2006).

Le Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution
1874 (2009)du Conseil de sécurité

Résumé

Durant la période considérée, la République populaire démocratique de Corée a maintenu et développé son programme nucléaire et son programme de missiles balistiques, en violation des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Lors des dernières parades militaires, elle a dévoilé de nouveaux systèmes de missiles balistiques intercontinentaux ainsi que des systèmes de missiles balistiques à courte et moyenne portée et à lanceur sous-marin. Elle a annoncé des préparatifs pour la mise à l'essai et la production de nouvelles têtes de missile balistique et la mise au point d'armes nucléaires tactiques. En outre, elle a produit des matières fissiles, maintenu en activité des installations nucléaires et modernisé ses infrastructures de missiles balistiques. Elle a continué de chercher à se procurer à l'étranger les matières et la technologie nécessaires à ces programmes. Aucun essai nucléaire ou essai de missile balistique n'a été signalé.

Pour faire face à la pandémie de maladie à coronavirus (COVID-19), la République populaire démocratique de Corée a imposé des contrôles aux frontières qui ont fortement limité les transferts licites et illicites de biens et la circulation des personnes. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur les importations illicites de produits pétroliers raffinés que le pays a continué d'effectuer, par livraison directe et par transfert entre navires, en usant d'ingénieux subterfuges. D'après les images, les données et les calculs reçus d'un État Membre pour la période du 1er janvier au 30 septembre, ces importations illicites ont dépassé à plusieurs reprises, en 2020, le plafond annuel de 500 000 barils.

Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur l'acquisition de navires par la République populaire démocratique de Corée et sur la vente de droits de pêche et les exportations de charbon effectuées en violation des sanctions. Il note que les expéditions de charbon semblent être en grande partie suspendues depuis fin juillet 2020.

Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur des transferts, par différentes filières, d'autres produits et biens interdits. Il a continué d'enquêter sur l'accès de la République populaire démocratique de Corée aux circuits bancaires internationaux par l'entremise de ses propres agents bancaires à l'étranger, d'entreprises conjointes, de sociétés fictives et par le recours à des actifs offshore et virtuels. Il a enquêté sur le Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies et la Korea Paekho Trading Corporation et sur les travailleurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée qui perçoivent des revenus en Afrique subsaharienne. Il a également enquêté sur d'autres travailleurs qui continuent de toucher des revenus à l'étranger, notamment des informaticiens détachés par le Département de l'industrie des munitions.

Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur les cyberactivités malveillantes menées par la République populaire démocratique de Corée en violation des sanctions, activités qui sont dirigées la plupart du temps par le Bureau général de reconnaissance, notamment celles visant des actifs virtuels et des prestataires de services d'actifs virtuels et les attaques dirigées contre les entreprises de défense.

Le Groupe d'experts a mis à jour les informations sur la coopération militaire présumée, les tentatives de violation de l'embargo sur les armes, les activités illicites des entités désignées, notamment la Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, et l'utilisation des locaux diplomatiques de la République populaire démocratique de Corée à l'étranger à des fins commerciales.

Le Groupe d'experts a examiné les renseignements reçus des États Membres et des organisations non gouvernementales sur les conséquences involontaires des sanctions imposées par l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Il présente également les résultats de l'enquête menée auprès des organisations internationales et non

gouvernementales au sujet des effets de la pandémie de COVID-19 et des sanctions sur les opérations d'aide.

Des recommandations sont formulées dans le rapport à l'intention du Conseil de sécurité, du Comité et des États Membres.

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I. Introduction

1. Au paragraphe 2 de sa résolution 2515 (2020), le Conseil de sécurité a demandé au Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution 1874 (2009) de présenter au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 1718 (2006) un rapport final contenant ses conclusions et recommandations. Le rapport du Groupe d'experts couvre la période du 4 août 2020 au 5 février 2021, qui coïncide avec la pandémie de maladie à coronavirus (COVID-19) (voir annexe 1 pour les mesures prises par la République populaire démocratique de Corée).

II. Activités récentes liées au programme nucléaire et au programme de missiles balistiques

Programme nucléaire

2. La République populaire démocratique de Corée a poursuivi son programme nucléaire, notamment la production d'uranium hautement enrichi, la construction d'un réacteur à eau légère et l'entretien des installations nucléaires. Plusieurs installations ont été réparées en 2020, suite aux dégâts causés par des typhons.

3. Le Groupe d'experts a observé des panaches de vapeur s'échappant du bâtiment de production de dioxyde d'uranium (UO_2) de l'usine d'enrichissement de l'uranium à Yongbyon. Un dispositif de refroidissement est resté retiré (voir annexe 2)[1]. Un État Membre a indiqué que l'usine d'enrichissement de l'uranium à Yongbyon était en activité.

4. Le Groupe d'experts a observé la construction de nouvelles infrastructures et la modernisation des bâtiments sur le site d'extraction d'uranium de Pyongsan (voir annexe 3). Selon l'État Membre, ces travaux de construction et de modernisation et la variation du volume des amas de déchets indiquent que les opérations d'extraction se poursuivent et que les usines de traitement sont en activité.

5. La construction du réacteur à eau légère à Yongbyon se poursuit. L'État Membre a informé le Groupe d'experts que des signes d'essais électriques associés à la construction du réacteur ont été observés en octobre et novembre 2020. L'État Membre n'a pas relevé de signes d'évacuation d'eau, ce qui pourrait indiquer que le dispositif de refroidissement n'a pas été testé durant la période considérée.

6. Aucun signe de fonctionnement du réacteur 5 MW (e) n'a été observé depuis la fin de 2018. Toutefois, des mouvements constants ont été observés aux abords du réacteur, ce qui donne à penser que celui-ci est entretenu en permanence. L'État Membre estime que le réacteur 5 MW (e) est capable de produire environ 7 kilogrammes de plutonium par an et que la République populaire démocratique de Corée pourrait détenir 60 kilogrammes de plutonium. D'après les images satellite, les typhons ont endommagé le barrage de la Kuryong, qui contrôle les niveaux de l'eau. Des travaux de reconstruction étaient en cours (voir annexe 4).

7. Le Groupe d'experts a pu constater, à l'aide des images satellite, les dégâts causés par des typhons et les travaux de reconstruction de routes et de ponts entrepris par la suite au site d'essai de Punggye-ri. De l'avis de l'État Membre, la présence de personnel montre que ce site n'est pas abandonné.

8. Le Groupe d'experts surveille l'installation à Kangson dont l'activité pourrait avoir trait au programme nucléaire. L'État Membre a indiqué qu'après avoir analysé

[1] S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 3.

les images, il n'a pas réussi à établir que Kangson était bien une usine d'enrichissement (voir annexe 5).

9. Selon l'État Membre, à en juger par la taille des missiles de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, il est fort probable qu'un dispositif nucléaire peut être monté sur les missiles balistiques intercontinentaux, ainsi que sur les missiles balistiques à courte et à moyenne portée. L'État Membre a déclaré toutefois qu'il n'était pas certain que la République populaire démocratique de Corée ait mis au point des missiles balistiques dont les corps de rentrée résistent à la chaleur générée au moment de la rentrée (voir par. 18).

10. La République populaire démocratique de Corée aurait fait des déclarations sur le perfectionnement de son programme nucléaire lors de plusieurs manifestations nationales du Parti du travail de Corée (voir par. 17 et annexe 6).

11. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur les articles essentiels dans le domaine nucléaire. En collaboration avec un deuxième État Membre, il a recensé des articles qui ne sont pas répertoriés comme articles interdits dans les résolutions pertinentes, comme le matériel de dépression [2] et les systèmes de contrôle informatiques (voir annexe 7).

12. L'Université Kim Il Sung et l'Université de technologie Kim Chaek ont publié récemment des travaux de recherche sur les programmes nucléaires (voir annexe 8). On peut en déduire que les universités de la République populaire démocratique de Corée poursuivent les travaux de recherche dans des domaines susceptibles de contribuer aux programmes d'armes de destruction massive du pays.

Transfert immatériel de technologie et activités des universités de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

13. Comme suite à sa précédente enquête sur le transfert immatériel de technologie[3], le Groupe d'experts examine les renseignements reçus d'un État Membre qui a recensé 161 études menées et ouvrages publiés conjointement avec des chercheurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée depuis 2017 sur des sujets qui pourraient avoir trait à des technologies dont le transfert est interdit dans les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité.

14. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des informations à 37 universités considérées comme « universités sœurs » par l'Université Kim Il Sung avec lesquelles cette dernière a effectué ou effectue des échanges universitaires. Neuf de ces établissements ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'ils n'avaient pas effectué d'échanges universitaires ou entretenu de liens de coopération avec l'Université Kim Il Sung (voir annexe 9) et qu'aucune violation n'avait été commise.

Recommandations

15. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité envisage de publier une nouvelle liste** d'articles liés aux armes de destruction massive et aux missiles balistiques, **auxquels s'appliquent les mesures énoncées aux alinéas a), b) et c) du paragraphe 8 de la résolution 1718 (2006).**

16. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres fassent preuve de vigilance dans le contrôle des échanges universitaires internationaux impliquant des chercheurs originaires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée en s'assurant de la conformité des sujets étudiés et des organismes parrains avec**

[2] En ce qui concerne les capteurs de pression, voir S/2019/691, par. 43, et S/2019/171 et S/2019/171/Corr.1, par. 65.

[3] Voir S/2020/151, par. 201 à 203.

les dispositions des paragraphes 10 et 11 de la résolution 2321 (2016), du paragraphe 17 de la résolution 2270 (2016) et des alinéas a), b) et c) du paragraphe 8 de la résolution 1718 (2006).

Missiles balistiques

17. À la parade militaire organisée à l'occasion du soixante-quinzième anniversaire du Parti du travail de Corée à Pyongyang le 10 octobre 2020 (voir fig. 1 à 4), la République populaire démocratique de Corée a présenté ses tout derniers systèmes de missiles balistiques modernisés et opérationnels et dévoilé un nouveau missile balistique intercontinental[4] (voir annexe 10) et un nouveau missile balistique à moyenne portée lancé par sous-marin (voir annexe 11). Comme le Groupe d'experts l'a déjà signalé, la République populaire démocratique de Corée a non seulement continué de développer et de moderniser son programme de missiles balistiques mais elle a également renforcé sa force de frappe nucléaire, ainsi que sa capacité de contrer les systèmes étrangers de défense antimissiles (voir annexe 12) tout en se protégeant avec son nouveau système de défense aérienne. Cadrant avec ce qui précède, le huitième congrès du Parti du travail de Corée, tenu en janvier 2021, fait valoir dans son rapport que les armes nucléaires tactiques et stratégiques et leurs vecteurs sont les principaux moyens de dissuasion du pays[5].

18. La parade militaire du 14 janvier 2021 a confirmé le developpement de la capacité de la République populaire démocratique de Corée de délivrer des armes nucléaires tactiques et stratégiques. Un autre missile balistique lancé par sous-marin[6] et un nouveau missile balistique à courte portée[7] ont été dévoilés (voir fig. 5 et annexes 11 et 12).

19. En plus de l'amélioration des systèmes de missiles balistiques révélée lors des parades militaires, la République populaire démocratique de Corée a continué de moderniser les infrastructures industrielles liées à son programme de missiles balistiques et ses bases de missiles balistiques. Le pays s'est attaché à cultiver des partenariats à l'étranger en vue d'échanger certaines technologies et d'acquérir des composantes.

20. Les parades militaires (voir fig. 1 à 5) mettaient en avant la diversité et l'innovation[8], ainsi que le renouvellement de l'arsenal de missiles, des missiles à carburant solide étant venus remplacer les missiles balistiques à courte et à moyenne portée à propergol liquide. Elles mettaient en avant la mobilité des différents systèmes[9], qui comprenaient des transporteurs-érecteurs-lanceurs et un sous-marin, en cours de construction[10], capable de lancer le missile balistique Pukguksong-3, et probablement les nouveaux missiles Pukguksong-4 et Pukguksong-5 (voir annexes 11 et 15).

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[4] Voir S/2017/742, par. 7 et note 3.

[5] Selon le rapport publié par le Comité central du Parti en janvier 2021, « en réussissant le tir d'essai du missile balistique intercontinental Hwasong-15 le 29 novembre 2017, le Comité central du Parti a démontré avec fierté au monde entier la concrétisation de l'objectif historique qu'est la constitution de la force nucléaire de l'État et de l'objectif de création d'une puissance de fusée. »

[6] Le nouveau missile balistique lancé par sous-marin appelé Pukguksong-5 a été décrit par l'Agence centrale de presse coréenne comme « l'arme, le missile lancé par sous-marin, le plus puissant au monde ».

[7] Le nouveau missile balistique à courte portée ressemble à une version perfectionnée du KN-23, montée sur un transporteur-érecteur-lanceur à 5 essieux.

[8] Voir S/2020/151, par. 194 et 195.

[9] Voir S/2020/840, par. 10 et 13.

[10] Voir également S/2020/151, par. 196 ; S/2017/150, par. 40 ; et S/2016/157, par. 41 à 44.

21. Le Groupe d'experts a constaté que la République populaire démocratique de Corée a continué de rénover les infrastructures de production à l'usine de chars de Kusong, qui participe à la production de transporteurs-érecteurs-lanceurs à chenilles pour le Pukguksong-2 et pour d'autres systèmes de missiles balistiques (voir annexe 13).

22. Les activités se sont poursuivies à l'usine automobile « 16 mars » dans le secteur de Pyongsong[11], où le Hwasong-15 a été assemblé et lancé en 2017. Des travaux de terrassement ont été entrepris pour améliorer les voies de communication sur le site (voir annexe 14).

23. Au chantier naval de Sinpo-Sud[12], l'activité constante observée depuis juillet 2020 au bassin d'amarrage sécurisé pourrait avoir trait à la manutention de missiles balistiques lancés par sous-marin. Des travaux de réparation ou de modernisation ont été entrepris sur le quai situé devant l'entrée de l'atelier où serait actuellement construit le sous-marin de la classe Romeo qui pourrait être équipé de ces missiles[13]. Il s'agirait peut-être de préparer le quai pour le lancement prochain d'un sous-marin. Des activités similaires ont été détectées au chantier naval de Nampo (voir annexe 15).

24. À l'aide d'images satellite, le Groupe d'experts a continué de surveiller les travaux d'infrastructure menés dans les bases de missiles balistiques, notamment les activités de construction et les travaux logistiques dans des sites comme la base d'opérations de missiles de Yusang-ri[14], la base d'opérations de missiles de Kal-gol[15] et la base de missiles de Hoejung-ri[16] (voir annexes 16 à 18).

25. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur des allégations de coopération entre la République populaire démocratique de Corée et la République islamique d'Iran concernant les missiles balistiques. Dans ses rapports précédents[17], le Groupe d'experts a signalé les activités des représentants de la Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation en République islamique d'Iran et la coopération technique entre les deux pays dans ce domaine. D'après un État Membre, la République populaire démocratique de Corée et la République islamique d'Iran ont repris leur collaboration sur des projets de mise au point de missiles à longue portée (voir annexe 19). Cette collaboration aurait porté notamment sur le transfert de pièces essentielles, le dernier envoi effectué à ce titre ayant eu lieu en 2020 (voir annexe 19-1). Dans sa réponse du 21 décembre 2020, la République islamique d'Iran a déclaré ce qui suit : « L'examen préliminaire des informations que nous a transmises le Groupe d'experts indique que de faux renseignements et des données fabriquées de toutes pièces ont peut-être été utilisés dans les enquêtes et analyses du Groupe d'experts » (voir annexe 19-2).

26. La République populaire démocratique de Corée a continué de chercher, par des moyens illicites, à se procurer certains composants à l'étranger (voir annexe 20 et S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 8 et 18 et annexe 6) et à faire parvenir ses propres produits à ses partenaires (voir annexe 19-1). En outre, elle a cherché à établir des liens de coopération scientifique et technique avec des universités et laboratoires à l'étranger (voir par. 13).

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[11] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 15.
[12] Ibid., par. 12.
[13] Voir S/2020/151, annexe 60.
[14] Également connu sous le nom de « Milchon-ri », (39° 27′ 01″ N 126° 15′ 35″ E).
[15] (38° 40′ 09″ N 126° 44′ 14″ E).
[16] (41°22′ 44.93″ N 126°54′ 38.16″ E).
[17] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 101, et les rapports antérieurs, notamment S/2019/691, annexe 32, par. 6, et S/2010/571, par. 50.

Figure 1

11 nouveaux systèmes de missiles balistiques présentés à la parade militaire du 10 octobre 2020, qui viennent renforcer les capacités de la République populaire de Corée en matière de missiles stratégiques et tactiques[18], dont le nouveau missile balistique intercontinental géant[19] (voir annexe 10), le missile balistique intercontinental Hwasong-15 et le missile balistique à moyenne portée Hwasong-12

Source : Télévision centrale coréenne (images), États Membres et Groupe d'experts (texte).

[18] En ce qui concerne le nombre exact, au moins un système pourrait ne pas avoir été présenté à la parade et être tenu en réserve pour remplacer un véhicule en cas de panne, une pratique courante dans les parades militaires (voir annexe 10). Pour ce qui est des chiffres, le terme « rounds » désigne le nombre de missiles montés sur un transporteur-érecteur-lanceur et le terme « system » désigne le système composé du missile et de son transporteur-érecteur-lanceur.

[19] Le nouveau missile balistique intercontinental géant est appelé provisoirement « Hwasong-16 » par les observateurs.

Figure 2
Parade militaire du 10 octobre 2020 : missiles balistiques à courte portée KN-24 et KN-23[20] (voir annexe 12)

- **KN-24**
- 9 SRBM systems
- caterpillar track TEL
- 2 rounds
- See S/2020/840 para.11, Tab.1, annex 7
- See S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 59

- **KN-23**
- 8 SRBM systems
- caterpillar track TEL
- 2 rounds
- See S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 58.1, annex 59

- **KN-23**
- 8 SRBM systems
- 4 axle wheeled TEL
- 2 rounds
- See S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 58.1, annex 59

Source : Télévision centrale coréenne (images), États Membres et Groupe d'experts (texte).

[20] Le missile balistique à courte portée a été décrit par l'Agence centrale de presse coréenne comme un « nouveau type d'arme tactique guidé » (KN-23), une « arme tactique guidée » (KN-24) et un « lance-roquettes multiples à longue portée » (KN-25).

Figure 3

Parade militaire du 10 octobre 2020 : nouveau missile balistique à moyenne portée lancé par sous-marin Pukguksong-4, missile balistique à moyenne portée Pukguksong-2 et missile balistique à courte portée KN-25 (voir annexes 11 et 12)

	• **New Pukguksong-4** • 4 SLBM systems • 6 axle wheeled semi-trailer
	• **Pukguksong-2** • 6 MRBM systems • caterpillar track TEL • See S/2020/151 para.194 annex 58.7 • See S/2019/691 annex 32 sect. 4 • See S/2019/171 annex 84 sect. 4-5 • See S/2017/742 para.7-10
	• **KN-25** Super-large multiple rocket launcher • 9 SRBM systems • 4 axle wheeled TEL • 5 rounds • See S/2020/840 para.11, Tab.1, annex 7 • See S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 59

Source : Télévision centrale coréenne (images), États Membres et Groupe d'experts (texte).

Figure 4
Parade militaire du 10 octobre 2020 : missile balistique à courte portée KN-25 (voir annexe 12)

	• **KN-25** Super-large multiple rocket launcher • 9 SRBM systems • caterpillar track TEL • 6 rounds • see S/2020/840 para.11, Tab.1, annex 7 • see S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 59
	• **KN-25** Super-large multiple rocket launcher • 9 SRBM systems • 4 axle wheeled TEL • 4 rounds • see S/2020/840 para.11, Tab.1, annex 7 • see S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 59

Source : Télévision centrale coréenne (images), États Membres et Groupe d'experts (texte).

Figure 5
Nouveaux systèmes de missiles balistiques présentés à la parade militaire du 14 janvier 2021 : à l'exception du missile balistique intercontinental, tous les missiles balistiques à courte portée exposés à la parade du 10 octobre 2020, un nouveau missile balistique à courte portée ressemblant au KN-23 et un nouveau missile balistique lancé par sous-marin, le Pukguksong-5 (voir annexes 11 et 12)

Source : Télévision centrale coréenne (images), États Membres et Groupe d'experts (texte).

III. Sanctions sectorielles et maritimes

27. La République populaire démocratique de Corée continue de se livrer à des activités qui sont interdites par diverses résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et à se soustraire à celles-ci. Selon un État Membre, au moins 121 cargaisons de produits pétroliers raffinés ont été livrées à la République populaire démocratique de Corée par les navires-citernes de ce pays, ainsi que par d'autres navires-citernes, au cours des neuf premiers mois de 2020[21]. Aucune des livraisons n'a été signalée au Comité conformément au paragraphe 5 de la résolution 2397 (2017)[22]. Un tableau fournissant des données sur le nom du navire, le numéro de l'Organisation maritime internationale (OMI), la date d'arrivée et le port, le dernier État du pavillon connu et le tonnage figure à l'annexe 21.

28. Selon l'État Membre, le volume de pétrole raffiné livré à la République populaire démocratique de Corée à travers ces cargaisons illicites [voir fig. 6 a)]

[21] Ces livraisons ont été faites principalement par des transferts de navire à navire.

[22] La Chine a notifié au Comité des livraisons de 5 043,33 tonnes de pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée en 2020. La Fédération de Russie a notifié au Comité des livraisons de 12 833,976 tonnes, soit un total combiné de 17 877,306 tonnes.

dépassait de plusieurs fois le plafond annuel maximal de 500 000 barils prévu dans ce paragraphe[23,24].

Figure 6 a)
Importations cumulées de pétrole raffiné non déclarées depuis janvier 2020



Source : État Membre.

29. Plusieurs États Membres ont estimé que les importations de produits pétroliers en République populaire démocratique de Corée pourraient augmenter en volume en 2020, en partie du fait de l'acquisition de nouveaux navires plus grands battant pavillon de pays tiers. Voir la figure 6 b) pour les importations mensuelles calculées et la figure 6 c) pour la répartition des livraisons mensuelles par type de navire.

[23] En janvier 2021, le Comité est convenu de formules pour les taux de conversion tonne/baril. En utilisant ces formules, les calculs du nombre de barils pour les livraisons dont le Comité a été informé seront enregistrés sur son site Web en temps utile, tout comme le nombre de barils figurant dans toute notification future dès publication.

[24] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, note de bas de page 14, et les rapports précédents pour les méthodes utilisées. Selon les estimations de l'État Membre, les livraisons représentaient plus de huit fois le plafond si les navires étaient chargés à 90 %, près de cinq fois s'ils étaient chargés à 50 % et plus de trois fois s'ils n'étaient chargés qu'à 33 % par livraison.

Figure 6 b)
Importations mensuelles calculées



Figure 6 c)
Importations mensuelles de pétrole raffiné calculées par type de navire



Source : État Membre.

Recommandations

30. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande à nouveau que les États Membres signalent tout transfert connu de produits pétroliers raffinés à la République populaire démocratique, dans le plein respect de la résolution 2397 (2017).**

Pratiques de transport maritime trompeuses et diligence raisonnable

Échange d'identités de navires : le New Konk *et le* Mouson 328

31. Le Groupe d'experts a observé un fait nouveau important : des navires qui mènent des activités tombant sous le coup de sanctions et qui prennent l'identité d'autres navires ou parfois échangent d'identité avec eux, au moyen de profils frauduleux, de modifications physiques et de la manipulation des transmissions du système d'identification automatique. Contrairement aux précédents cas d'usurpation d'identité de navires sur lesquels le Groupe d'experts a enquêté[25], les récents échanges d'identité ont montré une plus grande complexité quant à la méthode suivie par les navires pour passer d'un profil de système d'identification automatique à un autre, et à l'étendue des identités de dissimulation utilisées. Afin de mieux faire connaître les techniques d'échange d'identité et de faciliter ainsi la diligence raisonnable et le respect des sanctions, le Groupe d'experts donne l'exemple du *Mouson 328* et du *New Konk*.

32. Le *New Konk* (nº OMI 9036387), battant pavillon indéterminé, a déjà été identifié par le Groupe d'experts comme ayant cessé d'opérer en tant que navire collecteur effectuant des transferts de navire à navire pour se convertir en navire livrant des cargaisons de pétrole raffiné directement à Nampo à plusieurs reprises[26]. Sur la base des résultats de plusieurs enquêtes, le Groupe d'experts note que le *New Konk*, à un moment donné en 2020, a navigué sous le nom de *M0uson* [sic] et a transmis un numéro d'identité de service mobile maritime précédemment enregistré au titre du *Mouson 328* (nº OMI 9021198) alors que ce dernier navire naviguait sous pavillon des Palaos, ce qui rend cette transmission frauduleuse (voir fig. 7)[27]. Le Panama a confirmé que le navire a été radié de son registre le 29 août 2020[28].

[25] Voir, par exemple, le cas du *Yuk Tung* (nº OMI 9030591) (voir S/2019/171 et S/2019/171/Corr.1, par. 5 à 9).

[26] Voir S/2020/151, par. 32, et S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 27-28 et 62.

[27] Toutes les heures et dates figurant dans le rapport sur la plateforme Windward sont exprimées en heure d'hiver de New York.

[28] Le *Mouson 328* a battu pavillon panaméen de mai 2019 à août 2020.

Figure 7
Le *Mouson 328* changeant ses identifiants en mars 2020



Source : Windward, annotations du Groupe d'experts

33. Le 26 août 2020, des images satellite haute résolution ont capturé le navire transmettant un numéro d'identité de service mobile maritime (511444000) associé par le passé aux Palaos près de l'île de Dongyin, en Chine. L'analyse des images montre que les dimensions physiques du navire correspondent étroitement à celles du *New Konk* (voir fig. 8)[29]. Le *New Konk* a transmis pour la dernière fois son numéro OMI et son numéro d'identité de service mobile maritime en octobre 2019.

[29] Les dimensions du *New Konk* sont de 112 mètres de long et 18,5 mètres de large. Les dimensions du *Mouson 328* sont de 107,5 mètres sur 16,5 mètres.

Figure 8
Dimensions des navires et comparaison physique des images satellite, 26 août 2020[30]



Source : Maxar Technologies (à gauche) et État Membre (à droite).

34. Le Groupe d'experts a également suivi la trace du *Mouson 328*, alors sous pavillon panaméen, en tant que navire d'intérêt lorsque ce dernier a été aperçu en mai et juin 2019 dans les eaux de la République populaire démocratique de Corée avant que les signaux de son système d'identification automatique ne soient perdus.

35. Des enquêtes supplémentaires ont révélé une tentative antérieure de blanchiment de l'identité du *Mouson 328* en enregistrant le navire sous un nouveau numéro OMI sous le nom de *Cherry 19*, bâtiment nouvellement construit et battant pavillon dominicain, à la fin de 2019[31]. Les autorités maritimes ont par la suite retiré le numéro OMI après que les documents de demande d'enregistrement se sont révélés frauduleux. En octobre 2020, le navire aurait été enregistré sous le nom de *Smooth Sea 29*, navire battant pavillon thaïlandais, sur la base de documents frauduleux du *Cherry 19*, ce qui aurait essentiellement supprimé les données historiques du navire connu sous le nom de *Mouson 328*. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit à la Thaïlande pour informer ses autorités que le navire se trouvait en Thaïlande et qu'il pourrait utiliser des documents frauduleux pour dissimuler le *Mouson 328*. La Thaïlande a répondu que la demande d'information du Groupe d'experts était en cours d'examen par ses autorités.

36. Une fois que le *Mouson 328* a pris sa nouvelle identité frauduleuse en tant que *Cherry 19*, cela a également permis au *New Konk* de transmettre les identifiants du *Mouson 328* sans causer d'importantes anomalies du système d'identification automatique susceptibles de révéler l'échange. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur d'autres cas éventuels d'échange d'identité impliquant des navires-citernes associés à la République populaire démocratique de Corée. Les détails de l'enquête du Groupe d'experts et les réponses figurent aux sections a) à c) de l'annexe 22.

[30] Toutes les dates, sauf indication contraire, sont indiquées en temps universel coordonné (UTC).
[31] Chaque navire se voit attribuer un seul numéro OMI, qu'il conserve pendant toute sa durée de vie.

Maquillage de navire

Le New Regent *devenu le* Hang Yu 11

37. Les navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et d'autres navires désignés continuent à dissimuler leur origine, ce qui exige une diligence raisonnable supplémentaire de la part des propriétaires et exploitants de navires et des négociants en marchandises.

38. Un navire désigné dans les rapports précédents du Groupe d'experts, le *New Regent* (nº OMI 8312497)[32], a usé de maquillage et de documents frauduleux pour tenter de réceptionner du pétrole raffiné par transbordement d'un navire battant pavillon de la République de Corée. En réponse aux questions du Groupe d'experts, le propriétaire du dernier navire a déclaré que le navire qu'il avait rencontré était le *Hang Yu 11* battant pavillon panaméen (nº OMI 8694194) et qu'une diligence raisonnable avait été exercée « pour garantir que ce navire était doté de tous les documents et nous avons considéré que ce navire était en exploitation normale ». Le Groupe d'experts a vérifié de manière indépendante qu'aucun transfert de navire à navire n'a eu lieu.

39. Plusieurs facteurs auraient dû éveiller des soupçons lors de la procédure de diligence raisonnable concernant le *Hang Yu 11* (en fait le *New Regent*). Il s'agit notamment de la transmission d'identifiants incomplets ou non valables ; des différences physiques entre le *Hang Yu 11* et le *New Regent*, qui auraient été évidentes à partir d'une comparaison photographique ; des documents de bord périmés ; et du manque de précaution dans le traitement de la demande d'achat de la cargaison de pétrole. D'autres photographies obtenues par le Groupe d'experts montrent le contour en relief du numéro OMI recouvert de peinture appartenant au *New Regent* (voir fig. 9). Les informations publiques disponibles qui montrent que le *Hang Yu 11* a été impliqué dans un incident de sauvetage en février 2019 ont été confirmées séparément par le propriétaire du vrai *Hang Yu 11*, qui naviguait sous le nom de *Xin Sheng* sous pavillon togolais[33]. Les détails et les réponses figurent à l'annexe 23 a) et b).

Figure 9
Faux identifiants peints pour dissimuler le *New Regent* et son numéro OMI, 30 juin 2019

Source : État Membre.

[32] Désigné le 16 octobre 2018.

[33] Une plateforme commerciale de base de données maritimes a enregistré une absence de transmission du système d'identification automatique pour le *Hang Yu 11* entre février 2018 et avril 2020.

*L'*Infinite Luck *et le* Myong Ryu 1

40. Le Groupe d'experts a déjà signalé un transfert de navire à navire entre l'*Infinite Luck* (nº OMI 9063811) battant pavillon panaméen et le navire-citerne *Myong Ryu 1* (nº OMI 8532413) de la République populaire démocratique de Corée[34]. La société Uniform Shipping, le propriétaire enregistré de l'*Infinite Luck*, a répondu par l'intermédiaire d'avocats, qui ont fourni des « preuves » (voir annexe 24) que « l'*Infinite Luck* a été induit en erreur [pour effectuer] un transfert de carburant interdit » avec le *Myong Ryu 1*, qu'on a fait passer pour un navire-citerne chinois, le *Mingbo nº 5* (voir fig. 10).

41. Pour ses contrôles de diligence raisonnable, Uniform Shipping « demandait des photos du navire destinataire [...] pour confirmer que c'est le navire en question ». Comme mesure de conformité supplémentaire, un « reçu de livraison de soutes » signé par le navire destinataire « prouve également que l'*Infinite Luck* n'avait pas l'intention de se livrer à des pratiques maritimes illicites avec les navires de la Corée du Nord ».

42. Le Groupe d'experts a documenté de nombreux cas de navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et d'autres navires maquillés, qu'on a fait passer pour d'autres navires, ainsi que d'autres tactiques trompeuses utilisées pour acquérir illicitement du pétrole raffiné. Vu le caractère délibéré des manœuvres de dissimulation utilisées, le Groupe estime que les documents signés par les navires receveurs ne suffisent pas pour exonérer les navires fournisseurs de leur responsabilité. Pour que les propriétaires de navires et leurs homologues concernés puissent prévenir le risque de participer à des activités tombant sous le coup de sanctions, il faut des mesures de diligence raisonnable et de contrôle efficaces.

[34] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 33, et annexe 20.

Figure 10
Photographie fournie par le propriétaire de l'*Infinite Luck*



Source : Groupe d'experts.

Navires battant pavillon étranger et navires au pavillon indéterminé procédant à des livraisons à la République populaire démocratique de Corée

43. La République populaire démocratique de Corée poursuit l'importation illicite de produits pétroliers raffinés grâce au renforcement de sa flotte par un nombre croissant de navires-citernes battant actuellement ou précédemment pavillon étranger. Le recours à ces navires, qui ont une plus grande capacité de transport et livrent leur cargaison de pétrole raffiné directement dans les ports de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, est une pratique plus efficace que les transferts de navire à navire effectués en mer par des navires-citernes de la République populaire démocratique de Corée généralement plus petits avec d'autres navires plus petits. Pendant la période observée, de janvier à septembre 2020, ces navires ont livré directement dans d'autres ports de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, ce qui constitue une rupture par rapport au passé où les livraisons étaient concentrées au port de Nampo.

44. La République populaire démocratique de Corée semble concilier les précautions contre la maladie à coronavirus (COVID-19) et son besoin d'importer des produits pétroliers raffinés en envoyant ses navires-citernes réceptionner des cargaisons de pétrole transférées de navires étrangers directement à l'extérieur de la porte d'écluse de Nampo. Selon un État Membre, depuis fin juillet 2020, le pays a probablement interdit à tous les navires étrangers d'entrer dans le port de Nampo dans le cadre de ses restrictions relatives à la COVID-19. La figure 11 montre une représentation statistique de la concentration de navires à l'extérieur de la porte d'écluse de Nampo observée par le Groupe d'experts à partir d'images satellite.

Figure 11
Tableau montrant les navires devant la porte d'écluse de Nampo de mai à septembre 2020



Source : Groupe d'experts.

45. La République populaire démocratique de Corée a également augmenté ses importations de pétrole grâce à des navires battant pavillon étranger qui n'étaient pas auparavant mentionnés dans les rapports du Groupe d'experts. Ces navires viennent s'ajouter à la liste des navires-citernes anciennement sous pavillon étranger qui continuent à livrer du pétrole raffiné au pays. Tous les navires ont disparu du système d'identification automatique pendant les périodes d'enquête.

Autres navires sous pavillon étranger livrant du pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée

46. Le nombre de navires battant pavillon étranger qui livrent du pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée a augmenté en 2020[35,36]. Des échantillons d'images satellite fournis par un État Membre entre mai et octobre 2020, d'autres cas de navires livrant du pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée, les informations concernant les enquêtes menées à ce jour par le Groupe d'experts et les réponses obtenues par ce dernier figurent aux paragraphes i) à vi) de l'annexe 25 et à l'annexe 25, points a) à d). Ces navires comprenaient :

[35] Sauf indication contraire, toutes les informations contenues dans le présent rapport concernant le pavillon des navires et les entités figurant sur la liste des propriétaires, gestionnaires et exploitants enregistrés des navires sont tirées du site Web de l'OMI et de IHS Markit.

[36] En décembre 2020 ou janvier 2021.

a) L'*An Ping* (nº OMI 7903366), anciennement sous pavillon sierra-léonais, qui a été aperçu mouillant à Nampo le 8 juillet 2020 (voir fig. 12)[37]. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des informations aux Samoa et à l'entité propriétaire et/ou gestionnaire actuelle ou passée du navire, domiciliée dans la ville de Kaohsiung, dans la Province chinoise de Taiwan (voir annexe 25 pour les réponses pertinentes) ;

Figure 12
L'*An Ping* livrant du pétrole raffiné à Nampo, 8 juillet 2020

Source : État Membre.

b) Le *Heng Rong* (nº OMI 7913098), qui a été aperçu le 6 août 2020 et le 23 août 2020 chargé à la porte d'écluse de Nampo (voir fig. 13)[38]. Il a également procédé à un transfert de navire à navire le 15 août 2020 en mer Jaune ; (voir annexe 25 pour les réponses pertinentes) ;

[37] Le navire a été radié du registre du pavillon de la Sierra Leone le 2 juillet 2020, une raison ayant été fournie pour la vente et le transfert du navire.

[38] Le navire a été radié du registre du pavillon de la Sierra Leone le 7 octobre 2018.

Figure 13
Le *Heng Rong* à l'extérieur de la porte d'écluse de Nampo, août 2020



Source : État Membre.

c) Le *Rich United* (nº OMI 9129213), qui était sous pavillon indéterminé lorsqu'il a été aperçu en train de livrer du pétrole raffiné à Songnim le 13 juin 2020 (voir fig. 14). Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des informations aux Îles Cook, à la Mongolie, aux Seychelles, à la Chine et à l'entité ou aux entités propriétaires et/ou gestionnaires actuelles ou anciennes responsables du navire basées à Singapour (voir annexe 25 pour les réponses pertinentes) ;

Figure 14
Le *Rich United* livrant du pétrole raffiné à Songnim, 13 juin 2020

Source : État Membre.

d) Le *Run Da* (nº OMI 8511172), alors sous pavillon mongol, qui a été aperçu à l'appontement de livraison de pétrole de Nampo le 1er mai 2020 (voir fig. 15). Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des informations à la Mongolie, aux Philippines et à l'entité ou aux entités propriétaires et/ou gestionnaires actuelles ou anciennes responsables du navire basées à Hong Kong (Chine). La Mongolie a radié le navire de son registre à partir de septembre 2020 pour « infraction aux zones commerciales et violation de l'embargo des Nations Unies ». Les informations fournies par la suite ont montré que le navire a été vendu en avril 2020 à une société basée à Fuzhou (Chine), sans que le registre du pavillon et la société de classification n'en aient connaissance ou sans demande de radiation ou de réenregistrement (voir annexe 25 pour les réponses pertinentes) ;

Figure 15
Image satellite du *Run Da* au port de Nampo, 1er mai 2020

Source : État Membre (carte fournie par le Groupe d'experts).

e) Le *Xin Hai* (nº OMI 7636638), qui battait pavillon indéterminé au moment où il a livré du pétrole raffiné à Nampo le 1er septembre 2020[39]. Les enquêtes se poursuivent ;

f) Le *Xing Ming Yang 888* (nº OMI 8410847), dont la présence a été relevée le 3 juin 2020 à Songnim et le 28 juin à Nampo. Le Groupe d'experts a recommandé que le navire, battant pavillon indéterminé depuis novembre 2018, soit désigné pour avoir effectué un transfert de navire à navire avec le *Mu Bong 1* (nº OMI 8610461) en 2018[40]. Le navire transmettait frauduleusement un numéro d'identité de service mobile maritime associé à la République-Unie de Tanzanie alors qu'il se trouvait près de la baie de Luoyuan, en Chine (voir fig. 16). Le Groupe d'experts a sollicité l'aide de la Chine et de la République-Unie de Tanzanie (voir annexe 25 pour les réponses pertinentes).

[39] Le navire était sous pavillon sierra-léonais jusqu'en septembre 2019.
[40] Voir S/2019/171 et S/2019/171/Corr.1, par. 15-17, et figure VII.

Figure 16

Le *Xing Ming Yang 888* transmettant de faux identifiants en mai 2020 et livrant du pétrole raffiné au port de Songnim en juin 2020



Source : Windward, annotations du Groupe d'experts (en haut) ; État Membre (en bas).

47. Les navires susmentionnés partagent un certain nombre d'éléments communs. Tous ont disparu du système d'identification automatique pendant plusieurs jours voire plusieurs mois, qui coïncidaient avec les dates auxquelles les navires se trouvaient en République populaire démocratique de Corée. Ces navires ont également enregistré des trous dans les transmissions du système d'identification automatique en dehors de ces dates, ce qui indique d'autres livraisons illicites possibles. Bien que la majorité des navires n'aient plus de pavillon et ne disposent pas d'informations actualisées sur la propriété effective dans les bases de données

maritimes, ils ont continué à faire du commerce dans les eaux internationales et à s'approvisionner en pétrole raffiné pour le livrer à la République populaire démocratique de Corée.

48. Cet aspect de la situation – informations sur la propriété effective des navires périmées ou non mises à jour – a été signalé par le Groupe d'experts dans ses enquêtes sur les précédents navires qui ont livré directement du pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée[41].

Navires battant pavillon étranger qui ont continué à livrer du pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée

49. Les navires suivants (anciennement) sous pavillon étranger ont continué à livrer du pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée entre janvier et septembre 2020 (voir annexe 21). La plupart de ces navires ont été radiés de leur dernier registre de navires connu (voir annexes 26 et 27) :

a) Le *Bonvoy 3* (nº OMI 8714085), anciennement sous pavillon sierra-léonais[42] ;

b) Le *Diamond 8* (nº OMI 9132612), anciennement sous pavillon sierra-léonais[43] ;

c) Le *Hokong* (nº OMI 9006758), sous pavillon indéterminé ;

d) Le *New Konk* (nº OMI 9036387), sous pavillon indéterminé ;

e) Le *Subblic* (nº OMI 8126082), sous pavillon indéterminé ;

f) L'*Unica* (nº OMI 8514306), sous pavillon indéterminé ;

g) Le *Yun Hong 8* (numéro d'identité du service mobile maritime 413459380), battant pavillon chinois.

50. Le Groupe d'experts a observé, à partir de bases de données maritimes commerciales, que certains de ces navires, dont la désignation a été recommandée par le Comité, se trouvaient dans les eaux côtières chinoises[44]. Un État Membre a fourni séparément au Groupe d'experts d'autres dates et lieux pour certains de ces navires (voir annexe 28). Le Groupe d'experts a également obtenu des informations indiquant la poursuite d'une pratique déjà signalée[45] consistant à faire entrer des navires suspects dans les eaux territoriales chinoises, où ils ne peuvent être suivis par des navires de surveillance étrangers[46]. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit à la Chine, entre

[41] Voir S/2020/151.

[42] Selon l'État Membre, le *Bonvoy 3* référencé comme navire effectuant des livraisons directes est le *Bonvoy 3* anciennement sous pavillon sierra-léonais, portant le numéro OMI 8714085 et non le numéro OMI 8978784. L'administration maritime de la Sierra Leone a radié le navire le 12 novembre 2019. Les recherches approfondies du Groupe d'experts sur le *Bonvoy 3* portant le numéro OMI 8714085, en l'absence de données de suivi et d'autres informations commerciales sur le *Bonvoy 3* portant le numéro OMI 8978784, ont montré des itinéraires de navigation et des informations de réseau tendant à indiquer qu'il s'agit du même navire. Les enquêtes se poursuivent sur les deux *Bonvoy 3*.

[43] L'administration maritime de la Sierra Leone a confirmé l'annulation de l'enregistrement du navire le 7 août 2020, car il avait violé les sanctions contre la République populaire démocratique de Corée.

[44] Les eaux côtières désignent les eaux territoriales de 12 milles nautiques ou les eaux situées dans la zone contiguë de 24 milles nautiques.

[45] Voir S/2020/151, annexe 8.

[46] Deux experts estiment que toutes les informations figurant dans les trois premières phrases du paragraphe 50 peuvent être étayées davantage. Ils estiment également que les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité n'accordent à aucun État Membre le droit de suivre et de contrôler.

autres, pour lui demander des informations au cas où ces navires seraient immobilisés dans un port ou dans ses eaux territoriales[47]. En ce qui concerne les navires énumérés à l'annexe 28, la Chine a répondu qu'elle ne pouvait pas enquêter sur leurs activités sur la base d'informations limitées du Groupe d'experts, et qu'elle ne pouvait que confirmer que ces navires n'étaient pas entrés dans les ports chinois.

Navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée livrant du pétrole raffiné

51. Les navires-citernes anciennement sous pavillon étranger qui sont devenus des navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et les navires-citernes désignés de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ont continué à livrer du pétrole raffiné dans divers ports du pays (voir annexe 29 pour plus de détails)[48].

Facilitation de la livraison illicite de pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée

52. Le Groupe d'experts a poursuivi ses enquêtes sur les réseaux qui facilitent la livraison illicite de pétrole raffiné à la République populaire démocratique de Corée grâce aux liens entre les navires et les entités. T Energy International Co., Ltd (T Energy), entité ayant des adresses dans les districts de Zhongzheng et de Taoyuan[49], dans la Province chinoise de Taiwan, a été impliquée en tant que destinataire de la cargaison de pétrole raffiné à bord du *Viet Tin 01* (nº OMI 8508838), qui a fait escale à Nampo le 26 février 2019 et aux alentours de cette date[50]. (Une mise à jour du Viet Nam sur le navire figure à l'annexe 30.) Le Groupe d'experts a depuis lors ouvert des enquêtes sur d'autres cas de participation présumée de T Energy à ces achats ou de livraison présumée par transfert de navire à navire avec des navires-citernes de la République populaire démocratique de Corée. En s'appuyant sur des informations et des documents obtenus de divers États Membres, entités et individus, le Groupe d'experts mène des enquêtes pour déterminer dans quelle mesure la société a joué un rôle dans un réseau soutenant l'achat illicite de pétrole raffiné par la République populaire démocratique de Corée, y compris la facilitation et le courtage présumés de nombreux transferts de navire à navire avec des navires battant pavillon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée au cours des dernières années. Le Groupe a tenté de contacter T Energy mais n'a pas encore reçu de réponse ; les télécopies et les courriels adressés à la société sont retournés avec la mention « envoi non distribuable ».

53. Une liste des navires signalés par un État Membre comme ayant effectué des transferts de navire à navire, en association avec T Energy, avec des navires-citernes battant pavillon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, ainsi que les informations concernant les enquêtes du Groupe d'experts, y compris les réponses obtenues, figurent à l'annexe 31, points a) à d).

Transfert de droits de pêche

54. Sur la base d'un reportage dans les médias, le Groupe d'experts a adressé une demande d'information à Choe Un Bok, présidente de l'Association générale des Coréens en Chine, qui aurait organisé le transfert de droits de pêche de la République populaire démocratique de Corée[51]. Le Groupe n'a pas reçu de réponse de Mme Choe ni de l'organisation [voir annexe 32 a)].

[47] Voir résolution 2397 (2017), par. 9.
[48] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 26.
[49] Les adresses proviennent d'informations accessibles au public et d'un État Membre.
[50] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 39 et 40.
[51] En chinois : 旅华朝鲜人总联合会.

55. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des informations selon lesquelles la Weihai Peninsula Vessel Fuel Co., Ltd. était impliquée dans la planification de la création d'une coentreprise de pêche avec une entité de la République populaire démocratique de Corée [voir annexe 32 b)][52]. La société n'a pas encore répondu à la demande d'information que lui a adressée le Groupe d'experts.

56. Plusieurs États Membres ont fourni au Groupe d'experts des informations qui laissent penser que la République populaire démocratique de Corée continue de procéder au transfert de droits de pêche et que les bateaux de pêche continuent à user de dissimulation [voir annexes 32 c) à f)].

Exportations maritimes de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

57. La République populaire démocratique de Corée a continué à exporter du charbon, ainsi que d'autres articles interdits, en violation des résolutions pertinentes (voir par. 84 et annexes 34, 35, 36, 38 a), 38 b) et 39).

Méthodes de contournement des sanctions maritimes

58. La République populaire démocratique de Corée a continué à exporter du charbon vers la région de Ningbo-Zhoushan en Chine, en s'appuyant sur de grandes barges côtières battant pavillon chinois qui exportent directement son charbon vers la Chine et en acquérant des navires supplémentaires. Les navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée qui ont exporté son charbon ont également chargé des articles humanitaires dans divers ports chinois, ce qui indique l'acceptation dans ces ports de navires précédemment engagés dans des activités susceptibles de tomber sous le coup de sanctions[53].

59. Les navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ont également employé diverses techniques pour brouiller leur suivi dans les bases de données maritimes. Il s'agissait notamment de la manipulation des pavillons, des numéros d'identité du service mobile maritime et des types de navires, par exemple en faisant passer ces navires pour des bateaux de pêche ou des remorqueurs. Parmi les numéros d'identité du service mobile maritime manipulés, se trouvaient notamment ceux attribués à d'autres navires légitimes, ce qui créait des incohérences lors de la consultation des données de suivi du système d'identification automatique. Le Groupe d'experts a en outre observé que des navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée utilisaient des numéros d'identité de service mobile maritime « jetables » qui rendent difficile le suivi de ces navires[54] (voir également l'annexe 33 sur le brouillage du système d'identification automatique).

Exportations de charbon par des navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

60. Selon l'État Membre, la République populaire démocratique de Corée a exporté au moins 2,5 millions de tonnes de charbon de janvier à septembre 2020, en au moins 400 cargaisons expédiées vers les eaux territoriales chinoises[55]. La plupart de ces cargaisons sont allées dans la région de Ningbo-Zhoushan en Chine, où les navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ont continué à décharger du charbon

[52] En chinois : 祥瑞船舶運輸有限公司.

[53] Voir résolution 2397 (2017), par. 9.

[54] Le Groupe d'experts a relevé des cas de navires portant des numéros d'identité de service mobile maritime de courte durée datant de quelques mois seulement, ainsi que d'autres identifiants non valables, qui apparaissaient dans les eaux de Ningbo-Zhoushan et transmettaient de nouveau à proximité ou en République populaire démocratique de Corée, et a communiqué certaines de ces informations à la Chine.

[55] Deux experts sont d'avis que cette information peut être corroborée.

par transfert de navire à navire. De plus, l'État Membre a observé une augmentation du trafic maritime en 2020 autour de l'archipel de Zhoushan.

61. Le Groupe d'experts a continué à demander l'aide de la Chine concernant la présence de plusieurs navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée dans les eaux au large de Ningbo-Zhoushan, où ils ont continué à se rassembler à un moment donné[56]. Les images satellite ont capturé plus de 40 navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et des navires associés à Ningbo-Zhoushan le 17 juin 2020 (voir fig. 17 ; voir également l'annexe 34 pour des détails sur les navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée qui exportent du charbon dans la région de Ningbo-Zhoushan).

Figure 17
Représentation graphique des navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée par l'État Membre le 17 juin 2020 à Ningbo-Zhoushan (Chine)[57]



Source : État Membre.

Note : L'État Membre a fourni l'image satellite pour chacun des navires présentés ci-dessus.

62. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé à la Chine des informations sur tous les navires susmentionnés, y compris ceux figurant à la figure 17, en ce qui concerne leur présumée cargaison de charbon, les transferts de navire à navire effectués avec ces navires dans les eaux chinoises et les identifiants des navires receveurs et de leur propriétaire. La Chine a répondu que « pour les dix navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, à savoir l'*Asia Honor,* le *Myong Sin,* le *Paek Hak San,* le *Kum San Pho 3,* le *Flourishing,* le *Sam Jin 8,* le *Jang Jin Gang,* le *Su Song*, l'*Enterprise* et

[56] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 46 ; S/2020/151, par. 69 ; et S/2019/691, par. 19.
[57] Deux experts sont d'avis que cette information peut être corroborée.

le *Xing Ming Yang 888*, il n'existe aucune trace de ces navires entrant ou sortant des ports chinois ». Elle a indiqué que « la Chine n'est pas l'État du pavillon des navires susmentionnés et ne dispose pas d'informations plus détaillées ».

Exportation de charbon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et importation de cargaisons humanitaires

63. Le Groupe d'experts a poursuivi son enquête sur la violation continue des sanctions par le *Tae P(h)yong* (nº OMI 9018751 ; anciennement connu sous le nom de *Great Wenshan*) dans les eaux chinoises[58]. Le Groupe a suivi l'itinéraire du navire, qui a révélé que celui-ci était présent en République populaire démocratique de Corée le 8 juin 2020 et est retourné le 12 juin pour quelques jours dans la région de Ningbo-Zhoushan, où il s'était précédemment rendu en mai, puis a fait une escale à Longkou (Chine) avant de revenir à Nampo le 1er juillet 2020. Les images satellite obtenues par la suite auprès d'un État Membre ont fourni des informations sur la cargaison du navire, qui comprenait du charbon chargé à Nampo exporté vers les eaux de Ningbo-Zhoushan et des articles d'aide humanitaire importés à Longkou pour le voyage de retour à Nampo. Le *Tae Pyong* est retourné à Ningbo-Zhoushan à la mi-août avant de revenir à Nampo le même mois [voir fig. 18 a) et 18 b)]. L'activité du *Tae Pyong* consistant à exporter du charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée à de multiples reprises et, dans le cas susmentionné, à se rendre au port pour y prendre une cargaison humanitaire, rend cette activité passible des dispositions applicables du régime des sanctions[59].

64. Selon le même État Membre, au moins 11 autres navires battant pavillon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ont effectué des voyages similaires, au cours desquels ils ont exporté du charbon à l'aller et importé des cargaisons humanitaires au retour. En réponse aux demandes d'information que lui a adressées le Groupe d'experts concernant les activités du *Tae Pyong*, sa cargaison et son dernier propriétaire chinois connu, ainsi que les renseignements sur d'autres navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée effectuant éventuellement des trajets similaires, la Chine a répondu que « le navire *Tae Pyong* battant pavillon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée n'a pas fait escale au port de Zhoushan en 2020 ».

[58] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 52 à 56.
[59] Résolution 2375 (2017), par. 11, et résolution 2397 (2017), par. 9.

Figure 18 a)
Le *Tae Pyong* dans les eaux de Ningbo-Zhoushan, juin et août 2020



Figure 18 b)
Exportation de charbon et importation d'articles humanitaires par le *Tae Pyong* lors d'un voyage aller-retour



Source : État Membre.

Navires de charge livrant du charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

65. Selon un État Membre, des navires de grande taille battant pavillon chinois ont effectué des transferts de navire à navire avec des navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée dans la région de Ningbo-Zhoushan et ont ensuite livré du charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée dans divers ports chinois ou dans les eaux portuaires chinoises[60]. Ces navires de plus grande capacité transportent plus de marchandises par voyage que les barges de plus petite taille utilisées pour ces transferts comme il a été observé précédemment. De plus, cela permet de continuer à livrer la cargaison de charbon sur le lieu de transbordement. On peut citer comme exemples le *Shun Jin Bao* (numéro d'identité du service mobile maritime 413704010) livrant du charbon à Bayuquan (voir fig. 19), le *Huade16* (numéro d'identité du service mobile maritime 413249920) livrant du charbon à Guangzhou et le *Xinjinyue* (numéro d'identité du service mobile maritime 412501560) livrant du charbon à Caofeidian. Des détails, y compris des images supplémentaires, figurent à l'annexe 35. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des informations sur lesdits navires, notamment sur les transferts de navire à navire effectués avec des navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ainsi que sur l'origine et la destination de la cargaison de charbon déchargée.

66. La Chine a répondu que les navires susmentionnés « ont navigué entre les ports intérieurs chinois pendant la période mentionnée dans les lettres du Groupe d'experts, et ont effectué des procédures régulières de notification et d'approbation. Les douanes chinoises ont strictement examiné le certificat d'origine de leur cargaison, et aucune preuve d'activités violant les résolutions n'a été trouvée. Après un examen plus approfondi du journal de bord de ces navires, la possibilité qu'ils aient fait des escales dans les ports de la République populaire démocratique de Corée au cours de voyages intérieurs a également été exclue. Si le Groupe d'experts dispose de preuves supplémentaires, la Chine espère qu'il pourra les lui fournir ».

[60] Voir également S/2020/151, par. 72.

Figure 19
Livraison par le *Shun Jin Bao* de charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée à Bayuquan (Chine)



Source : État Membre.

Barges côtières livrant du charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

Charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

67. Fin mai 2020, un État Membre a observé un nombre considérable de barges côtières battant pavillon chinois en activité en République populaire démocratique de Corée, dont 52 sur le fleuve Taedong ou au mouillage juste à l'extérieur de la porte d'écluse de Nampo. La figure 20 montre quelques-unes des barges côtières devant la porte d'écluse de Nampo en juin 2020. Les barges côtières battant pavillon chinois[61] ont effectué au moins 155 expéditions, exportant environ 1,63 million de tonnes de charbon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée vers la Chine, selon le même État Membre[62,63].

[61] Ces barges sont du même type que les automoteurs présentés dans le rapport du Groupe d'experts de mars 2020 (S/2020/151), qui ont livré des produits interdits à la Chine.

[62] Deux experts sont d'avis que cette information peut être corroborée.

[63] Le Groupe d'experts a partagé une liste de 65 barges côtières battant pavillon chinois, dont l'État Membre a estimé qu'elles avaient effectué des exportations probables de charbon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée entre mai et septembre 2020.

Figure 20

Groupe de barges côtières battant pavillon chinois, porte d'écluse de Nampo, juin 2020 (groupe principal 38°42' 42″ N 124°59' 04″ E)



Source : État Membre (photo du haut) ; Planet Labs, Inc. (autres photos). 1er juin 2020, 02.08 UTC ; 5 juillet 2020, 01.40.35 UTC ; 22 juillet 2020, 02.36 UTC (images de Planet Labs orientées vers le nord). Annotations du Groupe d'experts.

68. Comme le Groupe d'experts l'a indiqué dans ses précédents rapports, les automoteurs d'origine chinoise qui ont chargé du charbon en République populaire démocratique de Corée pour le livrer dans des ports en Chine ne transmettent pas toujours de signaux du système d'identification automatique et ne semblent pas avoir de numéros OMI, ce qui indique qu'ils étaient essentiellement destinés à la navigation côtière[64]. Le Groupe d'experts a observé le *Chenggong 66* (numéro d'identité du service mobile maritime 413663365) émettant en tant que navire de charge au départ de Nantong (Chine) en juin 2020. Le navire semble avoir navigué au moins une fois vers Nampo avant de revenir dans les eaux chinoises, en suivant un itinéraire similaire à celui emprunté par les automoteurs en 2019. Le Groupe d'experts a écrit à la Chine pour demander des informations sur le type, l'origine et la cargaison du navire. Par la suite, il a obtenu d'un État Membre des images satellite du *Chenggong 66* (voir fig. 21), ainsi que d'autres barges côtières identifiées battant pavillon chinois et transportant du charbon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée vers la Chine. La Chine a répondu qu'aucune information valable n'avait été trouvée sur la base des numéros d'identité du service mobile maritime fournis pour la liste des 65 barges sous pavillon chinois mentionnées (pour plus de détails, voir annexe 36).

Figure 21
Itinéraire du *Chenggong 66*, juin et juillet 2020



Source : Windward (en haut), annotations du Groupe d'experts ; État Membre (en bas).

[64] Voir S/2020/151, par. 59 à 66.

Matériel et articles

69. Selon l'État Membre, des barges côtières battant pavillon chinois ont également exporté vers la République populaire démocratique de Corée des véhicules, des machines et des équipements lourds, dont la fourniture, la vente et le transfert sont interdits en vertu du paragraphe 7 de la résolution 2397 (2017). Sept de ces barges ont été capturées sur des images satellite entre mai et juillet 2020 dans la zone portuaire de Nampo (voir annexe 37). L'une des barges, le *Cheng Hong 28/Changhong28* (numéro d'identité du service mobile maritime 413180911), qui a probablement déchargé des wagons-citernes de pétrole, d'huile et de lubrifiant sur un quai à Nampo en mai 2020, a également chargé du charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée à Nampo en juin, et est arrivée avec sa cargaison le 21 juillet 2020 près de Yangjiaogou (Chine). Le Groupe d'experts a demandé l'aide de la Chine pour obtenir des informations sur les activités de ces barges et les résultats de toute enquête menée sur ces navires (voir fig. 22). La Chine a répondu qu'elle « attache une grande importance aux activités de contrebande au moyen de transferts de navire à navire impliquant la République populaire démocratique de Corée, et les autorités chinoises compétentes ont fait de grands efforts à cet égard. La Chine a réaffirmé à plusieurs reprises et ouvertement sa position solennelle contre les activités de contrebande au moyen de transferts de navire à navire et sa détermination à lutter contre ces activités conformément à la loi. Cela constitue en soi un facteur de dissuasion pour les activités pertinentes. »

Figure 22
Exportation par le *Cheng Hong 28* de wagons-citernes interdits et importation de charbon interdit



Source : État Membre.

Acquisitions illicites de navires en 2019 et 2020

70. Le Groupe d'experts a signalé que le *Su Ri Bong* (alias *Fu Xing 12/Pu Zhou*) (nº OMI 8605727), le *Tae P(h)yong* (nº OMI 9018751) et le *Sam Jin 8* (nº OMI 8810578) étaient des navires de charge battant pavillon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée en 2019 et début 2020[65]. Selon un État Membre, la République populaire démocratique de Corée avait en outre acquis plusieurs navires[66], bien qu'il

[65] Voir S/2020/151 et S/2020/840.

[66] D'autres navires probablement acquis illicitement continuent de faire l'objet d'enquêtes par le Groupe d'experts.

n'ait pas été confirmé que ceux-ci battent officiellement pavillon de sa flotte[67]. On peut citer par exemple l'*Enterprise*, alors sous pavillon togolais (nº OMI 9153331), le *Ming Zhou 6*, anciennement sous pavillon chinois (nº OMI 8602763), et le *Ri Hong*, anciennement sous pavillon indéterminé (nº OMI 9162318) et précédemment signalé[68].

71. Les enquêtes du Groupe d'experts indiquent que les navires susmentionnés, dont les derniers propriétaires enregistrés étaient répertoriés en Chine, ont également été enregistrés pour la dernière fois dans les bases de données maritimes commerciales près des ports chinois avant que les transmissions du système d'identification automatique ne soient interrompues[69]. Les navires sont ensuite apparus en République populaire démocratique de Corée (*Enterprise, Ming Zhou 6, Tae Pyong* et *Su Ri Bong*) ou dans les eaux de Ningbo-Zhoushan, à proximité d'autres navires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée (*Ri Hong* et *Sam Jin 8*). Des images satellite ou des transmissions du système d'identification automatique ont révélé que tous ces navires ont effectué plusieurs exportations de charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée en naviguant dans les eaux chinoises.

72. Selon un État Membre, le *Ming Zhou 6* a été acquis par une coentreprise entre la Chine et la République populaire démocratique de Corée qui avait été créée pour transférer le navire à ce dernier pays. Comme l'ancien *Fu Xing 12* (nº OMI 8605727), le *Ming Zhou 6* aurait été vendu par une société chinoise pour être démoli en mai 2019[70]. La Chine a répondu : « En mai et juin 2019, l'enregistrement des certificats de propriété et de nationalité du *Ming Zhou 6* et du *Fu Xing 12* ont été annulés, respectivement. Depuis lors, il n'existe aucune trace de ces navires entrant ou sortant des ports chinois. » Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur le *Ming Zhou 6* par le biais de sa présumée coentreprise. Des détails sur l'*Enterprise* et des mises à jour sur le *Ri Hong* figurent à l'annexe 38 a) et b).

Réseaux liés à la chaîne d'approvisionnement

73. Le Groupe d'experts poursuit ses enquêtes sur les personnes et entités qui facilitent l'exportation de charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée. Les documents qu'il a obtenus montrent que 17 415 tonnes d'anthracite ont été chargées à bord du *Glory Taizhou* (nº OMI 9641015) à Nakhodka (Fédération de Russie), le 12 août 2017 et livrées à Changxingdao (Chine), en septembre 2017[71]. La société K.W.B Resources Limited[72], qui est constituée dans les Îles Vierges britanniques et dont le directeur, du nom de Wang Jianbo, était basé à Yantai, a participé au transport initial du charbon de Nampo à Nakhodka en utilisant le *Jian Fu* (nº OMI 8306890), alors sous pavillon des Palaos, ainsi qu'à la livraison ultérieure à Changxingdao (voir fig. 23)[73]. La Chine a répondu que le *Glory Taizhou* avait déclaré à la douane à Dalian que le charbon provenait de la Fédération de Russie et a demandé des preuves que le charbon provenait de la République populaire démocratique de Corée. La Fédération de Russie n'a pas encore répondu.

[67] Enregistrés auprès de l'OMI.

[68] La Sierra Leone a accordé son pavillon au navire en avril et l'a retiré le 17 novembre 2020, suite à l'expiration du certificat provisoire d'enregistrement.

[69] En Chine continentale et à Hong Kong, des adresses commerciales ont été répertoriées.

[70] http://nbmc.com.cn/download.jsp?id=832.

[71] Le Panama a fourni des informations conformes à l'itinéraire du *Glory Taizhou* que le Groupe d'experts a identifié.

[72] En chinois : 天佑航運有限公司.

[73] Les Palaos ont fourni des informations sur le *Jian Fu* (aujourd'hui démantelé), qui indiquent une absence du système d'identification automatique correspondant à la période d'enquête identifiée.

Figure 23
Documents indiquant le transbordement de charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée



Source : État Membre.

74. Selon les informations émanant d'un État Membre, d'autres entités chinoises, XinXin Green Work Research & Development Co. Ltd. et Taizhou Yifeng Transportation Co. Ltd., ont été impliquées dans l'achat illicite de charbon provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée. On trouvera des précisions à ce sujet à l'annexe 39.

Omission dans la notification de transfert de pétrole

75. Sur la base d'un registre des transferts qu'il a obtenu, le Groupe d'experts s'est enquis auprès de la Fédération de Russie de l'éventuelle omission de 617 742 tonnes dans les notifications au Comité concernant le transfert de produits pétroliers vers la République populaire démocratique de Corée entre 2018 et 2019[74].

Recommandations

Au Comité

76. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande la désignation des navires suivants pour violation du paragraphe 5 de la résolution 2397 (2017) du Conseil de sécurité :**

- **L'*An Ping* (nº OMI 7903366), anciennement sous pavillon sierra-léonais ;**
- **Le *Heng Rong* (nº OMI 7913098), sous pavillon indéterminé ;**
- **Le *Rich United* (nº OMI 9129213), sous pavillon indéterminé ;**

[74] Les données mises à la disposition du Groupe d'experts contiennent des informations sur les transferts d'environ 32 982,625 tonnes de pétrole en 2018 et 2019 par 10 sociétés de la Fédération de Russie. Cela représente 52,5 % de la quantité de pétrole transférée à la République populaire démocratique de Corée entre 2018 et 2019 (62 709,116 tonnes) dont le Comité a été officiellement informé. Le Groupe d'experts a confirmé que les deux ensembles de données correspondaient clairement à la plupart des cas. Le Groupe note également que la Korea Ungum (Yngum) Corporation, une société écran de la banque du commerce extérieur désignée selon un État Membre, importait des produits pétroliers pendant cette période. Voir par. 141 pour les autres activités de la société Ungum.

– **Le *Run Da* (n° OMI 8511172), anciennement sous pavillon togolais.**

77. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande la désignation du navire suivant pour violation du paragraphe 5 de la résolution 2397 (2017), et recommande à nouveau la désignation du navire pour violation du paragraphe 11 de la résolution 2375 (2017) :**

– **Le *Xing Ming Yang 888* (n° OMI 8410847), sous pavillon indéterminé.**

78. **Le Groupe d'experts continue de recommander la désignation des navires suivants pour violation du paragraphe 5 de la résolution 2397 (2017) :**

– **Le *Diamond 8* (n° OMI 9132612), anciennement sous pavillon sierra-léonais ;**

– **Le *Hokong* (n° OMI 9006758), sous pavillon indéterminé ;**

– **Le *New Konk* (n° OMI 9036387), sous pavillon indéterminé ;**

– **Le *Subblic* (n° IMO 8126082), sous pavillon indéterminé ;**

– **L'*Unica* (n° OMI 8514306), sous pavillon indéterminé ;**

– **Le *Yun Hong 8* (numéro d'identité du service mobile maritime 413459380), battant pavillon chinois.**

79. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande la désignation des navires suivants pour violation du paragraphe 11 de la résolution 2375 (2017) :**

– **L'*Enterprise* (n° OMI 9153331), anciennement sous pavillon togolais ;**

– **Le *Ri Hong* (alias *Klausen*) (n° OMI 9162318), anciennement sous pavillon sierra-léonais ;**

– **Le *Tae P(h)yong* (n° OMI 9018751), battant pavillon de la République populaire démocratique de Corée.**

Aux États Membres, en matière de meilleures pratiques concernant les activités de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

Concernant les mesures de diligence raisonnable liées au contournement des sanctions

80. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande aux États Membres de continuer à sensibiliser l'ensemble du secteur aux problèmes posés, notamment aux nouvelles tactiques de contournement des sanctions par les personnes coupables, et aux mesures pertinentes pour atténuer ces risques. Ces informations peuvent être diffusées sous la forme d'avis et de circulaires à l'échelle du secteur.**

Concernant les mesures de diligence raisonnable liées aux transferts de navire à navire

81. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les parties qui se livrent à des transferts de pétrole raffiné de navire à navire dans des zones où l'on sait que des transferts illicites se produisent autorisent le capitaine du navire ou un membre d'équipage désigné à envoyer un courrier électronique au registre du pavillon concerné pour notification, en lui transmettant les informations suivantes : identifiants du navire (nom et numéros d'identité de l'OMI et du service mobile maritime) du navire concerné, matière et volume du transfert, date et heure du début et de la fin du transfert et lieu du transfert.**

82. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les contreparties concernées de la chaîne d'approvisionnement maritime envisagent de mettre en œuvre des**

contrôles permettant de vérifier correctement l'origine des navires qui effectuent des transferts de navire à navire, en particulier dans les zones où l'on sait que des transferts illicites ont lieu. Ces mesures pourraient comprendre l'exigence de documents d'expédition complets et précis, notamment des connaissements indiquant l'origine et la destination des marchandises et des copies des licences d'exportation, le cas échéant.

83. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande aux États Membres de faire preuve de vigilance pour identifier et prévenir l'exploitation illicite des navires obtenant des permis de pêche de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, qui peuvent utiliser diverses méthodes pour dissimuler leurs activités et leurs identités.**

Statistiques commerciales de la République populaire démocratique de Corée

84. Le commerce extérieur enregistré de la République populaire démocratique de Corée a chuté en 2020 en raison des mesures de fermeture des frontières prises pour prévenir la COVID-19[75]. Au cours des neuf premiers mois de 2020, les exportations totales du pays n'ont atteint qu'environ 9,2 % des exportations totales en 2019 (voir tableau).

Tableau
Commerce enregistré de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, 2019 et 2020 (janvier-septembre)
(En milliers de dollars)

	2019	*2020 (janvier-septembre)*
Exportations	447 351	41 115
Importations	2 725 394	310 452
Balance commerciale	**(2 354 508)**	**(269 337)**

Source : Trade Map du Centre du commerce international (consulté le 15 décembre 2020).

85. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'analyser les données commerciales de la République populaire démocratique de Corée à partir des statistiques commerciales publiées afin d'enquêter sur les échanges commerciaux effectués en violation des résolutions pertinentes[76]. En dépit des mesures de fermeture des frontières, les statistiques indiquent que la République populaire démocratique de Corée a effectué en 2020 de nombreuses transactions commerciales portant notamment sur des machines, du matériel électrique et du fer, en violation des résolutions pertinentes[77].

86. La République populaire démocratique de Corée fait également le commerce de produits interdits qui n'apparaissent pas dans les bases de données statistiques internationales ou nationales sur le commerce[78]. Selon un État Membre, la République

[75] Ces chiffres sont basés sur le Trade Map du Centre du commerce international, qui reflète les données douanières communiquées par les États Membres.

[76] Voir l'annexe 40 pour la liste complète des codes du Système harmonisé que le Groupe d'experts utilise pour surveiller la mise en œuvre de l'interdiction sectorielle. Cette annexe remplace l'annexe 4 des documents S/2018/171 et S/2018/171/Corr.1.

[77] Voir l'annexe 41 pour la méthodologie détaillée du Groupe d'experts et les détails complets concernant les enquêtes du Groupe et les réponses des États Membres. Le Groupe d'experts note que les réponses des États Membres ne contenaient pas toutes des informations suffisantes pour lui permettre de conclure que les échanges commerciaux enregistrés n'avaient pas été effectués avec la République populaire démocratique de Corée.

[78] Pour les cas mentionnés dans le présent paragraphe, le Groupe d'experts a consulté les sites Web

populaire démocratique de Corée a exporté au moins 4,1 millions de tonnes de charbon et peut-être d'autres minéraux interdits vers la Chine entre janvier et septembre 2020 (voir annexes 34, 35, 36, 38 a) et b) et 39) et a également importé des articles interdits tels que des machines en utilisant des barges qui provenaient de Chine en 2020 (voir par. 69 et annexe 37)[79]. Ces transactions commerciales n'apparaissent pas dans les bases de données statistiques commerciales.

Éventuels échanges en ligne de marchandises interdites

87. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur les activités d'une société chinoise, Dandong China-DPRK Information Co., Ltd., pour son exploitation continue d'une plateforme de commerce électronique (www.hcein.com)[80]. Le site Web de la société (voir fig. 24) indique que sa mission est de faciliter le commerce et l'investissement entre la Chine et la République populaire démocratique de Corée, les articles visés comprenant des marchandises interdites telles que les machines, le matériel électrique et les navires[81]. La société n'a pas encore répondu à la demande d'information du Groupe d'experts concernant ses clients, le fonctionnement du site Web et les contrats éventuels conclus, notamment les transactions commerciales et les investissements générés par ses activités. Les enquêtes se poursuivent.

de Trade Map du Centre du commerce international et de l'Administration générale des douanes de la République populaire de Chine.

[79] Deux experts sont d'avis que cette information peut être corroborée.

[80] En chinois : 丰百貿易拓展有限公司.

[81] Le site était toujours actif au 5 janvier 2021. Les articles interdits sont indiqués dans des cases rouges.

Figure 24
Site Web de la société Dandong China-DPRK Information Co., Ltd.

Source : www.hcein.com, annotations du Groupe d'experts.

Application de l'interdiction des importations et des exportations

88. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé aux autorités douanières de 35 États Membres des informations sur l'état de la mise en œuvre des obligations découlant des résolutions pertinentes entre 2018 et 2020. Il s'agit notamment de l'obligation d'inspecter toutes les cargaisons à destination et en provenance de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et de les saisir et les neutraliser lorsque des articles interdits sont trouvés, conformément au paragraphe 18 de la résolution 2270 (2016) et au paragraphe 20 de la résolution 2397 (2017).

89. Le Groupe d'experts a constaté que les États Membres mettaient en œuvre les interdictions[82]. Toutefois, les États Membres ont parfois dû relever le défi de devoir déterminer si certains articles étaient interdits de transfert vers et/ou depuis la République populaire démocratique de Corée. Il y a eu un cas de refus de

[82] Un État Membre a fourni des informations sur 12 cas de mentions d'exportation indiquant la République populaire démocratique de Corée comme pays de destination qui ont ensuite été retirées, les marchandises ayant été retournées.

dédouanement sans motif suffisant, qui concernait la saisie de médicaments exportés vers la République populaire démocratique de Corée, ce qui n'est pas interdit. Dans le même temps, un État Membre a révélé une mauvaise compréhension des résolutions pertinentes en soutenant que ses importations en provenance de la République populaire démocratique de Corée étaient autorisées parce que les articles « ne se sont pas révélés être des matières chimiques, nucléaires ou biologiques, comme indiqué dans... la résolution 2270. »

IV. Embargos, entités et personnes désignées, et travailleurs à l'étranger

Embargos

Cambodge

90. Le Groupe d'experts a noté que le film documentaire intitulé *The Mole: Undercover in North Korea* [La Taupe : un agent infiltré en Corée du Nord], sorti en octobre 2020, donne à entendre que des négociants d'armes internationaux de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et des ressortissants d'un pays européen se seraient réunis à plusieurs reprises à Phnom Penh en 2017 pour négocier un devis d'armement et discuter des modalités du contrat de vente. Le documentaire conduit à penser que les ventes d'armes n'ont jamais eu lieu. Le Cambodge a répondu comme suit à la demande de renseignements émanant du Groupe d'experts :

> Le documentaire vise à attaquer la Corée du Nord [...]. Le Cambodge n'a décelé aucun signe lié au commerce des armes sur son territoire [...] le documentaire vidéo ne présente aucun élément de preuve clair permettant de corroborer les informations concernant le commerce des armes. Il s'agit d'un documentaire imaginatif et fictif destiné à séduire le public pour gagner de l'argent ou à d'autres fins. (Voir annexe 43 ; voir également par. 151 et annexe 88).

Pour une affaire concernant l'Ouganda et le documentaire, voir l'annexe 88.

Nigéria

91. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur un complot déjoué de trafic d'armes ourdi par un ressortissant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée en République tchèque, un autre État membre de l'Union européenne et le Nigéria[83]. D'après un État Membre, un ressortissant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, Hong Yong Su, se trouvait au Nigéria en janvier 2020. L'État Membre a présumé que M. Hong était ou avait été membre des services de renseignement militaire de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et du Bureau général de reconnaissance (KPe.031). L'État Membre soupçonne également M. Hong d'agir au nom de la société Haekumgang Trading Co., considérée comme un organisme d'approvisionnement des forces armées de la République populaire démocratique de Corée actif en Afrique, ainsi qu'au nom de la Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation (KPe.006). Le Nigéria a répondu que « M. Hong Yong Su n'apparaît nulle part dans la base de données du service nigérian de l'immigration et que d'après les enquêtes menées la Haekungaan Trading Corporation n'est pas domiciliée au Nigéria et n'y exerce pas ses opérations » (voir annexe 44).

[83] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 74 à 77.

Fédération de Russie et Hongrie

92. Selon un article paru le 8 août 2020 dans *Kommersant*, le Service fédéral de sécurité de la Fédération de Russie a réussi, en août 2016, à empêcher Vladimir Lyubishin de faire passer du matériel militaire en contrebande. Konstantin Moskal, son assistant Denis Fedosov et M. Lyubishin avaient pour projet de faire passer en République populaire démocratique de Corée cinq stabilisateurs de cap et de verticale conçus pour être intégrés aux systèmes d'information (verticale, tangage et cap) de la chaîne principale et des chaînes de réserve des systèmes de navigation d'avions de combat, ainsi que d'autres pièces d'avions militaires. M. Lyubishin et son fils, qui ont été arrêtés en Hongrie en novembre 2016 à la demande des États-Unis d'Amérique, ont été extradés vers la Fédération de Russie en août 2018. Les tribunaux russes ont condamné M. Lyubishin à un an et cinq mois de prison, et M. Moskal à trois ans et six mois, avec une amende de 500 000 roubles. La Fédération de Russie a répondu comme suit à la demande de renseignements émanant du Groupe d'experts (voir annexe 45) :

> En septembre 2016, M. Pak Zen Un, un représentant de Sonkwang, l'organisme de commerce extérieur nord-coréen, a illégalement acheté un lot de pièces de rechange pour des avions MIG-29 à des citoyens de la Fédération de Russie, Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Lyubishin et Konstantin Viktorovich Moskal, dans l'intention de les faire passer en contrebande en Corée du Nord avec l'aide de M. Lyubishin [...]. En juin 2017, le Département des enquêtes du Service fédéral de sécurité de la Fédération de Russie a engagé des poursuites pénales contre M. Lyubishin (père) pour avoir planifié de faire passer en contrebande du matériel militaire en République populaire démocratique de Corée [...]. M. Lyubishin a plaidé coupable et, par son témoignage, il a incriminé M. Pak Zen Un dans l'organisation de l'expédition illégale à l'étranger de matériel militaire de fabrication russe.

La Hongrie a également répondu à la demande de renseignements émanant du Groupe d'experts (voir annexe 46).

Somalie

93. Selon le rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur la Somalie daté du 28 septembre 2020 (S/2020/949), quatre obus de mortier de calibre 60 mm ont été tirés par les Chabab le 17 février 2020 en direction du complexe de l'ONU situé dans l'enceinte de l'aéroport international Aden Adde. À l'issue d'une analyse des ailettes, le Groupe d'experts a déterminé que les obus de mortiers avaient été produits par divers fabricants. Il a aussi noté que l'un des obus de mortiers présentait des caractéristiques semblables à celles d'un modèle fabriqué en République populaire démocratique de Corée (60 mm HE type 63). Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des précisions à la Somalie mais n'a pas encore reçu de réponse.

République bolivarienne du Venezuela

94. Le Groupe d'experts créé en application de la résolution 1874 (2009) du Conseil de sécurité a continué d'enquêter sur une éventuelle coopération militaire et technologique entre la République bolivarienne du Venezuela et la République populaire démocratique de Corée. Selon un reportage paru dans les médias, le Président de l'Assemblée nationale constituante de la République bolivarienne du Venezuela a signé, lors d'une visite en République populaire démocratique de Corée en septembre 2019, une série d'accords par lesquels les parties s'engagent à mener des activités de coopération militaire et technologique[84]. La République bolivarienne

[84] Voir S/2020/151, par. 112.

du Venezuela a répondu comme suit à la demande de renseignements émanant du Groupe d'experts :

> [La République bolivarienne du Venezuela] se déclare gravement préoccupée par la décision du Groupe d'experts d'ouvrir une enquête officielle sur la base d'informations provenant d'un « reportage dans les médias », à savoir une source unique [...] compte tenu notamment du fait qu'il n'existe pas d'accord entre [la République bolivarienne du Venezuela] et la République populaire démocratique de Corée sur la coopération militaire et technologique (voir annexe 47).

Le Groupe d'experts continue de demander des précisions à la République bolivarienne du Venezuela mais n'a pas encore reçu de réponse.

Yémen

95. Le Groupe d'experts a poursuivi son enquête sur deux affaires liées au Yémen. La première affaire concerne un projet de coopération yéménite avec le secteur de la défense de la République populaire démocratique de Corée. La seconde porte sur un projet de fourniture de matériel militaire provenant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée[85]. En ce qui concerne la première affaire, le Yémen a répondu :

> L'homme qui se fait appeler Zakaria Yahya Al-Shami [...] appartient à la milice houthiste et ne représente à aucun titre le Gouvernement yéménite. Par conséquent, les actions et les tentatives qu'il a entreprises pour établir une relation de coopération militaire avec la République populaire démocratique de Corée (RPDC) constituent une violation flagrante des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité [sur] la RPDC.

En ce qui concerne la seconde affaire, le Yémen a répondu :

> L'ambassade de la milice houthiste à Damas et l'homme qui se fait appeler Al-Qanis ne représentent pas le Gouvernement de la République du Yémen. En outre, les agissements d'Al-Qanis, y compris la signature d'un protocole avec un courtier en armes syrien appelé « Hussein Al-Ali » portant sur l'importation de matériel militaire au Yémen, constituent des violations manifestes des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité [sur] la RPDC (voir annexe 48).

96. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur plusieurs affaires précédemment signalées concernant la République démocratique du Congo, l'Érythrée et le Myanmar (voir annexe 49).

Contrebande d'espèces et d'or

97. Les Émirats arabes unis ont déclaré en 2020 que les ressortissants iraniens soupçonnés d'être impliqués dans des activités de contrebande d'or et d'espèces menées par la République populaire démocratique de Corée résidaient à Doubaï (Émirats arabes unis)[86]. Un État Membre a indiqué que les ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée impliqués dans la contrebande voyageaient souvent à bord des appareils de la compagnie aérienne Emirates. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des informations à cette dernière mais n'a pas encore reçu de réponse concrète (voir annexe 51).

[85] Ibid., par. 113.
[86] S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 78 et annexe 30.

Textiles et œuvres d'art

98. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur une possible violation de l'embargo et des exigences en matière de gel des avoirs figurant dans les résolutions pertinentes. Des agences de voyage faisaient de la publicité pour des visites au Mansudae Art Studio et pour des produits interdits. Il a en outre été signalé que des œuvres d'art du Mansudae Art Studio avaient été transférées en vue d'être exposées. Le Paekho Art Studio a en outre participé à la construction de statues à l'étranger (voir annexe 52).

Textiles

99. La société Chugai Travel Co. Ltd[87] a fait de la publicité pour des tenues coréennes à l'intention des touristes étrangers à Pyongyang. La société a dit être la succursale japonaise d'Air Koryo et de la Korean International Travel Company[88]. Le Groupe d'experts attend toujours une réponse détaillée de sa part (voir annexe 53).

Œuvres d'art et artiste travaillant à l'étranger

100. Young Pioneer Tours a annoncé des visites au Mansudae Art Studio. Il avait indiqué précédemment sur son site Web que les touristes pouvaient visiter le studio, acheter des œuvres d'art et les faire expédier à l'étranger. Young Pioneer Tours a répondu au Groupe d'experts que « la direction n'avait pas prêté attention » au contenu mis en ligne en 2020 et que les visites avaient été organisées par l'intermédiaire de la Korean International Travel Company (voir par. 99)[89]. Young Pioneer Tours a également noté que, bien qu'une quarantaine de visites aient été organisées entre 2017 et janvier 2020, il n'avait connaissance d'aucun achat d'œuvre d'art (voir annexe 54).

101. Sur son site Web, Koryo Studio vend des œuvres d'art qu'il a commandées à des artistes de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ainsi que les œuvres d'un artiste du Mansudae Art Studio. Le représentant de Koryo Studio a dit au Groupe d'experts que les huiles sur toile vendues sur le site avaient été peintes avant 2009. Il a également déclaré qu'il « travaillait avec un dessinateur d'animation qui vit en République populaire de Chine (un employé d'un des studios d'animation de Pyongyang qui n'entretient absolument aucun lien avec le Mansudae Art Studio) ». Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des précisions concernant ce ressortissant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée percevant des revenus à l'étranger (voir annexe 55).

Œuvres d'art du Mansudae Art Studio

102. Selon certaines informations, plusieurs œuvres d'artistes affiliés au Mansudae Art Studio ont été présentées en République de Corée en 2019 et en 2020, lors d'expositions d'art organisées par l'Institut pour l'éducation sur l'unification, un organe subsidiaire du Ministère de l'unification, et le K Mecenat Network[90]. Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des réponses à ses demandes de renseignements (voir annexe 56).

103. Il a été rapporté qu'une œuvre de Kim Cheong Hee, directeur de la division artisanale du Mansudae Art Studio, a été présentée lors d'une exposition qui s'est tenue en 2019 à l'Assemblée nationale de la République de Corée. L'exposition avait été organisée conjointement par le Comité de la culture, des sports et du tourisme de

[87] Nom japonais : 中外旅行社.
[88] Voir S/2017/150, par. 148 à 151.
[89] Le numéro de téléphone fourni dans la réponse était le +850-218-111, poste 8375.
[90] En coréen : K-메세나네트워크.

l'Assemblée nationale, le comité d'organisation de la One Korea Global Campaign[91] et l'Association coréenne des beaux-arts[92]. L'œuvre de M. Kim aurait également été montrée en République de Corée en 2018, lors d'une exposition organisée conjointement par des entités comme l'Association coréenne des beaux-arts et le comité d'organisation de la One Korea Global Campaign. La réponse de l'Association figure à l'annexe 56.

Statues

104. De 2018 jusqu'à la fin de 2019 au moins, Congo Aconde SARL a participé à plusieurs projets de construction de statues dans les provinces du Lualaba et du Haut-Lomami (République démocratique du Congo). À la lumière des informations qu'il a pu voir, le Groupe d'experts considère que Congo Aconde SARL est une société écran de la Korea Paekho Trading Corporation, une société d'État qui exporte des œuvres d'art, y compris des statues créées par le Paekho Art Studio (voir par. 133, 147 et 149 et annexe 57).

Recommandations

105. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres fassent preuve de vigilance dans l'inspection des cargaisons, y compris les bagages des personnes qui entrent en République populaire démocratique de Corée ou en sortent, conformément au paragraphe 13 de la résolution 2321 (2016) et au paragraphe 18 de la résolution 2270 (2016).**

106. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres fassent preuve de vigilance en ce qui concerne le transfert d'œuvres d'art effectués par les entités désignées afin d'assurer le respect des exigences en matière de gel des avoirs qui sont énoncées dans les résolutions pertinentes.**

107. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande la désignation de la Korea Paekho Trading Corporation et du Paekho Art Studio.**

Drones

108. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur le transfert de drones[93] vers la République populaire démocratique de Corée, lequel constitue une violation de la résolution 2397 (2017). Les drones en question ont été observés lors du défilé militaire organisé le 10 octobre 2020 à Pyongyang. Il s'agirait de drones de type Mavic 2 Pro, fabriqués en 2018 ou plus tard par SZ DJI Technology Co. Ltd[94]. La compagnie n'a pas encore répondu à la demande de renseignements du Groupe d'experts.

[91] En coréen : 원케이글로벌캠페인 조직위원회.
[92] En coréen : 한국미술협회.
[93] Le code du Système harmonisé pour les drones est 85. Voir S/2020/151.
[94] Voir www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-likely-violated-sanctions-with-military-parade-drone-from-china.

Figure 25
Drones de type Mavic 2 Pro observés lors du défilé militaire organisé le 10 octobre 2020



Source : Rodong Sinmun et YouTube, annoté par le Groupe d'experts.

Utilisation abusive des biens des ambassades

Roumanie

109. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé à la Roumanie de lui fournir des informations complémentaires actualisées sur la location, à la société IMA Partners SRL, de biens immobiliers appartenant à l'ambassade de la République populaire démocratique de Corée[95]. La Roumanie a répondu que l'un des deux bâtiments situés au 28-36 Soseaua Nordului, dans le premier district de la ville de Bucarest et dans le périmètre de l'ambassade de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, est toujours utilisé par IMA Partners SRL, même si, d'après le contrat de location, le bail entre les deux entités mentionnées a été résilié le 10 novembre 2017. Quarante-quatre personnes morales ou physiques ont conclu un accord de sous-location avec IMA Partners SRL, qui a perçu, entre le 1er janvier 2018 et le 30 juin 2020, un revenu locatif total équivalent à 653 700 dollars (voir annexe 58). La Roumanie a toutefois assuré au Groupe d'experts qu'aucune transaction (espèces ou virement bancaire) n'avait été enregistrée entre IMA et l'ambassade de la République populaire démocratique de Corée pendant la période susmentionnée.

Bulgarie

110. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé à la Bulgarie des informations sur des données montrant que la société bulgare Terra Group faisait toujours de la publicité pour la location de la « Terra Residence », qui semblait être l'ancienne résidence de l'ambassadeur de la République populaire démocratique de Corée (sise au 56, rue Andrei Sakharov, Mladost 1, Sofia, 1784), et qu'une société appelée « Lora Catering » annonçait un espace en location à la même adresse[96]. La Bulgarie a demandé un délai supplémentaire pour mener l'enquête requise[97], en raison de la pandémie de COVID-19. Le Groupe d'experts n'a reçu aucune information de suivi.

[95] L'affaire a déjà fait l'objet d'une enquête par le Groupe d'experts (voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 85).

[96] Voir www.terraresidence.com et www.evepla.com/BG/Sofia/100084117957/Lora-Catering (consultés le 30 décembre 2020).

[97] L'affaire a déjà fait l'objet d'une enquête par le Groupe d'experts (voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 86).

Application de l'interdiction relative aux articles de luxe

111. En raison des restrictions imposées par les autorités sur les achats à l'étranger de biens de consommation[98], les importations d'articles de luxe [interdites en vertu de l'alinéa a) iii) du paragraphe 8 de la résolution 1718 (2006)] ont fortement diminué en 2020 et sont devenues sporadiques. La contrebande privée a pratiquement cessé elle aussi.

112. Le Groupe d'experts, ayant été informé de tentatives récentes visant à faire livrer au pays de nouvelles voitures de luxe fabriquées en Allemagne ou au Japon, a continué d'enquêter sur l'importation de voitures de luxe.

Mercedes-Benz

113. Le Groupe d'experts a poursuivi son enquête sur l'importation illégale, en République populaire démocratique de Corée, de deux véhicules Mercedes-Benz de la classe S 600 Sedan Long Guard VR9[99] qui, comme l'a confirmé un État Membre, ont été vendus par European Cars & More SRL à LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL à Hong Kong, puis transportés de l'Italie jusqu'aux Pays-Bas, où deux sociétés locales ont participé à la gestion logistique de l'exportation depuis Rotterdam. European Cars & More SRL a coopéré avec le Groupe d'experts et fourni des informations détaillées dans sa réponse datée du 20 octobre 2020 et dans des échanges antérieurs. Il a notamment été indiqué que European Cars & More SRL avait déjà vendu un certain nombre d'autres véhicules de luxe (Mercedes S 600 Guard, S 650 Maybach et S 600 Pullman) à LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL (voir annexe 60).

114. Le Groupe d'experts, n'ayant obtenu aucune information sur les utilisateurs finaux, craint que les véhicules mentionnés à l'annexe 60 n'aient fini par arriver en République populaire démocratique de Corée, où les dirigeants sont nombreux à utiliser des voitures similaires, dont la présence a d'ailleurs été constatée récemment (voir, par exemple, l'annexe 61). Le Groupe d'experts a continué de s'employer à établir un contact avec LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL et à solliciter des renseignements, mais n'a jamais reçu de réponse. Il a également demandé des informations et des documents supplémentaires à European Cars & More SRL. L'enquête se poursuit.

Toyota

115. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu de nouvelles preuves témoignant de l'utilisation de véhicules Lexus[100] en République populaire démocratique de Corée. Le dirigeant du pays aurait notamment utilisé l'un de ces véhicules en août 2020 lors d'une inspection sur place effectuée dans la province du Hwanghae du Nord (voir annexe 62). Le constructeur a informé le Groupe d'experts que le véhicule concerné semblait être une Lexus LX 570 à essence avec conduite à gauche, un modèle fabriqué depuis juillet 2017 par Toyota dans son usine de Yoshiwara (Japon) qui est surtout exporté aux États-Unis, en Chine et au Canada. Toyota n'a cependant pas été en mesure de préciser sur quel marché la Lexus LX 570 en question avait été vendue.

[98] Les autorités de la République populaire démocratique de Corée auraient décidé, en avril 2020, de limiter les importations de « biens non essentiels », y compris celles de nombreux produits alimentaires, textiles et appareils électroniques (Jeong Tae Joo, « N. Korea announces all 'trivial' imports restricted until end of the year », *Daily NK*, 23 avril 2020).

[99] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 92.

[100] Pour les résultats des enquêtes précédentes, voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 93.

Alcool et autres produits de luxe

116. Selon les informations dont dispose le Groupe d'experts, les envois de boissons alcoolisées vers la République populaire démocratique de Corée ont été irréguliers et ont diminué du fait des restrictions liées à la COVID-19.

117. Singapour a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'un transbordement de vin avait été saisi par ses autorités le 31 janvier 2020. Il ressort des documents pertinents que la cargaison était destinée à la « Sangmyong General Trading Corporation », qui, en 2012-2013, avait été identifiée par le Groupe d'experts comme une entité ayant violé l'interdiction d'importer des produits de luxe en provenance du Japon[101]. Le 25 août, un tribunal singapourien a ordonné, en application du droit national, la confiscation de la cargaison et sa remise aux autorités douanières du pays, qui en disposeront (voir fig. 26).

Figure 26
Décision d'un tribunal singapourien

To the Officer of Singapore Customs:

Order in Terms

The Seized Goods be dealt with as the Director-General of Singapore Customs thinks fit, and in such a case the Director-General may direct that the Seized Goods be destroyed or otherwise dealt with.

The Seized Goods are:

(a) 1158 cases x 4 boxes x 3 litres of Dry Red Wine;
(b) 50 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Orange Juice;
(c) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Summer Pine Juice;
(d) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Medly of Fruit Juice;
(e) 49 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Mango Juice; and
(f) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Secrets of the Valley Juice.

THE SEAL OF THE STATE COURTS SINGAPORE SEAL

Source : Groupe d'experts.

118. Singapour a informé le Groupe d'experts que Lim Cheng Hwee, le directeur de SINSMS Pte Ltd (une société qui a déjà fait l'objet d'une enquête menée par le Groupe d'experts), a été condamné à deux mois de prison pour avoir vendu illégalement de l'alcool[102] (d'une valeur totale de 562 082 dollars) à la République populaire démocratique de Corée entre 2013 et 2018 ; son épouse, Leng Ooi, a été condamnée à payer une amende et la société s'est vue imposer une amende de 30 000 dollars singapouriens (voir annexe 64).

119. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des informations au sujet d'un problème concernant l'admissibilité de l'exportation d'équipements sportifs, s'agissant notamment de déterminer de quels codes du Système harmonisé relevait la catégorie « articles de sports et de loisirs ». Le Groupe d'experts considère qu'en général, la définition des « produits de luxe » qui ne figurent pas spécifiquement dans la liste relative aux sanctions relève de la législation nationale.

[101] Voir S/2012/422, par. 79.

[102] Chad O'Carroll, « Singaporean company director jailed for selling alcohol to North Korea », *NK News*, 14 décembre 2020. Voir www.nknews.org/2020/12/singaporean-company-director-jailed-for-selling-alcohol-to-north-korea.

120. À cet égard, le Groupe d'experts rappelle que dans la Notice nº 3 d'aide à l'application, publiée en 2011 et mise à jour le 20 janvier 2017, le Comité indique, à l'alinéa iv) du paragraphe 4 : « Il faut veiller à ne pas limiter la fourniture de marchandises ordinaires à la population et à éviter les effets humanitaires négatifs sur la République populaire démocratique de Corée. »

Recommandations

121. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres rationalisent leurs listes de contrôle des exportations pour qu'elles cadrent avec la liste des articles de luxe interdits d'une manière qui soit compatible avec les objectifs des résolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) et 2321 (2016), en évitant d'élargir inutilement leur champ d'application et en veillant à ne pas limiter la fourniture de marchandises ordinaires à la population et à éviter les effets humanitaires négatifs.**

122. **Le Groupe d'experts renouvelle sa recommandation selon laquelle les États Membres devraient encourager leurs entreprises et ressortissants qui exportent des articles de luxe à inclure une disposition contractuelle afin d'empêcher toute revente à la République populaire démocratique de Corée.**

123. **Le Groupe d'experts renouvelle sa recommandation selon laquelle les États Membres et les organisations concernées devraient encourager les entreprises d'expédition et de transport à établir un système complet de contrôle des destinataires, compte tenu des risques de réexpédition.**

Département de l'industrie des munitions (KPe.028)

124. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur les activités d'un ressortissant de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, Ma Tong Hyok[103], qui serait un important chef des services informatiques du pays basé à Dalian ayant fait entrer en Chine des informaticiens de la République populaire démocratique de Corée relevant du Département de l'industrie des munitions[104]. S'appuyant sur des informations fournies par un État Membre, le Groupe d'experts a demandé des renseignements à la Dalian Runguang Science and Technology Co. Ltd[105], qui, selon l'État Membre, était pleinement consciente du fait qu'elle travaillait avec M. Ma et des informaticiens de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et qu'elle blanchissait de l'argent pour le compte du pays. La société n'a pas encore répondu à la demande de renseignements que lui a adressée le Groupe d'experts.

Bureau général de reconnaissance (KPe.031)

125. Le Groupe a continué d'enquêter sur les attaques menées par des cyberacteurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée relevant du Bureau général de reconnaissance, tels que Lazarus et Kimsuky. En 2020, la tendance était manifestement aux cyberattaques menées par le pays contre les secteurs de la défense d'autres pays du monde[106].

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[103] Selon l'État Membre, M. Ma et les équipes d'informaticiens de la République populaire démocratique de Corée dont il assure la supervision se trouvaient en Chine à la fin du mois de janvier 2020.

[104] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 110.

[105] En chinois : 大连欣路科技有限公司.

[106] Trois États Membres ont exprimé un point de vue similaire publiquement ou devant le Groupe d'experts. Le Groupe d'experts a déjà fait état d'attaques similaires dans les documents S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 117.

126. Le Groupe d'experts a cherché à en savoir plus sur les cyberattaques menées contre le secteur israélien de la défense en s'appuyant sur des sources en accès libre. Une société de cybersécurité considérait qu'il s'agissait de « la principale campagne offensive menée par Lazarus » en 2020, ajoutant que le groupe s'appuie sur un réseau probablement composé de « dizaines de chercheurs et d'agents des services de renseignement pour conduire la campagne à l'échelle mondiale »[107]. Selon le rapport présenté par la société, les pirates ont non seulement tenté d'obtenir illégalement accès à des technologies militaires[108], mais encore cherché à exfiltrer des informations dont ils pourraient tirer des gains financiers. Ils ont d'abord créé de faux comptes sur un site de médias sociaux très fréquenté par les entreprises[109] afin d'approcher les employés ciblés en se faisant passer pour des spécialistes des ressources humaines d'importantes entreprises du secteur de la défense et de l'aérospatiale, puis ont cherché à accroître leur crédibilité en s'entretenant avec ces employés par téléphone ou par message texte avant de leur envoyer des courriels dont les pièces jointes contenaient des logiciels malveillants. D'après la société de cybersécurité, les pirates ont ainsi réussi à infecter « plusieurs dizaines d'entreprises et organisations » et à accéder illégalement à des données classifiées, mais l'étendue précise des dommages n'a pas été rendue publique. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé à Israël des précisions sur la question[110] et les enquêtes se poursuivent.

127. En août 2020, les États-Unis ont identifié un nouveau groupe de cybermenaces, BeagleBoyz, relevant du Bureau général de reconnaissance et probablement actif depuis 2014, auquel ils ont attribué dans un bulletin d'alerte publique[111] le cyberbraquage dont la Banque du Bangladesh avait été victime en 2016. Selon le document, BeagleBoyz a tenté de voler près de 2 milliards de dollars depuis au moins 2015 en recourant à un système de « FASTCash » permettant de faire des retraits d'espèces à des guichets automatiques bancaires et en ciblant des plateformes de la Société de télécommunications interbancaires mondiales (SWIFT) et des serveurs hébergeant les systèmes de paiement d'institutions financières. BeagleBoyz a également attaqué des plateformes d'échange de cybermonnaies dont il a piraté l'accès en utilisant des courriels d'hameçonnage ciblé qui paraissaient être liés à des demandes d'emploi. Le Groupe d'experts note que les cyberattaques ciblant des institutions financières et des plateformes d'échange de cybermonnaies sur lesquelles il a enquêté et qui sont décrites dans le document S/2019/691 (par. 57 à 68 et annexe 21) correspondent aux activités de BeagleBoyz. Il note en outre que l'instigateur présumé d'un stratagème consistant à effectuer des retraits illégaux à des guichets automatiques bancaires en utilisant des données d'identité piratées provenant d'une banque sud-africaine a fui le Japon pour se réfugier en République populaire démocratique de Corée immédiatement après l'opération. Les faits se sont déroulés en 2016. La réponse du Japon figure à l'annexe 66.

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[107] Voir www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Dream-Job-Campaign.pdf. Le Groupe d'experts note que les médias ont fait état de cyberattaques similaires contre des entreprises européennes de défense.

[108] Les États-Unis ont également analysé les logiciels malveillants utilisés par des cyberacteurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et souligné que les informations ciblées concernaient « des technologies militaires et énergétiques clés ». Voir https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-232a.

[109] D'autres sociétés spécialisées dans la cybersécurité ont fait état d'activités similaires menées par des cyberacteurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée tout au long de 2020. Voir www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/operation-north-star-a-job-offer-thats-too-good-to-be-true.

[110] Le Gouvernement a déclaré publiquement qu'il avait déjoué les attaques de Lazarus. Voir https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Pages/Defense-Establishment-thwarts-cyber-attack-targeting-defense-industries-12-August-2020.aspx.

[111] Voir https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a.

128. Les membres du Groupe d'experts et du Comité ont de nouveau été la cible de cyberattaques[112]. En octobre 2020, un membre du Groupe d'experts a reçu un courriel d'hameçonnage qui semblait provenir d'un employé des Nations Unies et contenait un lien malveillant (voir fig. 27). En l'occurrence, l'expert a indépendamment identifié l'adresse de protocole Internet d'où provenait le courriel comme ayant été utilisée auparavant par Kimsuky (alias Thallium) et Konni, un autre groupe de cybercriminels largement associé à la République populaire démocratique de Corée[113].

Figure 27
Courriel d'hameçonnage envoyé à un membre du Groupe d'experts en octobre 2020

Source : Groupe d'experts

129. Le Groupe d'experts réaffirme que compte tenu de leur caractère persistant et extrêmement perturbateur, les cyberattaques, passées et actuelles, visant des organes de l'ONU comme le Comité et le Groupe d'experts, lesquels ont pour mandat de contrôler la bonne application des sanctions de l'ONU, équivalent à un contournement des sanctions.

[112] Le Groupe d'experts a confirmé qu'un représentant d'un État membre du Conseil de sécurité avait reçu le même courriel d'hameçonnage que celui reçu en 2020 par des membres du Groupe d'experts (voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 120).

[113] De nombreuses sociétés de cybersécurité soulignent qu'il existe des similitudes importantes entre Konni et d'autres groupes de cybermenaces de la République populaire démocratique de Corée comme Kimsuky et APT37. Un État Membre a également communiqué au Groupe d'experts des informations sur les activités de Konni en tant qu'auteur de menaces de la République populaire démocratique de Corée. Pour des informations provenant de sources en accès libre, voir https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html ; https://blog.alyac.co.kr/3390 ; https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-konni-malware-attacking-eurasia-southeast-asia ; https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat.

Ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée percevant des revenus à l'étranger

130. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur des ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée percevant un revenu à l'étranger. Plusieurs États Membres l'ont informé que de nombreux ressortissants du pays étaient toujours employés dans les secteurs de la construction, de l'art, de la santé, du sport, de la restauration et des technologies de l'information, et que ces travailleurs utilisaient notamment des visas de touriste ou d'étudiant pour entrer sur le territoire des pays concernés. Un État Membre a déclaré au Groupe d'experts qu'avec la pandémie de COVID-19 et les fermetures de frontière qui en ont découlé, il avait été plus facile pour les ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée de rester dans des pays tiers. Le Groupe d'experts note que, dans plusieurs pays, la législation nationale permet aux ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée de percevoir des revenus dans certaines circonstances. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté à la fois sur les nouvelles données recueillies et sur les cas déjà signalés[114].

Joueurs de football

131. Le Qatar a informé le Groupe d'experts de la résiliation du contrat de Han Kwang Son et de son départ du Qatar en janvier 2021[115]. Depuis 2017, plusieurs joueurs ont rejoint des équipes de la République populaire démocratique de Corée alors qu'ils étaient affiliés à des équipes japonaises. L'un de ces joueurs a été transféré dans une équipe de la République de Corée en 2019. Les réponses des États Membres figurent à l'annexe 67.

Travailleurs médicaux

132. Le Nigéria a fourni des informations sur un accord bilatéral dans les domaines de la santé et de la médecine, ainsi que sur les travailleurs originaires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée qu'il prévoit d'expulser, qui travaillent principalement dans des installations médicales (voir annexe 68).

Ouvriers du bâtiment

République démocratique du Congo

133. D'après les documents obtenus par le Groupe d'experts, Pak Hwa Song, Hwang Kil Su et les travailleurs de Congo Aconde SARL pourraient devoir être rapatriés, car ils perçoivent des revenus à l'étranger (voir par. 104, 147 et 149).

Sénégal

134. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur les ouvriers du bâtiment affiliés à la société Corman Construction and Commerce SUARL[116]. Les documents comptables internes montrent que la société envoyait des recettes à l'ambassade de la République populaire démocratique de Corée (voir annexe 69 ; voir également par. 143 à 146).

[114] S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 126 à 138.
[115] Ibid., par. 126.
[116] Voir S/2020/151, par. 144.

Travailleurs de la restauration et de l'hôtellerie

135. Un État Membre a déclaré que des ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée travaillaient dans des restaurants et des hôtels à l'étranger en 2020[117].

Sortie vers un pays tiers

136. La Géorgie a répondu au Groupe d'experts qu'il n'y avait pas de ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée sur le territoire qui est sous son contrôle et qu'elle ne disposait pas d'informations sur l'enquête que mène ce dernier sur les travailleurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ayant quitté la Fédération de Russie pour gagner l'Abkhazie (voir annexe 71)[118].

Recommandation

137. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres continuent à faire preuve de vigilance dans l'examen des preuves de statut de résident et des visas soumis par des ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée afin d'empêcher que les obligations figurant dans les résolutions ne soient contournées.**

V. Financement

138. Sur la base d'informations communiquées par les États Membres, d'informations qu'il a obtenues et d'informations de sources ouvertes, le Groupe d'experts estime que la République populaire démocratique de Corée continue d'accéder aux systèmes financiers internationaux par l'intermédiaire de coentreprises, de comptes offshore, de sociétés écrans, de prestataires de services d'actifs virtuels (tels que les cybermonnaies) et de représentants de banques à l'étranger. Les recettes illicites tirées des activités de contournement des sanctions et blanchies par ces réseaux contribuent directement et indirectement à l'avancée des programmes d'armes de destruction massive et de missiles balistiques du pays. Ces réseaux ont continué d'utiliser des méthodes et techniques de dissimulation pour tirer profit du manque de rigueur ou de l'insuffisance des règles et des règlements financiers de certains États Membres et des contrôles effectués par ces derniers.

139. Comme dans ses précédents rapports, le Groupe d'experts continue d'observer des personnes et des entreprises liées à la République populaire démocratique de Corée qui ciblent et utilisent principalement des institutions financières basées en Chine pour faciliter les activités de contournement des sanctions maritimes et des sanctions concernant l'importation d'articles de luxe, le travail illicite et le blanchiment des produits du vol d'actifs virtuels, et d'enquêter sur elles[119]. En outre, des sociétés prestataires de services continuent de faciliter, sciemment ou involontairement, les activités de contournement des sanctions auxquelles se livre la République populaire démocratique de Corée.

[117] Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur des travailleurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée dans le restaurant de l'hôtel Magnolias Pattaya Boutique (4/6 M.9 Maprachan Reservoir, Tambon Pong, Amphoe Banglamung, Chonburi, Thaïlande). La réponse de la Thaïlande figure à l'annexe 70.

[118] Voir S/2020/151.

[119] Deux experts sont d'avis que cette information peut être étayée davantage.

Représentants de banques à l'étranger

140. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'enquêter sur des représentants de banques à l'étranger. Il ressort d'un examen de procédures judiciaires engagées par un État Membre en février 2020 que Han Jang Su[120] a continué de contrôler des comptes bancaires en Fédération de Russie après que ce pays a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'il « a[vait] pris toutes les mesures prévues par sa législation pour appliquer les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité » à l'égard de M. Han (voir annexe 72). Il ressort également de ces mêmes procédures judiciaires que des représentants de la Foreign Trade Bank de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ont continué de gérer ou de contrôler des comptes basés en Chine après que ce pays a indiqué avoir informé le Groupe d'experts qu'il avait « pris des mesures à ce sujet conformément aux obligations énoncées dans les résolutions [et] fermé tous les bureaux chinois d'institutions financières de la République populaire démocratique de Corée en 2016, et que tous les représentants concernés qui étaient présents sur son territoire avaient quitté celui-ci » (voir annexe 72). Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur ces différences.

141. Par ailleurs, selon un État Membre, la Foreign Trade Bank facilite depuis 2017, par l'intermédiaire d'une société écran, la vente et l'exportation d'instruments de musique au profit d'une entreprise de la Fédération de Russie[121]. Le même État Membre a fait savoir au Groupe d'experts qu'en août 2019, la Korea Ungum Corporation[122], la société écran qu'utiliserait la banque, et la Unha Daesong Trading Company, l'entreprise affiliée à la banque, avaient passé des contrats d'une valeur de 2 millions de dollars concernant des instruments de musique et des pièces connexes par l'intermédiaire du représentant de la société écran présumée être utilisée par la banque, qui a également fait office de représentant de la banque à Khabarovsk, en Fédération de Russie. (La liste des banques et des numéros de compte liés à Ungum et à Unha Daesong figure à l'annexe 73)[123].

Génération de recettes et activités bancaires illicites en Afrique subsaharienne

142. Le Groupe d'experts a constaté une activité financière importante et continue liée à des réseaux de travail illicite opérant en Afrique subsaharienne. Il continue d'enquêter sur ces affaires, mais des éléments de preuve indiquent que des entités liées au Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies (KPe.050)[124], ainsi qu'une autre entité de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, la Korea Paekho Trading Corporation, ont facilité le travail illicite et l'accès aux systèmes financiers internationaux. Dans plusieurs cas, ces entreprises ont ciblé particulièrement des subventions et des prêts en faveur du développement, ainsi que des investissements étrangers directs destinés à des projets municipaux.

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[120] Voir S/2020/151, par. 177, et S/2019/171, par. 125.

[121] Le Groupe d'experts ne pense pas que l'exportation d'instruments de musique constitue une violation probable des sanctions, mais il enquête sur l'affaire en tant que violation potentielle des dispositions du paragraphe 33 de la résolution 2270 (2016) du Conseil de sécurité, et peut-être d'autres résolutions du Conseil.

[122] Selon l'État Membre, la Korea Ungum Corporation est également connue sous les noms de TS Ungum Corporation, de Korea Yngum Corporation et de Korea Ungum Company.

[123] Deux experts ont estimé qu'aucun élément de preuve ou document d'enquête disponible n'indiquait que ces deux entreprises servaient de sociétés écrans à la Foreign Trade Bank.

[124] Le 5 août 2017, le Conseil de sécurité a désigné le Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies (KPe.050) (voir résolution 2371 (2017), annexe II).

Sénégal

143. En septembre 2019, le Groupe d'experts a ouvert une enquête sur des informations parues dans la presse[125] selon lesquelles des entités soupçonnées d'entretenir des liens avec le Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies continuaient de mener des activités au Sénégal. Il estime que la société Corman Construction est une société écran utilisée par le Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies et qu'elle continue de générer des recettes pour la République populaire démocratique de Corée, en violation des dispositions du paragraphe 18 de la résolution 2375 (2017), du paragraphe 8 de la résolution 2397 (2017) et de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 8 de la résolution 1718 (2006).

144. En outre, le Groupe d'experts note que, bien que le Sénégal ait soumis au Comité un rapport national de mise en œuvre le 21 décembre 2017 (S/AC.49/2018/1), dans lequel il a indiqué que ses autorités avaient pris des mesures appropriées contre le Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural Group, qui était basé sur son territoire, et qu'elles avaient refusé de délivrer des visas d'entrée et de court séjour aux travailleurs de la société originaires de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ou de renouveler des visas préalablement délivrés à ceux-ci, les directeurs, administrateurs et employés de la société ont en fait continué d'exercer leurs activités au Sénégal. Le Groupe d'experts souligne également qu'il avait communiqué au Sénégal, dans sa lettre en date du 29 octobre 2019, les informations dont il disposait sur le changement de nom de la société, qui était devenue la « Corman Construction Commerce »[126]. Enfin, il estime que plusieurs entreprises sénégalaises qui ont signé des contrats avec Corman Construction l'ont fait alors qu'elles étaient au courant de la relation entre cette société et le Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural Group.

145. Le 21 décembre 2017, la Mission permanente du Sénégal a informé le Président du Comité que « les autorités sénégalaises compétentes [avaient] pris des mesures à l'encontre de l'entreprise nord-coréenne Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural Group » et que « le Gouvernement sénégalais avait systématiquement refusé de délivrer des visas d'entrée et de court séjour aux employés nord-coréens de l'entreprise, et de renouveler des visas préalablement délivrés. Du fait de ces mesures, la compagnie se trouve dans l'impossibilité de poursuivre la réalisation de ses chantiers[127]. »

146. D'après les documents obtenus par le Groupe d'experts, la société Corman Construction a été immatriculée comme société sénégalaise le 22 juin 2017 (voir annexe 74), environ six mois avant que le Sénégal n'informe le Groupe d'experts qu'il avait pris des mesures contre le Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural Group. L'analyse de contrats et de documents comptables obtenus par le Groupe d'experts montre que Choe Song Chol et Im Song Sun, ressortissants connus de la République populaire démocratique de Corée liés à la société, ont continué de gérer plusieurs projets de construction à Dakar et de recevoir une rémunération au titre de contrats attribués à cette société et à Corman Construction. Il s'agissait notamment de projets de construction exécutés pour le compte de SCI Adja Seneba (voir annexe 75), de Patisen (voir annexe 76) et de l'entreprise en charge du projet d'aménagement à Diamniadio Lake City (voir annexe 77). Le Groupe d'experts note également que Corman Construction a détenu et continue peut-être de détenir des comptes à la

[125] Voir Ham Ji-ha et Kim Seon-myung « Despite UN sanctions, North Koreans at work in Senegal », Voice of America, 24 septembre 2019, disponible à l'adresse suivante :www.voanews.com/africa/despite-un-sanctions-north-koreans-work-senegal.

[126] Dans son rapport final de mars 2020, le Groupe d'experts a appelé l'attention sur une enquête qu'il menait sur le Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Senegal-SUARL et identifié plusieurs personnes associées à cette société (voir S/2020/151, par. 144).

[127] Voir S/AC.49/2018/1, annexe.

Banque Atlantique et à la Banque Sahélo-Saharienne (voir annexe 78). Il attend toujours une réponse du Sénégal.

République démocratique du Congo

147. Vers février 2018, Pak Hwa Song et Hwang Kil Su, tous deux ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée (voir annexes 79 et 80), ont fait immatriculer à Lubumbashi la société Congo Aconde SARL (voir annexe 81), dont l'objet est de faciliter des projets de construction dans les provinces du Lualaba, du Haut-Lomami et du Haut-Katanga. Certains de ces projets constituent sans doute des violations des sanctions imposées par l'ONU, notamment des dispositions du paragraphe 29 de la résolution 2321 (2016)[128].

148. Peu après avoir créé Congo Aconde SARL, MM. Pak et Hwang ont ouvert des comptes libellés en dollars des États-Unis dans l'agence de Lubumbashi d'une banque dont le siège se trouve au Cameroun (voir annexe 82)[129]. Trois autres personnes associées à Congo Aconde SARL ont également ouvert des comptes dans la même banque : Han Kyong Ho, Ri Yong Gwang et Rim Chol (voir annexe 83)[130]. Selon les documents comptables obtenus par le Groupe d'experts, entre février 2018 et septembre 2020, les comptes appartenant à Congo Aconde SARL et à ses associés affichaient des dépôts d'un montant d'environ 407 800 dollars de dépôts et des retraits d'un montant d'environ 408 145 dollars[131].

149. Selon des documents obtenus par le Groupe d'experts, en février 2019, la ville de Lubumbashi a attribué à Congo Aconde SARL un contrat de services de construction (voir annexe 85). Le 18 avril 2019, M. Pak a demandé la levée d'une garantie bancaire liée à l'attribution de ce contrat du compte de Congo Aconde SARL à Afriland First Bank (voir annexe 86).

150. Le Groupe d'experts note que M. Hwang Kil Su est connu pour avoir participé à des projets de construction au Cameroun, sur lesquels il enquête actuellement. Il enquête également sur des activités similaires liées à la Korea Paekho Trading Corporation et à ses filiales au Rwanda, au Nigéria et au Ghana.

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[128] Les médias locaux indiquent que Congo Aconde SARL a construit des monuments à Haut-Lomami, qui ont été inaugurés en janvier 2019 (voir annexe 84). Un article de presse décrit également Congo Aconde SARL comme une entreprise « sud-coréenne », ce qui est inexact. Voir « Overt affairs: how North Korean businessmen busted sanctions in the Democratic Republic of Congo » (The Sentry, août 2020), disponible à l'adresse suivante : https://thesentry.org/reports/overt-affairs. Voir aussi « Artful dodgers: new findings on North Korean sanctions-busting in the Democratic Republic of Congo » (The Sentry, janvier 2021), disponible à l'adresse suivante : https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ArtfulDodgers-TheSentry-January2021.pdf.

[129] En réponse à une demande d'informations du Groupe d'experts au sujet des activités financières de Congo Aconde SARL, une institution financière a décrit ses procédures de diligence raisonnable, qui comprennent un système de recoupement des noms et des numéros de passeport avec les renseignements figurant sur les listes relatives aux sanctions de l'ONU. L'institution financière a indiqué que MM. Pak Hwa Song et Hwang Kil Su n'étaient pas des entités désignées. Elle a également remis au Groupe d'experts des documents attestant que les deux hommes avaient signé une déclaration selon laquelle les comptes ne seraient pas utilisés à des fins d'activités interdites, notamment de contournement des sanctions.

[130] Après la publication des informations susmentionnées (voir note 129), l'institution financière a fermé tous les comptes associés à Congo Aconde SARL en septembre 2020, selon un de ses représentants.

[131] L'institution financière a affirmé ce qui suit : « Nous n'avons effectué aucun virement à l'étranger depuis les comptes de CONGO ACONDE SARL et nous n'avons reçu de l'étranger aucun virement vers ces comptes ».

Coentreprises et entités de coopération

Korea Narae Trading Corporation

151. Dans son rapport de mi-mandat de 2020, le Groupe d'experts a souligné les tentatives faites par la Korea Narae Trading Corporation et ses représentants, dont Alejandro Cao de Benos, pour établir une coentreprise, en violation des résolutions pertinentes des organes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies[132]. *The Mole: Undercover in North Korea* retrace l'histoire de membres affiliés à la Korea Friendship Association et à la Korea Narae Trading Corporation qui tentent de participer à des activités de contournement des sanctions, notamment à la possible vente d'armes et à la possible vente illicite de pétrole (voir annexe 88). Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur les allégations faites dans ce film et souhaiterait la coopération de son réalisateur et de ses producteurs.

Hanne Ulaan LLC

152. En décembre 2020, la Mongolie a communiqué au Groupe d'experts des informations détaillées concernant une enquête interne sur des activités de contournement des sanctions. Selon elle, Choi Chon Gon, résident et citoyen de la Fédération de Russie, s'est rendu en Mongolie en janvier 2019 dans le but de créer la société Hanne Ulaan LLC et d'ouvrir des comptes bancaires. Les documents d'immatriculation de cette société ont également été envoyés à une adresse à Moscou qui correspond à celle de l'ambassade de la République populaire démocratique de Corée. Selon la Mongolie, ces documents comprenaient un « rapport sur les salaires de la société et le reçu de paiement des frais d'adhésion à la Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Mongolie ». Sur la base de ces activités financières, les autorités mongoles ont tout d'abord estimé que Hanne Ulaan LLC était une société écran que la République populaire démocratique de Corée utilisait pour contourner les sanctions. En outre, elles ont pris des mesures décisives pour geler environ 13 800 dollars se trouvant dans des comptes bancaires liés à Hanne Ulaan LLC et à M. Choi (voir annexe 89).

Korea Surim Trading Corporation

153. Selon un État Membre, la République populaire démocratique de Corée continue de créer des coentreprises et des entités de coopération avec des sociétés chinoises dans le but de contourner les sanctions. L'une de ces sociétés, la Korea Surim Trading Corporation, aurait, d'après cet État Membre, établi une coentreprise avec la China Zhejiang Province Qianwan Ecological Environment Co. Ltd. aux fins de l'élevage de porcs et de l'extraction de sable et de gravier à Sinuiju, le long du fleuve Yalu. Selon le même État Membre, la Korea Myohyang General Corporation s'emploie à faciliter les activités de cette coentreprise. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des informations aux entités ayant participé aux transactions correspondantes [voir par. 55 et annexe 32 b)], mais il n'a toujours pas reçu de réponse.

Korea Puhung Trading Company

154. Dans son rapport de mi-mandat de 2020, le Groupe d'experts a décrit les activités de Kim Su Il, agent du Département de l'industrie des munitions qui continuerait de travailler au Viet Nam (voir annexe 90)[133]. En réponse à la demande d'informations du Groupe d'experts, le Viet Nam a indiqué que M. Kim, qui n'a plus de permis de travail et a mis fin à ses activités, avait ouvert un compte dans une

[132] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, par. 151 et annexe 57.

[133] Ibid., par. 115. Le Viet Nam a indiqué au Groupe d'experts qu'il n'avait pas établi de liens entre M. Kim et le Département de l'industrie des munitions, ni de violations des sanctions.

banque établie sur son territoire en 2017 avant de le fermer le 8 janvier 2018. Trois transactions ont eu lieu entre 2017 et 2018. La première était un virement télégraphique d'un montant de 5 000 dollars émanant de la Korea Puhung Trading Company. Les deuxième et troisième transactions étaient des retraits en espèces d'un montant total de 5 000 dollars effectués, respectivement, le 4 août 2017 et le 8 janvier 2018. Le Viet Nam a également informé le Groupe d'experts que la Korea Puhung General Trading Corporation avait ouvert, le 10 avril 2017, des comptes libellés en dong et en dollars des États-Unis dans une banque établie sur son territoire. Il a affirmé que ces comptes avaient été fermés le 21 juillet 2020.

MCM International Trading Company Limited

155. En enquêtant sur des activités présumées de contournement des sanctions, le Groupe d'experts a démasqué une coentreprise ou une entité de coopération qui opérait en Thaïlande. Selon les dossiers d'immatriculation de la société, la MCM International Trading Company Limited a été enregistrée en novembre 2015 et reste active (voir annexe 91)[134]. Ces dossiers indiquent que le directeur de la société est un certain Min Myong Chol. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé des précisions à la Thaïlande sur cette question.

Cyberactivités visant les institutions financières

Actifs virtuels et prestataires de services d'actifs virtuels

156. Le Groupe d'experts a poursuivi ses enquêtes sur les cyberactivités de la République populaire démocratique de Corée qui visent des institutions financières, des actifs virtuels et des fournisseurs de services y relatifs. Sur la base d'un examen d'informations publiques et d'informations communiquées par des États Membres, il reste d'avis que des cyberacteurs associés à la République populaire démocratique de Corée ont continué de mener des activités contre des institutions financières[135] et des plateformes d'échange de cybermonnaies en 2020, dans le but de générer des recettes à l'appui des programmes d'armes de destruction massive et de missiles balistiques du pays. Selon un État Membre, la République populaire démocratique de Corée a volé des actifs virtuels d'une valeur totale d'environ 316,4 millions de dollars entre 2019 et novembre 2020.

157. Dans son rapport de mi-mandat, le Groupe d'experts a pris note des efforts que la République populaire démocratique de Corée déployait pour blanchir des actifs virtuels (c'est-à-dire des cybermonnaies) volés par l'intermédiaire de courtiers chinois, dans le but d'acquérir de la monnaie fiduciaire[136]. L'analyse des transactions en cybermonnaies montre que le pays continue de cibler les courtiers en actifs virtuels échangés sur le marché libre, en particulier ceux qui sont basés en Chine. Le Groupe d'experts note également que les cyberacteurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée ciblent de plus en plus les services « pair à pair » et les services pour lesquels il n'est pas recueilli d'informations sur l'identité des clients, y compris les services d'échange sur le marché libre.

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[134] Les documents obtenus par le Groupe d'experts portent à croire que les locaux de MCM International ne se trouvent pas à l'adresse indiquée sur le registre de la société.

[135] Sur la base d'informations de sources ouvertes, le Groupe d'experts enquête sur les tentatives qu'aurait faites la République populaire démocratique de Corée pour pirater une institution financière du Chili. En réponse à la demande d'informations du Groupe d'experts, les autorités chiliennes ont déclaré que « L'Unité du Bureau du Procureur général du Chili chargée de la lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent [et] les crimes économiques et organisés, a[vait] indiqué que l'enquête pénale ouverte en relation avec la cyberattaque contre [la banque] [restait] une enquête non officielle. » Le Groupe d'experts poursuit son enquête.

[136] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, annexe 56.

158. D'autres activités entreprises par les mêmes personnes basées en Chine ont été décrites dans le cadre d'une procédure judiciaire engagée par un État Membre en août 2020[137] ; ces activités visaient à blanchir les produits d'actes de piratage informatique commis en juillet et en septembre 2019, à l'issue desquels 272 000 dollars et 2,5 millions de dollars, respectivement, avaient été volés[138]. Il s'agissait notamment du vol de cybermonnaies alternatives, telles que les jetons Proton, les jetons PlayGame et les jetons IHT Real Estate Protocol. Selon un État Membre, la République populaire démocratique de Corée écoulerait à un taux réduit les bitcoins volés par l'intermédiaire de courtiers intervenant sur le marché libre et basés en Chine. Ces derniers convertiraient alors les actifs virtuels en cybermonnaies plus stables, telles que l'ethereum ou le bitcoin, une technique de dissimulation appelée « chain-hopping ».

159. Le Groupe d'experts enquête sur le piratage d'une plateforme d'échange de cybermonnaies qui a eu lieu en septembre 2020. Ce piratage a permis de voler des cybermonnaies d'une valeur de 281 millions de dollars sur cette plateforme. Il semble clairement ressortir d'une première analyse fondée sur les moyens utilisés lors de l'attaque et des tentatives faites par la suite pour en blanchir les produits illicites que la République populaire démocratique de Corée est liée à l'attaque. Il semble également y avoir un lien entre les transactions fondées sur la technologie de la chaîne de blocs effectuées dans le cadre du piratage et un second acte de piratage qui a été commis en octobre 2020 et au cours duquel environ 23 millions de dollars ont été volés. Selon des sources bien au fait des deux actes, les cybercriminels ont exploité des protocoles « DeFi », c'est-à-dire des contrats intelligents qui permettent d'opérer des transactions automatisées.

Plateformes indépendantes de services informatiques

160. Selon un État Membre, la République populaire démocratique de Corée continue de générer des recettes illicites en exploitant des plateformes indépendantes de services informatiques. Les informaticiens du pays peuvent contourner les procédures de diligence raisonnable et de vérification de l'identité des clients en employant essentiellement les mêmes techniques de dissimulation que celles appliquées pour accéder au système financier mondial, c'est-à-dire en utilisant de fausses identités, en recourant à des services de réseaux privés virtuels et en créant des sociétés écrans basées à Hong Kong. Selon une enquête interne menée par une entreprise sur la base d'une enquête du Groupe d'experts, la plupart des comptes liés à la République populaire démocratique de Corée sont basés en Chine[139]. Pour éviter tout contrôle, les utilisateurs des comptes « désactivent » souvent ceux-ci après avoir établi un contact avec des clients potentiels, c'est-à-dire des personnes qui cherchent à louer des services informatiques. L'entreprise a également observé une tendance selon laquelle les utilisateurs liés à la République populaire démocratique de Corée ciblent les plateformes indépendantes de services informatiques dont le niveau de sécurité est faible ou dont les procédures de diligence raisonnable sont peu rigoureuses.

[137] Selon les dossiers judiciaires, les autorités américaines ont pu relier les adresses de protocole Internet des courtiers aux mêmes adresses de protocole Internet qu'avait utilisées la République populaire démocratique de Corée pour faciliter deux actes précédents de piratage de plateformes d'échange de cybermonnaies. Voir www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-complaint-forfeit-280-cryptocurrency-accounts-tied-hacks-two-exchanges.

[138] Selon le même État Membre et d'après les informations obtenues par le Groupe d'experts, l'une des personnes basées en Chine accusées de blanchir les cybermonnaies volées par la République populaire démocratique de Corée avait créé un compte sur une plateforme d'échange de cybermonnaies quelques heures seulement avant que ce pays ne commette l'attaque de juillet 2019.

[139] Voir S/2020/840 et S/2020/840/Corr.1, annexe 47.

161. Dans le cadre de l'enquête qu'il mène actuellement sur des coentreprises, le Groupe d'experts a démasqué l'un de ces réseaux de travail informatique, qui opère à Jilin (Chine). Selon les informations obtenues par le Groupe d'experts, l'utilisateur en question était lié, via un numéro de téléphone et des adresses de protocole Internet chinois, à quatre autres comptes[140]. Il a également fourni un numéro national d'identification chinois et une photographie, deux éléments qui sont vraisemblablement frauduleux. En une année, le compte en question a généré environ 1 050 dollars (avec une moyenne de 200 dollars par opération). Le Groupe continue d'enquêter sur ce réseau, entre autres, mais il note en particulier que les plateformes indépendantes de services informatiques ont du mal à respecter les obligations relatives aux sanctions, et qu'elles s'exposent à des risques en facilitant involontairement l'accès de la République populaire démocratique de Corée aux systèmes de paiement internationaux.

Recommandations

162. **Le Groupe d'experts note que la République populaire démocratique de Corée recourt à des sociétés prestataires de services pour faciliter ses activités de contournement des sanctions et il encourage les États Membres à continuer de s'attaquer au problème des règles et de la réglementation opaques en matière d'enregistrement de sociétés qui peuvent conférer l'anonymat aux personnes et entités menant ces activités.**

163. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres prennent davantage de précaution à l'égard des maîtres-d'œuvre et des sous-traitants qui participent à l'exécution de projets de développement, en particulier à des projets de développement en Afrique subsaharienne faisant appel à des prêts municipaux, à des subventions ou à des investissements étrangers directs.**

164. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres travaillent avec les sociétés informatiques indépendantes pour promouvoir l'application des sanctions et renforcer les moyens et les capacités nécessaires à cette fin.**

165. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité inscrive Choe Song Chol et Im Song Sun sur sa liste relative aux sanctions.**

166. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité inscrive Pak Hwa Song et Hwang Kil Su sur sa liste relative aux sanctions.**

VI. Effets involontaires des sanctions

167. Au paragraphe 25 de sa résolution 2397 (2017), le Conseil de sécurité a réaffirmé que les sanctions imposées par l'ONU « [étaient] censées être sans conséquences humanitaires négatives pour la population civile de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et ne pas nuire ni faire obstacle aux activités, y compris aux activités économiques et à la coopération, à l'aide alimentaire et à l'assistance humanitaire, qui [n'étaient] pas interdites par [ses] résolutions », et souligné que la « responsabilité première de la République populaire démocratique de Corée [était] de pourvoir pleinement aux besoins de subsistance de son peuple et qu'elle [devait] le faire ».

168. Les organismes des Nations Unies, les États Membres et les organisations non gouvernementales décrivent la situation humanitaire en République populaire démocratique de Corée, qui ne cesse d'évoluer, comme catastrophique et en voie de

[140] Le Groupe d'experts a établi un lien entre au moins deux de ces noms d'utilisateur et adresses électroniques et deux plateformes indépendantes de services informatiques différentes.

détérioration rapide. Les effets conjugués de la pandémie de COVID-19, des catastrophes écologiques, des sanctions et de la mauvaise gestion des politiques sociales et économiques ont aggravé les pénuries alimentaires[141], donné lieu à une flambée des prix et à des achats effectués sous l'emprise de la panique, et contribué à limiter encore plus la disponibilité des fournitures et des services médicaux[142].

169. Compte tenu de ces facteurs et du manque de données précises, le Groupe d'experts n'est pas en mesure de faire une évaluation quantitative des effets involontaires des sanctions imposées par l'ONU[143] mais il note que, durant la période considérée, les sanctions ont vraisemblablement eu des effets involontaires sur la population civile.

170. Selon deux États Membres, les sanctions imposées par l'ONU ont eu les effets involontaires ci-après :

- Les restrictions imposées aux importations de carburant ont eu une incidence négative sur la sécurité énergétique[144], la production d'électricité[145], le transport civil et l'agriculture, et causé des problèmes écologiques tels que le déboisement.
- Le manque de ressources agricoles, notamment en ce qui concerne les services de transport, les importations de machines et la production d'engrais, ont entraîné une réduction des « disponibilités » alimentaires[146].
- Les secteurs de la santé, de l'assainissement et de l'hygiène ont été touchés par les restrictions à l'importation de fournitures et d'équipements médicaux[147].
- Les sanctions sectorielles ont entraîné la perte d'au moins 200 000 emplois, entraînant la disparition de sources de revenus et une montée du chômage latent.
- Le rapatriement de travailleurs a entraîné une perte de revenus et créé des conditions socioéconomiques défavorables. Ces travailleurs ont été principalement envoyés effectuer, quasiment sans rémunération, des travaux de construction dans des régions montagneuses reculées, et certains d'entre eux ont connu une crise d'endettement en raison de la cessation soudaine de leurs activités génératrices de revenus.

171. Deux autres États Membres ont indiqué au Groupe d'experts que, d'après leurs analyses, c'est la mauvaise gestion économique de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, y compris les projets coûteux et inutiles et le détournement de ressources, et non les sanctions, qui est le principal facteur à l'origine du déclin de

[141] Un État Membre a fait savoir au Groupe d'experts que la ration fournie par le système public de distribution de denrées alimentaires avait été réduite à 545 grammes en octobre 2020.

[142] La déclaration du Rapporteur spécial sur la situation des droits de l'homme en République populaire démocratique de Corée sur la crise humanitaire qui règne dans ce pays figure à l'annexe 98.

[143] Deux experts ont un avis différent sur cette question.

[144] Selon des documents de recherche (http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Refined-Products-Balance-Thru-July-22-2020-SR-PDF.pdf), le carburant importé est principalement utilisé dans le secteur civil (voir annexe 97).

[145] Selon les États Membres, « de nombreuses centrales thermoélectriques ont suspendu leurs activités en raison de la pénurie croissante d'hydrocarbures dans le pays ».

[146] Selon les États Membres, « les agriculteurs de la République populaire démocratique de Corée sont contraints de revenir à des méthodes moins efficaces (y compris l'utilisation de bêtes de trait et le recours au travail manuel), faute de pouvoir utiliser du matériel agricole qui fonctionne au carburant ».

[147] Un des États Membres note que « des problèmes de santé résultent des restrictions à l'importation de fournitures et d'équipements médicaux liées aux mesures de coercition, et d'un manque de devises étrangères dû aux restrictions à l'exportation ».

l'agriculture, de l'insécurité alimentaire et de la mauvaise qualité des services sanitaires et médicaux. Les États Membres ont en outre noté ce qui suit :

- La République populaire démocratique de Corée continue de faire passer la stabilité et la continuité du régime de la famille Kim avant toute autre priorité nationale, notamment la fourniture de services sanitaires et médicaux et la sécurité alimentaire.
- La grande majorité des revenus que les ressortissants de la République populaire démocratique de Corée perçoivent à l'étranger est conservée par les entreprises publiques qui emploient ceux-ci, de sorte que le régime est le principal bénéficiaire de leur travail. En outre, la dureté des conditions de vie, qui sont contrôlées et surveillées, est telle qu'il est difficile de tirer un quelconque « avantage social » des travailleurs à l'étranger.
- Des réformes de l'agriculture et des entreprises ont été lancées publiquement quelques mois après l'arrivée au pouvoir de Kim Jong Un, en 2012, mais elles ont été annulées presque immédiatement après, soit près de cinq ans avant que le Conseil de sécurité n'impose à l'unanimité des sanctions sectorielles et des interdictions contre les travailleurs à l'étranger, en 2017.
- La République populaire démocratique de Corée politise l'aide humanitaire. Elle n'accepte cette aide que dans les domaines jugés prioritaires par le Parti du travail de Corée et seulement de la part de pays qui ne posent pas de problème idéologique au régime ou qui n'exigent pas la mise en place de procédures visant à réduire au minimum le risque de détournement. En outre, il est « presque certain » que l'aide a été détournée pour répondre aux besoins des dirigeants, ce qui a fini par réduire l'intérêt pour la mise en œuvre d'une véritable réforme économique.
- Le régime a consacré toute son énergie à construire à la hâte un hôpital de prestige au cœur de la capitale. Les travaux auraient été lancés sans même que soit défini un plan global d'achèvement et ont été bâclés pour tenir un délai politique artificiel, qui, au final, n'a même pas été respecté.

172. Afin d'évaluer les conséquences de la pandémie de COVID-19 sur les opérations humanitaires en République populaire démocratique de Corée, le Groupe d'experts a mené une enquête auprès de 38 organisations en mai 2020 et a relancé chacune d'entre elles en octobre 2020. Il s'agit d'organismes des Nations Unies et d'organisations non gouvernementales qui ont soumis des demandes de dérogation au Comité, soit directement, soit par l'intermédiaire d'un État Membre ou du Coordonnateur résident des Nations Unies en République populaire démocratique de Corée. En janvier 2021, le Groupe d'experts avait reçu 11 réponses[148], dont un résumé figure à l'annexe 99 a).

173. Des organismes des Nations Unies et des organisations non gouvernementales ont informé le Groupe d'experts que le personnel et les capacités opérationnelles avaient été considérablement réduits en raison de la fermeture des frontières et des restrictions imposées aux voyages intérieurs et internationaux[149]. Plusieurs entités ont dû suspendre leurs activités de mise en œuvre et de suivi. Dans beaucoup de cas, l'aide humanitaire ne parvient plus aux populations cibles.

[148] La réponse à l'enquête du Groupe d'experts était facultative et ne préjuge en rien de l'obtention d'une dérogation. [Les propositions reçues des organisations non gouvernementales figurent à l'annexe 99 b)].

[149] En décembre 2020, seuls deux fonctionnaires internationaux de l'Organisation des Nations Unies chargés d'activités humanitaires et neuf ambassadeurs se trouvaient encore à Pyongyang.

174. Plusieurs entités ont souligné dans leurs réponses la charge que représentaient les coûts supplémentaires engendrés par le stockage à la frontière d'articles nécessitant des dispositifs de contrôle de la température, tels que les médicaments, et d'autres fournitures[150]. Certaines ont relevé des effets secondaires dus au fait que la chaîne d'approvisionnement et les dispositifs logistiques étaient moins fiables, ce qui contribuait à allonger les délais. Une entité a indiqué que ses délais d'approvisionnement s'étaient considérablement accrus, pour atteindre plus de huit mois[151]. Des entités ont également fait face à une concurrence accrue lorsqu'il s'est agi de trouver des expéditeurs et des transitaires disponibles, ce qui a aggravé le problème. Enfin, plusieurs répondants ont fait remarquer que l'absence continue d'un réseau bancaire stable, conjuguée à la fermeture des frontières et au manque de vols internationaux, avait créé de graves problèmes de trésorerie, qui entraîneraient vraisemblablement une réduction des efforts humanitaires et, éventuellement, une reprogrammation du budget pour l'année suivante.

Recommandations

175. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité examine les réponses des organisations non gouvernementales à son enquête afin de contribuer à éclairer les décisions futures et d'améliorer l'évaluation des besoins d'aide humanitaire et de l'efficacité de cette aide (voir annexe 99).**

176. **Le Groupe d'experts note l'importance que revêtent les dispositions visant à rétablir le réseau bancaire.**

177. **Le Groupe d'experts note l'utilité des exposés que les organismes compétents des Nations Unies présentent deux fois par an sur les effets involontaires des sanctions et recommande que le Comité poursuive cette pratique.**

178. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Conseil de sécurité continue d'examiner les questions et les procédures relatives à l'atténuation des effets involontaires des sanctions sur la population civile de la République populaire démocratique de Corée et sur les opérations d'aide humanitaire, pour aider la population vulnérable et surmonter les conséquences de la pandémie de COVID-19.**

179. **Le Comité devrait continuer de rationaliser les mécanismes et les procédures de demande de dérogation pour raisons humanitaires.**

VII. Rapports nationaux de mise en œuvre

État de la situation concernant les rapports des États Membres sur l'application des résolutions pertinentes

180. Au 5 février 2021, 66 États Membres avaient présenté des rapports sur l'application des dispositions du paragraphe 8 de la résolution 2397 (2017) et 81 États

[150] La Chine a noté que « les autorités douanières chinoises [avaient] établi une règle de base et une méthode de travail unifiée, qui leur [avaient] permis de régler activement les problèmes rencontrés lors du dédouanement des articles humanitaires destinés à la République populaire démocratique de Corée », malgré les affirmations contraires des organisations non gouvernementales (voir annexe 93).

[151] Le Comité accélère la procédure de dérogation au titre de l'aide humanitaire en mettant en place un dispositif de prises de décisions en deux jours, dans le cadre de la riposte à la COVID-19 (voir la Notice nº 7 d'aide à l'application, disponible à l'adresse suivante : https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/implementation_notice_assistance_no._7_-_french_0.pdf).

Membres sur l'application des dispositions de son paragraphe 17, 95 États Membres sur l'application de la résolution 2375 (2017), 90 États Membres sur l'application de la résolution 2371 (2017), 107 États Membres sur l'application de la résolution 2321 (2016) et 115 États Membres sur l'application de la résolution 2270 (2016). Malgré l'augmentation du nombre des rapports présentés, le Groupe d'experts note que de nombreux États Membres (127, dont 1 ayant siégé au Conseil de sécurité en 2020 en qualité de membre non permanent) n'ont toujours pas présenté de rapport sur l'application de la résolution 2397 (2017).

Recommandations

181. **Le Groupe d'experts recommande que les États Membres présentent leurs rapports dans le plein respect des résolutions 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) et 2397 (2017).**

VIII. Recommandations

182. Voir l'annexe 100 pour une liste récapitulative des recommandations.

Annex 1: COVID-19, Democratic People's Republic of Korea border measures

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea responded rapidly to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic with border closures, internal controls and quarantine measures (see S/840/2020, Annex 1). All international flights remained suspended throughout the current reporting period. Passenger rail services also remained suspended. Occasional and limited cross-border deliveries of goods and cargo by road and rail were recorded. Maritime deliveries to the refined petroleum facility at Nampo continued. Maritime container shipments were occurring at the start of the reporting period but were largely suspended shortly afterwards. Outward coal shipments continued at reduced levels. There was almost no movement of people into or out of the country. Diplomatic missions, UN agencies and non-government organisations were permitted to repatriate staff but were unable to bring staff into the DPRK.

Source: The Panel.

Annex 2: Yongbyon nuclear complex

(1) Plumes of steam observed in uranium enrichment plant complex on 14 July, 18 September, and 22 September 2020.

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 14 Jul. 2020, 02:17 UTC

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 18 Sep. 2020, 02:12 UTC

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 22 Sep. 2020, 02:54 UTC

(2) A cooling device at the uranium enrichment facility remained removed (see para. 3, S/2020/840)

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 12 Dec. 2019, 02:47 UTC, and 20 Dec. 2020, 02:45 UTC

Annex 3: Uranium mine and processing plant in Pyongsan

Pyongsan uranium mine and plant were damaged by typhoons in the summer of 2020. However, satellite imagery suggests its operation was continuing as of late 2020. Furthermore, satellite imagery suggests the leakage of a waste pipeline over the Ryesong River. The waste tailings contain heavy metal and acid and are highly toxic, which could cause local adverse environmental impact.

(1) Construction and modernization of the building



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 27 Nov. 2020, 04:54 UTC and 14 Apr. 2020, 02:21 UTC

(2) Leak of waste pipeline



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 27 Nov. 2020, 04:54 UTC; 14 Nov. 2020, 01:59 UTC; 30 Oct. 2020, 05:05 UTC; 20 Sep. 2020, 02:19 UTC; Google Earth: 23 Mar. 2019.

Annex 4: Impact of typhoons at the dam of Kuryong River in Yongbyon

Dam breach
18 September 2020

9 October 2020

17 October 2020

23 October 2020

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 8 Jul. 2020, 02:47 UTC; 5 Sep. 2020, 05:10 UTC; 18 Sep. 2020, 02:12 UTC; 9 Oct. 2020, 02:15 UTC; 17 Oct. 2020, 02:18 UTC; 23 Oct. 2020, 02:15 UTC; 20 Dec. 2020, 02:45 UTC

Annex 5: Suspected uranium enrichment facility in Kangson

The Panel is continuing monitoring the facility for its possible connection with the nuclear program in Kangson (figure). Several assessments have been stated. The IAEA has stated that "if the Kangson complex is a centrifuge enrichment facility, this would be consistent with the Agency's assessed chronology of the development of the DPRK's reported uranium enrichment program".[1] An analysis was published concerning one possibility that the facility is not a uranium enrichment facility but could be another type of facility related to the uranium enrichment programme, such as a workshop for production and testing of centrifuge components.[2]

Figure: Suspected uranium enrichment facility in Kangson

Source: Planet Labs Inc. (Skysat Collect, 4 Dec. 2020, 02:57 UTC)

[1] IAEA, 1 September 2020, GOV2020/42-GC(64)/18.

[2] 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2020/12/kangson201217/

Annex 6: Statement by Chairman Kim Jong Un concerning DPRK's nuclear weapon program

On 11 October DPRK's state media reported "Congratulatory note to Supreme Leader of Party, Nation and Armed Forces, Kim Jong Un" by several committees of Workers Party of Korea, State Affairs Commission, Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and Cabinet of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated on 10 October 2020. In the note they expressed the commitment to "…building strong military power by strengthening the political ideological and military technical power of the revolutionary force in all directions, and brighten the country as a world class military power, by massively strengthening defence capability centred around nuclear force in both quality and quantity."

On 9 January 2021, DPRK's state media reported in Mr. Kim Jong Un's report on the work of the Central Committee of the Party presented at Eighth Congress of the Workers Party of Korea in January 2021, Mr. Kim Jong Un stated the Central Committee "carried out the great cause of building a state nuclear force", and a plan to develop tactical nuclear weapons are presented. It was also reported that in the closing remarks of this Eighth Congress, Mr. Kim Jong Un stated that "[the country] must further strengthen the nuclear war deterrent while doing our best to build up the most powerful military strength."

Annex 7: A Member State's information on dual use choke-point items used for nuclear fuel cycle which are not listed as items to which measures imposed in paragraph 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) of resolution 1718 (2006) should apply

(1) Insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs)

Fast-switching electrical components are necessary in several power applications, including frequency changers. Four or more IGBTs are critical components in modern multi-phase frequency changers (inverters, converters, motor drives).

(2) Programmable logic controllers (PLSs)

Modern process control systems incorporate industrial computer technology for control rooms. PLCs contain the programmed software that operates instrumentation such as frequency changers and valves.

(3) Roots vacuum pumps, rotary vane vacuum pumps

Vacuum equipment is required in many nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Roots pumps are commonly employed as a booster pump for several types of forepumps (such as rotary vane pumps).

(4) Pressure transducers, micromanometers

Many nuclear fuel cycle processes require precise pressure measurement. Corrosion resistant pressure transducers are used for centrifuge enrichment cascade instrumentation. Micromanometers are also used as ancillary instruments to monitor operations.

(5) Epoxy resin and associated hardeners, monel welding rods

Epoxy resins and associated hardeners are used to form composite structures and protect centrifuge rotors from exposure to corrosive uranium components. Monel welding rods are used to weld corrosion resistant nickel-alloy materials.

Source: Member State and the Panel

Annex 8: Examples of research topics on two DPRK university websites

1. Kim Il Sung University academic journal Vol. 66, No. 2, 2020

(1) Study on Neutron Detector with Lithium-6 Sensor

Pak Su Il ,Ko Myong Son and Kim Song Jin

(abstract)

In this paper we manufactured a thermal neutron sensor with compound contained Lithium-6, constructed a thermal neutron detector with this sensor and ZnS(Ag) scintillator, and evaluated its detection efficiency. The thermal neutron detection efficiency of Lithium-6 sensor is 14%.

Keywords: neutron detector, scintillator, radiation detector

(2) Improvement of Some Characteristics in Nuclear Reactor Internal Vibration Measuring Instrument

Ri Kum San, Ro Kwang Chol

(abstract)

In order to realize normalization of analysis results for various type of accelerators sensors with sensitivity 10 ~ 1000mV within acceleration range of 1 ~ 50g, we have enabled gain of the charge amplifier to be regulated 0 ~ 60dB.

Applying on-line USB communication and microprocessor PIC18F4550 and converting measuring device into NI-VISA device, we have increased communication rate up to 12Mbps and normalized nuclear reactor internal vibration measuring.

In addition, by using powerful digital signal processing function of LabVIEW, we have improved reliability and realized multifunction and on-line in measuring and analyzing of nuclear reactor internal vibration.

Keywords: vibration measuring, nuclear reactor internal vibration

(3) A Method of Discriminating Seismic Wave and Explosive Wave in a Digital Seismic Analysis

Pak Chi Bong, Jong Kyong Su and Kim Yong Il

(abstract)

We suggested a method to determinate seismic wave and explosive wave, which were based on the power spectra mean frequency ratio and the linear discriminant analyze.

Keywords: seismic wave, explosive wave

Source: Kim Il Sung University website, www.ryongnamsan.edu.kp/univ/ko/research/journals (accessed 4 January 2021)

2. Publication by experts affiliated with Kim Chaek University of Technology

(1) Determination of geological strength index of jointed rock mass based on image processing

Kunui Hong (Faculty of Mining Engineering, Kim Chaek University of Technology),
Eunchol Han (School of Engineering and Science, Kim Chaek University of Technology),
Kwangsong Kang (Faculty of Mining Engineering, Kim Chaek University of Technology)

(abstract)

The geological strength index (GSI) system, widely used for the design and practice of mining process, is a unique rock mass classification system related to the rock mass strength and deformation parameters based on the generalized Hoek-Brown and Mohr-Coulomb failure criteria. The GSI can be estimated using standard chart and field observations of rock mass blockiness and discontinuity surface conditions. The GSI value gives a numerical representation of the overall geotechnical quality of the rock mass. In this study, we propose a method to determine the GSI quantitatively using photographic images of in situ jointed rock mass with image processing technology, fractal theory and artificial neural network (ANN). We employ the GSI system to characterize the jointed rock mass around the working in a coal mine. The relative error between the proposed value and the given value in the GSI chart is less than 3.6%.

Keywords: Jointed rock mass, Geological strength index (GSI), Image processing Fractal dimension, Artificial neural network (ANN)

Source: Kim Chaek University of Technology website,
http://www.kut.edu.kp/index.php/page/index?si=25http (accessed 4 January 2021)

(2) Papers published in KUT International Conference for the 70th foundation anniversary

1) The Stability Estimation of Rock Mass Surrounding Tunnel by Strength Reduction FEM

Jong Tok Yong, Jang Ui Jun

2) 3D Numerical Modeling for Tunnel in Anisotropic Rock by FEM

Hwang Ryong Hyon1, Ri Yong Il

3) Intelligent Back Analysis of Geotechnical Parameters for Soft Rock Mass Surrounding Tunnel using Grey Verhulst Model

Han Un Chol, Hong Kun Ui

Source: Kim Chaek University of Technology website,
http://www.kut.edu.kp/index.php/page/index?si=54 (accessed 4 January 2021)

Annex 9: “Sister University” listed on the website of Kim Il Sung University

1) Kim Il Sung University website



Source: Kim Il Sung University website, “Sister University” www.ryongnamsan.edu.kp/univ/en/education/sister_university. (accessed 11 December 2020)

2) Panel's enquiry (a letter sent to a university)

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL.: +1 212 963 1055 • FAX: +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: [redacted]

YOUR REFERENCE

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel would like to request information on academic exchanges between [redacted] University and the DPRK's Kim Il Sung University. The website of **Kim Il Sung University,** as of 11 December 2020, lists [redacted] **University** as a sister university with which Kim Il Sung University had previously conducted academic exchanges or is currently doing so (Annex).

The Panel makes enquiries concerning scientific and technical partnerships with DPRK scientists in the academic fields covered by the relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (below). The Panel seeks information to assess whether these partnerships have involved joint studies which may have contributed, or continue to contribute, to the development by the DPRK of technologies related to its WMD programme.

Paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), which reinforces paragraph 28 of resolution 1874 (2009) which called for Member State vigilance, states that "all Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines". Furthermore, paragraph 10 of resolution 2321 (2016) clarifies that for the purposes of implementing paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016) specialized teaching and training which

[redacted]

could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to, advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering.

Moreover, paragraph 11 of resolution 2321 (2016) decides that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless in specified cases exempted by the 1718 Committee or in all other cases notified in advance to the Committee.

Furthermore, the Panel has concerns that if DPRK scholars have access to the internet, libraries, and exchange with other scholars, they may use this to collect proliferation sensitive information which could contribute to the DPRK's WMD and ballistic missile development or the enhancement of its military operational capability. The Panel also has concerns that networks developed during overseas exchange programs may be used to facilitate the transfer of intangible technology applicable to the DPRK's WMD program.

In addition, paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017) requires all Member States to repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in their jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés within 24 months from 22 December 2017 and to submit midterm and final reports on repatriation. The Panel notes that paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017) covers all DPRK citizens who are earning income, regardless of work authorization, visa category, and how the payment is labelled.

In connection with the above, and in its effort to gather reliable and verifiable information, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in providing the following:

1. Information on the current status of [redacted] University's academic exchange with Kim Il Sung University.

2. The total number of DPRK students who have studied at [redacted] University since 2017, as well as the number of current DPRK students. Please specify their degree programs (whether Masters, PhD, post-doctorate researchers etc), fields of study and subject of their scientific collaborations, if applicable. Please provide information on any scholarships or sponsorship they have received / are receiving.

3. Confirmation if any DPRK scholars have been affiliated with [redacted] University since 2017. If so, please provide the Panel with the following information:

   3-1) A list of the DPRK scholars (name, affiliation, area of research, period of affiliation) as well as copies of documents showing their source(s) of income while in [redacted] including sponsorships (if applicable);
   3-2) Information on whether any financial support, such as scholarships, for the DPRK scholars are provided by [redacted] University; and
   3-3) Information regarding any non-financial resources provided by [redacted] University, including the use of facilities and access to databases and IT.

Paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2515 (2020) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal. The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to this issue.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be grateful for any information to be supplied within four weeks of the date of this letter. As the Panel intends to report on these matters in its next report to the Security Council, we would be grateful to receive a timely response to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration. Please reply to the Panel at [redacted]

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex: Website of Kim Il Sung University

Source: The Panel

(3) Replies from universities received by by 4 February 2021

University of Belgrade

UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE

Address: Studentski trg 1, 11000 Belgrade, Republic of Serbia
Tel.: +381-11 3207401; Fax: +381-11 2638818; E-mail: officebu@rect.bg.ac.rs

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Belgrade, January 13, 2021
05 68-101/2-21

[redacted]

I am addressing you with reference to the letter sent to the University of Belgrade on January 04, 2021, on behalf of United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts (Reference S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.12), with a request that the University of Belgrade provide information on academic exchanges between University of Belgrade and the DPRK's Kim Il Sung University.

As mentioned in the letter, the DPRK's Kim Il Sung University's website lists a Belgrade University from the then Yugoslavia as a partner university.

Please note that the University of Belgrade is a university from the Republic of Serbia and that since 2017, the year of reference mentioned in the letter, the Rector, as the University's only legal representative as defined by the Statute of the University of Belgrade, has not signed any agreements on cooperation or academic exchange with the DPRK's Kim Il Sung University. Consequently, there could not have been any student or staff exchanges subject to such agreements. Therefore, with respect to questions 1 through 3 of the Letter, the University of Belgrade has no information or records to provide in this regard.

In addition, please let us stress that the University of Belgrade has not had any type of cooperation, scientific, research or other with the DPRK's Kim Il Sung University since 2017 until the present date.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if the University of Belgrade may be of additional assistance.

Sincerely Yours,

Rector

[redacted]

Freie Universität Berlin

Freie Universität Berlin

Das Präsidium
Abteilung Internationales

Freie Universität Berlin, Abt. IV - Internationales
Kaiserswerther Straße 16-18, 14195 Berlin

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

United Nations
New York, NY 10017

Referat IV B
Kaiserswerther Str. 16-18
14195 Berlin

Telefon +[redacted]
Fax +[redacted]
E-Mail [redacted]
rlin.de
Internet www.fu-berlin.de
Bearb.-Zeichen IV B
Bearbeiter [redacted]
Zimmer [redacted]

In re: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.4

Berlin, 31.1.2021

[redacted]

Thank you very much for your letter from 4 January 2021. Please find the answers to your questions below:

1. The listing of FUB as a sister university on the website of the Kim Il Sung University is misleading, since no formal agreement between both universities has been signed. So far, only Letters of Intent regarding cooperation in the fields of humanities and social sciences have been exchanged.
2. From 3 to 24 January 2020, a group of 12 students from Kim Il Sung University attended a German language course within the framework of the Freie Universität Berlin International Summer and Winter University (FU-BiS) program at FUB. They were accompanied by two professors from their home university (please see the attached list for details). The visit was prepared in close cooperation with the German Foreign Office after detailed consultation with the German Ambassador to the DPRK, His Excellency [redacted]. All costs were borne by institutions from the Republic of Korea. During the whole time, the students had no access to FUB's WLAN or Intranet, no electronic devices were provided. Homework and other assignments were all hand-written.
3. No DPRK scholars have been affiliated with FUB since 2017.

Yours sincerely,

[redacted]

Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (Inalco)

inalco

Institut national
des langues
et civilisations orientales

Référence
2021/UNSCPE/001
Service émetteur
Présidence
Téléphone
33 01 81 70 10 00
Mail
Secretariat.presidence@inalco.fr

Reference : S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.6

Paris, 18 January 2021

Dear Madam/Dear Sir

In response to your letter regarding collaboration between Inalco and North Korean Kim Il Sung University, we inform you that our collaboration ended in 2017. Since then, we did not have any type of academic exchange or collaboration concerning research, technical partnership or education matter. We suspect a lack of updating in the Kim Il Sung website and we will ask them to delete incorrect information.
We assure the Panel of Experts that we respect the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by the Security Council resolutions and we do not intend to reactivate colloboration with North Korea universities in the future.

Yours Faithfully

[redacted]

inalco

Institut national des langues
et civilisations orientales

Comenius University in Bratislava

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, 21 January, 2021 5:04 AM
[redacted]
Subject: Kim Il Sung University

Dear,

I am writing you regarding the letter demanding information about students and scientists from Kim Il Sung University who were or are at Comenius University in Bratislava. However, Comenius University in Bratislava has no bilateral agreement with any North Korean University. Neither there exist faculty agreements.
So, the information about bilateral agreement with Comenius University in Bratislava published at the website of Kim Il Sung University IS FALSE. We do not have any cooperation with them and do not host any of their students or scholars.

Sincerely Yours,
[redacted]

University of Tirana

REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
UNIVERSITY OF TIRANA
DIRECTORATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STUDENTS

No. 100/1 Prot. Tirana, on 21 .01.2021

To: [redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [redacted]

Following the request send by the "Panel", where Kim Il Sung University has listed University of Tirana as a sister university and has conducted academic exchanges since 2017, I would kindly infom you that:

1-University of Tirana does not have any institutional agreement with Kim Il Sung University;

2- University of Tirana has not done any academic exchange with Kim Il Sung University;

3- No student from DPRK has studied at University of Tirana including current period;

4- No DPRK student scholars has been affiliated with University of Tirana since 2017 and current period;

Yours Faithfully,

RECTOR

[redacted]

Address: "Mother Teresa" Square, Rectorate UT, Tirana, Tel: +355 4 2250166/Fax: +355 4 22 39 81

Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski

СОФИЙСКИ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ
„СВ. КЛИМЕНТ ОХРИДСКИ"

РЕКТОР

SOFIA UNIVERSITY
ST. KLIMENT OHRIDSKI

RECTOR

Sofia, 27th January 2021

[redacted]

COORDINATOR OF THE PANEL OF EXPERTS

Subject: Your reference S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.11

[redacted]

In reference to your letter dated from 4th January 2021 and based on the internal investigation conducted on the issues you raised, we would like to provide you with the following clarifications:

1. Information on the current status of Sofia University's academic exchange with Kim Il Sung University:

During the period considered (since 2017 until now) Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski has not maintained any bilateral relations with Kim Il Sung University. There is no evidence in our archives for either existing cooperation agreements or similar documents, or for any form of academic exchange between both institutions.

2. The total number of DPRK students who have studied at Sofia University since 2017, as well as the number of current DPRK students.

Information regarding students, citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that have been enrolled in bachelor programmes at Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski. Since 2017 until now Sofia University has provided education to 11 students under consideration in your letter:

БЪЛГАРИЯ, СОФИЯ 1504, БУЛ. ЦАР ОСВОБОДИТЕЛ 15
ТЕЛ.: +359 2 987 39 96, 930 82 07; ФАКС: +359 2 846 61 71
WWW.UNI-SOFIA.BG RECTOR@UNI-SOFIA.BG

BULGARIA, 1504 SOFIA, 15 TSAR OSVOBODITEL BLVD.
PHONE: +359 2 987 39 96, 930 82 07; FAX: +359 2 846 61 71
WWW.UNI-SOFIA.BG RECTOR@UNI-SOFIA.BG

СОФИЙСКИ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ
„СВ. КЛИМЕНТ ОХРИДСКИ"
РЕКТОР

SOFIA UNIVERSITY
St. KLIMENT OHRIDSKI
RECTOR

No	Student's degree	Programme	Grounds for admission	Year of enrolment	Current status
1	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2016/2017	Study suspended in February 2017
2	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2016/2017	Study suspended in October 2017
3	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2016/2017	Study suspended in July 2019
4	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2016/2017	Study suspended in July 2018
5	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2016/2017	Study suspended in September 2018
6	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2016/2017	Study suspended in July 2019
7	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	Program for cooperation in the field of education and culture between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the DPRK	2016/2017	Completed program requirements in June 2020 before graduation
8	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2018/2019	Ongoing study
9	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2019/2020	Ongoing study
10	Full time BA Student	European Union and European Integration (BA)	child of a diplomat	2019/2020	Ongoing study
11	Full time BA Student	Psychology	Program for cooperation in	2017/2018	Study suspended in

БЪЛГАРИЯ, СОФИЯ 1504, БУЛ. ЦАР ОСВОБОДИТЕЛ 15
ТЕЛ.: +359 2 987 39 96, 930 82 07; ФАКС: +359 2 846 61 71
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СОФИЙСКИ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ
„СВ. КЛИМЕНТ ОХРИДСКИ"

РЕКТОР

SOFIA UNIVERSITY
ST. KLIMENT OHRIDSKI

RECTOR

			the field of education and culture between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the DPRK		October 2019

All bachelor students listed above have not received funding in the form of scholarships, grants or other financial aid provided by Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski. Master or doctoral students, citizens of DPRK, have not been enrolled at Sofia University since 2017.

3. Confirmation if any scholars have been affiliated with Sofia University since 2017.

We confirm that during the period under review there is no evidence of any scholars, citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who have been affiliated with Sofia University.

SOFIA UNIVERSITY
ST. KLIMENT OHRIDSKI
Osvoboditel Blvd

Yours faithfully,

[redacted]

Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD)

Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo
PRIMADA DE AMÉRICA
Fundada el 28 de octubre de 1538

Rectoría
"Año del Rediseño Curricular por Competencia y Consolidación de la Educación Virtual"

29th January 2021
Santo Domingo, N.D.

Nº 0065

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [redacted]

I am politely writing to you in reference to the communication DSD/AH023/2021 No. 01263 dated 19th January 2021 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic, about the Note Verbale MPRD-ONU-NY-0014-2021 dated 6th January 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations and the Note Verbale S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.17 dated 5th January 2021 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009).

In response to your request, I inform you that the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD), currently does not have any academic exchange program in development with the Kim Il Sung University of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), nor do we have in our database, agreements, scholarship programs or partnerships involving joint studies which may have contributed to the development by the DPRK of technologies related to its Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme.

Sincerely Yours,

[redacted]
Rector

UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE SANTO DOMINGO · SECRETARÍA GENERAL · Santo Domingo · República Dominicana

Ciudad Universitaria · Distrito Nacional
República Dominicana · Apartado Postal No. 1355
Tel.: 809-535-6273 · Fax: 809-535-7374
E-mail: rectoria@uasd.edu.do · www.uasd.edu.do

Cairo University (Egypt)

[Translation from Arabic]

3 February 2021

Sir,

I write in reference to your letter dated 5 January 2021 (S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.14). I have the honour to note that the relevant Egyptian agencies have reported the following:

I. With regard to the cooperation agreement between Cairo University and Kim Il Sung University:

1. The agreement in question was signed in July 2011. It has not been implemented since it was signed. No student or research exchange has been carried out under it (please find annexed the text of the agreement in the three languages).

2. Article 8 of the agreement states that it shall be valid for three years and automatically renewable for another three years only. The agreement would therefore have expired in July 2017.

II. With regard to faculty members or academic researchers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea affiliated with Cairo University since 2017:

There are no faculty members or academic researchers who are nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea currently affiliated with Cairo University, nor have there been any affiliated since 2017.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mohamed Edrees

Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations

(Original)

Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic
Of Egypt to the United Nations

البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية مصر العربية
لدى الامم المتحدة

304 East 44th Street / New York, NY 10017
Tel: (212) 503-0300 / Fax: (212) 949-5999

CHAN/2021/068/BH

٣ فبرايـــر ٢٠٢١

[redacted]

منسق فريق خبراء مجلس الأمن المنشأ بالقرار ١٨٧٤(٢٠٠٩)

تحية طيبة وبعد،

بالإشارة الى خطابكم رقم S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.14 بتاريخ ٢٠٢١/٠١/٥، أتشرف بالإحاطة بأن الجهات المصرية المعنية قد أفادت بما يلي:

أولاً: فيما يتعلق باتفاق التعاون بين جامعة القاهرة وجامعة كيم إيل سونج:

١- تم توقيع الاتفاق المشار إليه في يوليو ٢٠١١ ولم يتم تفعيله منذ توقيعه ولم يتم على أساسه إجراء أي تبادل طلابي أو بحثي (مرفق نص الاتفاق باللغات الثلاثة).

٢- وفقاً للمادة الثامنة من الاتفاق، فإنه يسري لمدة ثلاث سنوات ويجدد لثلاث سنوات فقط، ومن ثم فإن الاتفاق يعد منتهياً منذ يوليو ٢٠١٧.

ثانياً: فيما يتعلق بوجود أعضاء بهيئات التدريس أو باحثين أكاديميين من جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية ملحقين بجامعة القاهرة منذ عام ٢٠١٧:

لا يوجد أي أعضاء بهيئة التدريس أو باحثين أكاديميين من رعايا جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية ملحقين حالياً أو تم إلحاقهم سابقاً بجامعة القاهرة منذ عام ٢٠١٧.

وتفضلوا بقبول وافر الاحترام،

ع/ السفير / محمد ادريـــس

[redacted]

مندوب مصر الدائم لدى الأمم المتحدة

(annex: English text only)

Agreement on Friendship, Exchange and Cooperation in Fields of Education and Scientific Research Between Kim Il Sung University of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea and Cairo University of the Arab Republic of Egypt

****

Kim Il Sung University of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea and Cairo University of the Arab Republic of Egypt (hereinafter referred to as both Parties) desirous to develop friendly relations and promote exchange and cooperation in the fields of education, scientific research and training of mutual concern between the two Parties in accordance with the " Agreement on Cultural cooperation between the Government of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt" have agreed as follows:

Article 1 :-

Both Parties, in order to strengthen friendship and cooperation between the two universities, shall establish friendly relations.

Article 2 :-

Both Parties shall exchange congratulatory letters and organize various activities according to their given situations on the occasion of the other s national holidays, and other commemoeative days of the universities.

Article 3 :-

Both Parties shall exchange achievements and experiences gained in the fields of education and scientific research.

Article 4 :-

Both Parties shall undertake joint research relative to the issues of mutual concern and, if necessary, jointly organize workshops and training course and exchange visits of experts.

Article 5 :-

Both Parties shall encourage the students of Kim Il Sung University to study in Cairo University upon mutual agreement.

Article 6:-

Both Parties shall exchange delegations for the Purpose of sharing experiences and joint research, and the sending Party shall be responsible for round-trip expenses and the receiving Party shall be responsible for boarding and lodging, local transport and first aid.

Article 7 :-

This Agreement may be altered by mutual written consent of both Parties.

Article 8 :-

The Present Agreement shall enter into force for a period of three years on the day of signature by both Parties. It shall be renewed for another three years unless written notice is given six months before the termination by one of the Parties.

Done in two copies each in Korean, Arabic and English languages, all the texts being equally authentic.

President of Cairo University	President of Kim Il Sung University
[redacted]	Prof.Dr. Song Ja Rip
Date: 20/7/2011	2011/6/23 Pyongyang

The University of Algiers I (Algeria)

الجمهوريــة الجزائريــة الديمقراطيــة الشعبيــة

REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE

INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA ON ACADEMIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN UNIVERSITY OF ALGIERS AND THE DPRK'S KIM II SUNG UNIVERSITY

Further to the request of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) to gather and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by the Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017, 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), with regard to academic exchanges between University of Algiers and the DPRK's Kim II Sung University, the Government of Algeria would like to convey the following:

1- The University of "Algiers I" does not conduct any action of cooperation or exchange with DPRK's Kim II Sung University.

2- The information reported on the website of DPRK's Kim II University are unfounded and seems to refer to the minutes (*PV*) of the meetings held between the delegations of the two countries, signed in Pyongyang on August 6, 2014, under which it was envisaged to encourage cooperation between the two countries through inter-university twinning operations, in particular between the University of Algiers II and DPRK's Kim II Sung University.

3- It is worth mentioning that this proposal remained a simple declaration of intent and the twining operation was not implemented.

Source: The Panel

Annex 10: A new ICBM system[3] was revealed in the military parade of 10 October 2020 in Pyongyang, televised by KCTV

In the wake of the Hwasong-15 ICBM (KN-22)[4], the four new ICBMs[5] presented on their new Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) were probably genuine missiles not mockups according to a Member State, though the new ICBM has never been tested in flight. They are longer and have a larger diameter[6] than the Hwasong-15, which is 20.5m in length and 2.5m in diameter, and is theoretically capable of flying over 13,000 km (see S/2018/171 para.10). All of the new ICBMs were transported on eleven axle TELs (see figure 10-1).

According to several Member States, the new ICBM's warhead capacity appears to have increased, either for accommodating a larger payload or for deploying multiple reentry vehicles (MRV or MIRV)[7], although this remains to be confirmed.

The new ICBM has two liquid fuel propulsion stages. According to a Member State, its mass at takeoff will be around 105 tons. It is likely to be able to deliver a 1,700 kg payload mass (estim.) at a range of approximately 14,000 kilometers eastward and 10,500 km westward. Following the example of Hwasong-15, this new missile can reach the whole of Europe and the United States, but with a more threatening payload.

Concerning the 1st stage motorization, four nozzles under protection cover are recognizable, against two mobile nozzles of the Hwasong-15. These four nozzles may indicate the use of two DPRK versions of the twin-combustion chamber RD-250 engine, which would imply the use of two turbo pumps. (see S/2018/171 para.14-15)

According to a Member State's assessment, the TEL with 11 axles (the greatest number of axles for a transporter of this kind) is manufactured in the DPRK, providing greater carrying capacity than the 9 axle TEL for the Hwasong-15, which was derived from the six WS51200 off-road trucks imported by DPRK in 2011 as vehicles for transporting timber (see S/2013/337 paras. 52-58).

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[3] Using the term "system", the Panel describes the system consisting of the missile and its TEL;

[4] Regarding the exact number of the entities one spare or more systems may have been kept out of the parade to be available to replace a possible breakdown of a vehicle. This practice is common in military parades. According to a rigorous photo-analysis by NK-NEWS/NK-PRO website on the 26 November 2020, there was a fifth Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that was not seen in initial state media coverage of the parade. This practice of bringing an extra vehicle for each group, meant to fall in line in case of a problem, is common at North Korean military parades (https://www.nknews.org/pro/new-photo-reveals-extra-standby-icbm-at-north-koreas-military-parade/?t=1610062338850)

[5] The new super large ICBM (so far unnamed by the DPRK) is temporarily dubbed "Hwasong-16" by observers.

[6] The measurement assessment of the ICBM-TEL system was calculated from the KCTV pictures by various experts:

- see "North Korea showcases world's largest mobile ICBM" Jane's Intelligence Review, 03 Dec 2020 available from https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/FG_3805327-JIRThe measurements of the **new ICBM are a length of 25.2 m and a diameter of 2.73m** within plus or minus 5%
- The measurements of the **eleven axle TEL are a length of around 29.5m and a width of around 4m.**
- see "Does Size Matter? North Korea's Newest ICBM",38 North, 21 October 2020, available from https://www.38north.org/2020/10/melleman102120/The measurements of the **new ICBM are a length between 24 and 25m** and **a diameter between 2.4 and 2.5m**.
- Its mass, fully fueled, is somewhere **between 80,000 and 110,000 kg.**

[7] MRV: multiple reentry vehicle; MIRV: multiple independent reentry vehicle,

Figure 10-1: The new ICBM revealed in the military parade of 10 October 2020 in Pyongyang

Source: KCTV

Annex 11: a new MRBM/SLBM Pukguksong-4 was revealed in the military parade of 10 October 2020 in Pyongyang broadcast by KCTV as well as a new SLBM Pukguksong-5 in the military parade of the 14 January 2021

The four Pukguksong-4 were introduced as "underwater strategic ballistic missiles" and thus probably a new type of SLBM[8]. It is assumed to be a modified type of which the size has been enlarged (diameter close to 2m) compared to the Pukguksong-1 and Pukguksong-3 (diameter between 1.5m and 1.7m) (see S/2020/151 para.197 annex 58.7; S/2017/742 annex 4).

Due to the shroud dimension, the Pukguksong-4 may contain several reentry vehicles such as MIRV though this remains to be confirmed. According to a Member State, its maximal range is estimated to be between 3,500 and 5,400 km for payloads of 1,300 kg and 650 kg respectively. This is an improvement in comparison with the Pukguksong-3 (max. range close to 2,500km). Moreover, to reduce the weight of the casing from the first Pukguksong missiles, composite fibre may have been used in the structure of the outer coating as the filament patterns are visible on the black cylinder surface shown by KCTV images. (see figure 11-1 and S/2019/171 para. 5)

Currently, no operational North-Korean submarine appears to be able to launch the Pukguksong-4 although , on 23 July 2019, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea presented a submarine under construction in the building of the Sinpo south shipyard potentially capable of carrying ballistic missiles (see S/2020/151 para. 196, annex 60)

The four Pukguksong-5 in the 14 January 2021 military parade were introduced by KCNA as "The world's most powerful weapon, submarine-launch ballistic missile..."[9] The design of the Pukguksong-5 seems longer than the Pukguksong-4. The cone of its shroud seems more elongated. This new SLBM is expected to have a greater range and warhead carrying capacity than the Pukguksong-4 (See figure 11-2)

[8] DPRK printed "PKS-4 人" and "PKS-5 人"

[9] KCNA: "The submarine strategic ballistic missile, the world's strongest weapon, entered the square in succession powerfully demonstrating the might of the strong revolutionary army with military and technological upperhand of the world,"

Figure 11-1: A new MRBM/SLBM Pukguksong-4 was revealed in the military parade of 10 October 2020 in Pyongyang

Source: KCTV (Image), The Panel (Text)

Figure 11-2: New MRBM/SLBM Pukguksong-5, larger than Pukguksong-4, was revealed in the military parade of the 14 January 2021 in Pyongyang (yellow dotted line marks the shroud of Pukguksong-4)

Source: KCTV (Image), The Panel (Text)

Annex 12: Three types of SRBM missile were exhibited during the military parade of 10 October 2020 in Pyongyang broadcast by KCTV

These missiles were identified as the short-range ballistic missiles KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25 (see S/2020/151, annex 59) which are solid fuel propelled, that the DPRK test-launched on numerous occasions from 2019. Moreover, with their solid fuel propulsion, a distinctive feature of these new missiles is their use of depressed trajectory and irregular trajectory, which is the result of terminal phase manoeuvring, according to a Member State. (see S/2020/151, para 194; S/2020/840 para.11, annex 7).

According to a Member State, all these missiles will eventually replace the liquid fuel Scud family ballistic missiles such as so-called Rodong, Scud, Musudan types that appeared in past DPRK military parades but not in this last one on 10 October 2020 (see Parade of April 2017, S/2017/742 Para.8). They symbolize the renewal of the DPRK ballistic threat through the ongoing modernization of its BM capability. (see S/2019/171 annex 84)

Except for the new super large ICBM, all BMs presented in this parade have been test-launched including “Pukguksong-2”, “Hwasong-12” and “Hwasong-15” in 2017 (see S/2018/171 para.7, 9) as well as three different types of SRBM after May 2019.

The military parade showed that, as previously reported by the Panel, the SRBM could be launched from wheeled and or caterpillar track TELs.

- Nine KN-25 Super large multiple rocket launcher wheeled and 4 rounds[10] systems
- Nine KN-25 Super large multiple rocket launcher caterpillar track and 6 rounds systems
- Nine KN-25 Super large multiple rocket launcher wheeled and 5 rounds systems
- Eight SRBM KN-23 wheeled and 2 rounds systems
- Eight SRBM KN-23 caterpillar track and 2 rounds systems
- Nine SRBM KN-24 caterpillar track and 4 rounds systems

According to a Member State, the DPRK appears to be enhancing operational employment efficiency by diversifying types of TEL and the number of rounds of the super-large multiple rocket launcher such as 4, 5 (new) and 6 rounds (see figure xx3-1) following a trend confirmed in 2019 (see S/2020/151 para.194 and S/2020/840 annex 7)

Six new SRBM sytems (2 missiles mounted on 5 axle wheeled TEL) in the second military parade on 14 January 2021 have a design close to the KN-23 (see above). But the SRBM seems to be longer and possibly wider. If it is confirmed, this new SRBM is expected to have a greater range and warhead carrying capacity than the KN-23 (See figure xx3-2)

[10] Using the term 'rounds' the Panel describes how many missiles are mounted on one TEL for launch from that TEL

Figure 12-1: Three types SRBM KN-25, KN-23, KN-24 were exhibited during the military parade of 10 October 2020 in Pyongyang, broadcast by KCTV

Source: KCTV (Image), Member States and Panel (Text)

Figure 12-2: A new SRBM (resembles KN-23) was revealed in the military parade of 14 January 2021 in Pyongyang, broadcast by KCTV (new SRBM seems to be larger than KN-23 and its TEL has 5 axles)

Source: KCTV (Image), Member States and the Panel (Text)

Annex 13: The overall modernization of the Kusong factory handling BM TEL production demonstrates the development trend of BM programme infrastructure

The “Kusong Tank Factory” (aka “Kusong-Taegwan”, “Tank Plant - 95 Factory”, “No 95 Factory” in North Pyongan), whose main facilities are located in the northeast oriented valley (from the location 40° 03′ 13″ N 125° 13′ 08″ E) is currently undergoing overall modernization. This factory is involved in the production of TELs such as the Pukguksong-2 TEL and could potentially produce other TELs for BM (see figure 13-1) the area delimited by dotted red lines). Through this overall improvement, DPRK could increase its production of caterpillar tracked TELs.

A massive plan of building demolition and new construction has been underway since August 2020: at the southwest of the complex (40° 03′ 23″ N 125° 13′ 20″ E) and at the northeast (40° 03′ 50″ N 125° 13′ 57″ E) (see figure 13-1 the two areas delimited by dotted yellow lines).

Figure 13-1: The "Kusong tank factory" (North Pyongan) huge renovation

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 Dec. 2020, 02 58 UTC; 4 Dec. 2020, 02 56 UTC

Demolition and new construction in the south-west zone (SW) of the factory:

Two parallel large buildings and three smaller ones, oriented SW-NE were demolished between 6 August and October 2020, as well as two groups of factory buildings located at the southern part of the area (see Figure 13-2 dotted yellow lines) in the Kusong-Taegwan / Tank factory or Plant - 95 Factory (south-west corner 40° 03′ 12″ N 125° 13′ 06″ E; north-east corner limit 40° 04′ 17″ N 125° 14′ 37″ E). Subsequently, new constructions have started in this area. In particular, construction of a new factory building with a trapezoidal shape surface (see **SW1** at 40° 03′ 27″ N 125° 13′ 22″ E, see Figure 13-2,3) (longest base 85m, smallest base 55m, depth 60m) was well advanced in September.

The demolition of the five buildings at the north section was in progress during August 2020. A new factory building **(SW1)** whose surface shape is like a parallelogram was roofed.

On 18 Sept 2020, the demolition of the five buildings at the north section was almost finished. The demolition of the two groups at the south section was in progress and a large, new factory building, rectangular in shape, is under construction(150x140m). (see **SW2** at 40° 03′ 23″ N 125° 13′ 21″ E, see Figure 13-2,3).

On Oct 13, the demolition of the five buildings was completed as was that of the two groups in the south section. The new factory building (**SW1** parallelogram shape) is still in progress as is the large new rectangular structure (SW2, see Figure 13-2) (150x140m)

On Nov 2, all demolitions were finished. Construction of the new factory building (**SW1** parallelogram shape) is still in progress as well as the new structures **SW2.** The construction of two new buildings (**SW3** at 40° 03′ 20″ N 125° 13′ 19″ E and **SW4** at 40° 03′ 18″ N 125° 13′ 18″ E) is in progress (see Figure 13-2,3).

In early December the construction of the three new building was in progress (**SW2**, **SW3, SW4**) and **SW1 appears** almost finished. (see Figure 13-3).

Figure 13-2: Demolition and new construction in the south-west zone of the Factory



Source: Google Earth, 23 May 2019; Planet Labs Inc. 6 Aug. 2020, 02 39 UTC; Planet Labs Inc. 30 Aug. 2020, 01 40 UTC; Planet Labs Inc. 18 Sep. 2020, 01 46 UTC; Planet Labs Inc. 13 Oct. 2020, 02 39 UTC; Planet Labs Inc. 2 Nov. 2020, 02 39 UTC; Google Earth, 18 Oct. 2020; Planet Labs Inc. 4 Dec. 2020, 02 56 UTC

Figure 13-3: Focus on the demolition of several buildings and new constructions on the site SW (Southwest corner: 40° 03′ 17″ N 125° 13′ 16″ E; Northeast corner: 40° 03′ 26″ N 125° 13′ 29″ EE) from Aug 2020

Source: Google Earth, 23 May 2019; Planet Labs Inc. 4 Dec. 2020, 02 56 UTC

Demolition and new construction in the north-east (NE) zone of the Factory:

Several buildings oriented southwest-northeast have been demolished from August 6th to October 2020 along the valley (see figure 13-4 dotted yellow lines) in the Kusong-Taegwan - Tank factory or Plant - 95 Factory. (south-western corner 40° 03′ 45″ N 125° 13′ 45″ E; north-eastern corner limit 40° 03′ 57″ N 125° 14′ 09″ E) Subsequently new constructions have started in this area (figure 13-5).

Figure 13-4: Demolition of several buildings and new construction on the site NE (southwest corner: 40° 03′ 47″ N 125° 13′ 47″; northeast corner: 40° 03′ 56″ N 125° 14′ 08″ E) from Aug 2020



Source: Google Earth, 23 May 2019; Planet Labs. Inc. 30 Aug. 2020, 02 08 UTC; 19 Sep. 2020, 02 38 UTC; Google Earth, 18 Oct. 2020; Planet Labs Inc. 4 Dec. 2020, 02 56 UTC

Figure 13-5: Focus on Demolition of several buildings and new construction on the site NE (southwest corner: 40° 03′ 47″ N 125° 13′ 47″; northeast corner: 40° 03′ 56″ N 125° 14′ 08″ E) from Aug. 2020



Source: Google Earth, 23 May 2019; Planet Labs Inc. 4 Dec. 2020, 02 56 UTC

Annex 14: Developments at the Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant (South Pyongan)

The transformation of the site continues with a new track dug through the southwest hill located at the edge of the factory site, treatment of the concrete slab surface and general cleaning of the factory. Various activities have been detected in front of the building where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in 2017 before the ICBM test launch on 29 November 2017 that could be related to TEL preparation.

Figure 14-1: The surroundings of the new adjacent building (39°16'52.08"N 125°52'12.76"E) are clean (see area 1); **the renovation of the western building (39° 16′ 52″ N 125° 51′ 57″ E) seems to be finished** (see area 2). A **new track** (a possible future road or a wider track for TEL testing) that has been dug through the southwest hill located at the edge of the factory site is under construction from the south-east point 39° 16′ 49″ N 125° 51′ 54″ E to a northwest point 39° 16′ 53″ N 125° 51′ 48″ E (sea are 4). (see S/2020/840 para. 15, Annex.11)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 13 Nov. 2020, 05 12 UTC; 26 Jun. 2020, 05 16 UTC; Google Earth, 2 May 2020

Figure 14-2: The activity of large vehicles continued to be detected between July and 8 October 2020 with tracks from tires possibly left by wheels mounted on around 4 m long axles in front of the building (area 3). This new larger tire tracks could correspond to tracks left by a larger TEL than the Hwasong-15's TEL movements up to October 2020 because the measurement of the width is in range from 3 m to 4 m. They could be related to the new ICBM revealed during the 10 October Military Parade in Pyongyang whose TEL width is around 4 m. On 8 October workers seemed to be gathered in front of the building along an ellipse resembling the pattern of possible tracks let by the tires of the large axels. They appeared to be cleaning the tire tracks from the surface.



Source: Google Earth, 8 Oct. 2020; 24 Jul. 2020

Figure 14-3: Activity related to several vehicles and containers (up to 18 m) was detected from 13 November 2020 to 20 November 2020 in front of the building (see area 3) where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in 2017 before the ICBM test launch on 29 November 2017. At the same time, the concrete slab surface appeared to have been treated in some way.

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 13 Nov. 2020, 05 12 UTC

Annex 15: Activity observed at the Sinpo south shipyard since July 2020 (see Figure 15-1) and at the Nampo naval shipyard

At the **Sinpo south shipyard**, activity observed at **the secure boat basin** (40° 01′ 31″ N 128° 09′ 55″ E) since July 2020 could be related to the handling of submarine-launched ballistic missiles or preparations for a further submarine-launched ballistic missile launch test.

- The midget submarine which looks like a narrow container was removed after 15 September from its position on the dock. However, 3 to 4 new containers were positioned on **Nov 4** at the south west corner of the dock of the secure basin (40° 01′ 31″ N 128° 09′ 55″ E) (See Figure 15-2)and on **7 November** a white container (length around 12m) appeared on the dock ten meters from the North-eastern corner of the canopy (See Figure 15-4).

- The support vessel and submersible test barge had moved from their positions inside the basin as of **Nov 5 and Nov 29** (See Figure 15-3), while a side of the Sinpo-class SSB presumably berthed under the canopy was more visible from 3 December**.** (See Figure 15-4)

An activity probably related to the reparation or to the upgrading of the dock was detected **on Nov 4** in front of the entrance of the construction hall (40° 1'20.76"N 128° 9'46.55"E) where presumably the Romeo-class submarine, potentially to be equipped with SLBM, is currently being built (see S/2020/151 annex. 60). (See Figure 15-5)

At the **Nampo naval shipyard**, a new twin-building for the construction or maintenance of vessels (125m length, 38° 43′ 14″ N 125° 23′ 52″ E) has been under construction since 2018, replacing a shorter old twin-building (90 m). The launch dock (38° 43′ 12″ N 125° 23′ 52″ E) in front of the twin-building was renovated and its length was extended up to around 40 m from building doors. Because of the comparison with the Sinpo construction Hall (see Figure 15-5) this building could be used for the support or construction of the submarines.

Since December 2020, logistics activities appeared between this site and the secure basin boat where the submersible test stand barge is located. During the observed period between April and December 2020, the submersible test stand barge moved within the basin (see S/2020/151 annex 58-7.3). A possible support vessel related to the submersible test barge moved from the basin in November 2020. After 22 November 2020, the submersible barge did not clearly appear but a new larger drydock or barge (around 30m x 15m) appeared in December 2020 (see Figure 15-6).

Figure 15-1: Sinpo south shipyard and Mayang-do island shipyard and submarine base overview.



Source: Planet Labs. Inc. 7 Jan. 2021, 02 22 UTC; 4 Jan. 2021, 04 52 UTC; Google Earth, 26 Oct. 2015

Figure 15-2: Secure boat basin: The possible midget submarine or narrow container which was on the dock since May 2020 was removed from 15 September. 3-4 containers (length around 11-12 m) were visible until Nov 4 on the dock (40° 01′ 31″ N 128° 09′ 55″ E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 9 Sep. 2020, 04 57 UTC ; 15 Sep. 2020, 04 54 UTC ; 4 Nov. 2020, 04 58 UTC

Figure 15-3: A support vessel (length around 50m) moved from the north corner of the secure boat basin to the south west corner between Nov 5 and Nov 29. The submersible test barge moved from the dock side to berth along the north East side of the basin.



Source: Planet Labs. Inc Nov 5, 2020 02 25 UTC ; Nov 29, 02 47 00 2020 UTC

Figure 15-4: On 7 November a white container (length around 12m) appears on the dock. The side of the Sinpo-class SSB presumably berthed under the canopy is visible on the Dec 3

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 7 Nov. 2020, 05 03 UTC; 3 Dec. 2020, 01 51 UTC

Figure 15-5: **On the dock in front of the entrance of new Hall** (40° 1'20.76"N 128° 9'46.55"E) where presumably the Romeo-class submarine equipped with SLBM is currently under construction (see S/2020/151 annex. 60), a high crane (visible from apparent long shadow or that of the lifted load,at 14h00 local time) has been used on Nov 4 and Dec 20, on a site probably devoted to change or repair the railway or the concrete surface which are used by the cradle for the launch of the new submarine.

Source: Planet Labs Inc, Nov 4, 2020 04 58 UTC

Figure 15-6: Nampo naval shipyard: renovation of the construction/maintenance hall (, 38° 43′ 14″ N 125° 23′ 52″ E**) and activity inside secure boat basin** (38° 43′ 06″ N 125° 23′ 40″ E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 19 Dec. 2020, 02 12 UTC; 12 Dec. 2020, 04 28 UTC; Planet Labs Inc. 7 Jun. 2020, 02 21 UTC; Planet Labs Inc. 10 Apr. 2020, 05 04 UTC; Google Earth, 8 Nov. 2019; Google Earth, 7 Oct. 2018; Google Earth, 13 Mar. 2018

Annex 16: Ballistic missile bases activity

The Panel continued to monitor the activity of various ballistic missile bases such as the "**Yusang-ri missile operating base**" (aka "Milchon-ri", 39° 27′ 01″ N 126° 15′ 35″ E; South Pyongan), the "**Kal-gol missile operating base"** (38° 40′ 09″ N 126° 44′ 14″ E; North Hwanghae) and among those cited in S/2020/840 Para.13 Annex 9 the "**Hoejung-ri missile base**" (41°22'44.93"N 126°54'38.16"E; Chagang) where various construction sites and logistic activities were observed since summer 2020.

"Yusang-ri missile operating base" (Figure 16-1)

- Two new typical main buildings (50 m length, a wide central roof flanked by two symmetrical side roofs) located in the HQ area of the base at 39° 26′ 58″ N 126° 15′ 37″ E and 39°27′ 02″ N 126° 15′ 39″ E, were built from 2018 to 2020 as well as another support facility at 39° 27′ 08″ N 126° 15′ 23″ E. (see Figure 16-2)

- Since the beginning of the excavation of the tunnel in 2014 usable by heavy TEL, site-evolution and upgrading has been continuous. The site is oriented SE-NW from southeast entrance 39°27'27.66"N 126°15'6.01"E to northwest entrance 39°27'29.70"N 126°15'2.56"E (see Figure 16-3)

- From 8 October to 15 October 2020, a dozen white containers with non-standard size of around 7m x 1.5m were placed and removed from a location between the south underground gallery entrance (39° 26′ 33″ N 126° 15′ 41″ E) and the west side of the series of drive-through and possibly UGF entrances (red dotted lines, west : 39°26'29.39"N 126°15'48.91"E, centre: 39°26'29.28"N 126°15'50.36"E, East: 39°26'29.37"N 126°15'53.50"E). As they were located close to the drive-through and UGFs entrances, they were possibly related either to BM systems, or to agricultural equipment (see Figure 16-4).

Figure 16-1: Yusang-ri missile operating base



Source: Google Earth, 12 Oct. 2020; Planet Labs Inc. 29 Nov. 2020, 02 29 UTC

Figure 16-2: "Yusang-ri missile operating base" new building and facility constructions

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 29 Nov. 2020, 02 29 UTC; Google Earth, 12 Oct. 2020; Planet Labs Inc. 3 Jul. 2019, 02 15 UTC; Planet Labs Inc. 22 Nov. 2018, 01 26 UTC; Google Earth, 18 May 2017

Figure 16-3: "Yusang-ri missile operating base" the site-evolution of the excavation of the tunnel usable by heavy TEL (NW tunnel entrance 39°27'29.70"N 126°15'2.56"E – SE entrance : 39°27'27.66"N 126°15'6.01"E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 29 Nov. 2020, 02 29 UTC; Google Earth, 12 Oct. 2020; Planet Labs Inc. 3 Jul. 2019, UTC; Google Earth, 18 May 2017; April 13, 2014

Figure 16-4: "Yusang-ri missile operating base": movement of containers in the area of several underground gallery entrances.

From 8 October to 15 October 2020, a dozen white containers of a non-standard size around 7m x 1.5m were placed and removed from a location between the south underground gallery entrance (B1-39° 26′ 33″ N 126° 15′ 41″ E) and the west side of the series of drive through and possibly UGF entrances (red dots, B2 west : 39°26'29.39"N 126°15'48.91"E, B3 centre: 39°26'29.28"N 126°15'50.36"E, B4 East: 39°26'29.37"N 126°15'53.50"E). As they were located close to the driving-through and UGFs entrances, they were possibly related either to BM system, or to agricultural equipment.



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 29 Nov. 2020, 02 29 UTC; Google Earth, 12 Oct. 2020

Annex 17: Kal-gol Missile Operating Base

The undeclared "Kal-gol missile operating base", located around 100 km southeast of Pyongyang and 13 km south of Koksan (see figure 17-1), was precisely described by a CSIS report on 24 December 2020[11] as a base operating SRBM and MRBM.

Through recent Planet Labs satellite imagery analysis, the panel has confirmed that this base located in an area delimited at the NW 38° 41′ 07″ N 126° 43′ 10″ E and at the SE 38° 40′ 26″ N 126° 45′ 59″ E, is well-maintained and regularly improved (see figure 17-1). It resembles other BM operating bases (see S/2020/840 para.13). In addition to numerous underground gallery entrances protected by berms (see figure 17-2), a specific building used for TEL handling and training has been identified. Its roof incorporates a superstructure whose shape is a semi-arc to allow the erection of the TEL launching table for maintenance or training. (see figure 17-3) This kind of superstructure is visible in Jonchon-Mupyong-ni No 65 factory (see S/2020/840 annex 12, figure 12-9).

Figure 17-1: Kal-gol missile operating base overview, the new building typical of a BM base in the HQ area since 2019. (38°40'8.30"N 126°44'13.09"E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 16 Nov. 2020, 05 13 UTC ; Google Earth, 9 May 2019 and 6 May 2019

[11] A Center for Strategic and International Studies-Beyond Parallel report on 24 December 2020 provided analysis that characterized the site of the "Kal-gol Missile Operating Base" as an SRBM and MRBM missiles base (see "Undeclared North Korea: The Kal-gol Missile Operating Base", 24 December 2020, available at https://beyondparallel.csis.org/undeclared-north-korea-the-kal-gol-missile-operating-base/)

Figure 17-2: Kal-gol missile operating base two underground gallery entrances and their protective berms (location 38°40'10.93"N 126°45'23.57"E and 38°40'11.43"N 126°45'28.65"E).



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 16 Nov. 2020, 05 13 UTC; Google Earth 14 Apr. 2005

Figure 17-3: Kal-gol missile operating base, building of the type used for TEL handling and training (location: 38°41'4.39"N 126°43'14.38"E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 Jan. 2021, 05 13 UTC

Annex 18: Activity at the "Hoejung-ri missile base" (41°22'44.93"N 126°54'38.16"E) and the construction of a massive underground facility (41°21'56.37"N 126°55'41.91"E) (see S/2020/840, para.13 and Annex 9)

Figure 18-1: the access way to the underground entrance, oriented Southewest-northeast, was consolidated from 31 Aug 2020



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 29 May 2020, 02 12 UTC; 25 Jul. 2020, 01 59 UTC; 31 Aug. 2020, 01 37 UTC; 27 Sep. 2020, 02 04 UTC; 11 Nov. 2020, 02 01 UTC

Annex 19: DPRK-Iran ballistic missile cooperation

The Panel requested information from Iran concerning information received by the Panel that the SHIG's Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center received support and assistance from DPRK missile specialists for a space launch vehicle (SLV) (see annex 19-1), and that KOMID and SHIG were involved in shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). (see annex 19-1)

In an interim reply of 21 December 2020 (see annex 19-2) Iran stated that "widespread national restrictions imposed to contain the COVID-19 pandemic continue to pose serious challenges for a timely and proper investigation of such sensitive cases. Preliminary review of the information provided to us by the Panel indicates that false information and fabricated data may have been used in investigations and analyses of the Panel…"

Annex 19-1: Regarding technical and logictics cooperation

According to a Member State, within the past several years, Iranian missile technicians from SHIG traveled to North Korea regarding an 80-ton rocket booster under development by the North Korean government.

According to the Member State, 13 DPRK specialists may have travelled to Iran to support KOMID's work there, based on their experience with liquid propellant ballistic missiles systems (see table 19-1).

The partnership between KOMID and SHIG is also alleged by the Member State to have developed in the area of logistics through shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and routinely operating non-stop voyages from one third country ports to Iran. According to the Member State, these shipments included valves, electronics, and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

Table 19-1: According to the Member State, thirteen DPRK specialists who are suspected of travelling to Iran to support KOMID's work:

Name (last name given first)	*Date of Birth*	*Passport Number*
Kim Chang Rok	27 September 1962	N/A
Ri Song Chol	22 August 1968	654431555
Chae Hyok Mu	30 January 1985	654431556
Cho Myong Ho	8 May 1961	654431552
Choe Song Hyok	25 September 1968	654431553
Ryu Yon Chol	5 May 1965	654431554
Pak Chae Song	1 January 1966	654431551
Choe Pyong Wan	22 December 1960	N/A
Ha Chong Kuk	15 February 1970	381320313
Hong Hak Chol	21 January 1968	N/A
Kim Ho Chol	12 May 1962	290120514
Kim Won Il	19 January 1973	381134942
Ma Chol Won	28 March 1964	290120507

According to the Member State, the following Iranian SHIG officials are alleged to be involved in the KOMID-SHIG cooperation.

Asghar Esma'ilpur and **Mohammad Gholami,** who participated in Iran and supported the launch of an SLV that was launched with support and assistance from North Korean missile specialists.

- **Asghar Esma'ilpur** has served as the Director of the **SHIG Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center**, also known as **SHIG Department 7500**, and is currently a senior official in Iran's **Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).**

- **Mohammad Gholami** was a long-time **SHIG Haj Ali Movahed Research Center** senior official until his recent promotion to a role within the **AIO**.

- **Seid Mir Ahmad Nooshin** has been a key player in negotiations with the DPRK on long-range missile development projects. He was previously the Director of SHIG and now serves as the Director of AIO.

Annex 19-2: Irans's reply to the Panel

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 ny.mfa.gov.ir Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: Iran@un.int

In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

No. 120588 21 December 2020

Dear Sir,

I am writing in response to your letter dated 16 November 2020 (S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.322) with regard to Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) on the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Your request for specific information contained in the above-mentioned letter has been sent to the relevant Iranian authorities. Meanwhile, widespread national restrictions imposed to contain the COVID-19 pandemic continue to pose serious challenges for a timely and proper investigation of such sensitive cases.

Preliminary review of the information provided to us by the Panel indicates that false information and fabricated data may have been used in investigations and analyses of the Panel. The relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran would review any viable "evidence" with regard to alleged actions in violation of the relevant Security Council sanctions. Meanwhile, the Panel is expected to exercise maximum caution with regard to unsubstantiated claims received from countries with a clear political agenda towards Iran.

We respect our international commitments including under relevant Security Council resolutions on DPRK and wish to continue constructive engagement and cooperation with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009).

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Majid Takht Ravanchi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Source: The Panel

Annex 20: Key items, including materials and equipment, used in the DPRK ballistic missile program.

According to a Member State, among the items identified in the annex of "North Korea Ballistic Missile Procurement Advisory", 1 September 2020 (available from https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20200901), that DPRK has sought for its ballistic missile development efforts were items such as **multi-axle heavy vehicles**, **specialty steel and aluminum**, **filament winding equipment, carbon fiber for composite motor cases; and aluminum powder and ammonium perchlorate**.

The Member State reaffirmed that DPRK's ability to procure the types of technologies identified in the advisory from foreign suppliers is critical to its ongoing efforts to advance and expand its missile capabilities.

Annex 21: Tanker arrivals to the DPRK, January to September 2020

Tanker Arrivals to DPRK January - September 2020

	Coast	Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 33% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 50% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 90% Laden
1	East	Wonsan	Kum Un San	1-Jan-20	8720436	PRK	2070	683.1	1035.0	1863.0
2	West	Nampo	Kwang Chon (Yu Phyong 5)	1-Jan-20	8605026	PRK	1966	648.8	983.0	1769.4
3	West	Nampo	An San 1	4-Jan-20	7303803	PRK	3003	991.0	1501.5	2702.7
4	West	Nampo	Hokong	5-Jan-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
5	West	Nampo	Unica	8-Jan-20	8514306	SLE	4865	1605.5	2432.5	4378.5
6	West	Nampo	New Konk	10-Jan-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
7	West	Nampo	Sen Lin 01 (Kwang Chon 2)	10-Jan-20	8910378	PRK	1159	382.5	579.5	1043.1
8	West	Nampo	Subblic	10-Jan-20	8126082	TGO	5989	1976.4	2994.5	5390.1
9	West	Nampo	Kwang Chon (Yu Phyong 5)	13-Jan-20	8605026	PRK	1966	648.8	983.0	1769.4
10	West	Nampo	Sam Jong 2	17-Jan-20	7408873	PRK	2507	827.3	1253.5	2256.3
11	West	Nampo	Unica	21-Jan-20	8514306	SLE	4865	1605.5	2432.5	4378.5
12	West	Nampo	Hokong	22-Jan-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
13	West	Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 3	23-Jan-20	8791667	PRK	4983	1644.4	2491.5	4484.7
14	West	Haeju	Myong Ryu 1	23-Jan-20	8532413	PRK	817	269.6	408.5	735.3
15	West	Nampo	Sam Jong 1	29-Jan-20	8405311	PRK	1665	549.5	832.5	1498.5
16	West	Nampo	Subblic	30-Jan-20	8126082	TGO	5989	1976.4	2994.5	5390.1
17	East	Munchon Up	Chil Bo San	31-Jan-20	8711021	PRK	1999	659.7	999.5	1799.1
18	East	Chongjin	Chon Ma San	4-Feb-20	8660313	PRK	3565	1176.5	1782.5	3208.5
19	East	Hungnam	Sin Pyong 2	4-Feb-20	8817007	PRK	2105	694.7	1052.5	1894.5
20	West	Nampo	New Konk	7-Feb-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
21	West	Songnim	Hokong	9-Feb-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
22	West	Nampo	Unica	9-Feb-20	8514306	SLE	4865	1605.5	2432.5	4378.5
23	East	Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	13-Feb-20	8106496	PRK	1731	571.2	865.5	1557.9
24	East	Chongjin	Yu Jong 2	15-Feb-20	8604917	PRK	1180	389.4	590.0	1062.0
25	West	Nampo	Pu Ryong	20-Feb-20	8705539	PRK	3279	1082.1	1639.5	2951.1
26	West	Nampo	Subblic	23-Feb-20	8126082	TGO	5989	1976.4	2994.5	5390.1

	Coast	Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 33% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 50% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 90% Laden
27	West	Nampo	Chil Bo San	26-Feb-20	8711021	PRK	1999	659.7	999.5	1799.1
28	West	Nampo	Diamond 8	26-Feb-20	9132612	SLE	9273	3060.1	4636.5	8345.7
29	West	Songnim	Hokong	27-Feb-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
30	West	Nampo	Unica	4-Mar-20	8514306	SLE	4865	1605.5	2432.5	4378.5
31	West	Nampo	Bonvoy 3	5-Mar-20	8714085	SLE	3518	1160.9	1759.0	3166.2
32	West	Nampo	New Konk	15-Mar-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
33	West	Nampo	Yun Hong 8	17-Mar-20	0	CHN	2900	957.0	1450.0	2610.0
34	West	Nampo	Diamond 8	22-Mar-20	9132612	SLE	9273	3060.1	4636.5	8345.7
35	West	Nampo	Hokong	22-Mar-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
36	West	Nampo	Subblic	22-Mar-20	8126082	TGO	5989	1976.4	2994.5	5390.1
37	West	Nampo	Unica	25-Mar-20	8514306	SLE	4865	1605.5	2432.5	4378.5
38	West	Nampo	Bonvoy 3	31-Mar-20	8714085	SLE	3518	1160.9	1759.0	3166.2
39	West	Nampo	New Konk	8-Apr-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
40	West	Nampo	Subblic	12-Apr-20	8126082	TGO	5989	1976.4	2994.5	5390.1
41	West	Songnim	Unica	20-Apr-20	8514306	SLE	4865	1605.5	2432.5	4378.5
42	West	Nampo	Hokong	21-Apr-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
43	West	Nampo	New Konk	24-Apr-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
44	West	Nampo	Run Da	29-Apr-20	8511172	MNG	4999	1649.7	2499.5	4499.1
45	West	Nampo	Sam Jong 2	1-May-20	7408873	PRK	2507	827.3	1253.5	2256.3
46	West	Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	1-May-20	8532413	PRK	817	269.6	408.5	735.3
47	East	Chongjin	Nam San 8	7-May-20	8122347	PRK	3150	1039.5	1575.0	2835.0
48	East	Chongjin	Sin Pyong 2	7-May-20	8817007	PRK	2105	694.7	1052.5	1894.5
49	East	Hungnam	Pu Ryong	7-May-20	8705539	PRK	3279	1082.1	1639.5	2951.1
50	West	Nampo	Hokong	10-May-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
51	East	Chongjin	Sin Pyong 2	10-May-20	8817007	PRK	2105	694.7	1052.5	1894.5
52	West	Nampo	Mu Bong 1	14-May-20	8610461	PRK	1998	659.3	999.0	1798.2
53	West	Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	15-May-20	0	PRK	2114	697.6	1057.0	1902.6
54	West	Nampo	New Konk	15-May-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
55	West	Nampo	Rich United	15-May-20	9129213	UNK	7459	2461.5	3729.5	6713.1
56	East	Najin	Song Won	18-May-20	8613360	PRK	2101	693.3	1050.5	1890.9
57	West	Nampo	Sam Jong 2	24-May-20	7408873	PRK	2507	827.3	1253.5	2256.3

	Coast	Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 33% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 50% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 90% Laden
58	East	Wonsan	Sin Pyong 2	24-May-20	8817007	PRK	2105	694.7	1052.5	1894.5
59	East	Chongjin	Subblic	24-May-20	8126082	TGO	5989	1976.4	2994.5	5390.1
60	East	Wonsan	Chon Myong 1	25-May-20	8712362	PRK	2750	907.5	1375.0	2475.0
61	West	Songnim	Ji Song 6	25-May-20	8898740	PRK	1250	412.5	625.0	1125.0
62	East	Wonsan	Yu Jong 2	25-May-20	8604917	PRK	1180	389.4	590.0	1062.0
63	East	Chongjin	Yu Son	26-May-20	8691702	PRK	3398	1121.3	1699.0	3058.2
64	East	Kimchaek	Nam San 8	28-May-20	8122347	PRK	3150	1039.5	1575.0	2835.0
65	West	Nampo	Sam Jong 1	28-May-20	8405311	PRK	1665	549.5	832.5	1498.5
66	West	Nampo	Ji Song 6	29-May-20	8898740	PRK	1250	412.5	625.0	1125.0
67	West	Nampo	Chon Ma San	1-Jun-20	8660313	PRK	3565	1176.5	1782.5	3208.5
68	West	Nampo	Sen Lin 01 (Kwang Chon 2)	2-Jun-20	8910378	PRK	1159	382.5	579.5	1043.1
69	West	Songnim	Hokong	3-Jun-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5
70	West	Songnim	Ji Song 6	3-Jun-20	8898740	PRK	1250	412.5	625.0	1125.0
71	West	Songnim	Pu Ryong	3-Jun-20	8705539	PRK	3279	1082.1	1639.5	2951.1
72	West	Songnim	Xing Ming Yang 888	3-Jun-20	8410847	UNK	7303	2410.0	3651.5	6572.7
73	West	Songnim	Saebyol	4-Jun-20	8916293	PRK	1150	379.5	575.0	1035.0
74	West	Songnim	Run Da	5-Jun-20	8511172	MNG	4999	1649.7	2499.5	4499.1
75	West	Nampo	Bonvoy 3	8-Jun-20	8714085	SLE	3518	1160.9	1759.0	3166.2
76	West	Songnim	New Konk	8-Jun-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
77	West	Nampo	Rich United	11-Jun-20	9129213	UNK	7459	2461.5	3729.5	6713.1
78	West	Songnim	Nam San 8	15-Jun-20	8122347	PRK	3150	1039.5	1575.0	2835.0
79	West	Songnim	Sam Jong 1	15-Jun-20	8405311	PRK	1665	549.5	832.5	1498.5
80	West	Nampo	Chon Ma San	16-Jun-20	8660313	PRK	3565	1176.5	1782.5	3208.5
81	West	Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	18-Jun-20	0	PRK	2114	697.6	1057.0	1902.6
82	East	Wonsan	Sin Pyong 2	18-Jun-20	8817007	PRK	2105	694.7	1052.5	1894.5
83	West	Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 3	19-Jun-20	8791667	PRK	4983	1644.4	2491.5	4484.7
84	West	Nampo	An Ping	20-Jun-20	7903366	SLE	4950	1633.5	2475.0	4455.0
85	West	Nampo	Unica	20-Jun-20	8514306	SLE	4865	1605.5	2432.5	4378.5
86	West	Songnim	Hokong	21-Jun-20	9006758	SLE	3995	1318.4	1997.5	3595.5

	Coast	Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 33% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 50% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 90% Laden
87	East	Wonsan	Sin Pyong 2	24-Jun-20	8817007	PRK	2105	694.7	1052.5	1894.5
88	East	Wonsan	Chon Myong 1	25-Jun-20	8712362	PRK	2750	907.5	1375.0	2475.0
89	East	Wonsan	Yu Jong 2	25-Jun-20	8604917	PRK	1180	389.4	590.0	1062.0
90	West	Nampo	Xing Ming Yang 888	28-Jun-20	8410847	UNK	7303	2410.0	3651.5	6572.7
91	West	Nampo	Sam Jong 2	28-Jun-20	7408873	PRK	2507	827.3	1253.5	2256.3
92	West	Nampo	An San 1	1-Jul-20	7303803	PRK	3003	991.0	1501.5	2702.7
93	West	Nampo	Chong Ryong San	1-Jul-20	0	PRK				
94	West	Songnim	New Konk	2-Jul-20	9036387	SLE	8057	2658.8	4028.5	7251.3
95	West	Songnim	Saebyol	5-Jul-20	8916293	PRK	1150	379.5	575.0	1035.0
96	West	Songnim	Diamond 8	5-Jul-20	9132612	SLE	9273	3060.1	4636.5	8345.7
97	West	Nampo	An Ping	8-Jul-20	7903366	SLE	4950	1633.5	2475.0	4455.0
98	West	Songnim	Subblic	9-Jul-20	8126082	TGO	5989	1976.4	2994.5	5390.1
99	West	Nampo	Chon Ma San	26-Jul-20	8660313	PRK	3565	1176.5	1782.5	3208.5
100	West	Nampo	Saebyol	26-Jul-20	8916293	PRK	1150	379.5	575.0	1035.0
101	West	Nampo	Pu Ryong	28-Jul-20	8705539	PRK	3279	1082.1	1639.5	2951.1
102	West	Nampo	An San 1	28-Jul-20	7303803	PRK	3003	991.0	1501.5	2702.7
103	West	Nampo	Mu Bong 1	28-Jul-20	8610461	PRK	1998	659.3	999.0	1798.2
104	West	Nampo	Paek Ma	6-Aug-20	9066978	PRK	2250	742.5	1125.0	2025.0
105	West	Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	6-Aug-20	0	PRK	2114	697.6	1057.0	1902.6
106	West	Nampo	Chong Myong 1	8-Aug-20	8712362	PRK	2750	907.5	1375.0	2475.0
107	West	Nampo	Heng Rong	10-Aug-20	7913098	SLE	4890	1613.7	2445.0	4401.0
108	West	Nampo	An San 1	11-Aug-20	7303803	PRK	3003	991.0	1501.5	2702.7
109	West	Nampo	Chil Bo San	11-Aug-20	8711021	PRK	1999	659.7	999.5	1799.1
110	East	Wonsan	Yu Jong 2	18-Aug-20	8604917	PRK	1180	389.4	590.0	1062.0
111	West	Nampo	Mu Bong 1	27-Aug-20	8610461	PRK	1998	659.3	999.0	1798.2
112	West	Nampo	Chong Ryong San	30-Aug-20	0	PRK				

	Coast	Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 33% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 50% Laden	Delivery Metric Tonnage if 90% Laden
113	West	Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	30-Aug-20	0	PRK	2114	697.6	1057.0	1902.6
114	West	Nampo	Chil Bo San	30-Aug-20	8711021	PRK	1999	659.7	999.5	1799.1
115	West	Nampo	Po Chon (Zebra)	30-Aug-20	8848276	PRK	3538	1167.5	1769.0	3184.2
116	West	Nampo	Yun Hong 8	30-Aug-20	0	CHN	2900	957.0	1450.0	2610.0
117	West	Nampo	Xin Hai	1-Sep-20	7636638	UNK	4969	1639.8	2484.5	4472.1
118	West	Nampo	Nam San 8	4-Sep-20	8122347	PRK	3150	1039.5	1575.0	2835.0
119	West	Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	4-Sep-20	8605026	PRK	1966	648.8	983.0	1769.4
120	West	Nampo	Paek Ma	9-Sep-20	9066978	PRK	2250	742.5	1125.0	2025.0
121	West	Songnim	Nam San 8	14-Sep-20	8122347	PRK	3150	1039.5	1575.0	2835.0

Source: Member State

Annex 22 (a): Vessel Identity Swap

The Panel investigated the then Panama-flagged *Mouson 328* (IMO: 9021198) in light of numerous indicators of suspect activity that included: a suspicious May / June 2019 voyage to DPRK waters (see figure 1); four months of unexplained dark activity from November 2019 to March 2020 at a shipyard in Fujian Province, and the vessel changing out its identifiers after re-appearing in March 2020 and sailing as the *M0uson* in the direction of the Yellow Sea (see figure 2). Panama confirmed the vessel was deleted from its registry on 29 August 2020. The vessel also conducted other voyages with AIS transmission gaps outside of these periods.

Figure 1: *Mouson 328's* voyage, May/June 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Figure 2: *'Mouson 328'* changing its identifiers, March 2020



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

In the course of its investigations, the Panel noted an attempt in late 2019 to register the *Mouson 328* under a new IMO number as the newly built Dominica-flagged *Cherry 19*. After the *Mouson 328's* suspicious voyages to DPRK waters between May and June 2019, the vessel sailed to a shipyard in Fujian Province, China. Imagery of the *Mouson 328* from July to November 2019 shows that the vessel was likely modified at the shipyard (see figure 3). The next AIS transmission of the *Mouson 328* sailing as a Dominica-flagged vessel named *Cherry 19* was as the vessel entered the waters of Bangkok port, Thailand, in late November 2019. Photographs taken of the vessel show the initial assigned IMO number of the *Cherry 19* painted on the vessel's bridge but the IMO number belonging to that of the *Mouson 328* painted on its stern (see figure 4). The vessel was also photographed with two white containers located at the vessel's stern, similar in location to the containers captured on satellite imagery at the shipyard in late 2019. Maritime authorities withdrew the IMO number initially assigned to *the Cherry 19* following evidentiary inconsistencies.

Figure 3: *Mouson 328* re-painted, September / October 2019

Source: Google Earth, annotated by the Panel. Coordinates: 26°50'28"N, 119°41'20"E

Figure 4: IMO number inconsistencies, with the *Cherry 19's* initial issued IMO number at the bridge (top) and the *Mouson 328's* IMO number at the stern (bottom)

Source: The Panel

The same maritime database registered the vessel's last AIS capture on 7 November 2020 at a port at Samut Songkhram, (see figure 5) transmitting under its new identity as the Thai-flagged *Smooth Sea 29,* essentially removing the historical data of the vessel as the *Mouson 328*. The Panel wrote to inform Thailand of the *Smooth Sea 29's* location and the vessel's use of fraudulent documentation as a likely cover for the *Mouson 328*. Thailand responded that the Panel's requests for information "have been duly conveyed to our relevant authorities in capital and are pending their consideration".

Figure 5: *Smooth Sea 29* at Samut Songkhram, 7 November 2020 (EST)



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Google Earth (insert image of Samut Songkhram dated 19 April 2020), with a pinned location of 13°22'24"N,99°59'32"E where the vessel was last located on 7 November 2020 EST, based on AIS signal transmission

High-resolution satellite imagery obtained by the Panel showed a vessel on 26 August 2020 transmitting as the *M0uson* with a Palau-associated MMSI 511444000 matching the dimensions and features of the *New Konk* (IMO: 9036387), a vessel that had been previously proposed by the Panel for designation for delivering refined petroleum on multiple occasions to the DPRK and for conducting ship-to-ship transfers with another vessel that delivered its petroleum cargo to the DPRK[12].

Current investigations suggest that the *Mouson 328*, in registering itself first as the *Cherry 19* and then as the *Smooth Sea 29,* based on fraudulent documentation, appeared to allow another vessel, the *New Konk*, to assume the *Mouson 328's* identity while also creating fusion issues resulting in the *New Konk* appearing as the *Mouson 328* on commercial maritime databases.

The Panel wrote to Star Emperor Ventures Limited (hereafter "Star Emperor"), the vessel's registered owner since May 2019 and its management company, Pacific Expert Global Ltd (hereafter "Pacific Expert"). Both entities are listed as incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, with Star Emperor listing Pacific Expert, the vessel's manager and operator based in Kaohsiung, Taiwan Province of China[13], as its care-of address.

According to Mr. Yang, who stated he was the Director of both Star Emperor and Pacific Expert, Star Emperor purchased the *Mouson 328* on 10 May 2019 and sold it a few months later on 26 July 2019 to Rui He (HK) Marine Co, Limited, given various technical issues with the vessel. The vessel was for delivery to a buyer in Fu'an, Fujian Province, China. According to Mr Yang, the vessel was to be sold for scrap following delivery. Mr Yang stated he acquired the vessel "for high sea bunkering to Chinese fish vessel operating in east coastal of North Korea" (see annexes 22 (b) to (c)). During the time of his possession of the vessel, "There were no business connection with DPRK and also vessel never entry to any DPRK port". The Panel notes that as AIS transmission was not captured between 29 May and 5 June 2019.

According to information provided by the Panamanian authorities, the vessel was registered under its flag from 4 October 2018 to 20 February 2019 sailing as the *Angel 126* and flagged again on 17 May 2019 until 29 August 2020 sailing as the *Mouson 328.* Panama provided vessel positioning as well as other information to the Panel, including the periods where AIS was not transmitting. Panama confirmed it deleted the *Mouson 328* from its ship registry on 29 August 2020, in line with its responsibility "to suspend or delete any document related to the ships registered in the merchant navy of Panama, whenever their owners have failed to meet their obligations under Panamanian law and the relevant international treaties ratified by Panama".

Source: The Panel

[12] Paragraphs 27, 28 and 62, S/2020/691.

[13] While Star Emperor was no longer listed as an active company based on information from the International Maritime Organization, Pacific Expert was still listed as active.

Annex 22 (b): Letter from Pacific Expert Global Limited

From: Mr Yang [redacted] The owner of Mouson 328, Pacific Expert global Limited

To : 1718 Secretariat United Nations New York, USA DPPA 19173671525

Subject: outgoing communication #444 from the POE DPRK to Pacific Expert

Date : 14th Dec 2020

Statement of fact

To whom it may concern

I, Mr Yang [redacted] Chinese nationality, was the director of both Star Emperor Ventures Ltd and Pacific Expert global Ltd. Star Emperor Ventures Ltd purchased Mouson 328 with IMO 9021198 dated on 10th May 2019 for high sea bunkering to Chinese fish vessel operating in east coastal of North Korea. This is a seasonal fish heaven for squeezers from moth of May to September each year. To support fish vessel operation, I have decided to engage a tanker and delivery bunker to fish ground for Chinese fish vessels.

Mouson 328 delivered to Star Emperor on 13th May 2019 at 12:00lt at Kaohsiung and commenced the mentioned business on 25th of May 2019.

After sailing out from Kaohsiung, we have noted various technical problem on this tanker as an aged vessel. After two shipments in fish ground, due to technical issues, vessel was sold to Rui He(HK) Marine Co, Limited and delivered to buyer at Fuan Fujian China on 26th July 2019.

As statement above, I confirmed during the period possession of the vessel, the sole business nature was bunker delivery for Chinese fish vessels. There were no business connection with DPRK and also vessel never entry to any DPRK port.

1. **Confirmation of the vessel as being under your ownership, management and/or operation**
   I confirmed Mouson 328 was owned by Star Emperor Ventures Ltd and managed by Pacific Expert global Ltd.
2. Copies of AIS information and log books conforming the vessels location from April 2019 onwards.
   AIS tracking printout attached for your reference. Vessel has no entry to any port in DPRK. Log books was retained onboard at time of sale.
3. Current status of the vessel:

After delivery to Rui He(HK) Marine Co, limited, we have no update information on vessel status. In our agreement, vessel was supposed to be scrapped after delivery to buyer.

4. All shipping documentation including but not limited to customs documentation
   1). Voyage memo attached with cargo quantity discharge, name of fish vessel, voyage number, and date of discharge.
   As the nature of business out of territory water, there were no custom clearance required.
5. Information and full contact details of counterparties involved in any shipment of petroleum cargo to DPRK
   We confirmed again there were no any parties involved in DPRK.
6. Copy of all correspondence ---- Not applicable as no relation to DPRK
7. Copy of crew list ---- Attached with crew list
8. Method of payment for any petroleum cargo delivery to DPRK --- No applicable
9. Pacific Expert is co-located with Gold Advance Corp
   Pacific Expert Global Limited has rented a table from Gold Advance Corp in Taiwan for DOC purpose. Thereof the operation office for Pacific Expert Global limited had same address as Gold Advance Corp.
10. Nature of pacific Experts commercial relationship with Gold Advance
    As mentioned above, Pacific Experts rent a table from Gold Advance in Taiwan for DOC(document compliance) purpose.

List of document:

1. Document of compliance for Star Emperor Venture limited
2. Protocol of Delivery
3. Bill of Sale
4. AIS tracking printout
5. Voyage memo for voy no.1 and voy no.2
6. Crew List for Mouson 328
7. Office rental agreement between Pacific Experts and Gold Advance
8. Bill of Sale for Mouson 328
9. Protocol of delivery for Mouson 328

Source: The Panel

Annex 22 (c): Documentation relating to the sale of the *Mouson 328* (IMO: 9021198)

TO ALL TO WHOM these presents shall come I, [redacted]

of 13th Floor, Tower 2, New World Tower, 18 Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong, Notary Public duly authorized and qualified to practice in Hong Kong, do hereby Certify that the signature "Yang [redacted] subscribed to the BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate) hereto annexed is the true and lawful signature of Yang [redacted]

In Testimony whereof I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my Seal of Office this 25th day of July Two Thousand and Nineteen

[redacted]

Notary Public
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China

PROTOCOL OF DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE

We, STAR EMPEROR VENTURES LIMITED with its registered at Vistra Corporate Services Centre, Wickhams Cay II, Road Town, Tortola, VG1110, British Virgin Islands (hereinafter called "the Sellers") hereby deliver the Company's vessel "Mouson 328" presently registered under the Panama Flag of GRT 3,892 with IMO No. 9021198 on this 26th day of July 2019 at : hours, China time, at Fuan, China, to RUI HE (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED with its registered at Room C, 21/F., Central 88, 88 Des Voeus Road Central, Hong Kong (hereinafter called "the Buyers") in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 22nd July, 2019 thereafter (hereinafter called " the MOA") duly signed by and between the Sellers and the Buyers.

The Buyers hereby accept and take delivery of the said Vessel at Fuan, China, and certify that the same is delivered pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 22nd July, 2019 and addendum thereafter.

Made and signed in Two originals.
on the 26th day of July, 2019

For The Sellers
STAR EMPEROR VENTURES LIMITED

[redacted]

By 2019.7.26
Title: Attorney-in-Fact

For The Buyers
RUI HE (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED

[redacted]

By 2019.7.26
Title: Attorney-in-Fact

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO number	Name of Ship	Year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Propelling power of engine (KW)
9021198	MOUSON 328	1991, PANAMA	MOTOR TANKER	2,646 KW

	Meters	C'ntrs	Number of Tons (Where dual tonnages are assigned the higher of these should be stated)	
			Gross	Net
Length	107	30		
Breadth	16	50		
Depth	8	00	3,892	1,370

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book

We, (a) STAR EMPEROR VENTURES LIMITED, (hereinafter called "the SELLERS") having our registered office at Vistra Corporate Services Centre, Wickhams Cay II, Road Town, Tortola, VG1110, British Virgin Islands in consideration of the sum of United States Dollars Six Hundred Thousand only (USD 600,000) and other lawful and valuable consideration, paid to us by (b) RUI HE (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED, having its registered office at Room C, 21/F., Central 88, 88 Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong (hereinafter called "the BUYERS"), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hereby, transfer our whole title to and interest in the ship above particularly described, and in the boats, tackle and other appurtenances belonging of the said ship to the BUYERS.

Further we, the SELLERS for ourselves and our successors covenant with the BUYERS and their assigns, that we have power to transfer the sold ship and title thereto in manner aforesaid and that the same is free from all debts, encumbrances and maritime liens whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have executed this Bill of Sale on..... 25th July, 2019 SIGNED on behalf of the SELLERS by Yang [redacted] in his capacity as Director of Star Emperor Ventures Limited and in pursuance of a resolution of the Board of Directors of the SELLERS.

For and on behalf of
Star Emperor Ventures Limited

By [redacted]
Name: Yang [redacted]
Title: Director

Source: The Panel

Annex 23 (a): Sanctioned tanker *New Regent* (IMO: 8312497) masquerading as the '*Hang Yu 11*'

On or around 29 June 2019, a vessel masquerading as '*Hang Yu 11*' sailed from the Luoyuan Bay area in China to meet with a ROK-flagged tanker ("Tanker A") in a failed attempt at ship-to-ship transfer of refined petroleum. A few days earlier, Tanker A had engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Yun Hong 8* (MMSI: 413459380), a vessel which delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK. The following lists several indicators the Panel notes that should inform the process of due diligence in verifying the identity of the '*Hang Yu 11*'. Relevant extracts of the vessel owner's response are at Annex 23 (b).

(i) Identifier concerns and suspicious AIS track

AIS tracking on a specialized maritime database website shows a suspect vessel (MMSI: 356393000) with incomplete / invalid identifiers sailing up to Tanker A on and around the date, 30 June 2019 (figure 1).

Figure 1: A vessel with invalid identifiers sailing to meet Tanker A, 29 June 2019 (EST)



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

(ii) Photographs

Independent satellite imagery analysis indicates that the dimensions of the '*Hang Yu 11*' match the *New Regent.*

Various photographic comparisons of the '*Hang Yu 11*' and the *New Regent* indicate they are the same vessel[14].

[14] The Panel analyzed several images from various sources in making its determination.

Additional photographs subsequently obtained by the Panel show the '*Hang Yu 11'* painted over the vessel's embossed name, the *New Kopex* (figure 2). The *New Kopex* is the name the vessel used until 2011, before the vessel was re-named the *New Regent*. A wide variety of commercial maritime databases provide historical names of vessels that assist due diligence in vessel searches. Additionally, the vessel's painted over IMO number is that of the *New Regent*.

Figure 2: Painted over identifiers of the *New Regent*

Source: Member State

(i) Documentation checks

Ship documents of the *'Hang Yu 11' used* as proof that it was the Panama-flagged vessel with IMO number 8694194 (Document 5-1-3) are clearly outdated documentation. The '*Hang Yu 11'* (IMO: 8694194) has since March 2018 changed its flag and ship name as can be found on the International Maritime Organization's website.

*Togo-flagged Xin Sheng (*formerly *Hang Yu 11)*

The actual *Hang Yu 11,* sailing as the Togo-flagged *Xin Sheng* (IMO: 8694194) registered an AIS transmission gap between February 2018 and April 2020 on a commercial database platform. The Chinese manager and operator of the *Xin Sheng* confirmed that following a salvage incident the vessel was laid up for repairs between March 2018 and May 2020 at a shipyard in Zhoushan, China (figure 3). This confirmation is consistent with publicly available information on the vessel having drifted aground in February 2019 and of its subsequent auction in China in September 2020 following repairs.

Figure 3: Class Society's Statement of the *Xin Sheng (formerly Hang Yu 11)*) (IMO: 8694194)

ClassIBS
ISTHMUS BUREAU OF SHIPPING

STATEMENT

From: IBSCHINA December 16, 2020

To: Whom maybe concerned to

This is to certify that MV XIN SHENG flying with Togo flag, IMO No.8694194, keel laid on 19-Jan-2012, previous name is MV HANG YU 11 with Panama flag, the history of ship as follow:

1, Registered under Panama flag and named MV HANG YU 11 from 01-Jun-2016.
2, Entered into Zhoushan Haizhou Shipyard on 11-Mar-2018.
3, Registered under Togo flag on 21-Mar-2018.
4, Canceled from Panama flag on 06-Apr-2018.
5, Ship still repaired and laid up at Zhoushan Haizhou Shipyard from 11-Mar-2018 to 14-May-2020.
6, ClassIBS carried out re-activate survey from 14-May-2020 to 24-May-2020, and issued certificates for ship on 24-May-2020.

Eng. Liu Yinghao(IBS-520)

ISTHMUS BUREAU OF SHIPPING

Room102, 34-2 Huale Street, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China
Phone: (86) 411-82772390 Fax: (86)411-82772393
dalian@classibs.org http://www.ibschina.org http://www.classibs.org

Source: The Panel

Annex 23 (b): Excerpts on response on due diligence measures and documentation as provided by the owner of the ROK-flagged vessel

B) Notified by the buyer that *HANG YU 11* departed from Ningde port in China on 29 Jun 2019, would be arrived around 0100LT on 30 Jun 2019. Thus, the suspicious vessel would be *Hang yu 11*

3) Confirmation of ship-to-ship transfer(s) (amount, type and description) between [redacted] *and Hang yu 11 and if such transfer(s) of occurred on other occasions.*

[redacted]

On the 30th of June 2019, [redacted] met *Hang yu 11* that departed from Ningde, China. We investigated this vessel with all information we received beforehand through the best available sources we could access. We found that it appeared not listed on the sanction and not related to any suspicious activities is involved. We much more carefully looked into this vessel since the type of vessel was a tanker and the bigger amount of product it requested. When it approached our vessel, our captain and other responsible crews thoroughly conducted with our manual and calls to check with our office many times.

i. The external appearance when we looked was appropriate as the information given. It has its name engraved on the hull. When communicated with their crews, we did not notice decent accents of related countries on the sanction.

ii. We requested other supplementary information such as seafarer's book, ID card, certificate of registration, and pledge. The certificate of registration was the same as we received before. This was to make sure this vessel was equipped with all documents and we regarded this vessel to be a normal operation vessel.

iii. However, they spent a lot of time passing on their ID which brought attention to have our doubts. The condition of the sea was getting worse and possibly caused to have damages on our vessel.

iv. We instructed our captain to unberth and cancel the operation, ended up forcedly unberthing the vessel by cutting the rope while they kept denying to unberth.

4) Copies of all documentation and information collected on board the Hang yu 11;

A) Report by [redacted]

국적증서, 선박사진 & 서약서

[redacted]

2019-06-30

국적 증서(panama.pdf 490 KB | 서약서.pdf 43 KB | SHIP'S HULL.JPG 68 KB | SHIP'S NAME.JPG 32 KB

↳Documentation collected on board (nationality, pledge, photography of vessel)

"SAFETY OPERATION(安全運航)"
"ECONOMICAL OPERATION(經濟運航)"
"ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION(環境保護)"

TO: [redacted]
FM:
JUN 30, 2019

GOOD DAY, ALL

Re: [redacted]

선무에 수고하십니다.
표제건의 국적증서, 선박사진 & 서약서를 첨부하였으니 업무에 참조하시길 바랍니 다.

감사합니다.

B.RGDS/MASTER

B) Copies of all documentation

i. Certificate of vessel's nationality



IMO NO. 8694194

NUMERO OFICIAL 48130-16

DISTINTIVO DE LLAMADA H9HR

REPUBLIC OF PANAMA

↳Republic of Panama

PATENTE REGLAMENTARIA DE NAVEGACION / NAVIGATION STATUTORY REGISTRY

DATOS DE IDENTIFICACION DEL BUQUE / PARTICULARS OF THE VESSEL

HANG YU 11

HONG KONG COSNAVI INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LIMITED

NUEVA CONSTRUCCION

MLS & ASSOCIATES

NUEVA CONSTRUCCION

ASTRIUM SERVICES BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS GMBH

2012

2014

STEEL

89.80

15.20

6.80

2998.00

1489.00

4922.60

SISTEMA DE PROPULSION / PROPULSION SYSTEM

DIECISIETE (17) DE AGOSTO DE 2016

PANAMA

DIECISEIS (16) DE AGOSTO DE 2021

AUGUST, SIXTEEN (16) 2021

RECIBO OFICIAL No. 10092033A del 1 de julio de 2016

FERNANDO SOLÓRZANO

000232199

000232199

**Panel comment: The above documentation does not belong to the vessel in question as featured at Annex 23 (a).*

ii. Handwritten Letter of pledge



*Boxed comment annotated by the Panel as reflected in the Chinese text

iii. Photograph of *Hang Yu 11*

<Vessel's Hull>

<Vessel's name : Hang Yu 11>

Source: ROK-flagged tanker owner

5) A full description with supporting documentation (including from social media such as WeChat)(on the timelines on the request for bunkering

A) We confirmed that this vessel is not included in the UN & OFAC Sanction list when we checked the vessel.

i. 28/06/2019, the communication logs for verification of the vessel



ii. 29/06/2019, the record of vessel searching

iii. 29/06/2019, checked the certificate of registration before meeting *Hang yu 11*.

Source: The Panel

Annex 24: Response from Ming-Fa Attorneys at Law on behalf of Uniform Shipping Co Ltd[15]

MING-FA ATTORNEYS AT LAW

[redacted]

Received by the Panel via email on 17 December 2020 → Nov 16, 2020

To Panel of Experts of UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Dear Panel of Experts,

As entrusted by Panama-flagged tanker Infinite Luck (IMO : 9063811) shipowner, [redacted] Wang, also known as registered owner of Uniform Shipping Co. Ltd.(hereafter Uniform Shipping), we Ming Fa Law firm are here to clarify the issue addressed in the midterm report established by Panels of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) on 28 August 2020, affirming a ship-to-ship oil transfer between vessel Infinite Luck owned by Uniform Shipping, and a North Korea vessel Myong Ryu 1 (IMO: 8532413) in the East China Sea on 10 January 2020. The incident of involving vessel Infinite Luck in a ship-to-ship transfer was with the Chinese "Mingbo No. 5" tanker. In early Oct 2020, Uniform Shipping acquired the acknowledgement that DPRK-flagged tanker Myong Ryu 1 was disguised as Chinese Mingbo No. 5 tanker only after the midterm report of the resolution 1874 (2009) was published on 28 August 2020. As per our earlier discussion, Uniform Shipping hereby entrusted our firm to provide the following evidence in proving how Infinite Luck was deceived to conduct a prohibited fuel transfer for further committee investigation.

Uniform Shipping is a private company registered in Hong Kong represented by Hong Kong Secretary Service Company - "Standard Business Ltd." working as the designated agent. The owner of the corporation is [redacted] Wang, who lives in Taiwan. The address registered in Hong Kong belongs to the Secretary Service Company, not the actual operating office. The headquarter of Uniform Shipping is located at 11F.-5, No. 12, Fuxing 4th Rd., Qianzhen Dist., Kaohsiung City 806, Taiwan [redacted] in Kaohsiung Software Technology Park. The above information can be confirmed by the company's annual declaration form issued by Hong Kong Government (see annex 1).

[15] According to the legal firm, Mr Wang of Uniform Shipping, the *Infinite Luck's* owner, was only made aware of the incident following publication of the Panel's report in October 2020. The Panel notes that no contact details on Uniform Shipping / Mr Wang were easily available. The Panel sent a letter to Uniform Shipping through two email addresses obtained by the Panel that Mr Wang had used in his past business correspondences. Uniform Shipping's listed address was obtained from the Uniform Shipping's 2019 Annual Returns records from the Hong Kong corporate registry, which typically list the contact details of the company providing corporate registration services and not that of the owner. The Panel notes there was no Qianzhen District, Kaohsiung City address on the attached form provided by the legal firm.

On 2 December 2019, Uniform Shipping signed a short-term diesel freight forwarding service contract, stipulating that from 10 December 2019 to 10 February 2020 (two-month period), Infinite Luck was appointed solely to transport diesel for Hyuen Trade Ltd. (hereafter Hyuen Trade). The total freight expense is 0.98 million in RMB dollars (see annex 2). Based on the agreement, Uniform Shipping started shipping diesel to Chinese Mingbo No. 5 tanker on 10 January 2020. Mingbo No.5 tanker had not been designated by UNSC Sanctions Committee, and only until the midterm report established by Panels of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) on 28 August 2020 was it identified as DPRK-flagged tanker Myong Ryu 1.

Hyuen Trade assigned Infinite Luck to conduct ship-to-ship transfers to designated vessels, are all Chinese fishing auxiliary vessels. Before allowing each freight forwarding delivery to take place, [redacted] Wang, the person in charge of Uniform Shipping, would ask for a photos of the receiving ship to be sent back to office (headquarter),andpassed these photos through company's operation staff to Hyuen Trade staff, in order to confirm the ship. Therefore, Uniform Shipping still kept this these photos which clearly showed that the vessel was in disguise as Chinese Mingbo No. 5 tanker (see annex 3). In addition, after the delivery was completed on 10 January 2020, Infinite Luck, in compliance with Uniform Shipping standard operation procedure, would require Mingbo No.5 Master to sign "Bunker Delivery Receipt" and verify that diesel oil entrusted by Hyuen Trade to be carried by Infinite Luck had been delivered to Mingbo No.5 (see annex 4). This Bunker Delivery Receipy can also prove that Infinite Luck had no intention of engaging illicit shipping practices with North Korea vessels and always took appropriate due diligence measures.

In 2019, Infinite Luck tanker had some maintenance and repairing at Shenyin Shipping Engineering Co., LTD (hereafter Shenyin Shipping) in FuJian, China, and a total fee of 1.05 million RMB dollars was incurred. Since Hyuen Trade had to pay 0.98 million RMB to Uniform Shipping, Uniform Shipping instructed Hyuen Trade to pay on its behalf. The fact that Shenyin Shipping receiving the payment from Hyuen Trade can be proved by the receipt (see annex 5), which also indicates the fact that Infinite Luck was working in accordance with Hyuen Trade's instructions to transport diesel, and at that time Infinite Luck crew and Uniform Shipping shipowner [redacted] Wang didn't know Mingbo No. 5's concealed identity as DPRK-flagged tanker Myong Ryu 1.

Based on the above information, it is explicitly clear that Infinite Luck would not have known the true identity of Chinese Mingbo No. 5 tanker prior to the delivery taken on 10 January 2020, and the crew of Uniform Shipping and Infinite Luck had no subjective intention to transport diesel to North Korea vessels. If there are any doubts that need to be clarified, please contact us anytime and we will fully assist Uniform Shipping to cooperate with further investigation.

Sincerely yours,

Ming Fa Law Firm 銘法法律事務所

[redacted]

Annex 1: Uniform Shipping Co. Ltd.'s annual declaration form
Annex 2: The short-term diesel freight forwarding service contract signed between Uniform Shipping Co. Ltd. and Hyuen Trade Ltd.
Annex 3: Myong Ryu 1 in disguise as Chinese Mingbo No.5 on 10 January 2020
Annex 4: Shipping order signed by Mingbo No.5 shipowner
Annex 5: Receipt from Shenyin Shipping Engineering Co., Ltd. to Hyuen Trade Ltd.

Nov 16, 2020

Excerpts of Relevant Annexes of Photographs and Documentation provided relating to the company's due diligence measures

Annex 3

Mingbo No.5

Mingbo No.5



ANNEX 4

出 货 单

编号(NO.): 明波5号 日期(DATE): 2020 1月10号

收到柴油 700 吨(T), 计 840 M³ (KL)

以上数量确认无误

特此证明

供货方: 收货方:

Source: The Panel, boxed comments are annotated by the Panel.

Annex 25: Additional non-DPRK vessels delivering refined petroleum products to the DPRK from May 2020 to October 2020

Despite the majority of the vessels listed below no longer registering a flag and having no updated ownership information on maritime databases, the vessels continued to trade in international waters, obtaining their refined petroleum supplies for delivery to the DPRK.

The *An Ping, Rich United, Heng Rong, Xin Hai* and *Xing Ming Yang 888* were not flagged when they were reported delivering refined petroleum in the DPRK, with the last three tankers sailing without a flag for over a year while continuing to trade.

The *Heng Rong, Xin Hai* and *Xing Ming Yang 888* had their management companies dissolved or struck off on the Hong Kong company registry at least a year before these vessels engaged in sanctionable deliveries of unreported refined petroleum. None of these entities had updated ownership information on maritime databases. The *An Ping* and *Run Da* were sold around the time they were recorded delivering refined petroleum at Nampo, with the *An Ping* sold to an undisclosed buyer and the *Run Da* not reporting its sale.

(i) *An Ping* (IMO: 7903366)

The *An Ping,* formerly Sierra Leone-flagged, delivered unreported refined petroleum to the DPRK and was recorded on satellite imagery berthed at Nampo on 8 July 2020 (see figure 1). The vessel also delivered refined petroleum on at least two other occasions in June 2020[16]. The Sierra Leone Maritime Authority confirmed the vessel was de-registered on 2 July 2020 on the grounds of the vessel's sale, shortly before it conducted a port call at Nampo.

Figure 1: *An Ping* delivering refined petroleum at Nampo, 8 July 2020

Source: Member State

[16] Annex-21.

The *An Ping* was recorded on a maritime database as sold to an undisclosed buyer[17] in July 2020. The vessel has since been sailing as flagged unknown. Over the period the *An Ping* was reported to have delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK, it recorded a month long AIS transmission gap between June and July 2020, with no further transmissions since August 2020[18]. The vessel also conducted other suspect voyages with AIS transmission gaps outside of the above-mentioned occasions. Lack of AIS transmission while carrying re-stricted or banned commodities in affected waters has been recorded in the Panel's reports as a regular feature in vessels that have conducted illicit activities.

The *An Ping's* registered owner, ship manager and operator, Spring Gain International Ltd, incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, was recorded on the same maritime database as no longer active. The Panel wrote to the Document of Compliance (DOC) company holder, Gold Advance Corp (hereafter "Gold Advance"), registered in Samoa and based in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan Province of China. Gold Advance responded that there was a change in ownership of the company and that the present owner "On the day of cancellation ship management contract … did not work as DOC holder for An Ping". A Bill of Sale provided to the Panel showed the vessel was sold in May 2020 by Spring Gain International to a Ms Gong with an address at Shishi City, Fujian Province, China. According to the current management, "While previous management team planned to close the Gold Advance Corp., to avoid direct cost impact to shipowner by closing Gold Advance Corp., the current management was invited to take over …. Instead of asking owner to change to other DOC company … and this can save amount of expense for shipowners…". Elsewhere in its letter, Gold Advance stated, "As far as we know, and the information from previous management team "… this DOC work service is that they provide ship's safety management manual and procedure to ship for safety management quality implementation and meets ISM Code". See Annex 5(a) for relevant attachments.

(ii) *Heng Rong* (IMO: 7913098)

The *Heng Rong*, unknown-flagged since October 2018[19], delivered unreported refined petroleum to the DPRK and was recorded on satellite imagery on 6 August 2020 and on 23 August 2020 laden at Nampo Lock Gate (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Satellite Imagery of the *Heng Rong* (IMO: 7913098) in August 2020 outside Nampo, DPRK Lock Gate, DPRK



Source: Member State

[17] IHS Markit.

[18] All records unless otherwise stated in the report are as on December 2020.

[19] De-registered from Sierra Leone flag registry due to outstanding dues.

The *Heng Rong* recorded an unaccounted 3-month gap in AIS transmission between July and October 2020, covering the above-mentioned dates when the vessel was reported to have been in the DPRK.

A Member State reported to the Panel that during this period, and between port calls to the DPRK, the vessel conducted a ship-to-ship transfer on or around 15 August 2020. In September 2020, the vessel was photographed by the Member State during its hail and query with a changed name "*Aoshen 777*" displayed on its superstructure (see figure 3). Maritime databases have not recorded a change in the vessel's name.

Figure 3: *Heng Rong* changing out its name to *Aoshen 777* while being hailed and queried, 14 September 2020



Source: Member State

Outside of this period, the Panel notes that the vessel had displayed a previous extended period of unaccounted for gap in AIS transmission , from March to June 2020 (see figure 4), suggesting the possibility of other illicit activities.

Figure 4 Unaccounted AIS transmission gaps



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

In January 2021, Sierra Leone noted in an official letter notifying that the *Heng Rong* was reportedly using fraudulent certificates supposedly issued by the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration to continue to operate (see Annex 5(b).

The *Heng Rong's* registered owner, ship manager and operator, Bansda Shipping Co Ltd recorded on the International Maritime Organization's website was dissolved on the Hong Kong company registry's database on 2 February 2018, indicating a likely transfer of ownership that was not updated.

(iii) Rich United (IMO: 9129213)

The *Rich United* (IMO: 9129213) was recorded on satellite imagery at Songnim on 13 June 2020 (see figure 5). The vessel also delivered refined petroleum on at least one other occasion in May 2020[20]. A commercial maritime database platform showed the *Rich United* with several days of unaccounted gaps in AIS transmission during the dates of the suspected port calls at Nampo, DPRK. The vessel had also exhibited other periods of unaccounted AIS gaps outside of this period.

Figure 5: *Rich United* delivering refined petroleum at Songnim, 13 June 2020

Source: Member State

The *Rich United* was unknown flagged during these times of reported delivery. The vessel was recorded flagged under the Cook Islands for a year and de-registered on 4 May 2020. The International Maritime Organization listed the vessel as Mongolian-flagged on August 2020, sailing as the *Xin Hai*[21]. In response to the Panel's enquiry, Mongolia confirmed the vessel was not registered under its ship registry during the time indicated by the Panel of Experts report. Mongolia registered the vessel on 5 August 2020 and "… started using radio-communication number MMSI 457 206 000. Before registering the vessel , the Maritime Administration has run through all the necessary procedures and found no facts or information on violation of the UNSC relevant resolutions and sanctions. As the former owner (Rich United Trading Limited) of the vessel

[20] Annex 21.

[21] International Maritime Organization, December 2020.

"XIN HAI" has been changed and upon the request of the new owner the vessel "XIN HAI" de-registered from the Mongolian ship registry on 15 December 2020". See also Annex-M5(c) and 5 (d).

In the course of its investigations, the Panel noted several inconsistencies in AIS data transmissions on a maritime database platform. In December 2019, a vessel began transmitting positional information as the *Taian* under a Mongolia-associated MMSI number: 457206000. The *Taian* was initially transmitting without an IMO number. The *Taian* also transmitted on several occasions on the said MMSI at the same time as when the then Cook Islands'-flagged *Rich United*, was transmitting its then-issued MMSI number 518100674 (see figure 6), indicating these were two separate vessels.

Figure 6: *Taian* and *Rich United* MMSI's transmitting at the same time on various occasions



Source: Windward

A vessel transmitting the *Taian's* Mongolia-associated MMSI number and call sign JVYB5 sailed to Quanzhou port area on 25 or around August 2020 (EST), where it began transmitting the *Rich United's* IMO number. The vessel had changed its name from *Taian* to *Xin Hai* a week earlier prior to entering the port area (see figure 7). The Panel sought Mongolia and China's assistance into the AIS transmission discrepancies.

Figure 7: Identifier changes to the *Xin Hai*, August 2020.



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Mongolia replied that the "TAI AN" (IMO 8676324) was registered with its ship registry from 17 March to 17 September 2015, using the MMSI: 457 206 000. "Upon the registry's expiration, the same radio-communication equipment/number is being used by the newly registered vessel. Accordingly, the radio communication number formerly used by "TAI AN" has been transferred to the vessel "XIN HAI" registered in 2020, thus may be caused a similar situation for both vessels".

China replied that the ""Rich United" is a wrong name, which should be "Swift" according to its MMSI number. There is no record of this vessels entering or leaving Chinese ports."

The Panel's prior investigations into the *Rich United* listed the vessel as registered under Mongolia's ship registry before, between June 2017 and May 2019, sailing as the *Swift*. Panel research, also corroborated by Mongolia's reply, listed the *Swift* with MMSI number: 457451000. It would appear, based on Chinese response, that the vessel was transmitting its historical MMSI number associated with the *Swift* when it was at Quanzhou port area in late August 2020.

The *Rich United's* registered owner is the Seychelles incorporated Rich United Trading Ltd (hereafter "Rich United Trading"), listed under the care of address of EastAsia Shipping & Marine Service Pte Ltd (hereafter " EastAsia Shipping'), a Singapore-registered company which has also served as the *Rich United*'s ship manager and operator since May 2019. Seychelles responded to the Panel. EastAsia Shipping has yet to respond to the Panel. Investigations continue.

(iv) *Run Da* (IMO: 8511172)

The then-Mongolia-flagged *Run Da* delivered unreported refined petroleum to the DPRK and was recorded on satellite imagery berthed at Nampo petroleum delivery pier on 29 April 2020 (see figure 8). The vessel also delivered refined petroleum at Songnim on 5 June 2020. The *Run Da* exhibited unaccounted AIS gaps on several occasions over a sample four month observed period (see figure 9), indicating the vessel may have conducted illicit activities outside of the above-mentioned dates. From 15 June to 15 August (EST), when the

vessel reappeared after two months without AIS signal, the vessel recorded a length change back to its original[22] dimension, suggesting possible obfuscation of the vessel's identity during the two months.

Figure 8: Satellite imagery of the *Run Da* at Nampo port

Source : Member State

[22] The *Run Da's* reported length change was from 114 meters to 98 meters. The vessel's length is 98 meters.

Figure 9: Sample four months of the *Run Da*'s voyage route, April to August 2020



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

The Panel wrote to Mongolia and to the vessel's Class Society. SingClass International Pte Ltd (hereafter "SingClass")[23] informed the Panel that "Based on your complaint and report, our findings showed the owner had contravened our classification safety requirement and also breached the Mongolia Ship Registration Regulations by going out of the A1 trading region plus the breached of the UN Sanction Resolution. We have informed the Mongolia Ship Registry, which they had closed the ship registry with immediate effect. With Mongolia Registry closed, SingClass's Statutory certificates for the vessel are now null and invalid and the vessel is out of our class at this point in time". Mongolia reverted with additional documentation that the Panel is studying.

Singclass subsequently informed the Panel that it obtained information the *Run Da* was sold on to Long River Shipping Limited based in Fuzhou, China, on 10 April 2020 and the month prior to the vessel's port call in the DPRK. As the transfer of ownership was not reported with the requsite de/re-registration of flag and certificate that typically accompany an ownership change, SingClass considered the non-reporting a deliberate attempt to falsely use the vessel's old registry and its associated statutory trading certificates, which would be nullified with such a sale (see figure 10).

[23] According to the Mongolian Ship Registry website, SingClass serves as the registry's in-house technical arm.

Figure 10: Bill of Sale of the *Run Da*



BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO number	Name of Ship	Built year and Flag	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Power of engines (if any)
8511172	RUN DA	Built 1985 / Japan	MOTOR SHIP	2,300 kW

	METERS	Number of Tons	
Length	98.05		
Breadth	15.50	Gross	Net
Moulded Depth	7.90	3,384	1,574

and as described in more detail in Memorandum of Agreement dated 9th April 2020

We, SHUN FA MARINE LIMITED, (hereinafter called "the Transferor") having our registered address at Cheung Sun Tower, 116-118, Wing Lok Street, Sheung Wan, Hong Kong, in consideration of the sum of USD 100,000 (United States Dollars One Hundred Thousand only) paid to us by LONG RIVER SHIPPING LIMITED, (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") having its registered address at registered office at Huitao East Road, Pingtan County, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, China, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer all the share in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that thereon are free from all registered encumbrances, mortgage, maritime liens or any other debts whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have executed this document on April 10, 2020.

[redacted]

April 10, 2020

SHUN FA MARINE LIMITED [redacted]

LONG RIVER SHIPPING LIMITED [redacted]

Source: The Panel

Shun Fa Marine Limited (hereafter "Shun Fa Marine"), a Hong Kong incorporated company, is listed as the *Run Da's* group and registered owner, ship manger and operator since November 2019[24]. The vessel had transferred ownership five months prior to its recorded delivery of refined petroleum at Nampo port in May 2020 from Golden Sun Ocean Co Ltd to Shun Fa Marine Ltd, entities incorporated in Hong Kong, China. The *Run Da*'s Document of Compliance company holder and Technical Manager, Golden Lamp Stand Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co Ltd, a Kaohsiung-based company, has been with the vessel since 2011.

Publicly available sources list a Philippines' national (hereafter "Person P1") is registered on the Hong Kong company registry as Director of Shun Fa Marine. Person P1 had also previously registered a company, Bayabas Shipping Co Limited, with the Hong Kong company registry and provided the same national identification number. In November 2019, Shun Fa Marine's shares were transferred to another Philippines' national (hereafter "Person P2"). Person P2 shares the same family name with person P1 and the Panel is in the process of determining the nature of commercial and / or family relationship between these individuals.

The Philippines authorities provided the Panel with its interim investigation results. Its authorities confirmed there were no existing records in its national Business Name Registry and the Supply Chain database on Person P1 and his two companies. The Business Name Registry limits data to sole proprietors registered with the Department of Trade and Industry and the Supply Chain database limits data to logistics service providers. The Philippines Department of Justice and its National Bureau of Investigation have returned three derogatory records on Person P1 but have yet to ascertain whether the records pertain to the actual Person P1 in question. Further investigations remain on-going on the subject. On 22 October 2020, a subpoena was issued to the subject at the listed address as contained in the Hong Kong Company Database records" provided by Person P1. The Philippines stated it would convey additional information it could provide to the Panel as they are made available.

[24] IHS Markit as on December 2020.

***Xin Hai* (IMO: 7636638)**

The *Xin Hai* was unknown flagged during the time the vessel delivered refined petroleum to Nampo on 1 September 2020. The vessel was flagged under Sierra Leone until November 2019. The vessel's manager and operator Baili Shipping and Trading Limited was dissolved by de-registration on the Hong Kong corporate registry in March 2018. Investigations continue.

(v) *Xing Ming Yang 888* (IMO: 8410847)

The unknown-flagged *Xing Ming Yang 888* (IMO: 8410847) delivered illicit unreported refined petroleum products to the DPRK on at least two occasions, on 3 June 2020 (see figure 11) and 28 June 2020. The vessel, sailing as flagged unknown since November 2018, was recommended by the Panel for designation for having engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Mu Bong 1* (IMO: 8610461) in 2018[25].

Figure 11: Satellite imagery of the *Xing Ming Yang 888* at Songnim port

Source: Member State

A commercial maritime database platform recorded the vessel as sailing under false identifiers and transmitting a Tanzanian associated MMSI: 677001712 at some point in May 2020 while in Chinese territorial waters near Luoyuan Bay area (see figure 12). The Panel has observed vessels conducting sanctionable and illicit activities often transmit false flags and other identifiers, including MMSIs, in an attempt to obscure their identity. While the vessel was in Chinese waters in December 2020, the Panel sought China's assistance on information on the vessel including whether it entered port, whether the vessel was being detained and documentation from the vessel including verification of the vessel's identifiers. China responded that there was no record of the vessel entering or leaving Chinese ports.

[25] Paragraphs 15 to 17 and figure VII, S/2019/171.

Figure 12: Excerpts from a commercial maritime database platform showing the *Xing Ming Yang 888's* (IMO: 8410847) MMSI transmission.



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

During the time of the vessel's reported delivery of refined petroleum to the DPRK, the *Xing Ming Yang 888's* recorded registered owner, Xing Ming Yang (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd was already listed as a dissolved entity since June 2019 on the Hong Kong company registry, as was the vessel's listed operator, manager and Document of Compliance company holder, HK Qihang International Shipping Management Ltd. Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel

Annex 25 (a): Letter from Gold Advance Corp, dated 10 January 2021 and extracts of its attachments

To DPPA, United National, USA
From Gold Advance Corp.
Date 10 January 2021

Subject: Reply on Outgoing Communication #443 from the POE DPRK to Gold Advance Corp (An Ping)

Dear Sirs,

We received a facsimile message from DPPA of United Nations New York, USA dated on 11 December 2020 stating the motor tanker An Ping suspectedly involving in DPRK incident. This message was received recently by forwarding from previous personnel of the company.

First, we would like to advise that there was a management change of this company Gold Advance Corp. around 7 May 2020, including director position. We would like to express our concerns to you about this matter, and we hope to clarify by explaining below that the Gold Advance Corp. did not involve in DPRK operation.

The previous Gold Advance Corp management decided to close their business and laid off their staffs due to bad shipping market in recent year, it is said some of shipowner closed their business due to the impact of COVID 19. As far as we know, and the information from previous management team, the company Gold Advance Corp provides ship management consultant for ships with Document of Compliance (hereunder called as DOC) issued by relevant registry flag. Basically, this DOC work service is that they provide ship's safety management manual and procedure to ship for safety management quality implementation and meets ISM Code. For the case of [redacted] inspection in Taiwan, Gold Advance Corp also assist to rectifying the deficiencies in order to comply ISM requirement and port requirement. Currently Gold Advance Corp works as DOC company. The seafarer recruitment and technical repairing/supplying are done by owner or its appointed agent. It was understood that previous management team of Gold Advance Corp worked as DOC company only.

While previous management team planned to close the Gold Advance Corp., to avoid direct cost impact to shipowner by closing Gold Advance Corp., the current management was invited to take over the Gold Advance Corp, instead of asking owner to change to other DOC company, so by this, DOC company won't be changed from the aspect of ISM Code requirement, and this can save amount of expense for shipowners

Page 1

that already put their ships under Gold Advance Corp DOC. For information, the example of change DOC, the estimated cost including other certification would be reached to USD 10,000 to USD 16,000 for a ship to shipowner.

While during Gold Advance Corp. change management, An Ping shipowner did not continue to work with us as they plan to change to other ship management (DOC) or sale the ship due to their various concern, however we did not know their final intention after that. There was a cancellation of ship management agreement made between Gold Advance Corp and An Ping shipowner Spring Gain to avoid future dispute. The Spring Gain International Limited are required to change ship management as earlier as possible after this cancellation letter signed.

It was the time about in June that we heard the ship is going to delete from Sierra Leone. We have got Bill of Sale through owner after receiving your letter that the sale was made on 20 May 2020. It appeared that owner sold this ship on May 2020 after management cancellation.

In addition, we did not know this company was inactive because in registry certificate, the shipowner still named Spring Gain International Limited, we thought this company does not have problem.

As far as the reference we had in hand, we know this company director is named Gong [redacted]

We would also like to reply your question mentioned in your message as below:

In page 2

1) Confirmation that Gold Advance Corp served as the Document of Compliance (DOC) company holder for the An Ping (IMO: 7903366). Please confirm the dates and exact vessel services provided by your company and its associates. Please provide all supporting documentation; Copies of contracts and agreement between your company and the An Ping's owner and / or representatives for services rendered to the Vessel; Please also provide information and full contact information for the owner
   On the day of cancellation ship management contract, Gold Advance Corp did not work as DOC holder of An Ping. Cancellation of ship management agreement is attached for reference. Owner reference available in our hand attached as well.

2) Information on the entity / individual the An Ping was sold to in July 2020 along with all documents related to this sale
As per Bill of Sale provided from owner side, please see attached.

3) Information and documentation of your company's involvement in the ship's sailing operation in 2020 and on any other occasion where the An Ping visited the DPRK
Gold Advance Corp does not involve in DPRK operation as this company work on professional ship management for providing service of marine industry shipping standard.

4) Copy of all communications (including through messaging platforms such as WeChat related to the instruction on the voyage routes and any port calls or visits to the DPRK?
We did not have such communications as there is no involvement of DPRK operation

5) Any other information that you might consider relevant to the Panel's work as mandated by the Security Council in connection with the above or other similar trade and / or facilitation activities in potential violation of the applicable resolutions?
No.

With regard to assisting your investigation on below questions:

1. Nature of Gold Advance's relationship with Pacific Expert?
We do not know this company or any relevant to our ship management. This is our first time hearing this company.

2. Nature of Gold Advance's relation with Winson Shipping Taiwan Co., Ltd., the vessel's previous DOC company holder?
As per the reference we had in hand while took over Gold Advance Corp. this company has no relationship with Winson Shipping Taiwan Co., Ltd.

3. Information on whether Gold Advance Corp has in common with Pacific Expert any beneficial owner, office bearer, shareholder or employee, with full details if so?
Gold Advance Corp has no relation with Pacific Expert of above.

4. Any other information that you might consider relevant to the Panel's work as mandated by the Security Council in connection with the above or other similar trade and / or facilitation in potential violation of the applying resolutions.
   No, however, if you have any further question, we would like to cooperate to answer.

In final, we would like to stress that Gold Advance Corp. does not get involve in DPRK or participate anything related to DPRK. We provide this letter to you to support our statement with attachment.

Attachment
1. Change of director/shareholder of Gold Advance Corp
2. Termination of contract with An Ping shipowner
3. Gold Advance Corp DOC
4. Owner reference (Spring Gain)
5. Bill of Sale
6. An Ping Deletion Certificate

Gold Advance Corp.

Attachment No.1 change of director/shareholder of Gold Advance Corp

Gold Advance Corp. 金進股份有限公司

Director's Resolutions Entered on the 7th day of May 2020

Consent is given by the undersigned to the adoption of the following resolutions

Appointment of Director:	IT WAS RESOLVED That **Ms. Lin,** [redacted] be appointed as Director of the Company with effect immediately following the signing of these resolutions and it had noted that **Mr. Chang** [redacted] proposed to resign immediately following the appointment of the new Director.
Resignation of Director:	RESOLVED That the resignation of **Mr. Chang,** [redacted] as Director of the Company be accepted with effect immediately following passing of the resolutions.
Appointment of Secretary:	RESOLVED That **Ms. Lin,** [redacted] be appointed as Secretary of the Company with effect immediately following the signing of these resolutions and it had noted that **Mr. Chang,** [redacted] resigned immediately following the appointment of the new Secretary.
Resignation of Secretary:	RESOLVED That the resignation of **Mr. Chang** [redacted] as Secretary of the Company be accepted with effect immediately following passing of the resolutions.
Transfer of Shares :	NOTED That the Company had received advice of the following proposed transfer of shares in the capital of the Company:- Transferor — Transferee — No. of Shares **Mr. Chang,** [redacted] **Ms. Lin** [redacted] **1,000,000** RESOLVED That the aforesaid share transfer be approved and that upon receipt by the Director of the duly executed instruments of transfer, details of the new member be entered in the Register of Members and that Share Certificate No. 1 be cancelled.
Issue of Share Certificate(s):	RESOLVED That Share Certificate be issued signed by a Director of the Company and under the common seal as follows: Cert. No. — Shareholder — No. of Shares 3 — **Ms. Lin** [redacted] **,000,000 Ordinary Shares** FURTHER RESOLVED That the Director be authorised to witness the affixing of the common seal to the new Share Certificate.

[redacted]

Mr. Chang, [redacted]
Director

Attachment No.2 Termination of contract with An Ping shipowner

船舶管理合同終止協議

甲方(船舶管理顧問公司)	Gold Advance Corp
乙方(船東/船東代理)	Spring Gain International Limited

甲乙雙方於 2020 年 5 月 8 日同意終止安平輪(M.T. An Ping)船舶管理諮詢服務，雙方協議如下，共同遵守，如有違反，由乙方負完全責任並賠償甲方損失:

1. 雙方同意協議日終止船舶管理顧問服務。
2. 乙方不得再使用本公司所提供之服務，包含船舶管理文件手冊，印有本公司名稱之船舶管理張貼文件等，包含公司符合聲明(DOC)。
3. 基於友好與互信原則，乙方應於安平輪抵下一港時，應歸還上述文件，並更換管理公司。
4. 乙方應盡速完成更換管理公司，並於更換完成前，不得從事違反沿岸國、港口國以及聯合國制裁之活動行為，並由乙方自負法律責任。

[redacted]

甲方(船舶管理顧問公司)
Gold Advance Corp

[redacted]

乙方(船東/船東代理)
Spring Gain International Limited

Attachment number 5: Bill of sale

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the Secretary of State for Trade

Form No. 10A

X.S. 79 A

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

Official number	Name of ship	IMO Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
SL100845	AN PING	7903366, 1979, FREETOWN	Motor Ship	1,400 KW

	Meter	Centimeter	Number of Tons (Where dual tonnages are assigned the higher of these should be stated)	
			Gross	Register Net
Length	93	00	3167	1566
Breadth	15	50		
Depth	7	70		

And as described in more detail in the Register Book.

We, (a) SPRING GAIN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our principal place of business at P.O. BOX 957, OFFSHORE INCORPORATIONS CENTRE, ROAD TOWN, TORTOLA, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS in consideration of the sum of RMB 2,000,000 (Renminbi Two Million Only) paid to us by (b) MS. GONG [redacted] having its principal place of business at [redacted] SHISHI CITY, FUJIAN PROVINCE, CHINA (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer our whole Shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and (c) its assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from (d) all charters, encumbrances, mortgages, taxes and maritime liens and any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have executed this Bill of Sale on 20 May 2020

Signed, Sealed and Delivered by Mr. GONG [redacted] Director on behalf of SPRING GAIN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED.

[redacted]

Name: GONG [redacted]

Title : Director

(a) Name if full of Body Corporate. (b) Full name(s) and address(es) of transferee(s) with their description in the case of individuals, and adding "as joint owners" where such is the case.
(c) "his", "their" or "its". (d) If any subsisting encumbrance add "save as appears by the registry of the said ship". (e) Signatures and description of witnesses, i.e. Director, Secretary, etc.(as the cases may be).
NOTE – A purchaser of a registered British vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship, and neglect to this precaution may result serious consequence.
NOTE – Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.

F.3218 (August 1975)

Source: The Panel

Annex 25 (b): Letter from Sierra Leone Maritime Administration on the *Heng Rong* (IMO: 7913098) on its reported use of fraudulent certificates

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

To: Messrs. Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding – Tokyo MoU
Messrs. Paris Memorandum of Understanding – Paris MoU
Messrs. Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding – Med MoU
Messrs. Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding – Indian Ocean MoU
Messrs. Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding – Riyadh MoU
Messrs. Black Sea Memorandum of Understanding – Black Sea MoU
Messrs. Caribbean Memorandum of Understanding – Caribbean MoU
Messrs. Abuja Memorandum of Understanding – Abuja MoU

CC: SIERRA LEONE MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Date: 29th of January 2021
Transmittal No.: SL-0219-21

Official Letter

Dear Sirs,

Ref: M/V HENG RONG (IMO: 7913098)

We would like to hereby communicate and inform that the above - mentioned vessel is not registered under this Administration due to suspicions on violation of sanctions. We have been informed that the above-mentioned vessel is using fraudulently Certificates supposedly issued by Sierra Leone Maritime Administration in order to call Ports and move freely.

We would appreciate any assistance in combating such illegal activities.

We direct all parties to verify any Certificate issued by Sierra Leone Flag through our website: www.slmarad.com and download/ view the verification copy of the Certificate. In case the Certificate cannot be verified, please contact SLMARAD through: info@slmarad.com

Yours Faithfully,
The Undersigned.

Place and Date of issuance (DD/MM/YYYY)
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 29/01/2021

[redacted]
Registrar

REGISTRAR SLMARAD

RE-CER-26
22/01/2021

Sierra Leone Maritime Administration – SLMARAD
info@slmarad.com www.slmarad.com

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Source: The Panel

Annex 25 (c): Note verbale and unofficial translation from the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations in New York

MONGOLIA

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

6 East 77th Street, New York, N.Y. 10075
Tel: (212) 861-9460, Fax: (212) 861-9464

NUB/006/2021

The Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to transmit information requested by the respective Panel via Note Verbale S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.420.

Taking this opportunity, the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations would like to inform that the Note Verbale NUB/32/2020 regarding the vessel Subblic (IMO:8126082) and registration documents have been transmitted to the respective Panel on 27 May 2020.

The information and documentation on the Rich United aka Xin Hai (IMO:9129213) are attached herewith.

The Permanent Mission of Mongolia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

26 January 2021
New York

United Nations Security Council
Panel of Experts established pursuant to the resolution 1874 (2009)
New York

Non official translation

Additional information

The vessel "TAI AN" (IMO 8676324) has been registered to the Mongolian ship registry from 17 March 2015 to 17 September 2015. The vessel "TAI AN" de-registered from the registry as the vessel agent did not communicate to extend the registry. During its activities under the Mongolian ship registry, the vessel "TAI AN" was using radio-communication (MMSI 457 206 000) provided by the Mongolian Maritime Administration. Upon the registry's expiration, the same radio-communication equipment/number is being used by the newly registered vessel. Accordingly, the radio-communication number formerly used by "TAI AN" has been transferred to the vessel "XIN HAI" registered in 2020, thus may be caused a similar situation for both vessels.

The vessel "XIN HAI" (IMO 9129213) have registered to the Mongolian ship registry on 5 August 2020 and started using radio-communication number MMSI 457 206 000. Before registering the vessel, the Maritime Administration has run through all the necessary procedures and found no facts or information on violation of the UNSC relevant resolutions and sanctions. As the former owner (Rich United Trading Limited) of the vessel "XIN HAI" has been changed and upon the request of the new owner the vessel "XIN HAI" de-registered from the Mongolian ship registry on 15 December 2020.

Also, the vessel "XIN HAI" under the name "SWIFT" owned by "Frontlines Trading Co.Ltd" has been registered to the Mongolian ship registry on 3 August 2017. Upon the request for the change of its affiliation the vessel has been de-registered on 24 May 2019. During that time the vessel "SWIFT" was using radio-communication number MMSI 457 451 000.

Mongolian Maritime Administration has registered vessel "XIN HAI" on 2020 as there were no records on vessel "XIN HAI" violating the UNSC relevant resolutions and sunctions during its registration period of the 2017 under Mongolia ship registry.

The vessel "XIN HAI" was not in the Mongolian ship registry during the time indicated by the Panel of Experts report.

Source: Member State

The Panel notes the following:
* Due to transmission issues, the Note of 27 May 2020 referenced on the *Subblic* was not received.
** Documentation referenced in the Note Verbale on the Xin Hai are retained by the Panel.

Annex 25 (d): Deletion certificate of the *Xin Hai* (IMO: 9129213), 15 December 2020

[redacted]

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

MONGOLIA

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

DELETION CERTIFICATE

Issued under the provisions of
Chapter 3 of the Regulations for Registration of Ships 2003

Official Number	Call Sign	IMO Ship Number
48572096	JVMH7	9129213

Name of Vessel
XIN HAI

Name and Address of Owner	IMO Registered Owner Number	Shares (%)
RICH UNITED TRADING LIMITED 306 Victoria House, Victoria, Mahe, Seychelles	6073139	100

Description of Vessel			
Type of Vessel Oil Tanker	Year of Built 1996	Hull material Steel	Previous Registry / Name Cook Islands / RICH UNITED
Gross Tonnage 4993	Length(Metres) LOA - 99.20 ITC -- 93.83	Name of Builder Atlantis Shipyard Pte Ltd., Singapore	
Net Tonnage 2477	Breadth(Metres) 18.00	Number of Engines 1	Type of Engine / Total Power (KW) Diesel / 2672
Deadweight 4999	Depth(Metres) 10.30	Speed of Vessel (Knots) 10.00	Engine Make / Model Wartsilla Diesel

Date of Registry	Port of Registry	Date of Closure of Registry
05 August 2020	Ulaanbaatar	15 December 2020

Issued at Singapore on 15 December 2020.

The Registrar of the Mongolia Ship Registry, by the powers vested thereupon by the Regulations for Registration of Ships 2003,hereby certifies that the above-named vessel is free of registered encumbrances in the records of the Mongolia Ship Registry as on the date of closure.

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION MONGOLIA

[redacted]

REGISTRAR

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION (OPERATIONS)

Source: Member State

Annex 26: Letter from the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration on the de-registered status of vessels previously registered under Sierra Leone's ship registry and of their reported fraudulent use of documentation

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

To: Messrs. Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding – Tokyo MoU
Messrs. Paris Memorandum of Understanding – Paris MoU
Messrs. Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding – Med MoU
Messrs. Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding – Indian Ocean MoU
Messrs. Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding – Riyadh MoU
Messrs. Black Sea Memorandum of Understanding – Black Sea MoU
Messrs. Caribbean Memorandum of Understanding – Caribbean MoU
Messrs. Abuja Memorandum of Understanding – Abuja MoU

CC: SIERRA LEONE MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Date: 26th of January 2021
Transmittal No.: SL-0154-21

Official Letter

Dear Sirs,

Ref: M/V AN PING (IMO: 7903366) / M/V BONVOY 3 (IMO: 8714085) / M/V DIAMOND 8 (IMO: 9132612) / M/V HOKONG (IMO: 9006758) / M/V NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387) / M/V UNICA (IMO: 8514306)

We would like to hereby communicate and inform that the above - mentioned vessels are not registered under this Administration due to suspicions on violation of sanctions. We have been informed that the above-mentioned vessels are using fraudulently Certificates supposedly issued by Sierra Leone Maritime Administration in order to call Ports and move freely.

We would appreciate any assistance in combating such illegal activities.

We direct all parties to verify any Certificate issued by Sierra Leone Flag through our website: www.slmarad.com and download/ view the verification copy of the Certificate. In case the Certificate cannot be verified, please contact SLMARAD through: info@slmarad.com

Yours Faithfully,
The Undersigned.

Place and Date of issuance (DD/MM/YYYY)
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 26/01/2021

[redacted] – Registrar

REGISTRAR SLMARAD

RE-CER-26
22/01/2021

Sierra Leone Maritime Administration – SLMARAD
info@slmarad.com www.slmarad.com

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Source: The Panel

Annex 27: Satellite imagery samples of unknown flagged non-DPRK vessels delivering refined petroleum at DPRK ports

Bonvoy 3 (IMO: 8714085)

The unknown flagged *Bonvoy 3* was captured on satellite imagery at a petroleum delivery pier in Nampo, DPRK, on 10 April 2020. The vessel was also reported by a Member State to have delivered refined petroleum on two other occasions during the period from January to September 2020. The Sierra Leone Maritime Authority confirmed that the vessel was cancelled from its registry on 12 November 2019 (see also Annex 6). The *Bonvoy 3* has the capacity to offload up to 22,557 barrels of refined petroleum products per delivery. The vessel was registered in November 2020 sailing under a new flag, a new name *Fu Shun 3* and under new ownership and management with an address in Hong Kong, China. The flag state, Mongolia, under which the *Fun Shun 3* was sailing, cancelled the vessel's registration and all related certification issued to the vessel on 24 December 2020, with the stated reason as due to illegal activities involving the DPRK (see figure 1).

Source: Member State

Figure 1: Cancellation form issue by the Mongolian Maritime Administration for the *Fu Shun 3* (formerly known as *Bonvoy 3*), IMO: 8714085

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

MONGOLIA
SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Cancellation Form

Mongolia Maritime Administration
#606 Government Building-11
J.Sambuu's Street-11
Chingeltei District, 4th Khoroo
Ulaanbaatar 15141
Tel: 976-11310642
Fax: 976-11310642
Email: info@monmarad.gov.mn
Website: www.monmarad.gov.mn

By this means we inform that all certificates from MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY related to

Name of Ship	IMO No.	Official Number
FU SHUN 3	8714085	49112088

Have been cancelled by Administration ; due: illegal activities involving DPRK.

☒Other reasons:

INVALIDATED CERTIFICATES:

CERTIFICATE	NUMBER
PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY	49112088
PROVISIONAL MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE	49112088
PROVISIONAL SHIP RADIO STATION LICENCE	49112088
CARVING AND MARKING NOTE	49112088
CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD	CSR - 8/49112088
DECLARATION OF MARITIME LABOUR COMPLIANCE PART I	MLC - 49112088

REGISTRAR

Name: [redacted] **Signature:** [redacted] **Date: 2020.12.24**

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

Distribution: ☒Owner/Manager ☒Agent ☐Other: ____

Approved by: ..... Revised by: ..... Date of Revision: Page 1 of 1

Source: Member State

Hokong (IMO: 9006758)

The unknown flagged *Hokong* was captured on satellite imagery at a petroleum delivery pier in Songnim, DPRK, on 5 June 2020. The formerly Sierra Leone-flagged vessel was recorded as unknown-flagged from October 2019[26]. The vessel was also reported by a Member State to have delivered refined petroleum on eight other occasions during the period from January to September 2020. The *Hokong* has the capacity to offload up to 27,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per delivery.
See also Annex 26.

Source: Member State

[26] IHS Markit.

New Konk (IMO: 9036387)

The unknown flagged *New Konk* was captured on satellite imagery at a petroleum delivery pier in Songnim, DPRK, on 2 July 2020. The formerly Sierra Leone-flagged vessel was recorded as unknown-flagged from October 2019[27]. The vessel was also reported by a Member State to have delivered refined petroleum on seven other occasions during the period from January to September 2020. The *New Konk* has the capacity to offload up to 54,400 barrels of refined petroleum products per delivery.
See also Annex 26.

Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

[27] IHS Markit.

Annex 28: Vessels of interest recommended by the Panel for designation within China's Coastal Waters, March to September 2020

No.	Date	Vessel of Interest	General Location (from AIS)
1	15-Mar-20	UNICA	24-33N 119-01E
2	25-Mar-20	HOKONG	24-55N 119-17E
3	26-Mar-20	NEW KONK	24-48N 120-00E
4	26-Mar-20	SUBBLIC	24-45N 118-54E
5	26-Mar-20	HOKONG	24-58N 119-24E
6	26-Mar-20	NEW KONK	24-15N 119-02E
7	01-Apr-20	NEW KONK	24-40N 119-51E
8	30-Apr-20	DIAMOND 8	24-58N 119-25E
9	03-Apr-20	NEW KONK	22-19N 114-06E
10	07-Apr-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
11	20-May-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
12	27-May-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
13	04-Jun-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
14	17-Jun-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
15	17-Jul-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
16	03-Aug-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
17	11-Aug-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
18	26-Aug-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
19	27-Aug-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
20	28-Aug-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
21	29-Aug-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
22	30-Aug-20	UNICA	24-46N 118-45E
23	04-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-35N 122-30E
24	04-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	36-44N 122-33E
25	06-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	36-54N 122-39E
26	08-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-36N 122-40E
27	08-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-39N 122-41E
28	08-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-01N 122-42E
29	09-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-05N 122-45E
30	13-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-26N 122-46E
31	14-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-28N 122-50E
32	15-Sep-20	DIAMOND 8	37-17N 122-51E

Source: Member State

Annex 29: Examples of DPRK vessels delivering refined petroleum at DPRK ports

Former foreign-flagged tankers that have transitioned to DPRK tankers[28] and designated DPRK tankers continue to deliver refined petroleum at various DPRK ports. These included the *Kwang Chon 2* (former *Sen Lin 01*) (IMO: 8910378) and *Sin P(h)yong 2* (former *Tianyou*) (IMO: 8817007) also continued to deliver refined petroleum to various DPRK ports.

Designated DPRK tankers continue to obtain and deliver refined petroleum to the DPRK. These included the *Chon Ma San* (IMO : 8660313), designated in March 2018 for ship-to-ship transfers in mid-Nov 2017 (see sample satellite imagery at figure 1), and the *Pu Ryong* (IMO: 8705539) formerly the *Kum Un San 3* (see sample satellite imagery at figure 2), designated in October 2018 for conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with the *New Regent* on 7 June 2018.

Figure 1: Satellite imagery of the *Chon Ma San* at a petroleum deliver pier in Nampo, DPRK, on 1 June 2020



Source: Member State

The *Chon Ma San* was also reported by a Member State to have delivered refined petroleum on three other occasions during the period from January to September 2020. The vessel has the capacity to offload up to 24,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per delivery.

[28] Paragraph 26 of S/2020/840

Figure 2: Satellite imagery of the *Pu Ryong* (former *Kum Un San 3)* at a petroleum deliver pier in Songnim, DPRK, on 3 June 2020

Source: Member State

The *Pu Ryong* was also reported by a Member State to have delivered refined petroleum on four other occasions during the period from January to September 2020. The *Pu Ryong* has the capacity to offload up to 22,100 barrels of refined petroleum products per delivery.

Source: The Panel

Annex 30: Non-Paper updates from Viet Nam on the *Viet Tin 01* (IMO: 8508838)

1. Relevant Vietnamese authorities have been thoroughly conducting investigation into the case related to vessel Viet Tin 01. However, the investigation has been faced with a number of challenges, including lack of access to the vessel due partly to the Covid-19 pandemic, and therefore has not yet found sufficient, conclusive evidence regarding the alleged violation by vessel Viet Tin 01 of related Security Council resolutions.

2. Up to now, all the vessel crew were returned to Viet Nam. The Department of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Transport of Vietnam, requested company Thuan Thien and company Viet Tin to fulfill their obligations towards the vessel crew. Company Viet Tin is currently steeped in financial difficulties and is unable to repair the vessel to return to Viet Nam or to liquidate it to cover all related payments to the port authority of Malaysia. The vessel now lies in atrophy in the area for unusable ships of the Malaysian port and has been unable to operate normally for a long time.

3. Relevant Vietnamese agencies remain committed to resolving this case in a lawful and appropriate manner. In short term, the agencies, including Ministries of Public Security, Transportation and Foreign Affairs, will continue to have inter-agency meetings to discuss ways forward to address the case. We request that the Panel of Experts reflect in its upcoming final report the information provided by Viet Nam on the implementation of related Security Council resolutions regarding vessel Viet Tin 01.

Source: The Panel

Annex 31 (a): T-Energy's involvement in associated vessels engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers

The Panel wrote to relevant parties concerning the vessels' flag status, ownership, voyage routes, cargo details, involved counterparties, port and customs information, transaction details and payment records. The following vessels conducted ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged tankers or with tankers that have a DPRK connection, in all cases with the alleged involvement of T-Energy, based on lead information from a Member State:

(i) Unknown-flagged *Sea Prima* (aka *Courageous*) (IMO: 8617524) with *Saebyol* (IMO: 8916293) and with *Paek Ma* (IMO: 9066978) on or around 25 September 2019; and with *Sam Jong 1* (IMO: 8405311) and *Kum Jin Gang 2* (no recorded IMO number) on or around 24 August 2019.
(ii) Malaysia-flagged *Semua Gembira* (aka *JM Sutera 7*) (IMO: 9494917) with *Saebyol* on or around 2 February 2019; and with *Song Won* (IMO: 8613360) and with *Kum Un San* (IMO: 8720436) on or around 29 January 2019.
(iii) Panama-flagged *Ri Xin* (IMO: 9121302) with *Sam Jong 2* (IMO: 7408873) on or around 31 March 2018.
(iv) Then Panama-flagged *Chan Fong* (IMO: 7350260) with *Chon Ma San* (IMO: 8660313), on or around 17 March 2018.
(v) Then Panama-flagged *Koya* (aka *Hatch*) (IMO: 9396878) with *Chon Ma San* and with *Kum Un San 3* (IMO: 8705539) around 19 November 2017.

The following include the Panel's investigations conducted to date and replies obtained on these ship-to-ship transfers:

(i) *Sea Prima* (aka *Courageous*) (IMO: 8617524)

The unknown-flagged *Sea Prima* conducted ship-to-ship transfers with the designated DPRK tankers *Saebyol* (IMO: 8916293) and *Paek Ma* (IMO: 9066978) on or around 25 September 2019, according to a Member State. The Member State also reported that the *Sea Prima* conducted ship-to-ship transfers a month earlier on or around 24 August 2019 with the designated DPRK tanker *Sam Jong 1* (IMO: 8405311) and with the DPRK tanker *Kum Jin Gang 2* (no recorded IMO number).

The *Sea Prima* has been documented in previous Panel reports as having engaged with DPRK tankers on different occasions and the Panel recommended the vessel for designation. Since March 2020, Cambodian authorities have detained the *Sea Prima* sailing as the *Courageous*[29].

During the months of August and September 2019, the *Sea Prima* was sailing without a registered flag[30] when it conducted the reported ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers. Panel investigations indicated that Cour-age Maritime SA-BZE (hereafter "Courage Maritime"), the vessel's Operator and its Document of Compli-ance company holder, was registered in Belize in August 2019. Courage Maritime subsequently served as the vessel's operator upon receiving flag status from Cameroon. Courage Maritime listed an address that is alleg-edly co-located with T-Energy in Taoyuan District, Taiwan Province of China. According to the individual that registered Courage Maritime, the owners of the *Courageous,* New Eastern Shipping Co., Ltd (hereafter "New Eastern") with an address in Xiamen, China, had requested the company be registered with the Taoyuan District address as its operational address. The individual stated, "I wish to place on record that my role with regards to New Eastern Shipping [NES] / Courageous / Sea Prima [SP] are that of a Sale & Purchase (S & P) of vessel as a ship broker, and a Marine Consultant". After the completion of the S & P Transaction, I was asked by owner of New Eastern Shipping to be their Marine Technical Consultant ..". New Eastern requested the individual to use his name on "a temporary basis" to register the company in order to expedite registration,

[29] Paragraph 34 to 38, S/2020/640.
[30] The *Sea Prima* was previously flagged under Saint Kitts and Nevis and from November 2019 to till its detention by Cambodian authorities in March 2020 was Cameroon-flagged.

with the intention by New Eastern to transfer the company registration under a Mr Fang Xian-Sen. New Eastern provided identification of Mr Fang to the individual. According to the individual, the transfer to Mr Fang was unsuccessful "… because NES [New Eastern] failed to provide me with the correct residential address of Mr Fang Xian Sen. It was pending till now". Belize has yet to respond to the Panel. Investigations continue.

Semua Gembira (aka JM Sutera 7) (IMO: 9494917)

The Malaysia-flagged *Semua Gembira* conducted ship-to-ship transfers on a number of occasions with DPRK tankers, according to a Member State. These included transfers with the designated *Saebyol* on or around 2 February 2019, with the *Song Won* (IMO: 8613360) and with the *Kum Un San* (IMO: 8720436) on or around 29 January 2019.

The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) website lists the *Semua Gembira* as flagged under Malaysia's registry since February 2009. Panel investigations show the vessel with several days of unaccounted gaps in AIS transmission around the respective referenced January and February dates, during which illicit ship-to-ship transfers could have taken place (see figure 1). The *Song Won* and *Kum Un San* had not been transmitting AIS signals for over a week, while the *Saebyol* recorded an extended AIS transmission gap, over the respective dates in question.

Figure 1: *Semua Gembira's* recorded AIS transmission gaps between 28 and 31 January 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

The Panel wrote to Malaysia as flag registry and the vessel's listed registered owner, TKH Marine (L) Ltd[31] (hereafter "TKH Labuan"). Malaysia responded it was undertaking the necessary consultations with relevant agencies and would provide its feedback to the Panel in due course. While serving as the sole registered owner during the period of interest of January and Feb 2019 (hereafter "the material time"), TKH Labuan's shares

[31] IHS Markit. IHS Markit is the originating source for the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Ship Identification Number Scheme and is the sole authority with responsibility for assigning and validating these numbers. It is also the originating source for the IMO Unique Company and Registered Owner Identification Number Scheme, which it manages on behalf of IMO.

have since been beneficially acquired in full by another company as of July 2020, which in turn is an indirect subsidiary of the present group owner of the vessel (hereafter "Group Company"). TKH Labuan, as part of the Group Company, cooperated with the Panel's requests and is assisting the Panel with its investigations.

Based on current information available to the Panel, the Malaysia-flagged *Semua Gembira* was sold in 2017, as a result of the liquidation process, to a company incorporated in Samoa with a business address in Taiwan Province of China (hereafter "Company SG-TW). Company SG-TW appointed a Malaysian-registered company, Apacmarine Sdn Bhd (hereafter "Apacmarine") as the ship manager. Due to insufficient funds to purchase the vessel, Company SG-TW assigned TKH Labuan the rights of the *Semua Gembira* on 28 February 2018, with TKH Labuan paying the balance of the purchase price. TKH Labuan was wholly owned by Person 1, who also co-owns and holds a senior position at Apacmarine[32]. TKH Labuan / Person 1 also entered into an agreement the same date on 28 February 2018 with a Malaysian incorporated company, Jasa Merin (Labuan) Plc (hereafter "Jasa Marin"), the latter taking on a majority stake in TKH Labuan to provide the additional funds to complete the vessel's purchase, which was finalized in March 2018[33]. According to the Group Company, Jasa Marin, an entirely separate legal entity from TKH Labuan, has a role "limited to that acquired as a shareholder in or around 2018 following its subscription of shares in TKH Labuan", and has limited knowledge of the vessel's activities. TKH Labuan retains a contractual relationship with Apacmarine as the vessel's appointed ship manager pursuant to another agreement dated April 2019.

During the material time, TKH Labuan had bareboat chartered the vessel to Company SG-TW[34], the original purchaser of the *Semua Gembira* back in 2017, with the latter possessing full control of the vessel for the duration of the charter period. Company SG-TW's corporate details show it was incorporated on 20 January 2015 in Samoa with a sole shareholder. Under this charter, Apacmarine served as the ship manager for the vessel, pursuant to an agreement between Company SG-TW and Apacmarine. "Therefore, TKH Labuan had no knowledge of the Vessel's location during the Material Time."

On 20 December 2018, the bareboat charterer SG-TW entered into a time charter agreement with a United Arab Emirates company in Dubai (hereafter "Company TC-D), via T Energy, on 20 December 2018 (see Annex 31 (b)). The memorandum by SG-TW was attention to Company TC-D's office in Singapore.

Email communication on discharge orders made available to the Panel covering the material time show the Time Charter Company TC-D issuing discharge orders to Apacmarine, the ship manager. The discharge orders showed the estimated time of arrival of the receiving vessels that were identified via digits rather than vessel identifiers - the digits do not conform with IMO numbers or MMSIs. Receiving vessels were not identified by name during January to mid-February 2019, the material time . No discharge email entries were entered on and around 29 January and 2 February 2019, with the next closest discharge orders entered on 31 January and 1 February 2019, local time (see Annex 31 (c)).

A Bill of Lading showed a shipment of around 6,500 metric tonnes of "GASOIL 50 PPM S" loaded at Yangpu port, China, on 7 January 2019, with Vanphong Bay, Viet Nam, as its port of discharge (see Annex 31 (d)). The operational instructions were communicated by the Dubai company to Apacmarine. According to Apacmarine, the time charter was terminated on 7 March 2019 "after all the cargo were discharged off at Kaohsiung". According to Apacmarine, it was "not unusual for vessels to divert from the port of discharge named in the bill of lading based on instructions from the charterer, and that the decision to discharge the cargo at various locations during the voyage, and finally at Kaohsiung, was made by the charterer ….".

The vessel's voyage, daily reports and discharge orders under the material time was provided by the Group Company from information obtained from Apacmarine. According to Apacmarine, all ship-to-ship transfers conducted during the material time were carried out under verbal instructions by Company SG-TW's repre-

[32] As on December 2020.

[33] Jasa Merin held 70% and Person 1 held 30% of the shares.

[34] TKH Labuan then entered into a bareboat charter agreement with Company SG-TW for a 5-year period beginning 1 April 2018, upon finalization of the vessel's purchase. The agreement was terminated in April 2019.

sentative onboard the vessel, a Chinese national, Mr Zhang. As such, " no further documentation of the discharges was made. According to APAC[marine], this is in line with their typical bunkering operations for other charterers."

The Panel separately notes that Apacmarine also served as the previous registered owner, manager, operator and Document of Compliance company holder of the then Panama-flagged *Koya* (IMO: 9396878) when it was previously sailing as the *Semua Berjaya*[35]. The Panel is investigating a suspected case of ship-to-ship transfer between the *Koya* (IMO: 9396878) and a DPRK tanker that occurred in November 2017 (see iv below). Apacmarine has owned and / or managed at various points: the *Koya* (aka Hatch) the *Semua Gembira*, and the designated *Koti* (IMO: 9417115).

Other entities copied in some of the ship's discharge order communication included the Bareboat Charter Company SG-TW and T Energy. Investigations continue.

(ii) *Ri Xin* (IMO: 9121302)

The Panama-flagged *Ri Xin* conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the designated DPRK tanker *Sam Jong 2* (IMO: 7408873) on or around 31 March 2018, according to a Member State. Panel investigations show the *Ri Xin* with an unaccounted five-day AIS transmission gap around the date of the suspected ship-to-ship transfer (see figure 2). The *Ri Xin* also recorded AIS transmission gaps outside of these dates. The vessel has been flagged under Panama's registry since August 2014. The Panel has yet to receive a response from Panama.

Figure 2: Excerpts from a specialized commercial maritime database platform showing a segment of the *Ri Xin's* (IMO: 9121302) voyage from March to April 2018



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

The *Ri Xin* made a port call at Ulsan port, Republic of Korea, on or around 27 March 2018, with a reported destination of Hong Kong before dropping its AIS transmission between 29 March and 3 April 2018, during which the *Ri Xin* met with the *Sam Jong 2*. According to Ulsan port records, a Bill of Lading dated 29 March 2018 showed 3,770 tons of Gasoil 10PPM was loaded onto the *Ri Xin* for the purpose of transshipment. The

[35] IHS Markit.

vessel's registered owner, Sing Da Sheng Co Ltd (hereafter "Sing Da Sheng Co"), was the notify party, with two Singapore-based companies listed as the consignor and consignee. T Energy was listed as the consignor on other Bills of Lading based on Ulsan port records in the same month and the following month of April 2018. Investigations continue.

Sing Da Sheng Co Ltd (hereafter "Sing Da Sheng Co") is listed as the *Ri Xin's* registered owner since August 2014, as well as the ship manager and operator a year later. The entity is registered in Samoa with an address in Kaohsiung, Taiwan Province of China. A media report[36] indicated that Sing Da Sheng Co may be the owner the *Chan Fong* (IMO: 7350260)[37], another vessel the Panel is investigating for conducting ship-to-ship transfer with a DPRK tanker in March 2018 (see item iv below). Open source information including the Panel's analysis of tracking data of the vessels as well as information relating to a report on the abandonment of seafarers corroborates the media reporting of the abandonment of the *Chan Fong*. The Panel wrote to Sing Da Sheng Co. enquiring into the *Ri Xin* as well as requesting information on the *Chan Fong*, including whether the vessel was directly or indirectly under its ownership and management. The company has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiry. The Panel continues to await a response from Samoa.

(iii) *Chan Fong* (IMO: 7350260)

The then Panama-flagged *Chan Fong* conducted a ship-to ship transfer with the designated DPRK tanker *Chon Ma San* (IMO: 8660313) on or around 17 March 2018, according to a Member State. Panel investigations show the *Chan Fong* with an unaccounted week of AIS transmission gap coinciding with the date of the suspected ship-to-ship transfer (see figure 3), with the *Chon Ma San* also having a long period no AIS trans-mission from September 2017 to October 2019. The *Chan Fong* was flagged under Panama's registry between June 2014 to October 2018. The vessel is recorded in casualty / repair status[38] (see also above paragraph on the *Ri Xin)*. The Panel has yet to receive a response from Panama.

Figure 3: Excerpt showing a segment of the *Chan Fong's* (IMO: 7350260) voyage, March 2018



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[36] http://tw.appledaily.com/local/20201120/4Q7AKWN7YRE6VLUBSOGBSIARWY/

[37] Maritime databases and the International Maritime Organization list a different entity as the registered owner of the *Chan Fong*.

[38] International Maritime Organization (IMO), as on December 2020.

Celestial Sail Group Ltd (hereafter "Celestial Sail") is listed as the *Chan Fong's* registered owner since July 2017. The entity is registered in the Seychelles with a care of address of the vessel's ship manager and operator based in Kaohsiung, Taiwan Province of China[39]. Seychelles responded to the Panel. The company has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiry.

(iv) Koya (aka *Hatch*) (IMO: 9396878)

Then Panama-flagged *Koya* (aka *Hatch*) (IMO: 9396878) conducted ship-to-ship transfers with the designated DPRK tankers *Chon Ma San* (IMO: 8660313) and with the *Kum Un San 3* (IMO: 8705539) on or around 19 November 2017, according to a Member State. The *Koya* also recorded AIS transmission gaps outside of these dates and recorded as last AIS transmission (sailing as *Hatch*) in August 2018.

The *Koya* made a port call at Yeosu port, Republic of Korea, on and around 15 to 16 November 2017 (EST), with a reported destination of Taichung before dropping its AIS transmission and conducting its ship-to-ship transfers (see figure 4). According to Yeosu port records, a Bill of Lading dated 16 November 2017 showed 5,999.151 tons of Gasoil was loaded onto the *Koya* for the purpose of transshipment. A Republic of Korea-incorporated company was listed as the consignor with its consignee as the company's Singapore office. The Panel has yet to receive a response from Panama.

Figure 4: Excerpts from a specialized commercial maritime database platform showing a segment of the *Koya's* (IMO: 9396878) voyage in November 2017



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

During the time of the reported ship-to-ship transfer, the Koya's registered owner, ship manager and operator was Koya Corp. The Panel notes that the Panama-registered Koya Corp appeared to have shared the same directors as Koti Corp, the registered owner of the designated *Koti* (IMO: 9417115) that was engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK tanker *Kum Un San 3* (IMO: 8705539) on 9 December 2017. The *Koti* was impounded by the Republic of Korea in 2017 and scrapped in 2020.

The China-registered Dalian Grand Ocean Shipping Management Co Ltd (hereafter "Dalian Grand Ocean") served as the vessel's Document of Compliance (DOC) company holder between July 2017 to March 2018. Dalian Grand Ocean also served as the *Koti's* DOC company holder from July 2017. The Panel has yet to receive a response from the company.

Source: The Panel

[39] Ibid..

Annex 31 (b) :Excerpts of the Time Charter Memorandum for the *Semua Gembira*

TO : [redacted]

ATTN : MR.[redacted] Shin

VIA : T ENERGY / MR.[redacted] CHIU

RE : MT SEMUA GEMBIRA / [redacted] **T.C.P DTD 20TH , DEC. 2018**

=== CLEAN FIXTURE ===

Dear Sir,

With reference to our various correspondences, we are pleased to confirm this fixture with all subjects lifted and here recap clean fixture concluded as follows:

TIME CHARTER PARTY DATED : 20TH , DEC. 2018.

CHARTERERS : [redacted]

DISPONENT OWNERS : [redacted]

1. VESSEL : MT SEMUA GEMBERA

imo type	: product oil tanker
flag	: PORT KELANG
call sign	: 9MIE4
imo number	: 9494917
year built	: 2009
class	: bureau veritas
length overall	: 105.83 meters
beam	: 18.60 METRES
gt	: 5,182.00 metric tons
nt	: 2,594.00 metric tons
sdwt	: 8,008 metric tons

1

draft (summer)	: 7.800 meters
tpc at summer draft	: 16.54 METRIC TONS
keel to mast	: 32.02 metres
bow to centre manifold	: 53.475 metres
HULL type	: DOUBLE HULL
cargo 98% capacity	: 8740.417 cubic metres
slop tanks 98 % capacity	: 287.832 cubic metres
no. of cargo tanks	: 5x port + 5x starboard

QCIMF Q88 ATTACHED AS APPENDIX A

VESSEL LAST THREE CARGOES : 1ST LAST : ADO

2ND LAST : MGO

3RD LAST : ADO

2. SPEED AND BUNKER CONSUMPTIONS:

AT SEA – IFO 380CST FOR MAIN ENGINE AND MGO FOR AUXILIARY ENGINES.

IN PORT – MGO FOR AUXILIARY ENGINES

At sea Laden at speed 10 knots Main Engine consumption 8.00 MT per day.

At sea ballast speed 10 knots Main Engine consumption 7.50 MT per day.

At sea auxiliary Engine consumption 1 MT per day.

Consumption based on Wind scale up to Beaufort 4.

In port loading Auxiliary Engine consumption 1.00 MT per day.

In port Discharging Auxiliary Engines consumption 2.00 per day.

In port idling Auxiliary Engine 0.9 MT per day.

3. CHARTER PERIOD : **1MONTHS + 3MONTHS** AT CHARTERERS OPTION WITH OWNERS AGREEMENT BUT CHARTERER SHALL DECLARE THEIR OPTION AT LEAST 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE ESTIMATED EXPIRY DATE OF CHARTER PERIOD TO THE OWNERS. ALSO IN THE FINAL MONTH OF CHARTER PERIOD, CHARTERER SHALL USE THE VESSEL PLUS/MINUS 7 DAYS PERIOD UNDER THIS CHARTER PARTY

4. DELIVERY DATE : **20TH DEC. 2018**

TRADING AREA : SOUTH EAST ASIA (SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, VIETNAM, MYANMAR, BRUNEI, CAMBODIA), SOUTH CHINA, TAIWAN, HONG KONG, SOUTH KOREA, ALWAYS WITHIN SAFE PORT/BERTH, ALWAYS AFLOAT, ALWAYS ACCESSIBLE AND SAFE ANCHORAGE. TRADING AREA ALWAYS TO EXCLUDE WAR RISKS

2

xxxxxxx

[redacted]

CHARTER

[redacted]

MR. [redacted] HSU / C.E.O.

For and on behalf of

[redacted]

Authorized Signature(s)

13

Source: The Panel

Annex 31 (c): Excerpts of email communication of discharge order transmitted via email between the Dubai-based Time Charter company and Apacmarine as ship manager for the Bareboat Charter Company

Discharge order: SEMUA GEMBIRA / YANGPU, CHINA / SAILED REPORT / 07TH JAN

[redacted] Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:51 PM

Dear Captain,

Please see below the details of DO.

SERIAL NO.	5
RECEIVING VSL	6048
RECEIVING VSL ETA	20:00 31ST JAN., 2019 (UTC+8)
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION	GASOIL 50PPM
QUANTITY	1450MT
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION	MT /US BBLS AT 60F
DISCHARGE LOCATION	122° 20'0"E2r 10'0"N

RE: Discharge order: SEMUA GEMBIRA / YANGPU, CHINA / SAILED REPORT / 07TH JAN- parcel 5

2 messages

[redacted] Fri, Feb 1, 2019 at 5:36 PM

Dear [redacted]

Please release the next parcel as per the below.

SERIAL NO.	05
RECEIVING VSL	8972
RECEIVING VSL ETA	REVERTING
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION	GASOIL 50PPM
QUANTITY	1800MT
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION	MT /US BBLS AT 60F
DISCHARGE LOCATION	122° 20'0"E2r 10'0"N

Source: The Panel

Annex 31 (d): Bill of Lading for the *Semua Gembira*

Shipper

[redacted]

BILL OF LADING

B/L NO. YK19001

Nationality of Ocean Vessel

Consignee

[redacted]

Notify address

[redacted]

Shipped on board the vessel named herein in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise indicated) the goods or packages specified herein and to be discharged at the above mentioned port of discharge or as near thereto as the vessel may safely get and be always afloat.

The weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value, being particulars furnished by the Shipper, are not checked by the Carrier on loading. The Shipper, Consignee and the Holder of this Bill of Lading hereby expressly accept and agree to all printed, written or stamped provisions, exceptions and conditions of this Bill of Lading, including those on the back hereof. One of the Bills of Lading duly endorsed must be surrendered in exchange for the goods or delivery order.

In witness whereof, the Carrier or his Agents has signed Bills of Lading all of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void.

Shippers are requested to note particularly the exceptions and conditions of this Bill of Lading, with reference to the validity of the insurance upon their goods.

Original

Pre – carriage by

* Place of Receipt by Pre – carrier

Ocean Vessel: SEMUA GEMBIRA

Port of Loading: YANGPU, CHINA

Port of Discharge: VANPHONG BAY,VIETNAM

* Final destination (if goods to be transhipped at port of discharge)

Freight payable at

Number of original Bl(s)/L: THREE

Marks & Nos / Container Nos	Number and kind of packages; description of goods	Gross Weight kgs	Measurement m³
N/M	GASOIL 50 PPM S	NET WEIGHT:	
	6789.576 MT		
	6682.503 LT		
	8040.408 KLITRES AT OBSERVED		
	8091.703 KLITRES AT 30 DEG C		
	7990.557 KLITRES AT 15 DEG C		
	50285.000 US BBLS AT 60 DEG F		
	"CLEAN ON BOARD"		
TOTAL PACKAGES (IN WORDS)			

Freight and charges: FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY

Place of B(s)/L issue: YANGPU,CHINA

Dated: JAN, 7TH , 2019

Signed for the Carrier

M.T. SEMUA GEMBIRA Master Port Kelang

* (Applicable only when document used as a Through Bill of Lading

(FGC FORM 02) Printed in 1 – 1988

Source: The Panel

Annex 32: Fishing rights transfer

Annex 32 (a) Trading of DPRK fishing rights transfer and involvement of Chairperson of General Association of Koreans in China

A media report broadcast in May 2020 showed an agent who promoted fishing rights to operate in the waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The agent explained that every year about 800-1000 fishing permits were sold. In the program, the agent further explained that the contracts were signed in China and upon arrival to the waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, official fishing permits would be passed to the fishing vessels.

The same report purportedly showed Ms. Choe Un Bok, Chairperson of the General Association of Koreans in China, as a person who was tasked by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to sell fishing rights. In the report this individual stated that although the amount of payment for fishing rights changed, at the time of the recording the payment amount was 300,000 RMB[40], and for entry to certain profitable area of water there was an extra charge. The Panel has not received reply from Ms. Choe or the organization.

[40] Approx.46,000USD (rate of 15 January 2021).

Annex 32 (b): Fishing related joint venture and activity of DPRK's Korea Surim Trading Corporation

According to information obtained by the Panel, Weihai Peninsula Vessel Fuel Co., Ltd.[41] was in late 2019 involved in plans to establish with Korea Surim Trading Corporation a joint venture, concerning fishing, that would primarily operate in DPRK waters. The information obtained by the Panel suggests that the joint venture would be located in Sinuiju, DPRK.

According to the Member State, Korea Surim Trading Corporation was in 2019 and 2020 involved in directing numerous activities prohibited by relevant Security Council resolutions. These activities included ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged vessels. The Panel has not received a reply to its enquiry from Weihai Peninsula Vessel Fuel Co., Ltd.

According to the same Member State, Korea Surim Cooperation also engaged in trade on behalf of designated Korea Taeryonggang Trading Cooperation in 2016. The DPRK's Korea Myohyang General Corporation was directly involved in facilitating this relationship. For the more information on Korea Surim, see finance section.

[41] address: 12 Huayuan South Road, Weihai City, Shandong province, China

Annex 32 (c) : Fishing vessels observed by Member States

Fishing vessels observed by Member States

The Panel obtained information which suggests transfer of fishing rights continues. Multiple Member States provided information on Chinese vessels operating in, or intending to operate in, waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel investigated and submitted enquiries to the relevant countries. Information provided by Member States suggested that these vessels adopted measures to obfuscate their activities and identities, such as receiving licenses in the waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, concealing their names, and flying two country's flags. In this reporting period, a Member State informed the Panel of two vessels flying the flag of DPRK and Chinese flags (辽大中渔 15181 (Liao Da Zhong Yu 15181) and 福远 28 (FUYUAN 28)), and a vessel flying the flag of the Republic of Korea and Chinese flag (临渔运 0002(Lin Yu Yun 0002) (figures 1 and 2). The Republic of Korea replied to the Panel (Annex 32 (d)). For the Member States' information and the Panel's analysis see Annex 32 (e). China replied to the Panel (Annex 32 (f)).

Figure 1: Photo and interview result of fishing vessel 辽大中渔 15181

Interview result	
Date and time	05-Oct-20
Location	38°26.0'N 132°25.7'E
Name of the boat	辽大中渔 15181(Liao da zhong yu 15181)
Nationality	China (as answered). North Korean flag was displayed on the bow.
Tonnage of the boat	about 500 tonnes (as answered)
Home port	unknown
Port of departure	unknown
Date of departure	unknown
Date of return	The vessel was heading to DPRK waters but had been instructed to go back home due to engine trouble.
Destination	
AIS information /MMSI number	MMSI：412280000、NAME：Liao da zhong yu
Type of fishing	cover net
Fishing grounds	Waters of the DPRK
Duration of fishing	-
Number of the crew	13 (all Chinese)
Company name	unknown
Number of consorts	-
Other answers from the boat	・The company is applying for a fishing permit in the DPRK. The vessel was heading to DPRK waters following the instruction from the company. It did not provide detail about the purchase of a permit.

Source: Member State

Figure 2: Photo and interview result of fishing vessel 临渔运 0002

Interview result	
Date and time	19-Oct-20
Location	38°26.9'N 132°45.2'E
Name of the boat	临渔运 0002 (Lin Yu Yun 0002)
Nationality	China (as answered) Chinese and ROK flag was displayed on the bow.
Tonnage of the boat	1800 tonnes (as answered)
Home port	石岛(Shi Dao) (hull indication 调楼(Diao Lou))
Port of departure	石岛(Shi Dao)
Date of departure	14-Oct-20
Date of return	Scheduled to go back after receiving a permit and operating in DPRK waters for from 7 to 10 days
Destination	Waters of the DPRK
AIS information /MMSI number	412000000 (AIS ship name 0)
Type of fishing	Refrigerated Carrier
Fishing grounds	38°37'N 131°11'E (waters of the DPRK)
Duration of operation	7 to 10 days
Number of the crew	18 (all Chinese)
Company name	unknown
Number of consorts	-

Source: Member State

Annex 32 (d): Reply from the Republic of Korea to the Panel

To the Panel, the Republic of Korea replied “the Republic of Korea confirms that the vessel Lin Yu Yun 0002 is not registered as a ship of the Republic of Korea.” noting “no information concerning the vessel Lin Yu Yun 0002, including its flag status, MMSI numbers, and port entry, was found”.

The ROK further informed that (1) Article 5 (Hoisting of National Flag) of the Ship Act states non-ROK ships shall not hoist the national flag of the Republic of Korea; (2) Article 8 (Registry and Registration) of the Ship Act states each owner of an ROK ship shall apply for the registration of the ship to the administrator of a regional office of oceans and fisheries having jurisdiction over the port of registry within 60 days from the date of acquiring the ship, as prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries; (3) Article 17 (Indication of the Ship) of its Enforcement Regulations of the Ship Act states each ROK ship shall visibly display the name of the ship in Korean, including Arabic numerals, on the outside of the ship.

Annex 32 (e): Member States' information and the Panel's analysis

(1) First Member State information: Chinese Fishing Vessels in DPRK Waters

Chinese Fishing Vessels in DPRK Waters

	Flag	Vessel Name	Reg Owner	Call Sign	MMSI	Ship Type	Navigation Status	Latitude	Longitude	Age	Time Of Fix
1	China	Qiongfangyu11216	null	11216	412011216	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.908803	124.20434	496d10h	2019-06-07T02:49:05.000Z
2	China	Dongting11566	null	AMB0	412111566	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.66511	123.937727	177d11h	2020-04-21T02:02:40.000Z
3	China	Liaoyingyu25638	null	25638	412200592	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.695772	123.942695	275d14h	2020-01-13T23:17:54.000Z
4	China	Liaowayu55035	null	55035	412202853	30-Fishing	5-Moored	37.338428	125.000992	122d20h	2020-06-14T16:49:57.000Z
5	China	Zhong Tang 2	null		412205279	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	40.400347	131.76396	380d22h	2019-09-30T14:45:31.000Z
6	China	412205931	null	0	412205931	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.48482	124.103897	426d04h	2019-08-16T09:34:40.000Z
7	China	Liaozhuangyu65135	null	65135	412206082	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.542297	124.150327	426d07h	2019-08-16T05:44:07.000Z
8	China	Liaodanyu23817	null	0	412210072	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.472047	123.956825	387d08h	2019-09-24T05:37:34.000Z
9	China	Liaodanyu25423	null		412210192	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.357703	124.642733	471d07h	2019-07-02T06:16:04.000Z
10	China	Liaodanyu26488	null		412210225	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.699107	124.80616	416d06h	2019-08-26T07:37:27.000Z
11	China	Liaodanyu 25509	null		412210538	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.849587	124.053545	8d18h	2020-10-06T18:45:38.000Z
12	China	Liaodanyu25448	null		412210931	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.48989	123.835147	601d02h	2019-02-22T11:04:06.000Z
13	China	Liaodanyuyun25139	null		412211386	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.168513	124.478667	384d18h	2019-09-26T18:59:00.000Z
14	China	Liaodanyu23848	null		412211674	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.344227	124.763493	348d05h	2019-11-02T08:26:29.000Z
15	China	Liaodanyu 25968	null		412211839	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.662248	125.037083	417d11h	2019-08-25T02:22:38.000Z
16	China	Liaodanyu25721	null		412211887	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.828675	124.30629	444d02h	2019-07-29T10:49:29.000Z
17	China	Liao_dan_yu26685	null	123456	412215394	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.479397	123.95728	875d00h	2018-05-24T12:38:55.000Z
18	China	Liaodanyu26441	null	26441	412215418	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.340282	124.297502	30d00h	2020-09-15T13:14:21.000Z
19	China	Liaodanyuyun25097	null	25097	412215422	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	37.643918	125.488477	414d00h	2019-08-28T13:14:07.000Z
20	China	Liaodanyu26098	null	26098	412215438	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.426343	124.178418	525d09h	2019-05-09T04:25:10.000Z
21	China	Liaodanyu26096	null		412215491	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.064347	124.595225	358d22h	2019-10-22T14:37:59.000Z
22	China	Liao_dan_yu26687	null	123457	412215967	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.342285	124.036583	876d12h	2018-05-23T01:02:56.000Z
23	China	Liaodanyu01317	null	1317	412220973	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.822415	124.297345	390d03h	2019-09-21T09:44:59.000Z
24	China	Liaodanyuyun25043	null	25043	412221339	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.699745	124.243717	573d16h	2019-03-21T20:38:59.000Z
25	China	Danyubu5083	null	5083	412223844	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.303895	124.150968	28m52s	2020-10-15T13:08:59.000Z
26	China	Danyubu6152	null	6152	412223883	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.14507	124.213195	400d00h	2019-09-11T13:10:01.000Z
27	China	Liaodanyu23581	null	23581	412224015	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.608325	123.972905	18m51s	2020-10-15T13:19:00.000Z
28	China	Liaodanyu25145	null	25145	412224406	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.636238	123.938813	42m28s	2020-10-15T12:55:23.000Z
29	China	Liaodanyu25267	null	25267	412224457	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.633567	123.913202	5h37m	2020-10-15T08:00:05.000Z
30	China	Liaodanyu25406	null	25406	412224516	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.665275	123.964578	6m05s	2020-10-15T13:31:46.000Z
31	China	Liaodanyu25968	null	25968	412224786	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.583367	123.982702	16d17h	2020-09-28T19:43:08.000Z
32	China	Liaodanyu25989	null	25989	412224802	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.664872	123.964862	9m26s	2020-10-15T13:28:25.000Z

	Flag	Vessel Name	Reg Owner	Call Sign	MMSI	Ship Type	Navigation Status	Latitude	Longitude	Age	Time Of Fix
33	China	Dazhuangbu4427	null	0	412260049	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.260867	124.251753	454d11h	2019-07-19T02:22:12.000Z
34	China	Sss66668888	null	6666	412268888	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.250903	123.945235	36d19h	2020-09-08T18:08:16.000Z
35	China	1818	null		412281818	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.81984	124.21908	502d08h	2019-06-01T04:47:39.000Z
36	China	Jihuanggangyu 02040	null		412286786	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.685807	124.804322	898d17h	2018-04-30T20:08:09.000Z
37	China	Jinhanyu04883	null	4883	412301027	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.503658	124.159753	523d17h	2019-05-10T20:24:13.000Z
38	China	Jinhanyu04916	null	4916	412301051	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.279743	127.770693	437d04h	2019-08-05T09:20:42.000Z
39	China	Lurongyu55139	null	55139	412320049	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.422968	124.172348	523d07h	2019-05-11T05:59:34.000Z
40	China	Lurongyu52836	null	52836	412321643	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.578798	130.722793	439d00h	2019-08-03T13:14:10.000Z
41	China	Lu Laizhouyu 66023	null		412323636	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	40.32558	131.591377	380d16h	2019-09-30T21:25:10.000Z
42	China	Lurongyu58295	null	58295	412324168	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.787442	130.204445	438d14h	2019-08-03T22:46:39.000Z
43	China	Lurongyu55685	null	55685	412327826	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.217172	123.634667	542d21h	2019-04-21T16:20:05.000Z
44	China	Lurongyu58137	null	58137	412329155	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	40.692862	132.214668	380d14h	2019-09-30T23:02:17.000Z
45	China	Liaodanyu21008	null	8	412335111	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.462283	123.903017	152d03h	2020-05-16T09:59:42.000Z
46	China	Liao Dan Yu 23387	null	8 24	412335121	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.953592	131.843672	499d23h	2019-06-03T13:47:18.000Z
47	China	Liao Dan Yu 23388	null	8 24	412335122	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.955403	131.83443	499d23h	2019-06-03T13:54:13.000Z
48	China	_____	null	_____	412367878	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.495117	124.038085	870d00h	2018-05-29T13:19:58.000Z
49	China	Jifengyu00188	null	BCN0733	412432568	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	40.67724	132.124498	380d05h	2019-10-01T08:32:31.000Z
50	China	Jirenyu00126	null	126	412563212	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.286043	123.681992	135d18h	2020-06-01T18:53:17.000Z
51	China	350-3	null		412767878	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.139168	124.281678	384d14h	2019-09-26T23:25:21.000Z
52	China	Liaodahuayu15016	null	15016	412785692	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.312383	123.909515	136d18h	2020-05-31T19:22:16.000Z
53	China		null		412798709	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	37.70368	125.524507	524d00h	2019-05-10T13:04:03.000Z
54	China	201-2-89%	null	100200	412804151	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.562637	123.871795	8d09h	2020-10-07T03:41:31.000Z
55	China	Xing Hai 668	null		412866988	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.442917	130.15955	490d03h	2019-06-13T10:33:23.000Z
56	China	65170-5	null		413534567	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	38.306255	124.230147	384d03h	2019-09-27T09:38:21.000Z
57	China	Y Ongzheng S	null		413764201	30-Fishing	15-NotDefined	39.86398	124.276588	770d03h	2018-09-06T10:11:52.000Z

All vessels were broadcasting no IMO number, did not indicate any destination, and did not indicate any estimated time of arrival (ETA)

Source: Member State

(2) List of ships observed and individuals reported by the third Member State in September and October 2020

鲁荣渔 59295 (Lu Rong Yu 59295)

鲁荣渔 59296 (Lu Rong Yu 59296)

福远 27 (FUYUAN 27)

福远 28 (FUYUAN 28)

辽大中渔 15181(Liao da zhong yu 15181)

临渔运 0002(Lin Yu Yun 0002)

辽丹渔 3607 (Lian Dan Yu 3607)

辽丹渔 3608 (Lian Dan Yu 3608)

王德偉 (owner of 辽丹渔 3607)

(3) Panel's methodology

The Panel checked the data with various sources including through Member States.

A Member State stated that among these 57 vessels on the list of Annex 2 (1) above provided by another Member State, "no information is available to confirm the existence of vessels in No. 6, 9, 33, 48, 53 and 55. The other 51 vessels on the list are said to be 'Active' in relevant [maritime database] website, but there is no information about their IMO registration, owner and operator." The Member State also provided recent geographical positions of the vessels on the list, with names matching with MMSI recorded in publicly available maritime databases (Table). The Member State stated that "these positions were received in 2019 and they were around maritime areas around North Korea, including the east side of the Korean Peninsula".

Table: Member State information on the location of vessels

No.	Vessel Name	MMSI	Date	Time (UTC)	Latitute	Longtitude
5	ZHONG TANG 2	412205279	2019.9.26	14:57	41.90457N	130.3961E
13	Liao Dan Yu Yun 25139	412211386	2019.11.8	14:20	39.34904N	124.7636E
15	Liao Dan Yu 25968	412211839	2019.8.19	12:12	38.67237N	125.0151E
19	Liao Dan Yu Yun 25097	412215422	2019.8.22	0:37	37.64317N	125.4855E
20	Liao Dan Yu 26098	412215438	2019.5.8	15:33	38.4271N	124.1801E
21	Liao Dan Yu 26096	412215491	2019.10.22	14:37	38.06435N	124.5952E
38	Jin Han Yu 04916	412301051	2019.8.5	9:34	39.27627N	127.7595E
40	Lu Rong Yu 2836 *	412321643	2019.8.3	12:25	39.52571N	130.8495E
42	Lu Rong Yu 58295	412324168	2019.8.5	5:08	39.68707N	130.403E
46	Liao Dan Yu 23387	412335121	2019.6.13	10:33	39.37794N	130.2695E
47	Liao Dan Yu 23388	412335122	2019.6.13	10:59	39.36693N	130.2393E

* The vessel with MMSI No.412321643 is currently registered as Lu Rong Yu 2836.

The Panel also analysed satellite imagery of the vicinity to examine the information provided by the first Member State (Figure).

Figure: Example of satellite imagery of vicinity of the fishing vessels' location on the list (1)

No. & observation	Satellite imagery	Source
11. Liaodanyu25509; 38.849587° N, 124.053545°; 20201006; 18 45 38 UTC – several vessels observed at 5600 m 16hours before listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Oct 06, 2020; 02 13 UTC - 38.84881° N, 124.05348° E
15. Liaodanyu25968; 38.662248° N, 125.037083° E; 20190825; 02 22 38 UTC – several vessels observed in the area at the same time of the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Aug 25, 2019 02 06 UTC - 38.66153° N, 125.03699° E
17. Liaodanyu26685; 38.479397° N, 123.95728° E; 20180524; 12 38 55 UTC – several vessels observed at 6700 m, 7 hours before the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. May 24, 2018; 05 12 UTC - 38.47886° N, 123.95943° E

20. Liaodanyu26098; 38.426343° N, 124.178418° E; 20190509; 04 25 10 UTC - several vessels observed at 1200 m, 2 hours before the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. May 9, 2019; 02 08 UTC - 38.42543° N, 124.17828° E
21. Liaodanyyu2609; 6; 38.064347° N, 124.595225° E; 20191022; 14 37 59 UTC - no vessel observed within 2500m, 12 hours earlier of the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Oct 22, 2019; 02 06 UTC - 38.06316° N, 124.59523° E
23. Liaodanyu1317; 39.822415° N, 124.297345° E; 20190921; 09 44 59 UTC - vessel observed at 600 m, 7 hours before the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Sept 21, 2019; 02 29 UTC - 39.82142° N, 124.29723° E

33. Dazhuangbu4427; 38.260867° N, 124.251753° E; 20190719; 02 22 12 UTC – one vessel observed within 50 m at 10 minutes before the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Jul 19, 2019; 02 10 UTC - 38.26069° N, 124.25176° E
43. Lurongyu55685; 38.217172° N, 123.634667° E; 20190421; 16 20 05 UTC – several vessels observed at 2300 m, 10 hours after the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Apr 22, 2019; 02 09 UTC - 38.21640° N, 123.63465°E
44. Lurongyu58137; 40.692862° N, 132.214668° E; 20190930; 23 02 17 UTC – several vessels observed at 2500 m, one hour after the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Oct 1, 2019; 00 15 UTC - 40.69258° N, 132.21462° E

49. Jifengyu00188; 40.67724 N 132.124498 E; 20191001 08 32 31 UTC – several vessels observed at 400 m, 7 hours before listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. Oct 1, 2019; 01 38 UTC- 40.67608° N, 132.12439° E
53. …; 37.70368° N, 125.524507° E; 20190510; 13 04 03 UTC – several vessels observed at 1470 m, 11 hours after the listed time		*Source:* Planet Labs Inc. May 11, 2019; 02 03 UTC - 37.70053° N, 125.52427° E

Source: Planet Labs Inc., the Panel

Annex 32 (f): Reply from China to the Panel

3. Fishing rights (OC.459)

China always faithfully fulfills its international obligations and implements Security Council resolutions. China's fishing authority and relevant coastal provinces have taken measures, strengthened management, and demanded the fishing companies and fishermen to follow the Security Council resolutions. If the cases mentioned in the Panel's letter do exist, they must be illegal fishing activities. China's position on such illegal activities is consistent and clear that, once verified, we will deal with the cases in accordance with laws and regulations. However, since the information in the Panel's letter is lack of accuracy and short of substantial evidence, China is unable to conduct in-depth investigation accordingly.

Annex 33: DPRK vessels sailing without AIS transmissions

DPRK vessels that transit to Chinese waters typically do not maintain AIS transmission for significant periods or retain intermittent transmissions with false identifiers to avoid and obfuscate AIS tracking of where they conduct their illicit trade. While AIS non-transmission is a well-documented technique to evade sanctions, maintaining AIS transmission is also key to avoiding accidents at sea. Two DPRK vessels previously featured in Panel reports, *Jang Jin Gang* (IMO: 8914075) and *Su Song* (IMO: 9024889)[42] met with accidents around 15 October 2019 and 1 October 2019 respectively off Zhoushan waters when they were sailing without AIS tracks on maritime databases. Information obtained through the incident reports indicated the vessels were carrying anthracite coal / coal[43].

Source: The Panel

[42] The Jang Jin Gang transmitted sporadically and had not transmitted an AIS signal since June 2019. The Su Song has not transmitted AIS since Oc-tober 2018.

[43] Incident reports from the International Maritime Organization. Documentation including coordinates and summary report of the incidents held by the Panel.

Annex 34: Examples of DPRK vessels exporting coal to waters in Ningbo-Zhoushan, China

Asia Honor (IMO: 8405220)

On 2 August 2020[44], the DPRK-flagged *Asia Honor* loaded coal at Chongjin Port, DPRK, based on satellite imagery information. On 13 August, the vessel transmitting as '*A H*' briefly reported its AIS positional data and updated its draft status to laden before dropping transmission a day later. According to a Member State, the *Asia Honor* was underway laden with coal at 303524N 1232848E on 16 August as it approached Ningbo-Zhoushan, China. On 17 August, the vessel anchored in Ningbo-Zhoushan in close proximity to another DPRK-flagged vessel, *Myong Sin* (IMO: 9045182) (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Voyage route of *Asia-Honor* exporting DPRK-origin coal, August 2020



[44] All dates unless otherwise stated are given in Universal Time Coordinates (UTC).



Source: Member State

The Asia Honor was previously reported by the Panel transferring DPRK-origin coal to a lighter vessel around 15 February 2019 off the Gulf of Tonkin[45].

The vessel was last managed and operated by HongXiang Marine Hong Kong Ltd[46] (hereafter "HongXiang Marine") and listed Win Trade Worldwide Ltd (hereafter "Win Trade") as its registered owner before the vessel was DPRK-flagged in November 2018[47]. HongXiang Marine additionally managed the following vessels before they transitioned to DPRK vessels in 2018: *Horizon Star* (9017123*), Flourishing* (IMO: 8421315) and *Oriental Treasure* (IMO: 8421315)[48]. These vessels continue to export DPRK-origin coal to waters in Ningbo-Zhoushan in 2020 (see figure 2). The commonality of management company likely indicates associated entities and individuals involved in facilitating the DPRK's illicit activities.

Figure 2: *Horizon Star and Oriental Treasure* at Ningbo-Zhoushan, August 2020



Source: Member State

[45] Paragraph 20, S/2019/691.
[46] Struck off in June 2018 on the Hong Kong company registry.
[47] IHS Markit.
[48] The *Oriental Treasure* has been featured in several Panel reports aiding and abetting the DPRK's illegal coal export operations.

Paek Hak San (IMO: 9298076)

The DPRK-flagged *Paek Hak San* maintained intermittent AIS transmissions that showed at least two voyages made to the Ningbo-Zhoushan area since June 2019. On 19 June 2020 (EST), the vessel began transmitting its AIS outside of DPRK waters, ceasing transmission a day later as it was sailing through the Yellow Sea. The vessel resumed transmission on 21 June in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area. On its return journey to the DPRK, the *Paek Hak San* transmitted AIS positional data from 28 June to 1 July as it departed the Ningbo-Zhoushan area, and re-transmitted in the Yellow Sea on 3 July for the remainder of its voyage (see figure 3). The *Paek Hak San* returned to the Ningbo-Zhoushan area where it transmitted AIS signal on 24 July after departing DPRK waters two weeks earlier. There has been no further transmission since 26 July 2020[49].

Figure 3: Voyage route of *Paek Hak San* exporting DPRK-origin coal, June / July 2020

June 2020



July 2020



[49] As on December 2020..



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

China replied that there was no record of the *Asia Honor* and of the *Paek Hak San* entering or leaving Chinese ports.

Source: The Panel

Annex 35: China-flagged cargo vessels delivering DPRK-origin coal to various Chinese ports

In addition to the *Shun Jin Bao* (MMSI: 413704010) that loaded DPRK-origin coal in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area in China and offloaded the coal at Bayuquan port in August 2020, the following vessels were also reported to have conducted ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area and then transshipped and delivered their cargo at other Chinese ports:

China-flagged *Huade16* (MMSI: 413249920) loaded DPRK-origin coal in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area and offloaded the coal at Guangzhou port in June 2020. The *Huade16* was captured on satellite imagery at a pier alongside two unidentified barges of approximately 76 meters and 80 meters long.



Source: Member State

China-flagged *Xinjinyue* (MMSI: 412501560)[50] loaded DPRK-origin coal in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area and offloaded the coal at Caofeidian's coal wharf in August 2020.



XINJINYUE			TAE PYONG		
Timestamp	Latitude	Longitude	Timestamp	Latitude	Longitude
16 Aug 08:10	304836 N	1224713 E	16 Aug 08:12	304814 N	1224728 E
16 Aug 09:04	304840 N	1224713 E	16 Aug 09:00	304807 N	1224724 E
16 Aug 10:48	304814 N	1224724 E	16 Aug 10:48	304811 N	1224728 E
16 Aug 11:58	304822 N	1224720 E	16 Aug 11:51	304822 N	1224720 E
16 Aug 13:10	304832 N	1224720 E	16 Aug 13:06	304832 N	1224717 E
16 Aug 14:22	304829 N	1224731 E	16 Aug 14:15	304832 N	1224728 E
16 Aug 15:13	304825 N	1224731 E	16 Aug 15:18	304829 N	1224731 E
16 Aug 17:10	304822 N	1224731 E	16 Aug 17:09	304822 N	1224731 E
16 Aug 22:10	304832 N	1224720 E	16 Aug 22:06	304832 N	1224717 E

Source: Member State

17 August 2020





Source: Member State

[50] The *Xinjinyue* was transmitting an invalid IMO:456789900.

The Panel sought information on the said cargo-vessels, *inter alia*, concerning the ship-to-ship transfers conducted with DPRK vessels in domestic waters and on the offloaded coal cargo's origin and destination on these cargo vessels. The Panel provided relevant imagery, vessel identifiers, domestic voyage routes of the said cargo vessels and related information[51].

China replied that " According to the investigation by competent Chinese authorities, Chinese vessels "Huade16", "Shun Jin Bao" and "Xiniinyue" sailed between Chinese domestic ports during the time frame mentioned in the Panel's letters, and performed regular reporting and approval procedures. The Chinese Customs strictly examined the certificate of origins of their cargo, and no evidence of any activities violating the resolutions was found. After further examining the logbook of these vessels, the possibility of making port calls to DPRK ports during domestic voyages was also excluded. If the Panel has additional evidence, China hopes that the Panel could provide it."

Source: The Panel

[51] The said cargo vessels were not reported to have visited the DPRK.

Annex 36: China-flagged Coastal Barges delivering DPRK-origin coal to China

Eight China-flagged coastal barges with their names and transmitted MMSIs were reported by a Member State to have conducted multiple deliveries of DPRK-origin coal to China between May and September 2020. Figure 1 shows the typical voyage route of these coastal barges:

Figure 1: Typical delivery route of China-flagged coastal barges



Source: Member State

The general characteristics for the coal carrying barges included:

- limited reported data transmitted on AIS;
- barges lengths range between 50 meters and 120 meters; and
- barges have a previous history of transiting exclusively or almost exclusively between ports along the Chinese coastline.

A Member State provided examples of China-flagged barges involved in such activities. The information provided was overall consistent with the Panel's research and analysis of AIS tracking information where available and as indicated in the following images from a commercial maritime database platform. The barges included the following vessels:

1. *Cheng Hong 28 / Changhong28* (MMSI: 413180911)'s voyage March to August 2020[52].

The *Cheng Hong 28 / Changhong28* made port calls at Yingkou and Bayuquan ports in China on 30 March and 6 May 2020 (EST) before sailing towards DPRK waters in June 2020 from its AIS transmissions. The barge arrived at Jiangjiagou by July 2020 before ceasing AIS transmission on 4 August 2020[53].



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel[54]



Source: Member State

[52] All dates unless otherwise stated are recorded in Universal Time Coordinate (UTC).
[53] As on December 2020.
[54] All times and dates reflected on the Windward maritime database platform are in Eastern Standard time (EST).

2. *Chenggong 66* (MMSI: 413663365), *Xin Hai 39* (MMSI: 413897784) and two unidentified Chinese coastal barges, 19 June 2020.



Source: Member State

3. Unidentified 120-meter Chinese coastal barge laden with coal at Taean port, DPRK, which delivered coal to smaller vessels at Jingjiang port, China, May and June 2020.



Source: Member State

4. *Fu Hai 678* (MMSI: 413827610) departed Nanjing on 21 May 2020, sailed to the DPRK, and departed the DPRK by 8 June 2020. The vessel dropped its AIS transmission on its return journey while sailing through the Yellow Sea. Panel research on a maritime database indicates the vessel subsequently registered an AIS signal in July in the Nantong area, where the vessel changed its name to the *Shun De 678* while making its way up the river towards the port area of Jiangyin, China.



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

5. *Long Yu 1007* (MMSI: 412111000) and *Xin Hai 39* (MMSI: 413897784) loaded coal at a port on the Taedong River and at Nampo port respectively by 19 June 2020. Both barges departed the DPRK on 19 June and sailed through the Yellow Sea before they dropped AIS transmission in June 2020. Panel research indicates the *Long Yu 1007* subsequently re-transmitted an AIS signal in the Nantong area on or around 1 July and continued in a southern direction towards the Ningbo-Zhoushan area.





Source: Member State; Windward, annotated by the Panel

6. *Changfahai* (MMSI: 413563921) transmitted AIS in the Yellow Sea on 30 May 2020 (EST) and arrived in DPRK waters by 4 July. It departed by 24 July and its AIS signal was recorded in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area three days later before sailing south, reaching Fuzhou, China by 28 July. *Changfahai* also recorded an AIS transmission in the Nantong area where it met another Chinese cargo vessel on 5 August 2020. The barge first registered its MMSI transmission in the same Nantong area on 5 March 2020.



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

The Panel also shared a wider list of 65 China-flagged coastal barges (inclusive of the list of coastal barges above) that contained the ship name and associated MMSI it was transmitting, assessed by the Member State to have conducted probable coal export from the DPRK during the period between May and September 2020.

China replied that "With regard to the 65 Chinese-flagged barges mentioned by the Panel, the Chinese side could only confirm that there is no record of the vessel "Hua Yuan 0626" entering or leaving Chinese ports. For the other 64 vessels, there is no valid information found based on the provided MMSI number, or obviously unmatched vessel length information with the information in the letters of the Panel.

China attaches great importance to smuggling activities through ship-to-ship transfers involving the DPRK, and relevant Chinese authorities have made great efforts in this regard. China has repeatedly and openly

reaffirmed its its solemn position against smuggling activities through ship-to-ship transfers and its determination to combat these activities in accordance with law. This in itself is a deterrence to relevant activities.

At the same time, China has concerns on the practice of the Panel of simply transferring information provided by certain Member States without screening and verification. There are serious problems with the timeliness and accuracy of such information, based on which no meaningful investigation could be conducted. Inclusion of such information by the Panel in its report would create a wrong impression that China is not serious in implementing Security Council resolutions. China hopes that the Panel in performing its mandate, takes a more prudent and responsible attitude and leaves out information which is against the facts."

Source: The Panel

Annex 37: Unidentified China-flagged barges importing items to the DPRK

In addition to the *Cheng Hong 28* (MMSI: 413180911), a Member State provided the following information on unidentified China-flagged coastal barges importing sanctioned goods into the DPRK.

Barges "Bravo" and "Charlie"[55]: On 15 June 2020, a barge with the provided name "Bravo" was observed berthed at Nampo port's pier with two dump trucks loaded in its cargo hold. The dump trucks were subsequently observed parked on the pier by 20 June, when the coastal barge with the provided name "Charlie" was observed offloading unidentified cargo. Under paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017), the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, directly or indirectly, of transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89) are prohibited. Dump trucks are transportation vehicles identified under HS code 87.

Source: Member State

Barges "Delta" and "Echo": On 22 June 2020, a barge with the provided name "Delta" and tied to barge "Echo", was observed anchored near Nampo port loaded with one cab-over-engine truck in cargo hold one. Such trucks are transportation vehicles identified under HS code 87. "Echo" was had unidentified miscellaneous cargo in one of its holds.



Source: Member State

Barge "Foxtrot": On 4 July 2020, a barge with the provided name "Foxtrot" was observed loaded with seven vehicles: three cab-over-engine trucks with open cargo beds, one front-end loader, one excavator, one prime mover with trailer

[55] Bravo, Charlie, Delta, Echo, Foxtrot and Golf are used as names to depict the unidentified China-flagged barges.

(also known as a semi-trailer), and one personal vehicle. In addition, "Foxtrot" was loaded with six storage tanks. These items were offloaded by 9 July and located on the pier in Nampo port.



Source: Member State

Barge "Golf": On 16 and 17 July 2020, a barge with the provided name "Golf" was observed near Nampo Lock Gate loaded with a total of twelve vehicles split between cargo holds: eight cab-over-engine trucks, three cab-over-engine trucks with open cargo beds, and one personal vehicle. Cab-over-engine trucks and personal vehicles are transportation vehicles identified under HS code 87.



Source: Member State

China replied that it "attaches great importance to smuggling activities through ship-to-ship transfers involving the DPRK, and relevant Chinese authorities have made great efforts in this regard. China has repeatedly and openly reaffirmed its its solemn position against smuggling activities through ship-to-ship transfers and its determination to combat these activities in accordance with law. This in itself is a deterrence to relevant activities".

Source: The Panel

Annex 38 (a): Then-Togo-flagged Enterprise (IMO: 9153331) exporting DPRK-origin coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, China

Enterprise

The then Togo-flagged *Enterprise* (IMO: 9153331) recorded its last AIS transmission on 2 October 2019 (EST) outside Shidao, China, on maritime databases with a reported next destination as Incheon, Republic of Korea. A Member State confirmed the vessel departing the Shidao anchorage area by 5 October. The Republic of Korea confirmed the vessel neither ported at Incheon nor at any of its other ports thereafter. The *Enterprise* instead arrived at Nampo port by 11 October and has since, according to a Member State, conducted at least eight coal deliveries, including seven to the Ningbo-Zhoushan area and one to Lianyungang, China[56] (see figure 1). The *Enterprise* exhibited a similar pattern to the *Tae Pyong* where the latter departed a Chinese port in late December 2019, reported a destination to 'Order' before dropping AIS signal, and appeared at Nampo a week later. The vessel proceeded to conduct multiple exports of coal within Chinese waters in 2020. The *Tae Pyong* was subsequently reported as DPRK-flagged.

About four months prior to the *Enterprise*'s arrival at Nampo, the vessel's ownership and management was transferred to entities with listed addresses in China. Tai Yuan Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter "Taiyuan Shipping") is listed as the group owner of the *Enterprise* since June 2019, with Blue Sky Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter "Blue Sky") as the vessel's registered owner and Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd (hereafter "Dalian Taiyuan") as the ves-sel's operator and manager[57]. The Panel wrote to Togo, China and Chinese entities that own and / or managed the vessel.

Togo provided the Panel in January 2021 a suspension notification of the *Enterprise*. The said notification notifies all parties "… that the below mentioned certificates of the vessel "ENTERPRISE" (IMO: 9153331) have been suspended as of 20th day of June 2020 until further notice" (see figure 2).

China replied that there was no record of the *Enterprise* entering or leaving Chinese ports.

Figure 1: The *Enterprise* in Nampo and Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in May/June 2020

Source: Member State

[56] Information until October 2020.

[57] IMO. The listed fax numbers of the Chinese entities had error returns.

Figure 2: Suspension notification of the *Enterprise* issued by the Togolese Maritime Authority

REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE
TRAVAIL – LIBERTE – PATRIE

TOGOLESE MARITIME AUTHORITY
INTERNATIONAL SHIP REGISTRY

Our Ref. : 0091NOS/TG/01/21

NOTIFICATION OF SUSPENSION OF REGISTRY

SHIP NAME	:	**ENTERPRISE ex BLUE SKY**
OFFICIAL NUMBER	:	**TG-01241L**
PORT OF REGISTRY	:	**LOME**
CALL SIGN	:	**5 V F X 6**
IMO NUMBER	:	**9153331**
SHIP TYPE	:	**GENERAL CARGO**
GRT/NRT	:	**4743/2763**
REGISTERED OWNER	:	**BLUE SKY SHIPPING CO LTD (100%)**

Dear Sirs,

This is to notify all concerned parties that the below mentioned certificates of the vessel "ENTERPRISE" (IMO: 9153331) have been suspended as of 20th day of June 2020 until further notice.

Registry certificates are considered suspended as owners did not fulfill their obligations toward the Togo Maritime Administration since June 2020 and consequently no any certificate issued by our Administration for the vessel since 20th day of June 2020.

Therefore, following certificates issued by our Administration for the vessel "ENTERPRISE" (IMO: 9153331) have been suspended until further notice.

- **Permanent certificate of registry with reference No.TG/PR/139-38512/937**
- **Radio License with reference no. TG/PL/139-38512/2135**
- **Minimum safe manning with reference No.TG/PM/139-38512/2035**

In light of the above, all certificates on board including the statutory certificates issued on behalf of Togo flag are considered invalid.

As well, this notification CAN NOT be used in substitution for Deletion Certificate for which owners should apply to receive same from our Administration.

Please be guided accordingly.

Issued at Beirut, Lebanon on 29th day of January 2021

For the International Ship Registrar:

[redacted]

Tel/Fax Number: +961-1-883794
E – Mail: administration@togoregistrar.com

Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

Annex 38 (b): Unknown flagged *Ri Hong* (aka *Klausen*) (IMO: 9162318) exporting DPRK-origin coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, China

Ri Hong (aka *Klausen*) (IMO: 9162318)

The Panel reported on the *Ri Hong* sailing as flag unknown when the vessel was reported by a Member State to have exported DPRK-origin coal to waters in Ningbo-Zhoushan, China in April 2020[58]. The vessel was last recorded transmitting near Shidao, China on or around 18 December 2019 (EST) before it stopped transmission (see figure 1). The vessel was recorded on satellite imagery less than a week later at Songnim port, DPRK (see figure 2).

The Panel wrote to China and sought its assistance for information on the vessel as it last appeared near the Shidao port area, its export of DPRK-origin coal to the Ningbo-Zhoushan area, and on the *Ri Hong's* last known Chinese owner and operator before the vessel appeared in the DPRK. China replied "The DPRK-flagged vessel "Ri Hong" entered the sea area near Weihai from Inchon, ROK without entering ports, and left the sea area for an unknown destination."

The Panel notes that commercial maritime tracking databases show the *Ri Hong*, then Panama-flagged, called at Incheon port on and around 10 to 14 December 2019 (EST) prior to its arrival at Shidao on or around 14 December 2019 (EST). Panama confirmed it de-registered the *Ri Hong* on 20 December 2019[59].

Figure 1: Last recorded AIS transmission of the *Ri Hong*, December 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[58] Paragraphs 57 to 59, S/2020/840.
[59] Ibid.

Figure 2: *Ri Hong* at Songim port, DPRK, 23 December 2019



Source: Member State

In May 2020, the *Ri Hong* was captured on satellite imagery near Nampo Lock Gate, DPRK, and then in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters June 2020 (figure 3). The vessel was back loading coal at Nampo port in July 2020 (see figure 4).

Figure 3: Satellite imagery of the *Ri Hong* exporting DPRK-origin coal, May / June 2020

Source: Member State

Figure 4: Satellite imagery of the *Ri Hong* at Nampo, 4 July 2020

Source: Member State

The Panel notes that there has been no record on commercial maritime databases of any AIS transmission by the vessel sailing under the name of *Klausen* since December 2019 in spite of its reported flag and name change[60] and in spite of satellite imagery showing the vessel continuing to sail and conduct maritime trade. The Sierra Leone Maritime Administration confirmed the *Klausen's* de-registration on 17 November 2020 with the reason of the vessel's expiration of its issued provisional registration certificate. A Member State has assessed the *Ri Hong* as acquired by the DPRK though it remains unclear if the vessel is officially flagged under its fleet.

Updated information lists Converse Trading Limited, a Hong Kong-registered entity as the registered owner, operator and manager of the *Klausen* since May 2020. The company has no listed telephone, fax or email contact details. The Panel continues to await a response from the previous Chinese registered owner and operator of the *Ri Hong* of the vessel's status, activities, cargo and onward sale.

Source: The Panel

[60] As of December 2020.

Annex 39: Companies involved in the export of DPRK-origin coal

XinXin Green Work Research & Development Co. Ltd

The Panel investigated the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's illegal export from at least 2019 of coal using barges, based on information from a Member State. In July 2020, XinXin Green Work Research & Development Co. Ltd in Liaoning Province, China, imported 11,000 metric tons of DPRK-origin coal, using a vessel named Shu Shan 168. According to the Member State, the designated Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028) was directly involved in this transaction and benefited from it. XinXin Green has yet to reply to the Panel's inquiry.

Taizhou Yifeng Transportation Co. Ltd.

Based on information from a Member State, Taizhou Yifeng Transportation Co. Ltd. was involved in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's illegal export of coal using barges. According to information from a Member State, the Panel requested information from Taizhou Yifeng Transportation Co. Ltd. on whether the company worked together with Mulgil Trading Corporation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to import coal into China using a barge *Yi Feng 1* (Vessel ID number: CN20089481469, Vessel Registry number: 2008K2191995) between 2019 and 2020. Taizhou Yifeng has yet to reply to the Panel's enquiry.

Source: Member State

Annex 40: List of HS Codes the Panel applies for the monitoring of sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list superseds S/2018/171 annex 4 as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items for the complete list of prohibited goods and Implement Assistance Notes.

a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Condensates and natural gas liquids	**2709**	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of res. 2375 (2017)
	2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocrabons	
Industrial machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Transportation vehicles [61]	**86**	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	87	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	88	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof [62]	
	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	
Iron, steel and other metals	**Chapters 72-83**		Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	72	Iron and steel	
	73	Articles of iron or steel	
	74	Copper and articles thereof	
	75	Nickel and articles thereof	
	76	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	77	Reserved for possible future use	
	78	Lead and articles thereof	
	79	Zinc and articles thereof	
	80	Tin and articles thereof	
	81	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

[61] Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

[62] Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Coal	**2701**	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of resolution 2371 (2017)
Iron Ore	**2601**	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
Iron	**Chapter 72**	Iron and steel products (**7201-7229**)	
Iron and Steel products	**Chapter 73**	Iron and steel products (**7301-7326)**	
Gold	**261690**	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of resolution 2270 (2016)
	7108	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	710811	Gold Powder, Unwrought	
	710812	Gold in Other Unwrought Forms	
	710813	Gold in Other Semi-manufactured Forms	
	710820	Monetary Gold	
Titanium	**2614**	Titanium ores and concentrates	
Vanadium	**2615**	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	**2612**	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [**261210** and **261220**]	
	2617	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code **261790** - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	2844	Radioactive chemical elements & isotopes etc.	
Copper	**Chapter 74**	Copper and articles thereof (**7401-7419**)	Para. 28 of resolution 2321 (2016)
	2603	Copper ores and concentrates	
Zinc	**Chapter 79**	Zinc and articles thereof (**7901-7907**)	
	2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	**Chapter 75**	Nickel and articles thereof (**7501-7508)**	
	2604	Nickel ores and concentrates	
Silver	**2616100** **7106, 7107**	Silver ores and concentrates Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	7114	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
Seafood (incl fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	**Chapter 3**	Fish and Crustaceans, Molluscs and other Aquatic Invertebrates (**0301-0308)**	Para. 9 of resolution 2371 (2017)
	1603	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	1604	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	1605	Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
Lead	**Chapter 78**	Lead and articles thereof (**7801-7806**)	Para. 10 of resolution 2371 (2017)
Lead ore	**2607**	Lead ores and concentrates	

Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	**Chapters 50-63**		Para. 16 of resolution 2375 (2017)
	50	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	51	Wool And Fine Or Coarse Animal Hair, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof; Horsehair Yarn And Woven Fabric	
	52	Cotton, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof	
	53	Vegetable Textile Fibers Nesoi; Yarns And Woven Fabrics Of Vegetable Textile Fibers Nesoi And Paper	
	54	Manmade Filaments, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof	
	55	Manmade Staple Fibers, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof	
	56	Wadding, Felt And Nonwovens; Special Yarns; Twine, Cordage, Ropes And Cables And Articles Thereof	
	57	Carpets And Other Textile Floor Covering	
	58	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	59	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	61	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	62	Apparel and clothing accessories; *not* knitted or crocheted;	
	63	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
Agricultural products	**07**	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	08	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
Machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
Electrical equipment	**85**	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia	**25**	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
Wood	**44**	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
Vessels	**89**	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709 : crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713 : refined petroleum products [cap: 500,000 barrels]

Annex 41: Recorded trade between the DPRK and some Member States

1. Methodology

The Panel monitors prohibited exports and imports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2106), paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2371 (2017), paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2375 (2017) and paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 2397 (2017).

The Panel analysed Member States' trade data as reported by them to international trade statistics database such as the International Trade Centre (ITC) or Global Trade Atlas (GTA) to apply a uniform standard to all Member States. Where available statistics indicate trade in prohibited items, the Panel request Member States to provide additional information for verification, preferably with relevant original documents which can substantiate its explanation. The Panel notes that the DPRK does not release statistics on its external trade and only mirror statistics are available on DPRK exports and imports. This analysis does not include any exports and imports of prohibited items by the DPRK that were undetected or unreported by Member States.

The list of HS codes the Panel used for its analyses are included in annex 40 of this report.[63] The Panel reiterates that its enquiry is based on the WCO recommended list (see S/2017/150 para. 257, S/2018/171 annex 4 as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1). The Panel further notes that, while discrepancy may exist between the practice of certain Member States and the Panel in this regard, absence of reference to a specific HS code within relevant UNSCRs should not be construed in a way that makes the relevant provision unimplementable or practically ineffective by excluding certain subcategories of a prohibited item without reasonable grounds.

The Panel's analysis in this report primarily covers the period between April and September 2020. In 2020, however, the Panel observed that many Member States were unable to share their trade statistics in a timely manner. Therefore, this report also contains the Panel's analyses on the recorded trades of certain Member States which took place before April 2020. Furthermore, sometimes the Panel obtain hitherto unreported trade data newly made available to the international trade statistics database. In such cases, the Panel requested the Member State in question to provide clarifications on possible trade with the DPRK based on the new information.

2. Update on the Panel's past inquiries in 2020 final report (S/2020/151, annex 19)

Costa Rica replied to the Panel's inquiry on its recorded trade with the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019, and provided full documentation which show that the recorded trade the Panel inquired was not conducted with the DPRK.

Indonesia replied to the Panel's inquiry on its recorded trade with the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019. Indonesia stated that it "would like to reiterate that any information between Indonesia and its trade partners should be based on the information issued by our relevant authorities." Indonesia also stated that "There were imports of articles under HS 73, HS 74, HS 79 and HS 54 from DPRK by Indonesia during the questioned period. However, UNSCR 2371, 2321 and 2375 does not prohibits[*sic*] the procurement of the specific abovementioned HS codes. Thus, the imports of HS 73, HS 74, HS 79 and HS 54 from DPRK during the specified period should not be considered as incompliance against the referred UNSCR. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia are still conducting internal investigation with regard to the request related to HS 84 and HS 85, and will provide more information in due course."[64]

[63] For implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), see paras. 27 – 53 of this report. For implementation of luxury goods ban, see paras. 110 – 122.

[64] On the HS codes and the methodology the Panel uses for the monitoring purpose, see section 1 of this Annex.

3. Update on the Panel's past enquiries in 2020 midterm report (S/2020/840, annex 29)

Germany replied to the Panel's enquiry on its recorded exports of items under HS code 84 worth of 10,000 USD consisted of two categories of items. First, 41 fire extinguishers for the German Embassy in Pyongyang, which "are exempted from applicable sanctions provisions." Second, a "small medical centrifuge with a declared value of EUR 870 was exported, with the recipient being a hospital in Pyongyang." As for the second item, Germany stated that it has "brought this to the attention of the competent export control authorities with a view to ensuring strict compliance with applicable sanctions provisions."

4. Results of the Panel's latest enquiries for this report

Below is the result of the Panel's analyses of Member States' recorded trade with the DPRK. Each Member State may have a different covering period based on the availability of trade statistics. The most recent data the Panel used was September 2020.

The Panel reiterates that this is not a complete list of countries that traded with the DPRK during the said period, and the Panel is preparing further inquiries concerning other Member States as full trade data for this period becomes available.

Austria: Austria replied that its November 2019 exports of items under HS Code 84 to the DPRK worth of USD 26,000 appeared to be linked to the supply of spare parts of an item licensed prior to the adoption of the relevant resolution. The Panel notes that paragraph 7 of Resolution 2397 (2017) has not stipulated any transition period.

Bolivia: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Iron and iron ore [65]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2020	Bolivia	DPRK	72-73	147,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery [66]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2019	Bolivia	DPRK	84	63,000
July 2020	Bolivia	DPRK	84	19,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment [67]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Bolivia	DPRK	85	13,000
August 2020	Bolivia	DPRK	85	14,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Brazil: To the Panel's enquiry into the recorded imports and exports of machinery with the DPRK between April and September 2020, Brazil replied with detailed explanation from the Brazilian Internal Revenue

[65] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.
[66] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[67] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

Service that "the reference to alleged commercial transactions with [the DPRK] results from human error committed by importers or exporters when completing the corresponding customs declaration", and further informed the Panel the measures it has taken since 2018 to improve implementation of relevant resolutions.

Burkina Faso: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Machinery [68]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2019	Burkina Faso	DPRK	84	152,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

China: The Panel enquired China of recorded imports of iron and steel products (HS 72-73) worth of 9,549,000 USD from the DPRK, and export of machinery (HS 84) worth of 52,000 USD to the DPRK for the period between April and September 2020.

China replied that "In 2020, the DPRK commodities exports to China under HS Code 72 and 73 were steel ingot, steel billet, ferrosilicon, etc., which are not prohibited by the Security Council resolutions. Regarding DPRK commodities imports from China under HS Code 84 and 85 in 2020, one batch were goods for diplomatic use, and the other batch were aid from a Swiss humanitarian agency to the DPRK, which had been exempted by the 1718 committee. The transfer of the two batches of commodities was in full conformity with the requirements of the Security Council resolutions." [69]

[Imports]

Iron [70]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	China	DPRK	72, 73	79,000
June 2020	China	DPRK	72, 73	1,224,000
July 2020	China	DPRK	72, 73	4,078,000
August 2020	China	DPRK	72, 73	2,859,000
September 2020	China	DPRK	72, 73	1,309,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

[Exports]

Industrial machinery [71]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2020	China	DPRK	84	1,000
			85	32,000
September 2020	China	DPRK	84, 85	19,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Colombia: The Panel received two replies from Colombia for two inquiries into the recorded trade with the DPRK between October 2019 and September 2020. In two diplomatic notes, Colombia provided full

[68] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

[69] On the HS codes and the methodology the Panel uses for the monitoring purpose, see section 1 of this Annex .

[70] **Applicable resolution:** resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.

[71] **Applicable resolution:** resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7; **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

explanation on its customs clearance risk management system and its own enquiries to confirm whether it had exported and imported prohibited goods to/from the DPRK.

While the Panel could not independently conclude absence of prohibited trade with the DPRK as original documents were not provided, the Panel notes Colombia's efforts to implement relevant resolutions and assesses that at least a part of past trade records with the DPRK were erroneous.

El Salvador: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Machinery [72]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2020	El Salvador	DPRK	84	116,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Ethiopia: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Copper [73]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2017	Ethiopia	DPRK	74, 2603	31,000
February 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	74, 2603	39,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Zinc [74]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2020	Ethiopia	DPRK	79, 2608	100,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Textiles [75]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	50-63	10,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery [76]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2018	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	36,000
February 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	55,000
April 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	24,000
June 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	55,000
September 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	86,000
October 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	80,000

[72] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[73] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28.
[74] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28.
[75] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[76] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

December 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	31,000
April 2020	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	30,000
August 2020	Ethiopia	DPRK	84	133,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment [77]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2018	Ethiopia	DPRK	85	15,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[Exports]

Industrial machinery [78]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2019	Ethiopia	DPRK	84, 85	10,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Eswatini: The Panel enquired Eswatini of its recorded import of textiles from the DPRK worth of 14,000 USD in March 2020. Eswatini responded that it will transmit the requested information

Fiji: Fiji acknowledged the receipt of the Panel's enquiry.

[Imports]

Iron [79]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2017	Fiji	DPRK	72	42,000
October 2017	Fiji	DPRK	72	28,000
May 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	80,000
June 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	109,000
July 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	93,000
September 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	158,000
October 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	141,000
December 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	493,000
January 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	28,000
March 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	191,000
April 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	15,000
May 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	226,000
June 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	181,000
August 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	56,000
September 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	43,000
October 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	80,000
November 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	165,000
December 2019	Fiji	DPRK	72	119,000

[77] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

[78] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7; **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

[79] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 9.

January 2020	Fiji	DPRK	72	125,000
February 2020	Fiji	DPRK	72	308,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Textiles [80]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
November 2018	Fiji	DPRK	55	15,000
January 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	43,000
February 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	99,000
March 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	28,000
April 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	49,000
May 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	38,000
June 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	144,000
July 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	90,000
August 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	74,000
October 2019	Fiji	DPRK	55	142,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Machinery [81]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Fiji	DPRK	84	32,000
May 2018	Fiji	DPRK	84	192,000
June 2018	Fiji	DPRK	84	21,000
November 2018	Fiji	DPRK	84	13,000
February 2019	Fiji	DPRK	84	18,000
April 2019	Fiji	DPRK	84	10,000
February 2019	Fiji	DPRK	84	13,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment [82]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	Fiji	DPRK	85	26,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Vessels [83]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
November 2019	Fiji	DPRK	89	3,367,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[Exports]

Industrial machinery [84]

[80] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[81] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[82] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[83] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[84] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7; **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2019	Fiji	DPRK	84	41,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Metals [85]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	54,000
May 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	64,000
June 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	64,000
July 2018	Fiji	DPRK	72	25,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Germany: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Textiles[86]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2020	Germany	DPRK	61	13,000
February 2020	Germany	DPRK	61	15,000
March 2020	Germany	DPRK	61	39,000
April 2020	Germany	DPRK	61	19,000
June 2020	Germany	DPRK	61	62,000
September 2020	Germany	DPRK	61	37,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Ghana: The Panel received one reply for two inquiries to Ghana. In its first reply, Ghana shared the result of its own enquiry which sufficiently showed the absence of prohibited trade with the DPRK. The Panel has yet to receive a reply for its second inquiry.

[Imports]

Iron and iron ore [87]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Ghana	DPRK	72-73	43,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Seafood [88]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2020	Ghana	DPRK	03, 1603-1605	158,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[85] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7; **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

[86] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.

[87] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.

[88] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 9.

Textiles [89]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2020	Ghana	DPRK	50-63	17,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery [90]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Ghana	DPRK	84	12,000
May 2020	Ghana	DPRK	84	34,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Earth and stone [91]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Ghana	DPRK	25	1,519,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Guyana: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

Iron [92]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2018	Guyana	DPRK	73	17,000
January 2019	Guyana	DPRK	73	23,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Machinery[93]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
March 2018	Guyana	DPRK	84	161,000
April 2018	Guyana	DPRK	84	35,000
June 2018	Guyana	DPRK	84	103,000
August 2018	Guyana	DPRK	84	22,000
December 2018	Guyana	DPRK	84	69,000
January 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	154,000
February 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	77,000
March 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	88,000
April 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	29,000
May 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	20,000
June 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	51,000
July 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	26,000
August 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	20,000
September 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	32,000
October 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	30,000

[89] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[90] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[91] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[92] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.
[93] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

December 2019	Guyana	DPRK	84	279,000
February 2020	Guyana	DPRK	84	31,000
May 2020	Guyana	DPRK	84	21,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment [94]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2018	Guyana	DPRK	85	17,000
March 2019	Guyana	DPRK	85	14,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Earth and stone [95]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
March 2019	Guyana	DPRK	25	18,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[Export]

Metals [96]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
November 2019	Guyana	DPRK	72	18,000
December 2019	Guyana	DPRK	72	21,000
January 2020	Guyana	DPRK	72	27,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Honduras: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Machinery [97]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	Honduras	DPRK	84	34,000
November 2019	Honduras	DPRK	84	41,000
December 2019	Honduras	DPRK	84	49,000
January 2020	Honduras	DPRK	84	33,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment [98]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
November 2019	Honduras	DPRK	85	46,000
January 2020	Honduras	DPRK	85	38,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[94] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[95] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[96] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7; **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).
[97] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[98] *Ibid*.

India: The Panel made two inquires to India, first for the period between May and December 2019, and the second for the period between January and July 2020. In this period, India recorded imports of zinc, iron and steel products, textiles, electrical equipment, machinery, and food and agricultural products with total value of 1,364,000 USD. It also recorded exports of industrial machinery, iron and metals and vehicles with total value of 339,000 USD.

To both inquiries, India replied without original documents or other pertinent details that "after careful checks, we have found that there were no exports to or imports from DPRK" of prohibited items for both periods. [99]

Indonesia: Indonesia stated that while it imported 164,000 USD worth of zinc from the DPRK in January 2020, UNSCR 2321 (2016) did not prohibit "the procurement of the specific abovementioned HS codes", in this case HS 79 and HS 2608. [100]

Zinc [101]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2020	Indonesia	DPRK	79	164,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Italy: The Panel enquired Italy of its recorded export of metals (HS 72-83) to the DPRK in March 2020. Italy replied that "following investigations into the databank of the Italian Agency for Customs and Monopolies, no corresponding export of items, as indicated by the UN Panel of Experts, has emerged" but will keep the Panel informed of "any new, further details that may emerge."

Kenya: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Machinery [102]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2020	Kenya	DPRK	84	92,000
August 2020	Kenya	DPRK	84	96,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgyzstan replied that its State Customs Service found the recorded import of machinery from the DPRK in June 2020 was due to an inaccurate entry of the country of origin code, and this technical error has been corrected in its Unified Automated System.

Mauritius: Mauritius replied that "no transaction has been effected between Mauritius and the DPRK" concerning its recorded imports of iron in June 2019 and of machinery in February 2020 from the DPRK. Mauritius further stated that "[a]n error was made in the Mauritius Customs Management System (CMS) which has been duly amended."

[99] See part 1 of this Annex.

[100] On the HS codes and the methodology the Panel uses for the monitoring purpose, see section 1 of this Annex.

[101] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28.

[102] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

Mozambique: The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Mozambique.

[Imports]

Zinc [103]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	79	117,000
May 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	79	104,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Seafood [104]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	03	56,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Textiles [105]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	63	25,000
June 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	55	42,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Machinery [106]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	84	10,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment [107]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	85	10,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[Exports]

Metals[108]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	78	350,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[103] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28..
[104] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 9.
[105] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[106] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[107] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[108] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7; **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

Nigeria: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Iron [109]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	72, 73	19,000
May 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	72, 73	21,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Textiles [110]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	50-63	28,000
June 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	50-63	18,000
August 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	50-63	18,000
November 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	50-63	10,000
April 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	50-63	31,000
June 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	50-63	64,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery [111]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	84	26,000
March 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	84	54,000
April 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	84	136,000
January 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	84	56,000
April 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	84	20,000
July 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	84	18,000
December 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	84	63,000
January 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	84	142,000
February 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	84	25,000
March 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	84	15,000
April 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	84	131,000
June 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	84	90,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment [112]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	85	20,000
August 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	85	11,000
October 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	85	10,000
December 2018	Nigeria	DPRK	85	10,000
April 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	85	15,000
April 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	85	109,000
June 2020	Nigeria	DPRK	85	37,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[109] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.
[110] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[111] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[112] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

Agricultural products [113]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	7, 8, 12	11,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[Exports]

Metals[114]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	74	310,000
August 2019	Nigeria	DPRK	76	279,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

North Macedonia: North Macedonia replied that its recorded imports from the DPRK of iron, machinery and electrical equipment between 2018 and 2020 were "due to the technical error on all Customs declarations", and indicated its willingness to provide the digital copies of relevant customs declarations.

Pakistan: The Panel made two inquiries to Pakistan, first for the period between September 2019 and March 2020, and the second for the period between June 2017 and July 2020.

In its first reply, Pakistan shared the result of its own enquiry which unequivocally showed the absence of prohibited trade with the DPRK using original documentation.

The Panel has yet to receive a reply for its second inquiry.

[Imports]

Copper [115]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2017	Pakistan	DPRK	74, 2603	21,000
January 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	74, 2603	10,000
March 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	74, 2603	83,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Zinc [116]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2017	Pakistan	DPRK	79, 2608	13,000
June 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	79, 2608	276,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Iron [117]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2017	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	2,292,000
October 2017	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	49,000

[113] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

[114] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7; **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

[115] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28.

[116] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28.

[117] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 9.

November 2017	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	376,000
December 2017	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	21,000
January 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	45,000
February 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	63,000
March 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	412,000
April 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	10,000
May 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	95,000
June 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	56,000
July 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	145,000
August 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	78,000
September 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	59,000
November 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	15,000
July 2019	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	30,000
July 2020	Pakistan	DPRK	72, 73	27,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Textiles [118]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
March 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	20,000
April 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	44,000
June 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	19,000
July 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	83,000
August 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	42,000
September 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	54,000
October 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	287,000
December 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	30,000
May 2019	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	29,000
January 2020	Pakistan	DPRK	50-63	21,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery [119]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	88,000
March 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	61,000
April 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	145,000
May 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	38,000
June 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	244,000
July 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	140,000
August 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	161,000
September 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	108,000
October 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	15,000
November 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	84	19,000
February 2019	Pakistan	DPRK	84	26,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment [120]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	85	34,000

[118] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[119] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[120] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

March 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	85	32,000
April 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	85	12,000
May 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	85	130,000
June 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	85	25,000
October 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	85	16,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Agricultural products [121]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
March 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	7, 8, 12	16,000
September 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	7, 8, 12	40,000
October 2018	Pakistan	DPRK	7, 8, 12	16,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Russian Federation: The Panel made two inquiries to the Russian Federation, first for the period between September 2019 and March 2020, and the second for the period between June 2017 and July 2020. The Russian Federation replied to both.

In its first reply, the Russian Federation stated that all ‘imports’ from the DPRK were delivered from countries other than the DPRK, and the country of origin was the ROK. All ‘exports’ to the DPRK, are "covered by the exclusions provided for in paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of commercial civilian passenger aircraft of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), paragraph 22 of that resolution (goods needed by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) or paragraph 18 of Council resolution 2375 (2017) (concerning the Russian Federation-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Rajin-Khasan port and rail project).”

In its second reply, the Russian Federation provided full details of the exports to the DPRK, stating that all of them are “covered by exemptions provided for in Security Council resolutions.” It also confirmed the statistical data provided by the ITC were accurate. (See Annex T3)

Senegal: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Iron [122]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2020	Senegal	DPRK	72-73	269,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Textiles [123]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2020	Senegal	DPRK	50-63	12,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery [124]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)

[121] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[122] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.
[123] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[124] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

October 2019	Senegal	DPRK	84	210,000
March 2020	Senegal	DPRK	84	28,000
May 2020	Senegal	DPRK	84	11,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment [125]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2019	Senegal	DPRK	85	22,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Wood [126]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Senegal	DPRK	44	10,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

South Africa: The Panel inquired South Africa of its recorded import of electrical equipment from the DPRK worth of 480,000 USD in September 2020. South Africa replied that it would respond in due course.

Spain: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Machinery [127]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2020	Spain	DPRK	84	404,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Sweden: Sweden replied that its competent authorities confirmed that the recorded import of electrical equipment in September 2020 refers to an import from Japan, not from the DPRK. Sweden informed that it was caused by the importer's mistake, and its authorities now rectified the matter.

United Kingdom: The Panel made two inquiries to the UK for recorded import of machinery in November 2019, and trade of electrical equipment between April and September 2020.

In its first reply, the UK explained in full detail that the trade was with the USA, not the DPRK. In its second reply, the UK clarified that both imports and exports were conducted with the ROK as a part of routine trade.

Uruguay: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Electrical equipment [128]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)

[125] *Ibid*.
[126] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[127] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[128] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

May 2020	Uruguay	DPRK	85	18,000
June 2020	Uruguay	DPRK	85	21,000
July 2020	Uruguay	DPRK	85	13,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Venezuela: The Panel hast yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Textiles [129]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	Venezuela	DPRK	50-63	54,000
November 2019	Venezuela	DPRK	50-63	23,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical Equipment [130]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2019	Venezuela	DPRK	85	53,000
October 2019	Venezuela	DPRK	85	15,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery [131]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2019	Venezuela	DPRK	84	57,000
October 2019	Venezuela	DPRK	84	189,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[Exports]

Iron, steel, and other metals (HS 72-83) [132]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	Venezuela	DPRK	72-83	44,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Zambia: The Panel hast yet to receive a reply.

[Imports]

Zinc [133]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2019	Zambia	DPRK	79	351,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[129] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[130] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[131] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[132] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7. **Exemption:** shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).
[133] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28.

Textiles [134]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	Zambia	DPRK	63	95,000
July 2018	Zambia	DPRK	55	12,000
September 2018	Zambia	DPRK	63	28,000
September 2018	Zambia	DPRK	55	71,000
December 2018	Zambia	DPRK	55	75,000
June 2019	Zambia	DPRK	56	16,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Machinery [135]

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2018	Zambia	DPRK	84	18,985,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment [136]

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2019	Zambia	DPRK	85	42,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[134] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.
[135] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.
[136] **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

Annex 42: Reply from the Russian Federation on the Panel's inquiry to the recorded trade with the DPRK, April – September 2020

Translated from Russian

In response to the request for information from the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) contained in note OC.326, we should like to transmit the following table provided by the Federal Customs Service of Russia containing data on the export of goods subject to sanctions from Russia to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the period from April to September 2020.

The goods in question were listed in two customs declarations and are covered by the exemptions provided for in Security Council resolutions. Specifically, paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) provides for deliveries to the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and paragraph 7 of the same resolution provides for deliveries of spare parts for civilian passenger aircraft.

The shipments were accompanied by a permit from the Russian Federation Commission on Export Controls which was provided to the customs authorities. Customs inspections (screenings) were conducted.

The statistical data provided by the International Trade Centre are accurate in this case.

Table 1: Industrial machinery (HS 84-85)							
	CC FEA EAEC commodity group code	Value (in thousands of dollars)	Declaration No.	Recipient/ Goods	Authorization of the Russian Federation Commission on Export Controls	Customs inspection (screening)	Note
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
April 2020	84	25	10716050/ 170420/ 00 09766	Embassy of the Russian Federation/ Concrete mixers for construction mixtures, firefighting handline spray nozzle, firefighting valve, butterfly valve, check valve, mechanical presses, drain pumps, gate valves, ball valves, sprayers, filters, air vents, thermostatic valves, sets of mechanical hydraulic tools and pneumatic tools, tools with built-in electric motors, grinders		Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 2017, para. 22
	85	67	10716050/ 170420/ 00 09766	Embassy of the Russian Federation / Transformers, cables for distribution of electricity, emergency signalling devices, inductors, distribution panels, contactor (soft starter), heat guns, automatic switches, apparatus for switching or protecting electric circuits, plugs and sockets, transformers, insulating fittings, other switches, incandescent lamp-holders, wires and cables with insulated conductors		Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 2017, para. 22
August 2020	84	776	10702070/ 10820/01 85728	Air Koryo / TA-12-60 auxiliary power unit (gas turbine), used, repaired; hydraulic jacks and hoists; metered hand pumps, jacks and hoists for servicing TU-204-100B and TU-204-300 civilian aircraft	No. 271/20-ST20 of 12 March 2020	Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 2017, para. 7

Table 2: Transportation vehicles (HS 87)							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
August 2020	87	34	10702070 / 1 10820/01 85728	Air Koryo/ For the maintenance of TU-204-100B and TU-204-300 civilian aircraft: coupling and towing device - tow bar, manual rolling transportation device - tilt-back tire changer)	No. 271/20-ST20 of 12 March 2020	Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 2017, para. 7

Table 3: Metals (HS 73-83)							
April 2020	73	13	10716050 / 170420/0 0 09766	Embassy of the Russian Federation/ Other stamped ferrous metal products (couplings, pressure heads, fittings, tees, bends, thermal clips, elbows and bends, brackets, flanges, stainless steel pipes, threaded ferrous metal products (dowels and nails)		Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 20 17, para. 22
	74	6	10716050 / 170420/0 0 09766	Embassy of the Russian Federation/ Couplings, fittings, air vent, mounting sleeves, adapters, tees and threaded pipe fittings		Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 20 17, para. 22
	76	13	10716050 / 170420/0 0 09766	Embassy of the Russian Federation/ Heating radiators, aluminium foil, aluminium window profiles and aluminium structures		Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 20 17, para. 22
	82	3	10716050 / 170420/0 0 09766	Embassy of the Russian Federation/ Press jaws, extensions, vises, circular saw blades, putty knives, hand tools for masons, moulders, concrete workers, plasterers and painters		Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 20 17, para. 22
	83	2	1071605 0/ 170420/0 0 09766	Embassy of the Russian Federation / Electrodes		Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 20 17, para. 22
August 2020	73	43	1070207 0/ 110820/0 1 85728	Air Koryo/ Spare parts for the maintenance of TU-204-100B and TU-204-300 civilian aircraft (plugs for wheel bearings and brackets)	No. 271/20 -ST20 of 12 March 2020	Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 2017, para. 7
	82	10	1070207 0/ 110820/0 1 85728	Air Koryo/ Hand tools and spare parts for the maintenance of TU-204-100B and TU-204-300 civilian aircraft (handheld non-adjustable wrenches, lug wrenches and interchangeable wrench heads)	No. 271/20 -ST20 of 12 March 2020	Inspected	Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) of 22 December 2017, para. 7

Annex 43: Reply from Cambodia to the Panel's enquiry

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

NATION - RELIGION - KING

PERMANENT MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

No. PMC/UN/021/21

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts and, further to its Note Verbale No. PMC/UN/015/21 dated 15 January 2021 in response to communication (No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.461) dated 21 December 2020 from Mr. [redacted], Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), has the honour to convey to the 1718 Committee and to the Panel of Experts the **results** of the investigations carried out by the Royal Government of Cambodia into the documentary **"The Mole: Undercover in North Korea"**.

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 3 February 2021

United Nations Security Council
New York

cc to:
Mr. [redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1874(2009)
United Nations Security Council

327 East 58th Street, New York, NY 10022 Phone: (212) 336 0777 Fax: (212) 759 7672
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Information regarding the documentary "The Mole: Undercover in North Korea"

With reference to the Letter No: S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.461 of Mr. [redacted], the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), dated 21 December 2020 regarding the Panel's request for assistance on investigations arising from the documentary "The Mole: Undercover in North Korea" which was broadcasted by the BBC in a series of 2 episodes, one of which shows what appears to be an arm deal discussion partially filmed at two locations in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, the Royal Government of Cambodia has carried out a thorough investigation with the results as follows:

Based on the review of the above documentary, Cambodian experts identified two locations which were filmed in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, including:

1. **The Bale Phnom Penh Resort:** The place where the North Koreans stayed and negotiated the price of weapons.
2. **911 Cyclone Shooting Range**: The place where the North Korean group went to test weapons.

Result of Investigation and Location Verification

1. **The Bale Phnom Penh Resort:** Address: National Road 6, Bridge 8, Sangkat Bak Kheng, Khan Chroy Changva, Phnom Penh.
   - According to the manager ([redacted] from Germany) of The Bale Phnom Penh Resort, the discussion shown in the documentary certainly took place in The Bale Phnom Penh Resort.
2. **911 Kambol Shooting Range:** Address: Taphem Village, Kambol District, Phnom Penh, which is controlled by the Parachute Special Brigade Command 911.
   - The 911 Shooting Range is open to the public for weapons training and is strictly prohibited from arms trafficking.
3. **Characters in the documentary:**
   - Jim Mehdi Latrache Qvortrup (Played as James in the Documentary)
     Gender: Male

Page 1

Date of Birth: 06 / July / 1972

Nationality: Danish

- ➢ Jim Mehdi Latrache Qvortrup entered Cambodia on April 21, 2019 (LQ671 Bangkok-Phnom Penh) and left Cambodia on April 25, 2019 (MI605 Phnom Penh-Singapore).

- HEINE KAARSBERG (Accompanying Jim Mehdi Latrache Qvortrup)

Gender: Male

Date of Birth: 29 / August / 1962

Nationality: Danish

- ➢ Both people stayed at The Bale Phnom Penh Resort in Rooms 21 and 22 from April 21, 2019 and left on April 25, 2019.

Conclusion:

- The production of the above documentary aims to attack North Korea.
- Cambodia experts did not identify any signs related to the arms trade in Cambodia.
- The production of the above documentary video does not have clear basis and evidence that corroborate the arms trade since the production of this documentary is imaginative, fictional and appealing to the audience to earn money or for other purposes.

Plans:

- Continue to cooperate in researching and identifying targets as required.
- Pay attention to monitoring activities related to the illegal arms trade (including through social media) and take effective repressive measures.

Annex 44: Reply from Nigeria to the Panel's enquiry

PERMANENT MISSION OF NIGERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
TELEPHONE: (212) 953-9130
FAX: (212) 697-1970

Ref.No: PMN/DPR/15 November 4, 2020

H.E. [redacted],
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Your Excellency,

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ON THE INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RESPECT OF MR. HONG SUNG SU

We wish to refer to your letter with ref. No: S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.76 of May 27, 2020 on the alleged presence of Mr. Hong Yong Su, a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Nigeria, in January 2020.

2. We wish to note that the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) has no record of Mr. Hong Yong Su in its database and that investigations have revealed that the Haekungaan Trading Corporation is neither domiciled nor operational in Nigeria.

3. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Samson. S. Itegboje
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations

Annex 45: Reply from Russian Federation to the Panel's enquiry

Translated from Russian

OC.227

In September 2016, Mr. Pak Zen Un, a representative of Sonkwang, the North Korean foreign trade company, illegally purchased a batch of spare parts for MIG-29 aircraft from citizens of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Lyubishin and Konstantin Viktorovich Moskal, with the intent of smuggling them to North Korea with Mr. Lyubishin's assistance.

However, in November 2016, while they were in Budapest on business, Mr. Lyubishin and his son Vladimir were detained by the Hungarian authorities, at the request of the Department of Justice of the United States of America, on charges of smuggling weapons and trafficking drugs to the United States. The United States was adamant that the Russian nationals should be extradited as quickly as possible to the United States for judicial inquiry. The Drug Enforcement Agency of the United States had initiated criminal proceedings.

In June 2017, the Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation initiated criminal proceedings against the elder Mr. Lyubishin for planning to smuggle military equipment to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation initiated concurrent criminal proceedings against the younger Mr. Lyubishin under article 222 of the Russian Criminal Code (illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation or possession of weapons), which was closed in February 2020 in view of the absence of *corpus delicti* in the defendant's actions.

Having reviewed the documents in these criminal cases, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation submitted a request to the Ministry of Justice of Hungary seeking the extradition of the defendants to Russia.

On 10 August 2018, the Minister of Justice of Hungary approved the transfer of both the father and the son to Russia.

In September 2019, the Nagatinsky district court of Moscow found the elder Mr. Lyubishin guilty under article 30 (1) and article 226.1 (1) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and sentenced him

to one year and six months in prison. Mr. Lyubishin pleaded guilty and provided testimony incriminating Mr. Zen Un Park in the organization of the illegal shipment of Russian-made military equipment abroad.

Mr. Moskal, who together with the elder Mr. Lyubishin participated in illegal activities on behalf of Mr. Park Zen Un, was not present for the transaction that took place in September 2016; he had been imprisoned following prosecution by the Federal Security Service in connection with a different incident involving criminal activity.

Original: Russian

ОС.227.

В сентябре 2016 г. представитель северокорейской внешнеторговой компании «Sonkwang» Пак Зен Ун незаконно приобрел у граждан Российской Федерации Любишина Владимира Вячеславовича и Москаля Константина Викторовича партию запасных частей для самолетов МИГ-29, которые с помощью Любишина В.В. намеревался контрабандным способом вывезти в Северную Корею.

Однако в ноябре 2016 г. Любишин В.В. и его сын Владимир Владимирович, выехавшие по частному делу в Будапешт, были задержаны властями Венгрии по представлению Минюста США за организацию контрабанды оружия и участие в обеспечении наркотрафика в США. При этом американская сторона настаивала на скорейшей экстрадиции россиян в США для проведения судебного расследования. Инициатором уголовного преследования выступило Агентство США по борьбе с наркотиками.

В июне 2017 г. Следственным управлением ФСБ России в отношении Любишина–старшего было возбуждено уголовное дело по факту приготовления к контрабандному вывозу продукции военного назначения в КНДР.

Одновременно Следственным комитетом Российской Федерации в отношении Любишина–младшего было возбуждено уголовное дело по ст.222 УК России (незаконное приобретение, передача, сбыт, хранение, перевозка или ношение оружия...), которое в феврале 2020 г. прекращено в связи с отсутствием в действиях фигуранта состава преступления.

На основании материалов указанных уголовных дел Генпрокуратура России направила в Минюст Венгрии запрос об экстрадиции фигурантов уголовных дел в Россию.

10 августа 2018 г. министр юстиции Венгрии принял положительное решение о передаче Любишиных российской стороне.

В сентябре 2019 г. приговором Нагатинского районного суда г.Москвы Любишин–старший

был признан виновным в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ч.1 ст.30 и ч.1 ст.226.1 УК России и приговорен к лишению свободы сроком на 1 год и 6 месяцев. Свою вину Любишин В.В. признал и дал показания, изобличающие Пак Зен Уна в организации незаконной поставки за рубеж изделий военного назначения российского производства.

Москаль К.В., который совместно с Любишиным–старшим принимал участие в противозаконной деятельности в интересах Пак Зен Уна, в сентябре 2016 г. на сделке не присутствовал в связи с его привлечением органами ФСБ России к уголовной ответственности по другому эпизоду преступной деятельности, в рамках которого он и был приговорен к лишению свободы.

Annex 46: Reply from Hungary to the Panel's enquiry

Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations

No. 122/2020/HUPM/NEW

Ref. No.: S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.228

New York, 11 November 2020

Excellency,

The Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations has the honour to submit to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the information required by the Panel in its letter of 18 September 2020. Furthermore, the Permanent Mission of Hungary thanks the Coordinator for its patience and flexibility regarding the deadline for submitting the required information.

H.E. Ms. Katalin Annamária Bogyay

Ambassador, Permanent Representative

His Excellency [redacted]

Coordinator

Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

New York

Attachment: HUPM - DPRK PoE - answers

227 East 52nd Street, New York, NY 10022 Tel.: (212) 752-0209 Fax: (212) 755-5395 E-mail: hungaryun.ny@mfa.gov.hu

1. **Any information your authorities are able to provide on recent cases that have not been publicly reported, and an assessment of current DPRK efforts to procure embargoed equipment;**

Hungary possesses neither any information on the recent cases that have not been publicly reported nor an assessment of current DPRK efforts to procure embargoed equipment.

2. **The authenticity of the abovementioned media report in respect of the references to matters concerning Hungary and its competent authorities;**

The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation submitted an extradition request for the extradition of Vladimir LYUBISHIN Sr. 27 September 2017 for criminal offences with military items and services according to the Hungarian Criminal Code.

According to the facts of the case, Vladimir LYUBISHIN Sr. was part of a conspiratory group, which planned to smuggle military items from the Russian Federation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Budapest Capital Regional Court has established in its final decision dated 27 June, 2018, that the legal conditions for the extradition of Vladimir LYUBISHIN Sr. are met for all offences described in the request.

The Minister of Justice has ordered the extradition of Vladimir LYUBISHIN Sr. to the Russian Federation based upon the final decision of the Budapest Capital Regional Court.

The extradition of Vladimir LYUBISHIN Sr. to the Russian Federation took place on 10 August 2018.

Vladimir LYUBISHIN Jr. was also extradited to the Russian Federation on the same day based upon an extradition request for different offences.

3. **The specific circumstances of this case, including times, places, passports details and Visa history concerning Mr. Lyubishin and his son (of the same name), the process and result of the case;**

Hungary possesses no information on the specific circumstances of this case.

4. **List of all the items that Mr. Lyubishin and Mr. Moskal intended to smuggle to the DPRK such as spare parts for aircraft or other conventional weapons or related materiel;**

Hungary possesses no further information on the items that Vladimir LYUBISHIN Sr. and Mr. MOSKAL intended to smuggle to the DPRK compared with the list referred to the abovementioned media report.

5. **Information on any financial transactions (including date, amount and method of payment) related to this case and bank account information and transfer information of relevant individuals between 2015 to 2017;**

Hungary possesses no information on any financial transactions, bank account information and transfer information related to both of this case and relevant individuals.

6. **The contents of any investigation report, with documentation;**

Hungary possesses no information on the contexts of any investigation report.

7. **The legal documents (judgment, sentence, verdict or court order) and the extradition agreement between Hungary and the Russian Federation relating to Mr. Lyubishin and his son;**

The extradition proceedings of Vladimir LYUBISHIN Sr. and his son, Vladimir LYUBISHIN Jr. to the Russian Federation was conducted in accordance with the European Convention on Extradition and the Hungarian national laws referring to extradition.

In light of this, the court may decide on the fulfilment of the conditions for extradition or on the grounds for refusing extradition, and subsequently, on the basis of the court's decision, the Minister of Justice decides on the issue of the extradition.

The legal condition for the extradition are the following:

- Article 2 (1) of the European Convention on Extradition: *"Extradition shall be granted in respect of offences punishable under the laws of the requesting Party and of the requested Party by deprivation of liberty or under a detention order for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe penalty. Where a conviction and prison sentence have occurred or a detention order has been made in the territory of the requesting Party, the punishment awarded must have been for a period of at least four months."*

- Article 14 of the European Convention on Extradition:
  "1. A person who has been extradited shall not be proceeded against, sentenced or detained with a view to the carrying out of a sentence or detention order for any offence committed prior to his surrender other than that for which he was extradited, nor shall he be for any other reason restricted in his personal freedom, except in the following cases:

  a) When the Party which surrendered him consents. A request for consent shall be submitted, accompanied by the documents mentioned in Article 12 and a legal record of any statement made by the extradited person in respect of the offence concerned. Consent shall be given when the offence for which it is requested is itself subject to extradition in accordance with the provision of this Convention;

  b) when that person, having had an opportunity to leave the territory of the Party to which he has been surrendered, has not done so within 45 days of his final discharge, or has returned to that territory after leaving it.

  2. The requesting Party may, however, take any measures necessary to remove the person from its territory, or any measures necessary under its law, including proceedings by default, to prevent any legal effects of lapse of time.

3. When the description of the offence charged is altered in the course of proceedings, the extradited person shall only be proceeded against or sentenced in so far as the offence under its new description is shown by its constituent elements to be an offence which would allow extradition."

- Hungarian Act No XXXVIII of 1996 on international legal assistance in criminal matters:
  - a) and b) subparagraph of Article 5 (1)
  - Article 11 (1)
  - Article 11 (2)
  - Article 12
  - Article 14
  - Article 14/A

On the basis of the international and national laws, legal conditions for the extradition were analyzed by the Budapest Capital Regional Court through its investigation. Therefore, the Budapest Capital Regional Court has not examined the extradition in substance, and evidentiary procedure was not been conducted, as well.

8. Cooperation, if any, between the competent authorities in Hungary and any other countries in this case.

There was no cooperation between Hungary and any other UN Member State in this case.

Annex 47: Reply from Venezuela to the Panel's enquiry

Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela | Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores | Misión Permanente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela ante Naciones Unidas - Nueva York

No. 000196

The Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations presents its compliments to the distinguished Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) in the opportunity of referring to the latter's Notes Verbales Nos. S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.113 and S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.146, dated 24 October 2019 and 12 June 2020, respectively.

At the outset, the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations would like to stress three (03) points:

1. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a responsible member of the international community that has always met its international legal obligations, including those deriving from the Charter of the United Nations, including those referred to matters of international peace and security, under Chapter VII.

2. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, as an independent State, has the sovereign right to engage in and develop friendly relations and cooperation with any other State it so decides, in line with one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations.

3. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is fully aware and respectful of the measures imposed by virtue of relevant resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are legally binding by virtue of relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

In light of the above and in particular reference to the communications abovementioned, the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations advises hereby that the visit of members of the National Constituent Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV, in Spanish) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, from 24-27 September 2019, was of an exclusive political nature, at the invitation of the Worker's Party of Korea, and with the sole purpose of strengthening the ties of friendship between both nations, including amongst its political parties and parliaments.

Moreover, the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations transmits its serious concern at the decision of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) to initiate an official investigation on the basis of information from "a media report"; namely, one single source, as can be concluded from the communication dated 24 October 2019 and its Annex, particularly taking into account the fact that there is no single agreement between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on military and technological cooperation.

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Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela | Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores | Misión Permanente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela ante Naciones Unidas - Nueva York

This regretful course of action, that resembles more an accusation, without any proof and, instead, based on mere spurious and fabricated allegations, has allowed, perhaps inadvertently, the instrumentalization of the Panel of Experts to attack a full Member State of the United Nations, as is the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. For instance, this is most recently demonstrated by the way in which international media has reported in recent days the previous communications from the Panel of Experts to the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations and which, despite being of a non-public nature, were still leaked to the press and are being used for political purposes, as part of propaganda campaigns against Venezuela.

In addition, while the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations understands the mandate and scope of the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), it stresses that the Panel of Experts must ensure at all times compliance with due diligence and respect for the equal protection of rights. Sources must be rigorously corroborated and allegations must be duly verified, in order to avoid the initiation of a state of permanent suspicion and accusations against any country – including Venezuela –, without actually presenting any proofs. The contrary would then require constant responses to never ending accusations or media reports that have no backing, and which shall be an undesired practice.

Furthermore, the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations respectfully suggests the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), for future reference, to provide concrete evidence and/or indication, *onus probendi*, that may certainly lead it to either suspect or conclude that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has or is incurring in violations of the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in order to ensure that it can respond accordingly, insofar as the queries of the Panel of Experts are duly substantiated and/or from serious sources.

The Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations presents avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the distinguished Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest esteem and consideration.

REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA • MISION ANTE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS • NEW YORK •

New York, 29 July 2020

[redacted]
Coordinator, Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
New York.-

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Annex 48: Reply from Yemen to the Panel's enquiry

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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TEL: 212-355-1730
FAX: 212-750-9613

الوفد الدائم للجمهورية اليمنية
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

Ref. ROY/060/8.20

20 August 2020

Excellency,

In reply to your letters dated 22 November 2019 with reference (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.193), with regard to the Panel of Experts established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of measures imposed on Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

And with regard to your letters, the first was concerning the ongoing investigation of a cooperation project with the DPRK defense industry, for which Major General Zakaria Yahya Al-Shami signed a letter inviting two delegations from the DPRK to meet in Damascus. The second was concerning ongoing investigation of a project deal involving Mr. Naif Ahmed Al-Qanis who signed a protocol with a Syrian arms dealer, Mr. Hussein Al-Ali, in Damascus for the supply of military equipment. Please be advised that the so-called Zakaria Yahya Al-Shami is impersonating the position of "Chief of Defense staff". He is an affiliate of the Houthi militia and does not represent the Government of Yemen in any capacity, therefore, his actions and attempts to establish military cooperation with The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are a clear violation of Security Council resolutions of DPRK, as well as resolutions on arms embargo of Yemen, in particular, resolution 2216 (2015). These attempts are part of a wide array of efforts led by the Houthis and Iran; and are aimed at supplying the Houthis with weapons.

The so-called Naif Al-Qanis was appointed by the Houthi militia as their ambassador to Damascus, Syria, following the Syrian regime's violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and handing over the Yemeni Embassy in Damascus to the representative of the Houthi militia in a flagrant violation of international resolutions. The embassy in Damascus and the so-called Al-Qanis do not represent the Government of the

Republic of Yemen. Further, the actions of Al-Qanis, including the signing of a protocol with a Syrian arms dealer called "Hussein Al-Ali" in order to import military equipment into Yemen, are in clear violation of the Security Council resolutions of DPRK, as well as resolutions related to the arms embargo on Yemen, in particular resolution 2216 (2015).

The Government of Yemen recommends that the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) to share with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014) any information related to the aforementioned individuals or any other representatives of the Houthi militia in order to enable the effective tracking of the sources of the weapons used by the Houthis to prolong the conflict and target civilian objects in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Please accept, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Abdullah Ali Fadhel Al- Saadi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established

Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 49: Several previously reported cases related to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea and Myanmar

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Panel continued its investigation into the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the provision of military training and arms sales by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Presidential Guard of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2019/171, para. 68). The Panel wrote to Fouad Dakhlallah, who is suspected of violating Security Council resolutions by engaging with nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who were either working on behalf of entities designated by the Security Council or had been previously reported as being involved in prohibited arms-related activities in Africa and the Middle East (see S/2019/171, para. 67 and S/2020/151, para.104). The Panel has requested information from the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the above cases. The Panel has not yet received a reply to its enquiry from the DRC.

Eritrea

The Panel continued its investigation into arms-related cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Eritrea. Eritech Computer Assembly & Communication Technology PLC (also known as Eritech or Etech), "operated by the Eritrean Defence Forces" and co-located with "Asha Golgol Military Technical Centre", was identified as a recipient of arms and related materiel from Glocom, a company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea supplying military communications equipment (see S/2018/171, para. 91, S/2019/171, para. 70, and S/2020/151, para. 105). The Panel also continued to investigate Kim Kwang Rim, a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea whom the Panel had previously reported to be the representative of the Green Pine Associated Corporation in Eritrea. Eritrea has not provided substantive information in its responses to the Panel's repeated enquiries. The panel continues to ask Eritrea for further clarifications. To its further clarifications and enquiry, the Panel has not yet received a reply from Eritrea.

Myanmar

The Panel repeated its earlier request for documentation and other information concerning matters involving military cooperation between Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including ballistic missile cooperation since October 2006, as well as evidence of the return of technicians from Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to their respective home countries (see S/2019/171, para. 78 and S/2020/151, para.110). The Panel has not received a response on these matters. The Panel has not received a response on these matters.

Annex 50: Essentra

Following the announcement on 16 July 2020 of a deferred prosecution agreement between Essentra FZE Company Limited and the US Department of Justice relating to sales to the DPRK of components used in the manufacture of cigarettes, the Panel wrote to Essentra who cooperated with the Panel. The Panel is continuing its enquiries and has written to entities in several Member States concerning potential violations of UN sanctions.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/essentra-fze-admits-north-korean-sanctions-and-fraud-violations-agrees-pay-fine

Annex 51: Cash and Gold Smuggling by DPRK nationals in the Islamic Republic of Iran between Iran and the United Arab Emirates

Smuggling gold and cash could be in violation of multiple sanctions measures stipulated in relevant resolutions including:

Paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) prohibited transfer of financial assets, including bulk cash, to and from the DPRK, which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by relevant resolutions. Paragraph 14 of resolution 2094 (2013) clarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of this resolution to transfers of cash, including through cash couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK.

Paragraph 37 of resolution 2270 (2016) clarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) to transfers of gold, including through gold couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK.

Furthermore, although the Panel is still investigating the route of the transfer of gold, it notes that paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2016) prohibits the supply, selling or transfer of gold, regardless of whether it is directly or indirectly, from the DPRK territory or by DPRK nationals.

Concerning the three Iranian individuals who are suspected of involvement in the DPRK gold and cash smuggling between Tehran and the airport of Dubai[137], the United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that as of October 2020, these three Iranians were residing in Dubai. According to a Member State, the nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea involved in the smuggling often travelled using Emirates Airline. Since 2019, the Panel has been requesting information from the airline but has not yet to receive a substantive response.

The Member State assesses two nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pak Sin Hyok and Ri Kuk Myong, both in the Economic and Commercial Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Tehran, as being current participants in this smuggling. The Member State further informed the Panel of multiple nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including a former diplomat.[138]

Source: The Panel

[137] Mr. Mohammad Hussain Mehrchian, Mr. Mohsen Hussain Fahad and Mr. Heidar Saheb Faraji Dana.
[138] S/2020/151, para. 108, Annex 26.

Annex 52: On advertisement or display of prohibited items, Mansudae Art Studio and its artwork

Relevant UN security council resolutions obligate Member States to prevent the DPRK from generating or acquiring revenue to support its WMD program. To this end, the Committee and Security Council designates entities and individuals that are engaged in or provide support for DPRK's nuclear-related, other WMD and ballistic missile-related programmes. The designated entities are subject to the asset freeze pursuant to paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006).

DPRK's Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies (a.k.a Mansudae Art Studio, hereafter "Mansudae") was designated for the assets freeze pursuant to paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) in 2017 (see annex II, resolution 2371 (2017)). Mansudae work, to include statues and artwork available from their studio, are subject to the asset freeze by Member States pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2016). Also, the artwork potentially available at Mansudae Art Studio includes statues. The procurement of statues was prohibited in November 2016, pursuant to the resolution 2321 (2016), prior to the designation of Mansudae Art Studio in August 2017.

Paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2016) further requires Member States to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of designated individuals, entities, or persons or entities acting on behalf of or at their direction. Paragraph 12 of resolution 2270 (2016) affirms that "economic resources" as referred to in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 and prohibited to be transferred to the designated entities includes "assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable and immovable, actual or potential, which potentially may be used to obtain funds, goods, and services."

The Panel has previously highlighted the potential risks of showcasing prohibited items. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's parades that showcase its tanks, ballistic missiles, and conventional arm, for example, also promote the country's illicit military sales that generate revenue (see para 203, S/2020/151). Similarly, the DPRK may directly or indirectly benefit from the advertisement or showcasing of prohibited artwork or statues, which ultimately support Mansudae's overseas operations. The Panel is investigating the activity of Mansudae overseas. It previously investigated the exhibition and advertisement of Mansudae artwork, as well as purchase and transfer of Mansudae artworks by the visitors to the studio (see S/2020/840, paras. 102, 103, S/2020/151, paras. 102, 103, S/2019/171 para.95). Furthermore, individuals or organizations that facilitate the sale of prohibited artwork or statues would be subject to the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions (e.g. asset freeze or seizure).

Source: The Panel

Annex 53: Website of Chugai Travel Co. Ltd. [139]

(1) Advertisement of tailored Korean ethnic dress during tours in Pyongyang

Source: Website of Chugai Travel Co. Ltd. (accessed 25 December 2020)

[139] Address: 7-2-6, Ueno, Taitoku, Tokyo, Japan. According to the website of the General Association of Korean Residents. in Japan （在日本朝鮮人総聯合会）, this company is listed as a " business organization" (사업체) of the association. Chugai shares address with other companies/organizations including the Korean Football Association in Japan.

(2) Chugai Travel as general agency of Air Koryo[140] and Korean International Travel Company[141]

Welcome to Chugai Travel
Japanese General Agency of Korea International Travel Company and Air Koryo

Source: Website of Chugai Travel Co. Ltd. (accessed 25 December 2020)

[140] The Panel continues to investigate links between the DPRK military and Air Koryo, noting the absence of boundaries between the Korean People's Army Air Force and Air Koryo as well as the role of Air Koryo in incidents of non-compliance with the relevant sanctions.

[141] KITC is controlled by the National Tourism Administration (in Korean: 국가관광총국).

Annex 54: Article on Mansudae Art Studio (excerpt) on Young Pioneer Tours[142] Website

Mansudae Art Studio

Mansudae Art Studio

VISITING MANSUDAE ART STUDIO

Guess what? You can totally visit. On a great deal of our tours, so long as it's arranged beforehand, it's entirely possible to visit the studio yourself! Much of it is inaccessible unfortunately, but it's entirely possible to tour the outsides, see some magnificent works, buy a few for yourself and if you're very lucky, even get to see some of the artists at work and ask a few questions! You don't get much closer to the action than this without being a Korean yourself.

For those packing a lot of cash, the studio also offers large ornate pieces that likely won't fit in a suitcase. Luckily, that's no problem because the studio offers an exclusive postal service to help ship it overseas. For a fee, naturally, but if you've gone so far as to buy one of those huge works, why not go the distance?

IF YOU'D LIKE TO VISIT FOR YOURSELF, CHECK OUT OUR TOUR LISTINGS AND SEE WHICH ONES OFFER IT! IF YOU CAN'T FIND ONE THAT SUITS YOU, FEEL FREE TO TRY AN INDEPENDENT TOUR INSTEAD!

Source: Website of Young Pioneer Tour (accessed 30 December 2020); square was added by the Panel.

[142] Address listed on the reply to the Panel: Leahkena Home, Taphul Road, Siem Reap, Cambodia.

Annex 55: Website and reply of Koryo Studio[143]

(1) Advertisement on Koryo Studio website





Source: Koryo Studio website, https://koryostudio.com/commissions/ (last accessed 17 December 2020).

Poster created in 2020

[143] Address: No. 27 Bei San Li Tun Nan East Courtyard, Chaoyang District, Beijing, China. Formerly known as Pyongyang Art Studio.



Source: Koryo Studio Website, https://koryostudio.com/commissions/ (last cccessed 17 December 2020)

Advertisement of the Mansudae artist's artwork

Limited edition linocuts depicting the iconic roles of women in Korean society

Enquire About Artworks

Limited edition linocuts from 'The Spiritual Core of Korea' series

In 2015 Koryo Studio commissioned [redacted] to produce three linocuts to represent iconic roles of females in society. The artist was requested to limit the colour palette to produce three striking images.

Kim Kwang Nam also worked in collaboration with Nicholas Bonner on *The Future is Bright: Deep Sea and Space* which opened at the Anna Schwartz Gallery in Melbourne, Australia 2016

Society owes much to those who toil in the fields, and the female tractor driver is already a prominent symbol in socialist art. The farmer wears a loose-fitting, army-style cap, which marks her as one of the youth brigade, or volunteers working labour projects across the country. This painting sends messages to DPRK viewers - note the

Source: Koryo Studio Website, https://koryostudio.com/commissions/ (last accessed 17 December 2020)

(2) Reply from Koryo Studio founder (excerpt)

I would also just like to note for the information of the Panel that painting propaganda art is a relatively common activity for artists in the DPRK, of which there are hundreds with this ability, working in studios around the country other than Mansudae including Paekho (White Tiger studio), Central Art Studio, Railway Studio (there are about ten studios in Pyongyang alone), as well as art studios in all provinces which produce posters for state use. In addition, there are poster art competitions for amateurs, and several places produce propaganda art by semi-professional artists such as The Foreign Language Bookstore in Pyongyang, DMZ shop, Kaesong Stamp Shop etc. But I would like to just confirm again that we have had no dealings with any artist who had worked for Mansudae or had any affiliation with Mansudae since we cut off our relationship with [redacted] in 2015.

All of the oil paintings listed on our site were painted either in 2001, 2006, 2007 or 2008. The cost of each piece was the equivalent of 30 euros. I have the catalogue of these works which has the dates on the canvas, should you be interested. Again these were all painted before 2009.

With regard to the artwork 'Let's Wash Our Hands', I would like to inform the Panel that on the 30th June 2020 we sent out the following press release to clarify that it was painted by a North Korean artist who was not affiliated with any North Korean entity and was no longer living in North Korea:

> As Koryo Studio director [redacted] who commissioned the piece, from his North Korean artist contacts) put it, "When we realised that North Koreans were being instructed on hygiene rules, we imagined that the message would also be handed out, as it often is, through visual notices in the form of propaganda posters. However, as North Korea was the first country to close and it still remains inaccessible, we had no way of finding out what visual imagery they would be using to prepare their citizens".
>
> Koryo Studio worked with the artist over email and it took a few weeks for us to get the first sketch. By this time, the health emergency was global. We asked the artist to add the year and he did so in such a way as to make it rather striking with '2020' looming behind the diligent hand-washing lady.

Again, we worked with the animation artist who is living in PR China (an employee of one of animation studios in Pyongyang, absolutely no connection with Mansudae Art Studio).

The artists we have commissioned who were connected to Mansudae Art Studio are those who worked on the Asia Pacific Triennial in 2009, [redacted] in 2015 and artist Hwang In Jae, who died in 2015.

Source: The Panel

Annex 56:Replies from Republic of Korea, K-Mecenat Network and Korean Fine Arts

(1)Reply from the Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea provided the Panel with information concerning artwork exhibited at Odusan Unification Observatory held in 2019 and 2020. According to the reply, “for the Odusan Unification Observatory South/North Art Exhibition, artworks owned by K Mecenat Network and two ROK art collectors were rented. In accordance to Article 16 and 17 of the Personal Information Protection Act, information regarding the ROK art collectors is protected by law. Therefore, the names are provided in an anonymous format.”

The Republic of Korea further stated “the artworks displayed at the exhibition are owned by the organizer, K Mecenat Network and ROK collectors. Therefore, no contact, direct or indirect, was made with DPRK nationals, including the Mansudae Overseas Project of Companies.” The Republic of Korea provided list of artworks exhibited in 2019 and 2020 at Odusan Unification Observatory, stating “it is extremely difficult to verify the affiliation and job title of the DPRK artists considering the limitation of information due to the clandestine nature of DPRK.” The list of DPRK artworks exhibited in 2019 includes the following: Kim Chung Hee, “Tiger in Mt. Baeksu” (unidentified), Son U Yong (Sun Wu Young), “Ripening Autumn” (2006), Jung Chang Mo “Pomegranate” (2007). The list of DPRK artworks exhibited in 2020 includes the following: Jung Chang Mo, “Magnolia Sieboldii” (2008), Son U Yong (Sun Wu Young), “Mt. Geumgang” (2002), Hong Un Seok, “Strong Prosperous, Cultural Country” (2019), “Bright Future of Homeland”(2019), and “Dokdo” (2019).

The Republic of Korea further stated that “Among the artworks displayed at the Odusan Unification Observatory South/North Art Exhibition, the alleged Mansudae Studio affiliated artists are Kim Chung Hee, Jung Chang Mo, and Sun Wu Young. Owners of the displayed artworks, including K Mecenat Network, purchased the artworks in the DPRK from 2010 to 2013.” And “after speculative media reports named DPRK artist Hong Un Seok as a Mansudae Art Studio affiliate, the relevant Korean authorities have tried to verify this information through various channels. So far, no such affiliation has been confirmed.”

(2) Reply from K-Mecenat Network[144]

Response regarding the "Peace, the wind is coming" South·North Exhibition

Exhibited artworks made in North Korea

- South North Exhibition was hosted by the Institute for Unification Education, and organized by K Mecenat Network to promote inter-Korean reconciliation and peace. Regarding the exhibited artworks made in North Korea, artworks owned by K Mecenat Network and artworks(rented) of 2 South Korean art collectors were exhibited.

- Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information to confirm the alleged affiliation of the North Korean artists.

[144] The artists reported to be displayed, and enquired regarding affilication to Mansudae include Jeong Chang Mo(정창모), Son U Yong(선우영) and Hong Un Seok(홍운석) . Jeong Chang Mo and Son U Yong have been lisetd as Mansudae Art Studio artits in other exhibitions held prior to the designation of Mansudae Art Studio. "London Korean Links, Mansudae Artists to visit London from DPRK in November", https://londonkoreanlinks.net/2014/09/08/mansudae-artists-to-visit-london-from-dprk-in-november/

<North Korean artworks exhibited in 2019>

	Artist	Title	Year of Production
North Korean (20 pieces)	Gil Jin Sub 길진섭	Harvest 추수	1940s
	Lee Kwe Dae 리쾌대	Flower still life 꽃 정물	1956
	Kim Gi Man 김기만	Yellow magnolia acuminata 황목련	1987
	Kim Man Hyung 김만형	People Swelling Melted Iron 쇳물 붓는 사람들	1957
	Kim Sang Jik 김상직	A Kite at Cheong-bong 청봉의 수리개	1996
	Kim Sung Min 김성민	Jaenggang Dance 쟁강춤	2008
	Kim Chung Hee 김청희	Tiger in Mt. Baekdu 백두산 호랑이	Unidentified
	Ryu Jung Bong 류정봉	Sangpaldam Moonlight of Mt. Geumgang 금강산 상팔담의 달밤	2004
	Moon Hwa Chun 문화춘	Sunrise from Mt. Baekdu 백두산의 해돋이	2000
		Yalu River upstream 압록강 상류	
	Sun Wu Young 선우영	Ripening Autumn 숙성의 가을	2006
	Jung Young Hwa 정영화	Mt. Geumgang 금강산	2010
	Jung On Nyeo 정온녀	Nude 누드	1945
	Jung Chang Mo 정창모	Pomegranate 석류	2007
	Choi Sung Ryong 최성룡	The First Snow 첫눈	2006
	Choi Jae Deok 최재덕	Dissection 해부	1961
	Choi Chang Sik 최창식	Still life 정물	1969
	Choi Jae Nam 최재남	Road to Rungrado May Day Stadium 능라도 5.1경기장 가는 길	1997
	Han Sang Ik 한상익	Mt. Baekdu crater lake 백두산 천지	1971
	Jeon Young 전 영	A pine tree in the winter 설송	2017

Regarding ownership information of the exhibited North Korean artworks

o artworks owned by K Mecenat Network and artworks(rented) of 2 South Korean art collectors were exhibited.

Regarding alleged communication with Mansudae Art Studio

o We made no such contact with North Koreans nor entities of other countries for the purpose of Odusan Unification Observatory South-North Art Exhibition.

Response to media's allegation

o The artworks of the alleged artists owned by K Mecenat Network and South Korean art collectors were purchased in South Korea prior to the UNSC North Korea Sanction designation(2017). Their artworks were purchased in South Korea between 2010-2013. Therefore, the artworks are not subject to the UNSC sanctions.

o After the media reports on Hong Un Seok(홍운석)'s Mansudae Art Studio affiliation, we have tried to check his affiliation in many ways. But no official information has been confirmed regarding the alleged Mansudae Art Studio affiliation.

Source: The Panel

(3) Reply from Korean Fine Arts Association

Concerning the two exhibitions held in 2018 and 2019 in which artwork of Kim Cheong Hee was displayed, Korean Fine Arts Association (KFAA) replied that according to the staff who worked in 2018, the artworks displayed in the exhibitions in 2018 and 2019 were leased for free of charge by collectors in the ROK (2018) and China (2019) and has been returned to ROK collector or will be returned to China. KFAA also provided

the list of artworks exhibited at the National Assembly in 2019. The list includes two artworks of Kim Chung Hee. KFAA stated that according to the collector in China the two artworks exhibited in 2019 were both produced in 2009. The Panel requested relevant document to support the statement.

Annex: 57: Congo Aconde

Procurement of statues from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been prohibited since 2016 pursuant to paragraph 29 of resolution 2321(2016).

Congo Aconde SARL, headed by Mr. Pak Hwa Song and Mr. Hwang Kil Su was involved in projects to build several statues in the Lualaba and Haut-Lomami provinces, DRC, from 2018 to at least late 2019. Based on the information seen by the Panel, the Panel considers Congo Aconde to be a front company for the state-run Paekho Trading Company, which exports artwork including statues created by Paekho Art Studio (Figure).

The Panel also notes the passport of Mr. Pak and Mr. Hwang were issued on 14 July 2014, which suggests that they may have been active overseas since 2014 (Annex 79, 80). The Panel is investigating their overseas activities before the establishment of the Congo Aconde. The Panel has not yet received reply from the Democratic Republic of Congo. For detail of the case see finance section.

Figure : Congo Aconde's letter head (top left), company's seal (bottom left) appared on Request for Surety Bond and certificate of Paekho Trading Corporation for artwork

Source: The Panel

Annex 58: Reply from Romania

PERMANENT MISSION OF ROMANIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The Ambassador,
Permanent Representative

No. 7519

New York, 19 November 2020

Dear Mr. Coordinator,

We are writing in reference to your letter no. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.20 concerning the implementation of international sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Romania, and in addition to our letter of 4 August 2020, we have the honor of providing supplementary information.

According to the outcome of the investigations carried out by the Romanian competent authorities, 44 legal/natural persons entered into lease agreements with IMA PARTNERS SRL regarding the building located at 28 – 36 Șoseaua Nordului, 1st District, Bucharest.

Based on the above-mentioned lease agreements, during the period 1 January 2018 and 30 June 2020, the rent collected by IMA PARTNERS SRL amounted to a total of 2.693.380 RON (approx. 653.700 USD), most of the money being wire transferred.

Further detailed information on the businesses and transactions operated in relation to the premises are provided in the attached document.

Within the aforementioned reference interval, no transactions - neither cash, nor wire transfers - were identified between IMA PARTNERS SRL and the DPRK Embassy. Furthermore, as we had mentioned in our previous letter, according to the statements of the two parties, the lease agreement concluded between IMA PARTNERS SRL and the DPRK Embassy was terminated as of 10.11.2017. The company continues the sublease agreements in relation to the building, invoking a retention title for investments made in the premises. The representative of the company declared in writing that no payments had been made to the DPRK between 1 January 2018 and 30 June 2020.

Romania will continue to take all necessary measures aimed at ensuring an adequate application of UNSC Resolutions. Moreover, we would like to express our availability to continue our close and open cooperation with this Panel.

Please accept, Mr. Coordinator, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dr. Ion I. Jinga

Annex: List of parties to lease agreements with IMA PARTNERS SRL

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations

573-577 3rd Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Phone: (212) 682-3273, (212)682-3274, Fax: (212) 682-9746
E-mail: newyork-onu@mae.ro http://mpnewyork.mae.ro

Annex 59: Excerpts from lease agreement and addendum between the Embassy of DPRK to Romania and S.C. Ima Partners S.R.L.

This annex is confidential.

Annex 60: Information on the sales of Mercedes vehicles to LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL

For what concerns the relationship with LS, European informs the Panel that during 2018 Europ sold to LS ITALIA three more Mercedes as indicated as follows:

Vehicle	Car Chassis	Plate	N. Contr.	Date Contr.	Invoice No.	Invoice Date	Delivery
Mercedes S600 Guard	WDD2221761A356488	FN035CH	121/17	27/12/17	20	03/04/18	13/02/18
Mercedes S650 MAYBACH	WDD2229801A351655	FR839RD	62/18	25/06/18	44	07/08/18	10/12/18
Mercedes S600 PULLMAN	WDD2229761A333357	FN144YT	27/18	06/03/18	49	26/09/18	12/03/19

For these three Mercedes the Complaint of the Termination of Movement with PRA has been made January 10, 2020.

Activate Windows

Source : The Panel

Annex 61: Images of Mercedes brand vehicles (Maybach Pullman W221, W221 restyling, S600 Landaulet) used by the DPRK leadership

Source :https://autoreview.ru/news/daimler-ne-v-kurse-gde-kim-chen-yn-vzyal-svoi-mersedesy

Source : https://vladnews.ru/2019-04-24/150341/prezidentskiy_kortezh

Source : https://www.drive2.ru/c/471173169168777960/

Annex 62: Images of Lexus LX 570 vehicle used by Kim Jong Un (Agust 2020)

Source: KCTV

Annex 63 : Reply Letter from Singapore

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

15 September 2020

[redacted]
Coordinator
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)

[redacted]

I write to inform you of the Singapore Government's forfeiture of a shipment of wine allegedly bound for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Singapore received information from a Member State in January 2020 concerning an allegedly DPRK-bound shipment of alcohol that transhipped in Singapore from 7 to 10 January 2020. The shipment was held for checks while in Singapore, and was seized by Singapore authorities on 31 January 2020.

According to the invoice and packing list submitted by the shipping agent, the shipment of wine was supplied to Sangmyong General Trading Corporation ("Sangmyong"). The hygiene certificate submitted by the shipping agent identified Sangmyong as the importer. The Panel would recall that Sangmyong had previously been identified as an entity that had actively violated Japan's ban on luxury goods trade with the DPRK in the Panel's reports S/2012/422 (2012) and S/2013/337 (2013). Sangmyong is also listed by the Dow Jones Risk Center as an "entity fully owned by the OFAC comprehensively sanctioned government of North Korea via the Korean Worker's party".

Under Regulation 5(a) of Singapore's United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010, "no person in Singapore and no citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the DPRK, whether or not the item originated in Singapore".

318 East 48th Street, New York, NY 10017, United States of America | T +1 (212) 826 0840 F +1 (212) 826 2964 | mfa.gov.sg/newyork

Our authorities investigated the shipping agent for possible offences committed under the laws of Singapore in relation to the seized shipment. Following the completion of investigations, no offence was disclosed against the shipping agent.

On 25 August 2020, our authorities obtained a court order under Regulation 17(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010 for the shipment to be forfeited to the Director-General of the Singapore Customs for disposal. The relevant court documents related to the proceedings resulting in forfeiture are attached at Annex for information. The forfeiture also fulfils the obligation of Member States under Paragraph 20 of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397 (2017) to seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by the relevant UNSC Resolutions.

Singapore reiterates our commitment to upholding our obligations under the relevant UNSC resolutions, and will continue to be of assistance to the Panel where possible.

Yours sincerely,

BURHAN GAFOOR
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Enc.

ANNEX

APPLICATION PURSUANT TO REGULATION 17(1) OF THE UNITED NATIONS (SANCTIONS – DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA) REGULATIONS 2010

Third Report of Deputy Chief Superintendent of Customs [redacted], made in support of the application of the Attorney-General under Regulation 17(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010 ("**UN DPRK Regulations**"), before the undersigned District Judge, State Courts of the Republic of Singapore, on **25 August 2020**.

Items seized vide Report/Case No.: C2003520/IP/01

2. As stated in the First Report of DCSC [redacted] filed on 11 August 2020 (the "**First Report**"), Singapore Customs seized the following goods on 31 January 2020 in exercise of its powers under Regulation 14A of the UN DPRK Regulations read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68) ("**Seized Goods**"):

(a) 1158 cases x 4 boxes x 3 litres of Dry Red Wine;
(b) 50 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Orange Juice;
(c) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Summer Pine Juice;
(d) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Medly of Fruit Juice;
(e) 49 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Mango Juice; and
(f) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Secrets of the Valley Juice.

Reports filed by Singapore Customs on 11 August 2020 and 21 August 2020

3. The background facts and outcome of Singapore Customs' investigations are set out in detail in the First Report. To summarise, shipping documents revealed that Sangmyong General Trading Corp ("**SGTC**") was the client / receiver of the Seized Goods. Korea Sangmyong General Trading Corporation (also known to Singapore Customs as SGTC) was flagged by the United Nations Panel of Experts as a "DPRK end-user" in its 2013 Report[1] and its 2012 Report[2] for its involvement in the smuggling of luxury goods into the DPRK.

4. As stated in the Second Report of DCSC [redacted] filed on 21 August 2020 (the "**Second Report**"), Singapore Customs gave notice of the application to five parties that appeared to have an interest in the Seized Goods, pursuant to Regulation 17(3) of the UN DPRK Regulations. As at 20 August 2020, two parties had indicated that they would not be contesting the forfeiture of the Seized Goods. As at 25 August 2020, there

[1] Report of the Panel of Experts (S/2013/337).
[2] Report of the Panel of Experts (S/2012/422).

1

was no response received from the remaining three parties. Singapore Customs' correspondence with the five parties are set out in detail in the Second Report.

Mention on 25 August 2020, at 10:00 am, Court 7A of the State Courts, Republic of Singapore

5. State Counsel [redacted] and [redacted], on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore, applied for the forfeiture of the Seized Goods under Regulation 17(1) of the UN DPRK Regulations. The Seized Goods were proved to be designated export items (i.e. items listed in paragraph 2(a) to 2(f) above)[3] and designated luxury items (i.e. items listed in paragraph 2(a) above)[4]. The Seized Goods were also proved to be the subject of a contravention of Regulation 5(a) of the UN DPRK Regulations which reads:

> "A person in Singapore and no citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall – (a) supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, whether or not the item originated in Singapore".

6. Upon the application of the Attorney-General, and upon reading the First and Second Reports, the learned District Judge [redacted] was satisfied that forfeiture of the Seized Goods under Regulation 17(1) of the UN DPRK Regulation was made out.

7. In view of the above, may I seek a court order for the Seized Goods to be forfeited to Singapore Customs, and either destroyed or otherwise dealt with.

[redacted]

[redacted] (DCSC)
Assistant Head
Trade Investigation Branch
Singapore Customs

for Director-General of Singapore Customs

[3] Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations, Seventh Schedule (Prohibited imports from and exports to (including transhipped goods and goods in transit originating from or bound for) country or territory, Third Column, DPRK, (18) Any goods that are for the purposes of trade with any person in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

[4] Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations, Seventh Schedule (Prohibited imports from and exports to (including transhipped goods and goods in transit originating from or bound for) country or territory, Third Column, DPRK, (5)(t) wines and spirits.

2

Source: Member State

Annex 64 : Reply from Singapore on SINSIMS

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

20 January 2021

[redacted]
Coordinator
Panel of Experts
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

[redacted]

I refer to your letter (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.102) dated 30 August 2019, requesting information on SINSMS Pte Ltd ("SINSMS") and related entities and individuals; and Singapore's reply to the Panel dated 20 September 2019.

SINSMS provided services relating to freight forwarding, packing and crating. Lim Cheng Hwee ("Lim") was the director and a shareholder of SINSMS. Lim was in-charge of SINSMS's business and operations. Hong Leng Ooi ("Hong") is Lim's wife. Hong assisted Lim with the administrative operations of SINSMS and took instructions from him. On seven occasions between December 2013 to July 2018, SINSMS, on the instructions of Lim, arranged for the freight of wines and spirits from Singapore to Dalian, China, with the knowledge that the said wines and spirits were ultimately bound for Nampo, DPRK. Lim knew that supply of the wines and spirits to the DPRK was in breach of Singapore's UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 ("UN-DPRK Regs"). Lim deliberately concealed the fact that the goods were destined for the DPRK, by supplying the goods to the DPRK via transhipment through Dalian and failed to declare the final port of delivery to Singapore Customs. Hong was involved in preparing the booking confirmations and bills of lading for the shipments. She thus had information relating to the said shipments but failed to report the same to the relevant authorities. The total value of the prohibited goods supplied to the DPRK in this manner amounted to SGD 745,488.87, or approximately USD 562,082.

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Lim, Hong, and SINSMS pleaded guilty to the charges against them on 12 December 2020. The charge sheets, which were also provided in our letter to the Panel on 20 September 2019, are enclosed for the Panel's reference. They were sentenced as follows:

a) **Lim**: Two months' imprisonment for three charges of engaging in a conspiracy to supply wines and spirits to DPRK, under Regulation 5(a) read with Regulation 16(1) of the UN-DRPK Regs;

b) **Hong**: Fine of SGD 4,000 for two charges of having information about the supply of goods to DPRK, and failing to report such information to the relevant authorities, under Regulation 14(1)(c)(i) read with Regulation 16(1) of the UN-DPRK Regs; and

c) **SINSMS**: Fine of SGD 30,000 for three charges of supplying wines and spirits to DPRK, under Regulation 5(a) read with Regulation 16(1) of the UN-DRPK Regs.

During court proceedings, the Prosecution emphasized that the legislative intent of the UN-DPRK Regs is to give effect to the United Nations Security Council's resolutions against the DPRK and that freight forwarders such as SINSMS and its agents play a vital role in countering the DPRK's illicit shipping and sanctions evasions efforts. The Prosecution also highlighted the aggravating features of the case, namely, the protracted period of offending, the substantial value of the goods involved, and difficulty of detection given the deliberate concealment of the fact that the goods were destined for DPRK. The presiding District Judge accepted the Prosecution's submission and fully agreed with the sentences as submitted by the Prosecution.

This outcome is testament to our shared commitment in ensuring the full implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. We look forward to continuing our cooperation and partnership with the Panel.

Yours sincerely,

BURHAN GAFOOR
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Enc.

Source: Member State

Annex 65: DPRK cyber threat actors in the Reconnaissance General Bureau (KPe.031)

The United States, in a published document, assessed that most of the country's cyber operations take place in the Cyber Warfare Guidance Unit (aka Bureau 121) of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which has more than 6,000 members with many of them operating from overseas. According to the document, three cyber threat actors – Lazarus, Andariel and Bluenoroff – belong to the Cyber Warfare Guidance Unit, and the Andariel group has about 1,600 members and the Bluenoroff Group has about 1,700 members. The document did not specify the size of the Lazarus group. The United States considers the Andariel and the Bluenoroff as subgroups of Lazarus.

Source:https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30043-ATP_7-100.2-000-WEB-2.pdf

Annex 66: Reply from Japan on a suspect of DPRK-linked ATM heist

The Panel previously investigated cyberattacks against financial institions and cryptocurrency exchanges based on information from a Member State (S/2019/691, paras. 57-68 and annex 21), and the Panel notes that the cases correspond to the activities of BeagleBoyz, a newly identified cyber threat actor of the DPRK.

The Panel enquired of Japan about a suspected ringleader of an ATM heist using stolen credentials from a foreign bank who reportedly[145] fled from Japan to the DPRK after the attack. Japan replied: "[T]he Police of Japan and the relevant authorities have been continuing thorough investigation of this case. With regard to the media article quoted in the Panel's letter, there is no confirmed information as of 29 January 2021 that indicates connection between the suspects arrested with the case, including [(readacted), (redacted), (redacted), (redacted)], and North Korea, including their contacts with any North Korean individuals/entities."

[145] https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/04/2b45db5e313b-suspected-ringleader-of-huge-coordinated-atm-scam-entered-n-korea.html#:~:text=A%20man%20believed%20to%20be,incident%2C%20investigative%20sources%20said%20Saturday.&text=The%20fake%20credit%20cards%20used,from%20South%20Africa's%20Standard%20Bank

Annex 67: Football players

Several football players of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea earn income at teams abroad.[146] The Panel is seeking information on the current situation of the three football players, Mr. Choe Son Hyok, Mr. Pak Kwang Ryong and Mr. Han Kwang Song. Italy informed that Mr. Choe was still in Italy due to the suspension of international flights to enter the DPRK. Concerning Mr. Pak, Austria replied that "there is no further information on this case that we have not shared with the panel of experts already." Qatar replied with information about Mr. Han's deportation in January 2021 (figure 1). Several media reported that a Russian football team FC-Tambov was planning to contract with Mr. Han (igure 2), while the Panel has not received a reply from the team. Concerning several football players who played in Japan and the Republic of Korea,[147] Japan replied "the Government of Japan has generally banned the entry of any DPRK nationals into Japan, and there are no nationals of the DPRK whose repatriation is required pursuant to paragraph 8 of UNSC Resolution 2397(2017)". Japan provided information regarding the football players requesting not to "disclose the information considering that it includes personal information." The Republic of Korea replied, "No DPRK worker has been granted work authorization or entered the Republic of Korea since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2375 on 11 September 2017. Please note that requested information on individuals cannot be provided in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the Personal Information Protection Act of the Republic of Korea."

The Panel is further collecting information on several cases reported by a media outlet[148] in which students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Russian universities were illegally working at construction sites. It is reported that in one case, such students were arrested and fined 2000 rubles. In another case, students were arrested but released as they had been working under an internship program (figure 3).

[146] S/2020/151, para. 132, S/2020/840, paras.127-128.

[147] Information was collected from various sources including websites of football teams and Korean Football Association in Japan(在日朝鮮人蹴球協会). This association is listed as "a centaral level organizations" by the General Associaion of Korean Residents in Japan, and sharing address with Chugai Travel Co. Ltd. (See embargo section).

[148] BBC, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-55447145.

Figure 1: Reply from Qatar concerning Mr. Han Kwang Song

Permanent Mission of the
State of Qatar to the United Nations
New York

الوفد الدائم لدولة قطر
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

URGENT

2021/0007038/5

الوفد الدائم لدولة قطر / نيويورك

The Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has to honour to refer to its note verbale dated 26 January 2021 (ref. 2021/006564/5) regarding the DPRK football player Mr. Han Kwang Song, which conveyed that, in keeping with the commitments of the State of Qatar per the provisions of Security Council resolutions concerning DPRK nationals earning income abroad, he had been terminated from Al Duhail Sports Club and no longer has any association with the club, and that he would depart from the State of Qatar.

In that regard, the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar has the further honour to inform the Panel of Experts that the relevant authorities of the State of Qatar have confirmed that Mr. Han Kwang Song has departed Doha on Tuesday 26 January 2021 at 08:05 a.m. on board Qatar Airways flight no. QA131.

The Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 29 January 2021

[redacted]
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on the DPRK established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1874
United Nation
New York
Email: dppa-poe1874@un.org; [redacted]

809 U.N. Plaza • 4th Floor • New York, NY 10017 • U.S.A. • Tel: (212) 486-9335 • Fax: (212) 758-4952

Source: Member State

Figure 2: Media report dated 25 August 2020

«Тамбов» может арендовать бывшего северокорейского игрока «Ювентуса»

25 августа 2020, 12:38автор Сергей Рябкин

Нападающий катарского «Аль-Духайль» Хан Кван Сон может продолжить карьеру в «Тамбове». Источник Betting Insider сообщает, что клуб РПЛ сделал предложение об аренде северокорейца.

21-летний форвард ранее выступал за «Кальяри» и стал первым северокорейским футболистом, забившим в Серии А.

Летом 2019 году Хан Кван Сона за 5 млн евро приобрел «Ювентус» – он провел 17 матчей за вторую команду чемпионов Италии в третьем дивизионе и не забил ни одного мяча. Уже в зимнее трансферное окно «Юве» продал нападающего в Катар.

Отметим, что Transfermarkt оценивает северокорейца в 2,7 млн евро.

Source: Betting Insider, https://betting.team/ru/blog/tambov-khan

(Summary in English)

The forward of Qatari Al-Duhail Han Kwang Song may continue his career at Tambov. A Betting Insider source reports that the club has made an offer to lease Mr. Han. In the summer of 2019, Han Kwan Song was bought by Juventus for 5 million euros. In winter Juventus sold Han to Al-Duhail.

Figure 3: Media report concerning work of DPRK students (excerpt)

(English translation)

North Korean students outside of Russian laws. Why do they come to Russia?

Anastasia Napalkova

BBC

28 December 2020

Because of United Nations sanctions, workers from North Korea have stopped coming to Russia. But North Korean students who want to learn the Russian language or graduate from a local university do come. The authorities then find some of these students at construction sites in the Far East. What happens to them after that?

Several students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) were detained at the construction site of an apartment building in Irkutsk in February 2019. According to Interior Ministry officials, they were working there as construction workers, without a work permit.

Among the detainees was an assistant brigadier: he received instructions from his superiors and distributed them among the workers, the court materials say. His name is not in the court documents.

When detained, he explained to the police that he had "arrived in the territory of the Russian Federation for the purpose of employment" and that he had obtained a student visa solely for entry into the country. Since early January 2019, he "along with fellow DPRK nationals" had been "working at the construction site without permits," according to court filings.

Once in court, the DPRK citizen retracted his earlier explanation, stating that he and his comrades were at the construction site not for work, but "on a tour from an educational institution".

In the courtroom, he was unable to say the name of the institution, its address, programme, cost and period of study. A construction site guard told Interior Ministry officials that 10 to 15 DPRK citizens were living at the construction site in the back rooms.

The court fined the student 2 thousand roubles without deportation from Russia.

There are dozens of such cases in the "Justice" State automated data system. Some students are less fortunate. In Bashkortostan, a court ordered the expulsion of student An. G. Ch. from Russia with a fine of 2 thousand roubles because he was working, although he had come to study.

Hiring unauthorized citizens is also perilous for companies. A court decided to suspend the operations of "Stroy Alliance" in Vladivostok for 14 days because a worker from DPRK, who had arrived as a student at Primorsky Polytechnic College, was found building a multi-level parking lot.

Others are luckier. For example, the court cases were dismissed against students Chon Her Cher and Cho Kym Men from Artem Regional Technical College.

The Migration Service found them assembling fittings at a construction site. The students said that they were doing internships, which was consistent with the academic schedule, plus there was no evidence that they were getting paid for their work. The court accepted these arguments.

DPRK citizens have become more frequent visitors to Russia for private, tourist and educational purposes in recent years (not counting 2020), as shown by data from the border service of Russia's Federal Security Service. At the same time, the number of work trips has dwindled to nothing: United Nations sanctions prohibiting new employment contracts with North Korean nationals were enacted in 2017. The contracts already in place expired in December 2019. Work trips of DPRK citizens to Russia then stopped.

Bringing in workers disguised as students?

From 5 August 2020, foreign students in Russia can officially work in their free time, and no special permission is required. State Duma deputy Kazbek Taisaev suggested in a conversation with the BBC that this law could help the situation of DPRK citizens who are forced to leave Russia.

According to court records, there has been at least one attempt to bring North Korean workers to Russia, first by sending them there to study. True, this was back in 2018, before the law was adopted allowing students to work, but after the ban on work contracts with DPRK nationals.

The trial took place in September 2020 between two private individuals in Smolensk: Evgeny Pivnyak approached Inessa Skakova for help – he asked her to arrange for 96 DPRK citizens to study in Russia. This was "necessary for business, so that the citizens could legally work in Russia," says the case file from the witness testimony.

Skakova testified that Pivnyak planned to employ them after they had learned Russian. The cost of enrolling one student under their agreement was 10 thousand roubles. Pivnyak transferred an advance payment of 500,000 roubles.

Skakova, as an "agent", was able to arrange for the DPRK citizens to enrol in the "Academy of Additional Education" to study Russian. But in order to start studying, the State fee had to be paid: the parties argued about who should pay it.

It is not entirely clear whether the DPRK citizens were required to enter Russia specifically on a student visa. Another obscure point is that the case file indicates that the DPRK nationals were to work as "highly skilled labour", but learning Russian is not mandatory for this category of workers, said lawyer Sofia Batura, deputy general director of Confidence Group.

Pivnyak could not be contacted, Skakova did not respond to the letter from the BBC and the educational institution's phones were not working.

The “agent” who found the educational institution for the North Koreans, according to the case file, worked for “Megalayn” LLC as the project manager for the reconstruction of a military unit in Krasnoye Selo in 2013.

At that time there were only two construction companies with that name registered in St. Petersburg. One of them is linked to Evgeny Prigozhin and was a contractor for the Ministry of Defence on many projects. There is no evidence that DPRK nationals have worked on projects for the Department of Defence or for “Megalayn”.

“Defectors”

Some citizens from DPRK who came to Russia do not want to return to their home country even after their visa expires. These are, first and foremost, migrants workers. They are trying to obtain temporary asylum and refugee status in Russia.

“Such appeals are isolated cases,” says Novosibirsk-based lawyer Anna Gulevich, who assists DPRK citizens in the courts. She says that, following the adoption of United Nations sanctions, lawyers had expected an increase in the number of DPRK nationals seeking asylum. But that did not happen. “They probably didn’t know that they were leaving Russia for good,” she explains.

Lawyer Tatyana Tyutyunnik from Vladivostok is now defending four DPRK citizens who did not want to return to their home country. Some took advantage of this opportunity, including against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic. “If there was no coronavirus, they would have gone home, but they stayed and decided to seek help,” she says.

(**Original**)

Северокорейские студенты вне российских законов. Зачем они приезжают в Россию?

Анастасия Напалкова

Би-би-си

28 декабря 2020

Из-за санкций ООН в Россию перестали приезжать рабочие из Северной Кореи. Зато приезжают северокорейские студенты, которые хотят изучить русский язык или закончить местный вуз. Власти находят потом некоторых из этих студентов на стройках на Дальнем Востоке. Что с ними после этого происходит?

На стройке жилого дома в Иркутске в феврале 2019 года были задержаны несколько студентов из КНДР. По версии сотрудников МВД, они работали там строителями, не имея разрешения на работу.

Среди задержанных был помощник бригадира: он получал указания от начальства и распределял их среди рабочих, говорится в материалах суда. Его имени в судебных документах нет.

При задержании он объяснил полицейским, что "прибыл на территорию РФ с целью "работа по найму"", а учебную визу оформил исключительно для въезда в страну. С начала января 2019 года он

"вместе с земляками - гражданами КНДР работает на строительном объекте без разрешительных документов", - говорится в материалах суда.

Уже в суде гражданин КНДР отказался от своих прежних объяснений, заявив, что он и его товарищи были на стройке не по работе, а "на экскурсии от учебного заведения".

В зале суда он не смог сказать название учебного заведения, его адрес, программу, стоимость и период обучения. Охранник стройки сказал сотрудникам МВД, что 10-15 граждан КНДР живут на строительной площадке в подсобных помещениях.

Суд оштрафовал студента на 2 тыс. рублей без выдворения с территории России.

Таких дел в базе ГАС "Правосудие" десятки. Некоторым студентам везет меньше. В Башкортостане суд постановил выдворить студента Ан Г. Ч. из России со штрафом 2 тыс. рублей, потому что он работал, хотя приехал для учебы.

Приглашать на работу граждан, не имеющих разрешения, чревато и для компаний. Суд принял решение приостановить деятельность компании "Стройальянс" во Владивостоке на 14 суток, потому что на строительстве многоуровневой парковки был обнаружен работник из КНДР, который приехал как студент Приморского политехнического колледжа.

Другим везет больше. Так, судебные дела против студентов Регионального технического колледжа из города Артем по имени Чон Хер Чер и Чо Кым Мен были прекращены.

Миграционная служба обнаружила их за монтажом арматуры на стройке. Студенты говорили, что проходят практику, что соответствовало учебному графику, к тому же не было доказательств, что они получают деньги за работу. Суд принял эти аргументы.

Граждане КНДР в последние годы стали чаще приезжать в Россию с частными, туристическими и учебными целями (не считая 2020 года), следует из данных пограничной службы ФСБ России. В то же время, количество рабочих поездок сошло на нет: в 2017 году были приняты санкции ООН, запрещающие заключать новые трудовые договоры с гражданами Северной Кореи. Действие уже заключенных договоров закончилось в декабре 2019 года. Тогда же прекратились рабочие поездки граждан КНДР в Россию.

Привезти рабочих под видом студентов?

С 5 августа 2020 года иностранные студенты в России могут официально подрабатывать в свободное от учебы время, и специальное разрешение на это не требуется. Депутат Госдумы Казбек Тайсаев предполагал в беседе с Би-би-си, что этот закон может помочь положению граждан КНДР, которые вынуждены покидать Россию.

Согласно материалам судов, была как минимум одна попытка привезти в Россию северокорейских рабочих, сначала отправив их на учебу. Правда, это было в 2018 году, еще до принятия закона, позволяющего студентам работать, но после запрета на заключение рабочих договоров с гражданами КНДР.

Суд происходил в сентябре 2020 года между двумя частными лицами в Смоленске: Евгений Пивняк обратился к Инессе Скаковой за помощью - он просил её устроить 96 граждан КНДР на учебу в России. Это "необходимо для бизнеса, чтобы данные граждане могли законно трудиться на территории России", говорится в материалах дела со слов свидетеля.

Со слов Скаковой записано, что Пивняк планировал их трудоустройство после изучения русского языка. Стоимость устройства на учебу одного студента по их договоренности составила 10 тыс. рублей. Пивняк перевел предоплату 500 тысяч рублей.

Скакова в качестве "агента" смогла организовать поступление граждан КНДР для обучения русскому в "Академию дополнительного образования". Но для начала обучения нужно было еще оплатить госпошлину: стороны спорили, кто должен ее платить.

Не до конца ясно, должны ли были граждане КНДР въехать в Россию именно по учебной визе. Еще один неясный момент - в материалах дела указано, что граждане КНДР должны были работать как "высококвалифицированная рабочая сила", но изучение русского не является обязательным для этой категории работников, говорит юрист София Батура, заместитель генерального директора Confidence Group.

Связаться с Пивняком не удалось, а Скакова не ответила на письмо Би-би-си, телефоны учебного заведения не работают.

"Агент", которая нашла для северокорейцев учебное заведение, согласно материалам дела, работала в ООО "Мегалайн" начальником проекта по реконструкции воинской части в Красном селе в 2013 году.

В то время в Санкт-Петербурге было зарегистрировано только две строительные компании с таким названием. Одна из них связана с Евгением Пригожиным и была подрядчиком минобороны по многим проектам. Данных о том, что граждане КНДР трудились на проектах минобороны или "Мегалайна", нет.

"Перебежчики"

Некоторые граждане из КНДР, приехавшие в Россию, не хотят возвращаться на родину даже после окончания визы. В первую очередь речь идет именно о трудовых мигрантах. В России они пытаются получить временное убежище и статус беженца.

"Такие обращения - это единичные случаи", - говорит адвокат Анна Гулевич из Новосибирска, которая помогает гражданам КНДР в судах. По ее словам, после принятия санкций ООН юристы ждали роста числа граждан КНДР, которые добиваются убежища. Но этого не произошло. "Скорее всего, они не знали, что уезжают из России навсегда", - объясняет она.

Адвокат Татьяна Тютюнник из Владивостока сейчас защищает четверых граждан КНДР, которые не захотели возвращаться на родину. Некоторые воспользовались этой возможностью в том числе на фоне пандемии коронавируса. "Если бы не было коронавируса, они уехали бы домой, а так остались и решили обратиться за помощью", - говорит она.

Source: BBC website, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-55447145

Annex 68 : Replies from Nigeria to the Panel concerning bilateral agreement in the field of health and medical sciences with the DPRK

(1) Letter dated 23 September 2020

PERMANENT MISSION OF NIGERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
828 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
TELEPHONE (212) 953-9130
FAX (212) 697-1970

Ref.No. PMN/DPR/15 September 23, 2020

Your Excellency,

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IMPOSED ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2397 (2017)

We wish to refer to your letter with ref. No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.167 of June 29, 2020, requesting for an update on the current repatriation process for DPRK nationals earning income in Nigeria and other sundry matters.

2. We wish to note that, even before your aforementioned inquest, the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) had further discovered that additional Thirty-Seven (37) DPRK nationals were present in some states of the federation.

3. Following the above discovery, the Minister of Interior proceeded to grant approval for their subsequent deportation in March 2020. However, the outbreak of Covid-19 and the ensuing lockdown, as well as restrictions of international flights have stalled the deportation process. In addition, the NIS has notified the state governments of the federation on the need to abide by UNSC resolutions on the employment of DPRK nationals.

4. With regard to the operation of Haekumgang Trading Corporation in Nigeria, investigations have revealed that the company is neither domiciled nor operational in Nigeria.

5. With respect to enquiries made on the implementation of the Bilateral Agreement in the field of health and medical sciences between Nigeria and DPRK, it is pertinent to note that based on the terms of the Agreement, 'Parties shall bear the cost of its personnel and where there is a joint project the cost shall be shared between the parties except otherwise agreed'. Nigeria will continue to implement Security Council resolutions and fulfill its international obligations.

6. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[redacted]

Ambassador Samson S. Itegboje
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations

(2) Letter dated 4 November 2020

PERMANENT MISSION OF NIGERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
828 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
TELEPHONE: (212) 953-9130
FAX: (212) 697-1970

Ref.No: PMN/DPR/15

November 4, 2020

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Your Excellency,

RE: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IMPOSED ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2397 (2017)

Further to our letter of even reference dated September 23, 2020 on the Implementation of the Measures Imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council Resolution 2397 (2007). Kindly find attached herewith, document (Annex B) containing the names, passport number, company name, address and location of the thirty-seven (37) DPRK nationals awaiting deportation, as provided by the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS).

2. Kindly also note that the terms of the Bilateral Agreement between Nigeria and DPRK signed on June 17, 2020, in the field of health and medical sciences, exist only in the areas of 'Public health disease control and prevention, institutional capacity in the field of health as well as political sensitization and cooperation which further requires that both parties shall bear the cost of its

personnel and, where there is a joint project, the cost shall be shared between the parties except otherwise decided.

3. The following are the main areas of interest jointly agreed upon by the parties as contained in the Bilateral Agreement:

i. Communicable diseases HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, polio and measles eradication;

ii. Non-communicable diseases, primary health care and emerging and re-emerging diseases;

iii. Biotechnical development and Ophthalmology.

4. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[redacted]

Ambassador Samson. S. Itegboje
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations

DPRK NATIONALS IN NIGERIA AWAITING REPATRIATION

	NAME	SEX	PASSPORT NO	NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS	STATE
1	HAN YONG HUN		108130169	ABURIME-CHANGSU ORIENTAL DIAGNOSTICS HOSPITAL	BENIN CITY	EDO STATE
2	ANON OK GYONG		10813170	ABURIME-CHANGSU ORIENTAL DIAGNOSTICS HOSPITAL	BENIN CITY	EDO STATE
3	LI CHOI SU		836231236	ABURIME-CHANGSU ORIENTAL DIAGNOSTICS HOSPITAL	BENIN CITY	EDO STATE
4	PAK OK JU		836231239	ABURIME-CHANGSU ORIENTAL DIAGNOSTICS HOSPITAL	BENIN CITY	EDO STATE
5	PAK CHOP RYONG		109137729	ABURIME-CHANGSU ORIENTAL DIAGNOSTICS HOSPITAL	BENIN CITY	EDO STATE
6	LI KYON HUA		109137730	ABURIME-CHANGSU ORIENTAL DIAGNOSTICS HOSPITAL	BENIN CITY	EDO STATE
7	RI SU GIL		108232598	EMIRI ORIENTAL CENTRE LIMITED	PORT HARCOURT	RIVERS STATE
8	RI CHOL MUN		836336632	EMIRI ORIENTAL CENTRE LIMITED	PORT HARCOURT	RIVERS STATE
9	KIM HYE YONG		836336643	EMIRI ORIENTAL CENTRE LIMITED	PORT HARCOURT	RIVERS STATE
10	RIM KWANG SIK	M	927335870	FRANOSON MANYON INT'L COMPANY LIMITED	2 enugo str, ojoto, idemili south	ANAMBRA STATE
11	HONG YONG CHOI	M	9272366874	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
12	KIL SON JO	M	927236883	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
13	SIN RAN HUI	F	927236877	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
14	KIM CHANG UK	M	927236897	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
15	JANG KWANG CHOI	M	927236876	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
16	SON NYO PAK	F	927236884	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
17	WI CHOI NAM	M	927340251	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
18	HU NAM KIM	F	927236899	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
19	RI HYE SONG	F	927236875	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	142 oguta rd, onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
20	KIN SONG HYOK	M	109146522	NIGER OPTICAL SERVICES COMPANY (NIG)LIMITED	onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE

21	PAEK YONG NAN	M	927332794	NIGER OPTICAL SERVICES COMPANY (NIG)LIMITED	onitsha	ANAMBRA STATE
22	KIM KWANG CHOL	M	927237155	KRISTO ORIENTAL ACUPUNCTURE CENTRE LTD.	8 bisi anigbogu lane, amudo awka	ANAMBRA STATE
23	JONG UN OK	F	927236886	(ACC HUSBAND)	8 bisi anigbogu lane, amudo awka	ANAMBRA STATE
24	CHOE CHAN YONG	M	927236894	KRISTO ORIENTAL ACUPUNCTURE CENTRE LTD.	8 bisi anigbogu lane, amudo awka	ANAMBRA STATE
25	CHOE KUM JU	F	927236896	(ACC HUSBAND)	8 bisi anigbogu lane, amudo awka	ANAMBRA STATE
26	JON SONG IL	M	927236902	ROSEBOOM ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE LTD.	8 bisi anigbogu lane, amudo awka	ANAMBRA STATE
27	KANG HYE SUK	F	927236905	ROSEBOOM ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE LTD.	8 bisi anigbogu lane, amudo awka	ANAMBRA STATE
28	CHOE CHANG RIN	M	927236878	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	owerri	IMO STATE
29	KIM PONG HWA	F	927236879	EMIRI ORIENTAL MEDICAL CENTRE , LIMITED	owerri	IMO STATE
30	AN CHOL JIN	M	108448029	MEMEYS HOSPITAL ENUGU	enugu	ENUGU STA
31	KIM JONG NAM	M	109234350	NIGER STATE GOVT	Minna	NIGER STAT
32	RI NAM CHOG	M	109234351	NIGER STATE GOVT	Minna	NIGER STAT
33	YUN TAL JUNG	M	745233311	NIGER STATE GOVT	Minna	NIGER STAT
34	JONG MI JU		745234819	AKIT- RUNGRA ACUPUNCTURE CENTRE LTD	IBADAN	OYO STATE
35	CHANG YUN KIM		745234804	AKIT- RUNGRA ACUPUNCTURE CENTRE LTD	IBADAN	OYO STATE
36	JIN SU RI		108330824	AKIT- RUNGRA ACUPUNCTURE CENTRE LTD	IBADAN	OYO STATE
37	MIN OK CHON		108330826	AKIT- RUNGRA ACUPUNCTURE CENTRE LTD	IBADAN	OYO STATE

Annex 69: Corman Construction

The Panel has been investigating about 30 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea affiliated with Corman Construction & Commerce Senegal SUARL.[149] Corman Construction is formerly known as Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Senegal.

The Panel has obtained internal financial records that indicate Corman Construction was sending revenue to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea embassy. According to the ledger, these transactions, which totalled approximately USD 3,500 from September 2019 to August 2020, were recorded as "당위원장이 대사관에 바쳤음" ("dedicated to the embassy by the chairman of the party"). The ledger also listed the consignee for these transactions as the "embassy." For detail of the activity of Corman see finance section.

[149] S/2020/151, para.144.

Annex 70: Reply from Thailand to the Panel concerning DPRK workers

Attachment

Information requested by

the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1874 (2009)

as per the Panel of Experts' Note No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.26 dated 7 January 2021

The Royal Thai Government wishes to provide information related to "Mokran Lake Restaurant" in the Magnolias Pattaya Boutique Resort, Pattaya, as follows:

1. On 29 November 2019, Thai authorities conducted on-site inspections at Mokran Korean Restaurant/Mokran Lake Restaurant, located in the Magnolia Pattaya Boutique Resort, Pattaya, Chonburi province. This on-site inspection of the restaurant was included in Thailand's Final Report pursuant to paragraph 8 of UNSC Resolution 2397 (2017), sent to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2016).

2. During the on-site inspection, the authorities found that Mokran Korean Restaurant/ Mokran Lake Restaurant was already out of business and no North Korean nationals were found in and around the vicinity. Concerned authorities continue to monitor the locale as a precaution measure.

3. Concerning the POE's inquiry into the operations of the Mokran Korean Restaurant/ Mokran Lake Restaurant, the Thai authorities have reported that the restaurant remain permanently closed for business.

* * * * * *

Source : The Panel

Annex 71 : Reply from Georgia to the Panel's enqury concerning presence of the DPRK nationals

1. Georgia replied to the Panel that there were no DPRK nationals on Georgia Government's controlled territory.

2. With regards to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia replied to the Panel that Georgian Government has no effective control over these regions, hence it did not have information on the Panel's enquiry regarding the travel and/or presence of DPRK workers from Russia to Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia.

Annex 72: Overseas banking representatives

According to the February 2020 legal proceedings of a Member State[150], between December 2015 and January 2019, Han Jang Su carried out prohibited activities as the Moscow-based representative of FTB.[151] On five occasions, from November 2017 to July 2019, the Panel requested information from the Russian Federation regarding Mr. Han's whereabouts, his financial activities, and his status as the Moscow-based representative of FTB.

- According to the court proceedings, on 10 January 2018, Han Jang Su provided documentation to a Russian bank that confirmed the status of Ko Chol Man, Han Ung, Ri Jong Nam, and O Song Hui as members of FTB's board of directors.
- According to the court proceedings, on 29 January 2018, Han Jang Su provided a signature card to a Russian bank for FTB's account, containing the signatures of the previously mentioned board members, as well as Ri Yong Si, Jo Un Hui, O Song Hui, and Ri Jong Won.[152]
- In April 2018, the Russian Federation submitted a notification to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) that Russia would request an exemption from the asset freeze provisions for Mr. Han to cover basic living expenses.
- In July 2018, the Russian Federation submitted to the Panel that "it has taken all measures under Russian national legislation to implement the relevant resolutions of the Security Council" regarding Mr. Han.
- According to the court proceedings, on 13 August 2018, Han Jang Su aided Ri Chun Song with information on how to establish a Russian bank account for a foreign company.
- In November 2018, the Panel sent a letter of inquiry to the Russian Federation regarding information, provided by another Member State, that indicated that Mr. Ri Jong Won was serving as a Moscow-based deputy representative of FTB. The Russian Federation replied in December 2018 that Mr. Ri Jong Won "arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an official accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation."
- According to the court proceedings, on 10 January 2019, Han Jang Su received due diligence documents, which specified Ko Chol Man as the beneficial owner of FTB's Moscow-based account.
- According to the court proceedings, on 10 January 2019, Han Jang Su received due diligence documents, which specified Kim Kwang Chol (Korea Ungum Corporation) as the beneficial owner of Ungum's bank account.
- According to the court proceedings, on 27 January 2019, Ri Myong Jin and Jo Un Hui—members of FTB in Pyongyang—received a communication affirming Han Jang Su's status at FTB Moscow.
- According to the court proceedings, in September 2019, Han Jang Su facilitated a payment on behalf of Unha Daesong Trading Company to accounts held at two banks located in Russia.

[150] See, https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/u-s-indictment-usa-v-ko-chol-man-et-al/e872ed0c-7f79-4122-abc5-b7ce2bd47e99/.

[151] See paragraph 177 of S/2020/151 and paragraph 125 of S/2019/171.

[152] This suggests that Mr. Ri was continuing to act as an FTB representative while also acting as an officially accredited member of embassy personnel.

- In February 2020, the Russian Federation informed the Panel that Mr Han Jang Su left Russia in 2019.

In response to the Panel's enquiry regarding these differences, the Russian Federation replied: "With regard to the request of the Panel of Experts concerning citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Hang Jang Su and Ri Jong Won, we ask the Panel to let itself be guided by the reliable information already provided, rather than allow itself to be influenced by the idle speculations and insinuations being fed to it periodically by a certain Member State."

China

In October 2017, the Panel sent an inquiry to China regarding the status of several DPRK nationals believed to be working on behalf of FTB in China. Among others, these individuals included Kim Tong Chol (KPi.068), Ko Chol Man (KPi.069), Ri Chun Hwan (KPi.074), and Ri Chun Song (KPi.075). The Panel asked for, *inter alia,* travel records, financial records, diplomatic accreditation records, and any measures taken by China's competent authorities to investigate and/or expel the individuals. On 25 January 2018, China informed the Panel that its competent authorities had listed the designated individuals as being forbidden to enter or transit through China and had requested Chinese banks and financial institutions to freeze their assets.

In May 2018, the Panel once again requested information from China regarding the status of FTB representatives operating within China. In its July 2018 reply, China stated that it had "taken corresponding measures in accordance with the requirement of the resolutions" and that it "...has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China in 2016, and all of the relevant representatives in China have left China". China indicated that it could not verify whether the individuals have a relationship with the designated financial institutions.

In November 2019, the Panel once again sent an inquiry to China requesting information about Han Yong Chol (KPe.047), who was suspected of continuing to operate as an FTB representative in Beijing. China replied that it "has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China." In response to the Panel's enquiry, China replied "There is no transaction involving Ri Chun Hwan in April 2019. There is neither any Ri Chun Song involved transaction record related to the payments from accounts located in China to any Chinese or Russian companies in 2016 and 2017, or any acceptance of payments in June 2017." This is different from information in the February 2020 court proceedings, namely:

According to the court proceedings, Ri Chun Hwan (KPi.074) acted as FTB's representative in Zhuhai, China from October 2013 to at least April 2019.

- According to the court proceedings, in December 2018, Mr. Ri Chun Hwan received a communication, in his capacity as a China-based FTB representative, from Mr. Ri Myong Jin (FTB Pyongyang).
- According to the court proceedings, in April 2019, Mr. Ri Chun Hwan confirmed to FTB Pyongyang that he directed a payment from his China-based accounts.

- According to the court proceedings, Ri Chun Song has acted as FTB's representative in Beijing, China from 2015 to 2019.
- According to the court proceedings, in November 2016 Ri Chun Song directed payment to a Chinese company from a China-based account.
- According to the court proceedings, in May 2017, Ri Chun Song directed a payment to a Russian company from a China-based account.
- According to the court proceedings, in June 2017, Ri Chun Song received payment into a China-based account.

In response to the

China has closed all representative offices of DPRK financial institutions in China according to the Security Council resolutions. All the relevant representatives have left China. Chinese banks have always strictly implemented the targeted Security Council sanctions, and would not provide any financial services to individuals or entities designated by the Security Council. Considering its cooperative relationship with the Panel, China has overcome great difficulties and has had the commercial banks to carefully investigate the two individuals mentioned in the Panel's letter. There is no transaction involving Ri Chun Hwan in April 2019. There is neither any Ri Chun Song involved transaction record related to the payments from accounts located in China to any Chinese or Russian companies in 2016 and 2017, or any acceptance of payments in June 2017.

Annex 73: Korea Ungum Corporation and Unha Daesong Trading Company account numbers and relevant transactions

Agrosoyuz Commercial Bank
Account: 40807810800000000010
Account Owner: Korea Ungum Corporation[153]
Transactions:

- September 2017 payments from [REDACTED]
  February 2018 payments from [REDACTED]

Sputnik Bank
Account: 40807810240000000002
Account Owner: Korea Ungum Corporation
Transactions:

- February 2019 payments from [REDACTED]

Asia Pacific Bank
Account: 40807810700580000008
Account Owner: Unha Daesong Trading Company[154]
Transactions:

- September 2019 payments from [REDACTED]

Russian Financial Society
Account: 40807810300000000599
Account Owner: Unha Daesong Trading Company
Transactions:

- September 2019 payments from [REDACTED]

Sberbank
Account: 40807810250000000032
Account Owner: Unha Daesong Trading Company
Transactions:

September 2019 payments from [REDACTED]

Source: A Member State

[153] Korea Ungum Corporation (aka TS Ungum Corporation; Korea Yngum Corporation, Korea Ungum Company) is a suspected front company for DPRK's Foreign Trade Bank (designated KPe.047). See, paragraphs 172-173 in the 2020 Final Report (S/2020/151).

[154] Unha Daesong Trading Company (aka "Unha Daisong") is a suspected front company for DPRK's Foreign Trade Bank (designated KPe.047).

Annex 74: Corman Construction & Commerce SUARL Registration Documents

REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL
MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE
ET DES FINANCES

ORIGINAL

Décret N° 2012 - 886 du 27/08/2012
abrogeant et remplaçant le décret
N° 95 - 364 du 14/04/1995

AVIS D'IMMATRICULATION

Le numéro ci-dessous vous est définitivement attribué à la suite des modifications intervenues dans le nouveau système d'immatriculation.

N.I.N.E.A : 006422422 2Y2

DATE D'IMMATRICULATION : 22/06/2017

DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES IMPÔTS ET DES DOMAINES
PAR ORDRE
LE DIRECTEUR DES IMPÔTS
MEF

DENOMINATION	CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE - SUARL		
ENSEIGNE / SIGLE	CCC - SUARL		
ADRESSE/BP	CITé ASSEMBLéE OUAKAM VILLA N° 103 /		
LOCALITE	DAKAR	TELEPHONE	774638436

CENTRE FISCAL	NGOR-ALMADIES		
CONTROLE	1		
FORME JURIDIQUE	SOCIÉTÉ UNIPERSONNELLE À RESPONSABILITÉ LIMITÉE		
ACTIVITE PRINCIPALE	CONSTRUCTION DE BATIMENTS COMPLETS		
AUTORISATION MINISTERIELLE (POUR ASSOCIATION)			
REGISTRE DE COMMERCE		SN DKR 2017 B 16435	
DATE DE CREATION		22/06/2017	
CAPITAL SOCIAL	1000000	CHIFFRE D'AFFAIRES	
EFFECTIF TOTAL	0	NOMBRE D'ETABLISSEMENTS SECONDAIRES	

En cas de désaccord sur les renseignements portés sur cet avis, veuillez y apporter les rectifications souhaitées et le retourner à :

SERVICE REGIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DE LA DEMOGRAPHIE DE DAKAR

Rocade Fann Bel-Air Cerf-Volant BP 116 Dakar
RP - SENEGAL

Le NINEA doit obligatoirement figurer sur toutes les quittances, factures ou lettres reçues ou établies par vous et sur les actes, déclarations ou pièces produits, émis ou passés dans vos relations avec les Administrations Publiques ou Privées et les Entreprises. Il vous est par conséquent demandé de prendre les dispositions utiles pour vous conformer à la législation.

NINEA-DU CNI

Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie
NINEA

2000 FRANCS

DAKAR, le 23/06/2017

Lamine NDIAYE

ORIGINAL

A.P. Porto Novo 23/24 juin 1999

☐ d'ouverture d'un ETABLISSEMENT SECONDAIRE
☐ d'ouverture d'une SUCCURSALE d'une personne morale étrangère

RENSEIGNEMENTS RELATIFS A LA PERSONNE MORALE

DENOMINATION : **<<CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE>> SUARL**

NOM COMMERCIAL : CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE ENSEIGNE: SIGLE : CCC

ADRESSE DU SIEGE : Dakar (Sénégal), Cité Assemblée Ouakam, ville n° 103, N° RCCM DU SIEGE:SN.DKR.2017.B.16435

ADRESSE DE L' ETABLISSEMENT CREE :

FORME JURIDIQUE : SUARL

CAPITAL SOCIAL 1 000 000 Fcfa DONT NUMERAIRES 1 000 000 F CFA DONT EN NATURE 0 F CFA

DUREE 99 ans

RENSEIGNEMENTS RELATIFS A L'ACTIVITE ET AUX ETABLISSEMENTS

ACTIVITE : Activité Principale(Préciser) Réalisation & construction de bâtiments et tous Travaux de maçonnerie et de menuiserie ;
Etudes, Conseils;
Bâtiment Travaux Publics (BTP);

Date de début : 16/06/2017 Nbre de salariés prévus : 0

PRINCIPAL ETABLISSEMENT OU SUCCURSALE :<<CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE>>SUARL

Adresse :

Origine : ✓Création ☐ Achat ☐ Apport ☐ Prise en location gérance
☐ Autre:(Préciser)

Précédent Exploitant : Nom : Prénom :

Adresse :

Loueur de fonds(Nom,dénomination,adresse) :

ETABLISSEMENTS SECONDAIRES (Autres que celui créé) ☐ Oui ☑ Non

Adresse :

Activité :

ASSOCIES TENUS INDEFINIMENT ET PERSONNELLEMENT (*)

(*) La totalité des renseignements relatifs à ces associés doit IMPERATIVEMENT figurer sur le formulaire complémentaire M.O Bis annexé

RESUME DES INFORMATIONS :

NOM	PRENOM	DATE ET LIEU DE NAISSANCE	ADRESSE

2000 FRANCS

RENSEIGNEMENTS RELATIFS AUX DIRIGEANTS (*)(**)

(*) Concerne les Gérants,Administrateurs ou associés ayant le pouvoir d'engager la personne morale

(**) Les renseignements ne pouvant figurer ci dessous doivent IMPERATIVEMENT être reportés sur le formulaire M.o Bis annexé.

NOM	PRENOM	DATE ET LIEU DE NAISSANCE	ADRESSE	FONCTION (***)
Choi	Choe Song	16/05/1973 à Pyongyang (RPD de COREE),	Macao à Pyongyang (RPD de COREE),	Gérant

(***) Préciser : Gérant, PDG,Administrateurs, Associé

COMMISSAIRES AUX COMPTES

NOM	PRENOM	DATE ET LIEU DE NAISSANCE	ADRESSE	FONCTION
				TITULAIRE
				SUPPLEANT

LE SOUSSIGNE (préciser le mandataire) SCP NDIAYE & NDIAYE Associés demande à ce que la présente constitue ✓DEMANDE D'IMMATRICULATION AU R.C.C.M

La conformité de la déclaration avec les pièces justificatives produites en application de l'acte uniforme sur le droit commercial général a été verifiée par le greffier en Chef soussigné qui a procédé à l'inscription

Le 22/06/2017 sous le NUMERO **SN.DKR.2017.B.16435**

Fait à Dakar
Le 22/06/2017
Signature

Maître Oumy IRIANDOUM
DIAW
Greffier

1

Mo Bis
A.P. Porto Novo 23/24 juin 1999

INTERFACE COMPLEMENTAIRE AU FORMULAIRE Mo (*)

* Cette intercalaire doit IMPERATIVEMENT être annexé au formulaire Mo lorsque les rubriques 15 et 16 de ce formulaire n'ont pu être entièrement renseignées.

ASSOCIES TENUS INDEFINIMENT ET PERSONNELLEMENT (*)

INSCRIRE CI-DESSOUS LES NOMS, PRENOMS, DOMICILE PERSONNEL, DATE ET LIEU DE NAISSANCE, NATIONALITE, DATE ET LIEU DU OU DES MARIAGES, REGIME MATRIMONIAL, CLAUSES RESTRICTIVES OPPOSABLES AUX TIERS , SEPARATION DE BIENS, DE TOUS LES ASSOCIES TENUS INDEFINNIMENT ET PERSONNELLEMENT DES DETTES SOCIALES /

RENSEIGNEMENTS RELATIFS AUX DIRIGEANTS (*)(**)

* Concerne les Gérants, administrateurs ou associés pouvant engager la personne morale.
INSCRIRE CI-DESSOUS LES NOMS, PRENOMS, DATE ET LIEU DE NAISSANCE, ADRESSE, QUALITE (Préciser : Gérant, PDG ,PCA , Administrateur ou associés) CONCERNES ET QUI N'ONT PAS PU ÊTRE INSCRITS SUR LE FORMULAIRE Mo EN RUBRIQUE 14 :

La conformité de la déclaration avec les pièces justificatives produites en application de l'acte uniforme sur le droit commercial général a été verifiée par le greffier en Chef soussigné qui a procédé à l'inscription le 22/06/2017 sous le NUMERO SN.DKR.2017.B.16435

(reporter ici le numéro de formalité figurant sur le formulaire Mo)

Fait à Dakar
Le 22/06/2017
Signature

2

ENREGISTRE Csf Ngor Alma
Le 21/06/2017 12:45:10
N° 28
L'Inspecteur

DIRECTION GENERALE DES IMPOTS ET DOMAINES

DECLARATION D' EXISTENCE

De la Société Anonyme ou civile ou commandite simple
ou société en nom collectif: CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE SUARL
Faite par SCP NDIAYE & NDIAYE Associés , demeurant au 10, Rue Mohamed V BP 22922 DAKAR Ponty
en qualité de Notaire.

Dénomination de la Société: **CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE SUARL**

Objet de la Société: Réalisation & construction de bâtiments et tous Travaux de maçonnerie et de menuiserie ;
Etudes, Conseils;
Bâtiment Travaux Publics (BTP);
Ingénierie technique, financière et architecturale;
La maîtrise d'ouvrage;
Travaux publics, Bâtiments ; voiries et Réseaux divers ; Terrassement,
Décoration,
Le génie civil,
Fournitures de biens et équipements ;
Achat et Vente de Matériaux de Construction; (Engins lourds, grue fixe, grue mobile, excavateur, chargeurs, camions)
Assistance technique dans les procédures administratives et financière ;
La conception, la production ou l'assemblage, la commercialisation, l'installation d'équipement solaires et leur représentation exclusive ;
L'importation, l'achat, la vente, la fourniture et la distribution de tous matériels et équipements s'y rapportant ;
La formation, l'entretien, la maintenance et le service après-vente ;
Toutes activités liées à l'industrie immobilière (L'acquisition, la Propriété, la Gestion, l'administration par bail ou autrement et la disposition des immeubles et droits immobiliers; l'exploitation et la location-gérance de tous immeubles et droits immobiliers);

Partenariat et Financement de projets,
Investissement dans tous les domaines, courtage et intermédiation
Recherche de financement et Étude de faisabilité
Société de négociation et d'import-export
Le Négoce; le Négoce international ; le Partenariat commercial ;
La Représentation; la Distribution et toutes prestations de services relatives à l'importation et l'exportation;
L'importation, la transformation, l'exportation, la mise en œuvre, la maintenance de tous biens matériels et/ou immatériels relatifs aux domaines d'intervention de la société.
Assistance en Commercialisation ;
Commerce général
Import- Export
Le tout directement ou indirectement pour leur compte et pour le compte de tiers, soit seuls, soit avec des tiers par voie de création de sociétés nouvelles, d'apport, de fusion, de sociétés en participation, ou de gérance de tous biens ou de droits ou autrement.

Annex 75: SCI ADJA Seneba and Corman Construction contracts and transactions

According to documents obtained by the Panel, SCI ADJA Seneba, which is a subsidiary of EMG Universal Auto Group, entered into at least two contracts with Corman Construction between May 2017 and October 2017. EMG Universal Auto is a group of Senegalese companies owned and operated by Mr. Mbaye Gueye.

In May 2017, MOP Senegal entered into a contract with SCI ADJA Seneba to perform construction services at a Sengalese hotel. The period of performance for the work was October 2017 to October 2018 (Figure 1). The contract, which does not state a value, is signed by Mr. Mbaye Guye representing SCI ADJA SENEBA and Mr. Im Song Sun representing MOP Senegal.

In October 2017, Corman Construction entered into a contract with SCI ADJA Seneba to perform construction services at or near a local airport. The value of the contract was CAF 83,000,000 (approximately USD 150,000) and was to be paid in four installments (Figure 2). On page 2 of the contract, Corman Construction is listed as "CORMAN GROUP OF COMPANIES." Both the email address and phone number listed are the same used by MOP Senegal. The contract names "Monsieur Cholung Choe" as the representative for Corman Construction.[155]

Figure 3 shows two payments made from Mr. Mbaye Gueye and EMG Automotive, respectively, to Corman Construction. The first payment is dated 25 February 2017 in the amount of CAF 900,000 (approximately USD 1,600). The second payment is dated 13 December 2017 in the amount of CAF 24,900,000 (approximately USD 45,000). Although the Panel is unable to assess the purpose of the first payment, it is likely that the second payment (dated 14 December 2017) is an installment on the October 2017 contract. Representatives from SCI ADJA Seneba have not responded to the Panel's request for information.

[155] The Panel assesses that "Cholung Choe" is likely the same as Mr. Choe Song Chol— a known representative of MOP Senegal.

Figure 1. May 2017 Mansudae Overseas Project, Senegal, contract with SCI ADJA SENEBA



MANSUDAE OVERSEAS PROJECT
GROUP OF COMPANIES
architectural&Technical Service(Sénégal)

Ref: MOP /DG /07
Date 02/05/2017

Add :Espace Residence OuakamTel : (00221) 77 3513694
E-mail : mop.cshl@gmail.com (00221)33 8604092

02/05/2017

Accord de principe

Les deux parties dont SCI ADJA SENEBA siégant dans l'Av.Fahd Ben Abdal Aziz(Maître d'ouvrage) et MOP Sénégal ayant le siège à Ouakam, cité Assemblée (Maître d'œuvre) ont convenu à propos de la Résidence Hôtellerie,voici ce qui suit ;

Projet :HOTEL de Mammelle (R+4)
Site :Ouakam, derrière la clinique de Mammelle,au bord de la Mer
Superficie bâtie :3500m2
Superficie bâtie totale :14000m2
Condition de finition des travaux : sous forme de clé en main
Durée de travaux :du mois d' Octobre 2017-au mois d'Octobre 2018

Le Maître d'ouvrage déclare avoir reçu l'attestation de construction.
Le Maître d'ouvrage procède à l'enquête topographique et tout le nécessaire à la construction de l'Hôtel.
Le Maître d'ouvrage prépare le CPTP nécessaire au plan du projet et les travaux de construction.
Le Maître d'ouvrage reçoit l'approbation du plan du bureau de contrôle.

Le Maître d'œuvre prend en charge les plans de gros œuvre, architecture, électricité,plomberie et sanitaire.
Le Maître d'œuvre rédige le devis du plan

Les deux côtés discutent le devis et font le contrat de construction.

Le présent accord se prépare à titre officieuse et ne cède pas à la tierce partie sans approbation de l'un des deux parties.

SCI ADJA SENEBA

SCI ADJA SENEBA
Av. Fahd Ben Abdal Aziz
Echangeur HannxAutoroute
Mr.GUYE EMG

MOP SENEGAL

Administrateur du MOP SENEGAL
IBRAHIM Sengson

Adja SENEBA

Société civile Immobilière

Construction - Location – Vente

Appartements, Maisons à usage d'habitation et commercial

Accord de principe

Les deux parties dont SCI ADJA SENEBA siégant dans l'Av.Fahd Ben Abdal Aziz(Maître d'ouvrage) et MOP Sénégal ayant le siège à Ouakam, cité Assemblée (Maître d'œuvre) ont convenu à propos de la Résidence Hôtelière, voici ce qui suit ;

Projet : Résidence Hôtelière,

Site :Ouakam, derrière la clinique de Mammelle,au bord de la Mer

Superficie bâtie : 3500m2

Superficie bâtie totale : 14000m2

Condition de finition des travaux : sous forme de clé en main

Durée de travaux :du mois d' Octobre 2017-au mois d'Octobre 2018

Le Maître d'ouvrage déclare avoir reçu l'attestation de construction.

Le Maître d'ouvrage procède à l'enquête topographique et tout le nécessaire à la construction de l'Hôtel.

Le Maître d'ouvrage prépare le CPTP nécessaire au plan du projet et les travaux de construction.

Le Maître d'ouvrage reçoit l'approbation du plan du bureau de contrôle.

Le Maître d'œuvre prend en charge les plans de gros œuvre, architecture, électricité, plomberie et sanitaire.

Le Maître d'œuvre rédige le devis du plan

Les deux côtés discutent le devis et font le contrat de construction.

Le présent accord se prépare à titre officieuse et ne cède pas à la tierce partie sans approbation de l'un des deux parties.

SCI ADJA SENEBA	MOP SENEGAL
M. GUEYE	IBRA IM Songsun

S.C.I ADJA SENEBA
Echar... Dakar
Tél.: 33 869 04 12

Avenue Fahd Ben Abdel Aziz x Auto route – R.C. BE N 456/1 CASE 2009 NINEA: 004358455 2R7
Tél. : (221) 221 33 869 04 12 – Fax : (221) 33 867 93 67 – Mail; sadjaseneba@hotmail.fr Site web; www.sadjaseneba.com

Figure 2. October 2017 Corman Construction Contract with SCI ADJA SENEBA



CONTRAT D'ENTREPRISE

Projet de Construction d'un Immeuble à Rez de chaussée et 02 étages avec terrasse accessible sise Yof

Maître d'Ouvrage : SCI ADJIA SENEBA

Date : Octobre

Entre les soussignés,

Nom : SCI ADJA SENEBA
Adresse : Av. Ben Abdel Aziz x Autoroute
Téléphone : 221 33 869 04 12
Fax : 221 33 867 93 67
BP : 7894
E-mail : sadjaseneba@hotmail.fr

1

Le MAÎTRE D'OUVRAGE

D'une part

Et,
CORMAN GROUP OF COMPANIES
Nom: Monsieur Cholung Choe dit Ibrahim COREA
Adresse : Espace Résidence Ouakam
Téléphone : 00221-77-351-36-94
Fax : 00221-33-860-40-92
E-mail : ibrahim.corea@gmail.com ; mop.csh@hotmail.com/
L'ENTREPRENEUR

D'autre part

Ci-après dénommé,

Il a été convenu ce qui suit :

Article 1 :
L'entrepreneur s'engage à réaliser les travaux conformément aux plans et au
joint.
Article 2 :
Le lieu d'exécution des travaux est aux **Yoff, Route de l'aéroport,**
Article 3 :
Le montant des travaux clé en mains est fixé à Quatre vingt trois millions
(**83 000 000**). **FCFA TTC**
Article 4 :

Le payement se fera comme suit :

1er payement : 30% soit 24 900 000 F TTC à la signature du contrat
2ème payement : 30% soit 24 900 000F TTC après réception dalle PH Rez de chaussée.
3ème payement : 30% soit 24 900 000F TTC après réception dalle PH 1er et 2ème Etage.
4ème payement : 10% soit 8 300 000F TTC après réception des travau

Article 5 :
En cas de retard dans l'exécution des travaux, l'entrepreneur est passible d
de retard à concurrence de 1 / 5000e par jour de retard.
Article 6 :
Le client déclare avoir librement choisi son Entrepreneur.

2

ns le cas où le maître d'ouvrage est amené à modifier son programme entraînant un angement de plus de 10% du coût à un stade de son déroulement, il est prévu que entreprise reçoive des honoraires complémentaires au prorata du coût de ces derniers. Un avenant au présent contrat est alors rédigé pour fixer dans ce cas, les conditions de la rémunération complémentaire revenant à l'entreprise.

Article 7 :

Si dans le cours des prestations, des difficultés s'élèvent entre les représentants du maître d'ouvrage et l'entreprise, il est prévu d'en référer à un tiers choisi d'un commun accord qui fait alors connaître sa décision par écrit.

Si l'entreprise n'accepte pas cette décision, chacune des parties, à savoir le maître d'ouvrage d'une part et l'entreprise d'autre part, s'oblige à solliciter l'avis d'un arbitre, en cas de désaccord qui persiste, le différend sera soumis aux tribunaux compétents qui trancheront en dernière instance selon les règles en vigueur au Sénégal.

Article 8 :

Mode de règlement des travaux par avance à payer suivant planning de décaissement ci-joint.

En cas de faillite, de décès, de liquidation des biens ou règlement judiciaire de l'entreprise, le maître d'ouvrage peut résilier de plein droit le contrat sans indemnités compensatoires et sans préjudice de tout droit ou recours qu'elle peut avoir.

Article 9 :

Réception des travaux : elle sera faite en présence des deux parties et du représentant du maître d'ouvrage. A cet effet le client adressera en temps utile une demande de réception en précisant la date à laquelle les travaux seront achevés.

Article 10 :

La durée d'exécution des travaux sera de **120 Jours** à compter de la date de paiemen du 1er décompte.

En vue de la bonne marche des travaux, les deux parties déclarent fixer domicile au lieux ci-dessus mentionnés.

Article 11 :

La législation du travail et la réglementation sociale en vigueur au Sénégal sont applicables à l'entreprise qui s'astreint à respecter toute législation ou réglementation nouvelle rendue obligatoire au fur et à mesure de leur parution au Journal Officiel du Sénégal.

Aucune indemnité basée sur les sujétions et difficultés entraînées par décisions des autorités administratives concernant l'emploi de la main d'œuvre sénégalaise ne peu être acceptée.

Observations de l'entrepreneur :

- La retenue de garantie de 10% sera payée dans un délai de 07 jours à compte de la date de réception définitive des travaux c'est-à-dire la levée des réserve 100% par l'entreprise CCC.
- Dans le cas ou il ya des retards dont la responsabilité du maitre d'ouvrage est engagé, les pénalités de retards ne seront pas appliquées et l'entrepreneur pourra réclamer un dédommagement correspondant à la paie de son personne
- Le maitre d'ouvrage prend en charge la mission du Bureau de Contrôle et les approvisionnements en eau et électricité.

Le MO accompagnera l'entrepreneur pour la facilitation de tous les procédures nécessaires à la bonne exécution du projet.
Si le projet en cours serait suspendu à cause des mesures d'Etat et du gouvernement la responsabilité ne retombera en aucun cas à l'Entrepreneur.

à DAKAR (Sénégal),
18oct. 2017,
double exemplaire.

e Maître d'Ouvrage
CI ADJA SENEBA

L'Entrepreneur
Corman GROUP OF COMPAGNIES

C.I ADJA SENEBA
Fann Ben Abdel Aziz
Changeur Hann z Autoroute Dakar
Tél.: 33 869 04 12

DF=5000
Z=24000
29000

Enregistré à : Bureau de Recouvrement Ngor Almadies
Bordereau N° 492 / 28
Le VE 111 / 369 CASE 2492
Reçu Vingt neuf mille.
Le Chef de Bureau

26 OCT. 2017

AMADOU DIOP
Chef du Bureau de Recouvrement de Ngor Almadies
Inspecteur des Impôts et des Domaines

CORMAN
CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE

Figure 3. Payments from SCI ADJA Seneba to MOP Senegal and Corman Construction





BANK OF AFRICA

Chèque n° 2627525

FCFA 24908 0001

Payez contre ce chèque Vingt Quatre Millions Neuf Cent Huit Francs

A l'ordre de CORTAH CONSTRUCTION ET COMMERCE SENEGAL SUARL

DAKAR

PAYABLE

BANK OF AFRICA
Sièges et Agences
B.P. 1992 RP DAKAR
TEL:(221)33849 62 40

SN100 01003 002527710008 79

GUEYE MBAYE
LOT N°2
SENEGAL

SIGNATURE(S)

(Ne pas dépasser le cadre réservé)

Reçu le 14/Déc./17

19-12-019

Annex 76: Patisen and Corman Construction

Patisen is a Sengal-based food processing company, founded in 1981 and headquartered in Dakar (also known as Patisserie Senegal). According to documents obtained by the Panel, Patisen signed a contract with MOP Senegal in September 2016 (Figure 1) to perform construction-related services on a loading dock. The contract is valued at CAF 750,000,000 (approximately USD 1,353,000) and signed by Mr. Choe Song Chol.

In January 2018, Patisen signed a contract with Corman Construction for interior construction related services at a salt factory— including, demolition, paving, and painting (Figure 2). The contract was valued at CAF 15,638,228 (approximately USD 28,200). Mr Choe Song Chol is listed on the contract as representing Corman Construction. Additionally, Corman Construction lists its email address as the same email address used by MOP Senegal.

Documents obtained by the Panel suggest that Corman Construction and Patisen signed into an additional contract for supplemental construction services in May 2018 (Figure 3). It is not known to the Panel whether these services were performed, but media sources indicate the presence of Democratic People's Republic of Korea labor at the site in September 2019 (Figure 4 and 5). The contract value was CAF 2,327,354 (approximately USD 4,000).

Figure 6 shows three payments from Patisen to Corman Construction. The first payment is dated 13 February 2018 and payable to Mr. Choe Song Chol in the amount of CAF 26,008,638. The second payment was for CAF 7,500,000 on 2 May 2018 and the third payment was for CAF 2,000,000 on 2 July 2018. The second payment was payable to Mr. Im Song Sun— a representative of both MOP Senegal and Corman Construction. Representatives from Patisen have not responded to the Panel’s request for information.

Figure 1. September 2016 contract between Patisen and MOP Senegal

PATISEN DAKAR/ A016 - 620

MANSUDAE OVERSEAS PROJECT
GROUP OF COMPANIES
Espace Résidence Ouakam
csc.mop@gmail.com

Designation : PATISEN DAKAR
Unité de plateforme logistique/site Soabois
AFFAIRE N° A016-620

Construction d'une plateforme logistiaueSOABOIS

Le 24 Septembre 2016

MARCHÉ ENTRE LES SOUSSIGNÉS

PATISEN

Rond-Point Cymos

BP 185 DAKAR SENEGAL

Maître d'Ouvrage représenté par Monsieur Youssef OMAÏS, PDG

d'une part

MOP

Espace Résidence Ouakam

Société représenté par Monsieur CHOE SONG CHOL,

d'autre part

Il est convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :

La société PATISEN confie à la société MOP la commande concernant le présent lot, conditions ci-après.

PATISEN Rond-Point Cymos BP 185 Dakar/SENEGAL Page 1 sur 4

PATISEN DAKAR/ A016 - 620

ARTICLE 1 - PRIX

Montant Total HT en Francs CFA **750 000 000 FCFA**

Sept Cent Cinquante millions de francs CFA.

Le prix ci-dessus est net, global, forfaitaire, ferme, non révisable et non actualisable, pour l'ensemble des travaux définis par la Spécification Technique du présent lot.

ARTICLE 2 - CONDITIONS DE PAIEMENT

Le paiement se fera par versement d'acomptes suivant l'avancement des travaux.

Présentation des factures et des situations de travaux

Des factures seront présentées suivant l'état d'avancement des travaux.

ARTICLE 3 - DÉLAIS DE LIVRAISON

Les services dont MOP a la responsabilité au titre de la présente commande, devront être exécutés suivant le planning d'exécution qui définit par corps d'état la durée et l'enchaînement des prestations.

ARTICLE 4 - PÉNALITES

Non-respect du planning

En cas de non-respect des délais du planning contractuel des travaux, il serait appliqué une pénalité de 1/500ème du montant hors taxes de la commande par jour calendaire de retard, plafonnée à 5 % du montant des travaux.

Nous nous réservons le droit de prolonger les délais ci-dessus. Les pénalités seraient néanmoins applicables à compter des nouveaux délais contractuels.

Absence et retards aux rendez-vous de chantiers

Les absences non excusées aux rendez-vous de chantier ou tout retard de plus de 45 minutes, feront l'objet d'une pénalité de 100 000 FCFA.

Ces absences seront comptabilisées à la fin de chaque mois et leur montant déduit des situations mensuelles correspondantes.

PATISEN se réserve le droit d'appliquer des pénalités par constatation (et par jour) du non-respect des règles d'hygiène et de sécurité.

ARTICLE 5 - PIECES CONTRATUELLES

5.1 Le présent marché de travaux

5.2 Le contrat signé entre PATISEN et MOP

5.4 Le planning d'exécution des travaux

5.5 Les devis de MOP ci joints : Construction Plateforme logistique SOABOIS

ARTICLE 6 - DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES PARTICULIERES

6.1 En cas de contestations, les parties conviennent de faire attribution de juridiction des Tribunaux de DAKAR.

6.2 L'entreprise reconnaît être allée sur le chantier avant l'établissement de son offre et avoir pris connaissance de toutes les sujétions nécessaires à la bonne réalisation des travaux.

6.4 Incluses toutes sujétions d'installation et de parfaite réalisation en égards aux Règles de l'Art en pareille matière.

6.5 Les entreprises sont pleinement responsables de leurs travaux et de leurs protections jusqu'à la réception.

ARTICLE 7 - ASSURANCES

Le chapitre est régi par la disposition de l'article 4.4 du Cahier des Clauses particulières qui fait parti du marché.

A leur gré, les entreprises pourront ou non contracter une assurance contre le vol pour la durée des travaux.

Les travaux seront soumis au contrôle d'un Bureau de Contrôle.

ARTICLE 8 - TRAVAUX SUPPLEMANTAIRES

Si Patisen et MOP seront tombés d'accord sur les travaux supplementaires et d'autres travaux ailleurs en présence de devis validés, les devis seront considérés le contrat annexe .

PATISEN DAKAR/ A016 - 620

Le présent marché est signé en 2 exemplaires originaux.

Pour La Société PATISEN

« BON POUR COMMANDE »

Le

Pour l'entreprise MOP

« BON POUR ACCEPTATION DE COMMANDE »

Le

PATISEN Rond-Point Cymos BP 185 Dakar/SENEGAL Page 4 sur 4

Figure 2. January 2018 contract between Patisen and Corman Construction

Dakar le 13 Janvier 2018

CORMAN CONSTRUCTION
COMMERCE SUARL

Architectural & Technical Service (Senegal)

Ref : CCC / D18- 004
Date : 13/Janvier/ 2018

Add : Espace Résidence Ouakam
E-mail : csc.mop@gmail.com

Tel : (00221) 77 463 84 36
Fax : (00221) 33 860 40 92

R.C SN DAKAR 2017 B 16435 NINEA 0064224222 Y2

PATISEN
PROJET DE CONSTRUCTION USINE DU SEL
Devis estimatif de dallage intérieur Usine TAMARO (2ème étape)
Récapitulation Générale

N°	Désignations	Prix Total (CFA)
LOT 1	1 - Démolition et évacuation structure exist	1,727,163
LOT 2	2 -Plancher à dalle pleine ep	11,447,938
LOT 3	3-Enduits	322,818
LOT 4	4.-Chambre technique	2,140,310
	TOTAL HTVA	15,638,228

Corman Construction et Commerce:

CHOE SONG CHOL

CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE

Figure 3. May 2018 contract between Patisen and Corman Construction



CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE
SENEGAL SUARL

Architectural & Technical Service (Senegal)

Ref : CCC / F16 - 0&2 SN DKR 2017 B 16435 Add : Espace Résidence Ouakam Date : 15 / Mai / 2018
NINEA 006422422292 Tel : (00221) 77 8513694 Tel fixe(00221)33 860 40 92 E-mail : mop.cih@hotmail.com

Suppléments des travaux du villa Patisen

No	Désignation	somme (FCFA)
1	Travaux dallage 10cm	640, 768
2	bâtiment de poste	1, 686, 586
6	Total	2, 322, 354

2 000 000

CORMAN CONSTRUCTION & COMMERCE

Figure 4. Reported DPRK nationals at the Patisen worksite, 16 September 2019

Source: https://www.voanews.com/africa/despite-un-sanctions-north-koreans-work-senegal

Figure 5. Undated Photo of Patisen Loading Docks

Source: Google Maps

Figure 6. Payments from Patisen to Corman Construction

Série 002 Chèque N° 2171494

BSIC
BANQUE SAHELO-SAHARIENNE
POUR L'INVESTISSEMENT ET LE COMMERCE

FCFA 26.608.638+

Payez contre ce chèque Vingt six millions huit mille six cent trente huit francs (Somme en toutes lettres)

A l'ordre de CHOE SONG CHOL

A Dakar Le 08/02/ 2018

PAYABLE
TOUTES AGENCES BSIC
Plce de L'Indép.XRue Malenfant
B.P. 4106 Dakar Sénégal
Tel (221) 33 889 58 58

Compte N° SN111 01001 020028000012 37

PATISSERIE SENEGAL
BD DE LA LIBERATION X PLACE LE
BP 185 DAKAR

Signature (s)

(Ne pas dépasser le cadre)

[redacted]

2018. 2. 8 전수 소금공장 2번째 15 638

Mayonnaise 10 370



SÉRIE CHÈQUE N°
AN1 3514650

Ecobank
La Banque Panafricaine

Km 3 Avenue Cheikh Anta Loop
B.P. 8095, Centre Douanes (CD)
Dakar Sénégal

[redacted]

F.C.F.A. 7.500.000 +

PAYER CONTRE CE CHÈQUE Sept millions cinq cent mille francs — SOMMES EN TOUS

À L'ORDRE DE IM SONG SUN

Fait à Dakar LE 02/05/18

PAYABLE À
ECOBANK
SIEGE ET AGENCES
B.P. 9095 DAKAR CD
TEL: (+221) 33 859 99 99

SN094 01001 121015661201 84

PATISEN SA
33 BOULEVARD DE LA LIBERATION
DAKAR SENEGAL

SIGNATURE(S)

(NE PAS DÉPASSER LE CADRE RÉSERVÉ)

2016/01

[redacted]

소금공장 3 (4차) 수입금

남은돈 7 500 000

2018. 5. 4



SÉRIE CHÈQUE N°
AN1 5735159

Ecobank
La Banque Panafricaine

ECOBANK SENEGAL
Km 5 Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop
B.P. 9095, Centre Douanes (CD)
Dakar, Sénégal

F CFA 2000000+

PAYER CONTRE CE CHÈQUE Deux millions de francs

À L'ORDRE DE

Fait à Dakar

LE 02/07/18

SIGNATURE(S)

PAYABLE À
ECOBANK
SIEGE ET AGENCES
B.P. 9095 DAKAR CD

SN094 01001 121015661201 84

PATISEN SA
33 BOULEVARD DE LA LIBERATION
DAKAR SENEGAL

2016/01

TEL: (+221) 33 859 99 99

[redacted]

오마이는 주택 비용 추가.

200 000 F

2018. 7. 3

Annex 77: Corman Construction work on the Diamniadio Lake City development

Based on information obtained by the Panel, as well as publicly available information, the Panel made inquiries into alleged work performed by Corman Construction on the Diamniadio Lake City development project in Dakar, Senegal. In its response to the Panel's inquiry, representatives from the company in charge of the Diamniadio Lake City development project stated that their organization did not have "any partnership or commercial relationship with the company Corman Construction & Commerce SUARL…" The representative further stated that in July 2019, representatives from Corman Construction visited the project site to offer their services but those services were declined.

The Panel has obtained additional financial records, however, that indicate at least two payments were made to Corman Construction and Commerce for work performed on the Diamniadio Lake City development project. These payments occurred in May and June 2020, in the amount of CAF 15,000,000 and CAF 21,000,000, respectively.

Annex 78: Corman Construction Financial Accounts

Figure 1. Corman Construction Account Statement at Banque Atlantique

BANQUE ATLANTIQUE

[redacted] en FRANC CFA BCEAO (XOF)

Relevé du 01/06.2019 au 28.06.2019 (page 1)

MOP SENEGAL SUARL
APPT 11
CITE AGENCE IMM 13
OUAKAM
SENEGAL

Date	Libellé	Référence	Valeur	Débit	Crédit
	Ancien solde au 31.05.2019				10,575
28.06	Pack Acnet + formule SMS Week+ Alerte **	N303729	28.06.19	1,755.00	
28.06	FRAIS COMPTE [redacted] -850	Frais	30.06.19	5,850.00	

RELEVE DE COMPTE

Le 25 Juin 2019

RELEVE D'IDENTITE BANCAIRE

du compte : CORMAN CONSTRUCTION
compte : FRANC CFA BCEAO

DOMICILIATION

CORMAN CONSTRUCTION
DAKAR
DAKAR

REFERENCES BANCAIRES

Banque	Code agence	N°Compte	Clé RIB
1	01001	[redacted]	74

Gestionnaire
AISSATOU DIAO YADE

IBAN
SN111 20242500012 74

RELEVE D'OPERATIONS POUR LA PERIODE DU 01/06/2019 AU 28/06/2019

Date	Libellé	Valeur	Débit	Crédit	Solde
	Solde au 01/06/2019				46.505,0000
6/2019	FRAIS DE TENUE DE COMPTE	27/06/2019	23.400,0000		23.105,0000
	Frais de tenue de compte				
	Frais de tenue de compte			5,0000	
	Total des mouvements		23.400,0000		
	Solde au 28/06/2019				23.105,0000

Figure 2. Corman Construction check from Banque Sahelo-Saharienne, payable to Patisen



Annex 79: Passport for Pak Hwa Song

발급책임자 수표 / Signature of Authority

조선민주주의인민공화국 Democratic People's Republic of Korea

PO PRK 654331357

박화성

M

PAK HWA SONG DPR KOREA

13 OCT 1962 PYONGYANG

14 JUL 2014 14 JUL 2019

MINISTRY OF FORFIGN AFFAIRS

P0PRKPAK<<HWASONG<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

6543313575PRK6210135M1907140<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<4

Annex 80: Passport for Hwang Kil Su



3

발급책임자 수표 / Signature of Authority

조선민주주의인민공화국 Democratic People's Republic of Korea

PO PRK 654331363

황길수 M

HWANG KIL SU DPR KOREA

09 DEC 1973 PYONGYANG

14 JUL 2014 14 JUL 2019

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

소지자 수표 / Holder's Signature

황길수

POPRKHWANG<<KILSU<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

6543313634PRK7312092M1907140<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<8

Annex 81: Corporate Registration and related documentation for Congo Aconde SARL

Figure 1. Corporate Registration document, dated 26 February 2018

M.o

A.P. Porto Novo 23/24 juin 1999

DECLARATION ■ **de CONSTITUTION** DE PERSONNE MORALE
ou ☐ d'OUVERTURE **d'un ETABLISSEMENT SECONDAIRE**
ou ☐ d'OUVERTURE d'une **SUCCURSALE** d'une personne morale ETRANGERE

RENSEIGNEMENTS RELATIFS A LA PERSONNE MORALE

1 DENOMINATION : **CONGO ACONDE**
NOM COMMERCIAL : _____ ENSEIGNE : _____ SIGLE : **C.A**
2 ADRESSE DU SIEGE : **1041 avenue Ulindi,Q/Golf, C/Lubumbashi, V/Lubumbashi, P/Katanga, RD Congo**
3 ADRESSE DE L'ETABLISSEMENT CREE : _____
FORME JURIDIQUE : **S.A.R.L.** N° R.C.C.M. du siège : **CD/LSH/RCCM/18-B-00029**
4 CAPITAL SOCIAL : **16147271 CDF** DONT NUMERAIRES : _____ DONT EN NATURE : _____
5 DUREE : **99** Années entières consécutives

RENSEIGNEMENTS RELATIFS A L'ACTIVITE ET AUX ETABLISSEMENTS

6 **ACTIVITE** : ACTIVITE PRINCIPALE : (préciser) Aménagement des places publiques Embellissement de l'environnement Décoration Bâtiments, Travaux publics. Et généralement, toutes les opérations financières, commerciales, industrielles, mobilières et immobilières, pouvant se rattacher directement ou indirectement à l'objet ci-dessus ou à tout objet similaires ou connexes.
8 Date de début : **26/02/2018** Nombre de salariés prévus : **6**

PRINCIPAL ETABLISSEMENT OU SUCCURSALE :
9 Adresse :
10 Origine : ■ Création ☐ Achat ☐ Apport ☐ Prise en location gérance ☐ Autres
11 (préciser) : _____
12 Précédent exploitant : Nom : _____ Prénoms : _____
13 Adresse : _____ N° RCCM : _____
Loueur de fonds (nom/dénomination, adresse) :
14 **ETABLISSEMENTS SECONDAIRES** : (autres que celui créé) ■ Non ☐ Oui (préciser) :
Adresse : _____
Acivité : _____

ASSOCIES TENUS INDEFINIMENT ET PERSONNELLEMENT (*)

15 (*) La totalité des renseignements relatifs à ces associés doit IMPERATIVEMENT figurer sur le formulaire complémentaires M.o Bis annexé.
RESUME DES INFORMATIONS :

NOM	PRENOM	DATE LIEU DE NAISSANCE	ADRESSE

RENSEIGNEMENTS RELATIFS AUX DIRIGEANTS (*)(**)

16 (*) Concerne les Gérants, Administrateurs ou associés avant le pouvoir d'engager la personne morale
(**) Les renseignements ne pouvant figurer ci-dessous doivent IMPERATIVEMENT être reportés sur le formulaire M.o Bis annexé.

NOM	PRENOM	DATE LIEU DE NAISSANCE	ADRESSE	FONCTION(***)
M. PAK	HWA SONG	13/10/1962 A PYONGYANG	1041 avenue Ulindi,Q/Golf, C/Lubumbashi, V/Lubumbashi, P/Katanga, RD Congo	Gérant

(***) Préciser : Gérant, PDG, Administrateur, Associé

COMMISSAIRES AUX COMPTES

17

NOM	PRENOM	DATE LIEU DE NAISSANCE	ADRESSE	FONCTION
				TITULAIRE
				SUPPLEANT

LE SOUSSIGNE (préciser si mandataire) : **MAÎTRE RICK LUMBALA NGOY**, MANDATAIRE
demande à ce que la présente constitue ■ **DEMANDE D'IMMATRICULATION AU R.C.C.M.**
18 La conformité de la déclaration avec les pièces justificatives produites en application de L'Acte Uniforme sur le Droit commercial général a été vérifiée par le Greffier Titulaire du Guichet Unique soussigné qui a procédé à l'inscription le **26/02/2018** sous le NUMERO **CD/LSH/RCCM/18-B-00029**

Fait à Lubumbashi
Le 26/02/2018
Signature

26 FEV 2018

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
GUICHET UNIQUE
ANTENNE DE LUBUMBASHI
GREFFE D'IMMATRICULATION
DE CREATION D'ENTREPRISE
MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE ET GARDE DES SCEAUX

Kapalas
MUSAGI WABULASA
Greffier Titulaire du Guichet Unique

Figure 2. Corporate National Identification record



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE NATIONALE

SII

KINSHASA, LE 12/03/2018

IDENTIFICATION NATIONALE

STE CONGO ACONDE SARL

C.A SARL

1041 AV.ULINDI Q.GOLF C/LUBUMBASHI

6-83-N30195N

Messieurs,

Par application de l'Ordonnance -Loi n°73/236 du 13 août 1973 portant institution d'un numéro national d'identification, il a été décidé de vous attribuer le numéro

Ce numéro annule et remplace tous les numéros d'identification qui vous avaient été attribués précédemment.

Désormais il devra figurer sur les entêtes des lettres, factures, reçus, quittances, déclarations, actes et autres pièces produits dans le cadre de vos relations avec les services et entreprises des secteurs public et privé.

Si vous recevez d'autres lettres semblables à celle-ci, ou si vous constatez une erreur ou une omission dans les renseignements ci-dessous, veuillez en avertir le Secrétaire Général à l'Economie Nationale, B.P. 8.500 Kinshasa 1.

Veuillez également lui communiquer le plus tôt possible toute modification qui interviendrait dans ces renseignements.

INFORMATIONS OBLIGATOIRES

Raisons Sociale	STE CONGO ACONDE SARL
Date de Création	26/02/2018
R.C.C.M :	LSH/RCCM/18-B-00029
Localité R.C.C.M :	LUBUMBASHI
Numéro B.P. :	
Localité B.P. :	

INFORMATIONS COMPLEMENTAIRES

Adresse	1041 AV.ULINDI Q.GOLF C/LUBUMBASHI
Secteur d'activité	SERVICES FOURNIS AUX ENTREPRISES
Résident au Congo	1
Forme juridique	SARL
Nationalité	REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
Date effet	12/03/2018

POUR LE MINISTRE

Christophe KALALA MBAYO

Secrétaire Général a.i

Figure 3. Congo Aconde corporate tax document

Kinshasa, le 05 MARS 2018

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
MINISTERE DES FINANCES

N°11/11002509M/DGI/DIRAF/DIGR/IM/2018

DIRECTION GENERALE DES IMPOTS

DIRECTION DE L'ASSIETTE FISCALE

Objet : Notification du Numéro Impôt A1803944H

A la Société
CONGO ACONDE

AV.ULINDU Q/GOLF MUNUA C/LUBUMBASHI

KATANGA

Messieurs,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance qu'en application des dispositions de la Circulaire Ministérielle n°002/CAB/MIN/FINANCES/2006 du 20 juin 2006 relative à l'exécution du Décret n°03/012 du 18 juillet 2003 portant institution d'un Numéro Impôt, vous êtes désormais identifiés sous le Numéro Impôt: **A1803944H**

A cet effet, j'appelle votre attention sur l'obligation légale d'afficher ledit numéro aussi bien sur toute correspondance avec l'Administration Fiscale que sur tout facturier ou autre document émis en tenant lieu.

Par conséquent, tout autre Numéro Impôt vous attribué antérieurement est définitivement désactivé, et conformément à la répartition des compétences entre services gestionnaires, la gestion de votre dossier fiscal relève de la compétence de : **Centre d' Impôts Synthétiques de LUBUMBASHI**

Veuillez agréer, Messieurs, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

*cl: - D.G
- DGA(TOUS)
- Insp. Coordo
- Directeur Provincial du KATANGA

Eric BULUNDWE KASAMBA
Directeur

DIRECTION GENERALE DES IMPOTS
DIRECTION DE L'ASSIETTE FISCALE

PM011803699990

Figure 4. Articles of Incorporation signature page

12

2. En outre les soussignés donnent mandat à Monsieur PAK HWA SONG résident au n° 104 Avenue ULINDI Quartier Golf Commune et Ville de Lubumbashi à l'effet de prendre les engagements suivant au nom et pour le compte de la société CONGO ACONDE S.A.R.L

Article 28 : Les frais, droits et honoraires des présents statuts sont à charge de la société.

Fait à Lubumbashi, le 21/02/2018 en 6 originaux

LES ASSOCIES

1. Monsieur PAK HWA SONG
2. Monsieur HWANG KIL SU

Figure 5. Capital Declaration

DECLARATION DE SOUSCRIPTION DU CAPITAL SOCIAL

Nous soussignés : PAK HWA SONG et HWANG KIL SU déclarons par la présente avoir souscrit le montant de 10.000USD (dollars américains dix mille) comme capital social de la société CONGO ACONDE S.A.R.L en sigle C.A

Fait à Lubumbashi le 21/02/2016

LES ASSOCIES SIGNATAIRES

1. PAK HWA SONG
2. HWANG KIL SU

**The Panel is investigating the date discrepancy with the date on the capital declaration.*

Annex 82: Congo Aconde account numbers and domicile statement

Afriland First Bank

N°	NAMES	ACCOUNT N°	DATE OF OPENING
1	PAK HWA SONG	[redacted] USD	14/06/2019
2	HWANG KIL SU	[redacted] USD	13/06/2019
3	RY YONG GWANG	[redacted] USD	12/07/2019
4	HAN KYONG HO	[redacted] USD	14/06/2019
5	RIM CHOL	[redacted] USD	08/07/2019
6	CONGO ACONDE SARL	[redacted] USD	23/02/2018
		[redacted] USD	27/04/2018

Afriland First Bank CD

Siège Social
Boulevard du 30 juin n°767
Kinshasa/Gombe
(+243) 99 000 11 11
(+243) 99 000 22 22
[illegible]
Numéro d'impôt A0750212P
CD/KIN/RCCM/14-B-3350

ATTESTATION DE DOMICILIATION BANCAIRE

Nous soussignés **AFRILAND FIRST BANK CD SA**, dont le Siège Social est au n°767 Boulevard du 30 juin, BP 10470 à Kinshasa/Gombe,

Attestons que **CONGO ACONDE SARL, STE EN FORMATION,** entretient le compte suivant :

- **N° de Compte** : [redacted] **USD**
- **COORDONNEES CORRESPONDANTS / BMCE BANK**
  - **SWIFT CODE** : **BMCEFRPP**
  - **IBAN USD** : **IBAN FR**[redacted]
  - **IBAN EURO** : **IBANFR**[redacted]
- **COORDONNEES AFRILAND FIRST BANK CD**
  - **SWIFT CODE** : **AFCDCDKIXXX**

Ouvert dans nos livres à l'Agence de Lubumbashi avec **un versement de $US 10.000,00 pour la constitution du capital social.**

En foi de quoi, la présente attestation est délivrée pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

Fait à Lubumbashi, le 23 Février 2018

Pour Afriland First Bank CD SA
Agence de Lubumbashi

Contrôleurs des Opérations
Manix KANIKI

Le Chef d'Agence
Lévi's LEMA

AFRILAND FIRST BANK CD
54, Av. MOERO
C. LUBUMBASHI
Agence de LUBUMBASHI

19. Limitations, exclusions de la responsabilité de la Banque
La Banque ne répond pas des dommages ou autres conséquences qui peuvent être causés par :
- le défaut d'authenticité de signature des ordres qui sont donnés à la Banque;
- l'irrégularité des procédures d'opposition judiciaire ou extrajudiciaire ;
- le non-prélèvement ou le prélèvement incorrect des retenues fiscales applicables ;
- les lois, usages, coutumes, règles ou conventions applicables aux correspondants, centres de dépôts collectifs ou systèmes de compensation ;
- toute information commerciale donnée, transmise ou reçue de bonne foi ;
- tout événement généralement quelconque d'ordre politique, économique ou social, de nature à troubler, désorganiser ou interrompre totalement ou partiellement les services de la Banque alors même que ces événements n'auraient pas le caractère de force majeure;
- le manquement par le Client de se conformer à toutes les dispositions légales ou réglementaires de son pays de résidence ou de toute autre législation applicable.
D'une façon générale, la Banque ne répond que de sa faute grave dans ses relations avec le Client.

20. Données informatiques
La Banque se réserve le droit de mettre sur support informatique une série de données nominatives se rapportant à chaque Client. Le refus de communiquer celles-ci à la Banque et l'interdiction qui lui serait faite d'avoir recours à des techniques, seraient un obstacle à une entrée en relation ou au maintien des relations existantes avec la Banque. Ainsi, le Client s'engage à signaler sans délai les modifications intervenues dans les informations personnelles communiquées à la Banque notamment en ce qui concerne l'adresse, la capacité des signataires, le statut civil, etc.
Toute modification de la situation du client qui n'aurait pas été signalée saurait être opposable à la Banque.

21. Modification des Conditions Générales
La Banque peut modifier à tout moment les présentes Conditions Générales par une notification écrite pour tenir compte notamment des modifications législatives ou réglementaires, ainsi que des usages de la place et de la situation de marché ou de la politique de la Banque. En cas de contestation écrite, la Banque mettra immédatement fin aux relations avec le client.

22. Lieu d'exécution des obligations de la Banque
Pour des raison d'efficacité, la Banque peut être conduite à mettre le client en relation avec des unités différentes en son sein. En toute hypothèse et sauf stipulation contraire expresse, l'unité de domiciliation du compte du Client est le lieu d'exécution des obligations de la Banque envers le Client et du Client envers la Banque.

23. Enregistrement des communications téléphoniques
Le Client reconnait à la Banque le droit de procéder à l'enregistrement de leurs communications téléphoniques. La Banque peut conserver les enregistrements aussi longtemps qu'elle le jugera utile.
En cas de contestation relative à un ordre donné par voie téléphonique par le client, les enregistrements auront valeur de preuve.
Le défaut d'enregistrement ou de conservation ne pourra pas être invoqué à l'encontre de la Banque.

24. Expédition d'objets
Toute expédition au Client d'espèces, de valeurs mobilières ou autres valeurs quelles qu'elles soient, est effectuée aux frais et aux risques et périls du Client.
La Banque peut souscrire, aux frais du Client, une assurance afin de couvrir ces expéditions, mais elle ne sera pas tenue de le faire à moins qu'elle en ait reçu l'ordre formel écrit du Client.
En cas de sinistre, la Banque payera au Client les indemnités versées effectivement par la compagnie d'assurance après les déductions applicables.

25. Confidentialité des informations
Toute information relative au(x) compte(s) du Client et aux opérations qui y sont liées sera traitée par la Banque comme strictement confidentielle. Une telle information ne sera divulguée par la Banque qu'au Client ou conformément aux instructions du Client.

26. Prêt de titres
La Banque est autorisée à utiliser les titres du Client dans des opérations de prêt pour autant que ces opérations ont lieu dans un marché généralement ouvert aux professionnels du secteur financier et organisé par des agents de change ou par des systèmes de compensation ou par des institutions organisant le marché. Ce prêt se ra fait au risque et profit de la Banque à condition toutefois que la responsabilité de la Banque envers son Client ne soit en aucune circonstance supérieure à la responsabilité revenant aux systèmes de compensation ou aux institutions organisant le marché, conformément aux usages et règles applicables dans le marché concerné. Aucune rémunération ne sera payable au client qui reconnait que les frais de garde et de conservation afférents au dépôt de titres tiennent compte de l'autorisation donnée par le client à la banque pour le prêt de titre.

27. Droit applicable et for
La loi applicable est celle du lieu du siège social de la Banque.
Les litiges éventuels entre le Client et la Banque seront de la compétence exclusive du tribunal du lieu du siège de la banque ou de l'agence auprès de laquelle le compte est ouvert. La Banque se réserve toutefois le droit d'agir au lieu de résidence du Client ou devant tout autre tribunal compétent malgré l'élection de juridiction qui précède.

28. Acceptation
Le soussigné, Client, déclare avoir spécialement lu et approuvé tous les articles des présentes conditions générales de Banque et par sa signature, ci-dessous accepte expressément qu'ils l'engagent dans leur intégralité et sans aucune réserve.

Pour la banque

Le client
(Nom et signature précédés de la mention lu et approuvé)

Lu et approuvé

Fait en deux exemplaires
à Lubumbashi le 23/02/2018

Pak Hwa Song
Hwang Kil Sa

Validation
Date 23/02/2018
Visa

INTITULE: CONGO ALONSE SARL

N° du Compte [redacted]

Nom, Prénom(s) et n° CNI des signataires	Spécimen de signature		Observations pouvoirs
A PAK HWA SONG Gérant			seul
B Hwang Kil Sa Conseiller technique			seul
C			

Annex 83: Passports of Han Kyong Ho, Ri Yong Gwang and Rim Chol

Figure 1. Han Kyong Ho’s passport

Figure 2. Ri Yong Gwang's passport

Figure 3. Rim Chol's passport

Annex 84: Congo Aconde and Monuments in Haut Lomami

Haut Lomami : inauguration des monuments Mzee Kabila et Ilunga Mbidi a Kamina

Agence Congolaise de Presse (French)
Mercredi 23 Janvier 2019

Kamina, 23 janvier 2019 (ACP).- Le gouverneur du Haut Lomami, Kalenga Mwenzemi a procédé mercredi à Kamina, au dévoilement du monument Mzee Laurent Désiré Kabila construit à la jonction des avenues Lumumba et de l'Eglise. Peu après, il a aussi dévoilé celui de l'empereur luba, Ilunga Mbidi Kiluwe, érigé au rond-point de la gare au croisement des avenues de la Base et des Manguiers.

Cette cérémonie qui n'a connu aucun mot de circonstance s'est déroulée en présence des députés et des ministres provinciaux du Haut Lomami ainsi que de nombreux curieux venus admirer ces oeuvres d'art. Ces monuments ont été construits l'année dernière par la société sud-coréenne, Congo Akonde qui n'a donné aucun détail sur ces réalisations. Toutefois, ces travaux ont été entièrement financés par le gouvernement provincial du Haut Lomami.

Source: Agence Congolaise de Presse

Annex 85: Contract award letter dated 23 February 2019

Figure 1. Surety Bond Declaration by Congo Aconde's Bank to the City of Lubumbashi

Afriland First Bank CD

Siège Social
ard du 30 juin n°767
inshasa/Gombe
43) 99 090 11 11
43) 99 090 22 22
o d'impôt A0700212P
N/RCCM/14-B-3330

CAUTION DE SOUMISSION
N°0001-SMS-16-10-2018

Afriland First Bank CD/Agence de Lubumbashi, n° 92, Avenue SENDWE Lubumbashi/Haut-Katanga, RDC

Bénéficiaire : **Ville de LUBUMBASHI**

Sis 1041, Avenue ULINDI Q/Golf, Commune et Ville de Lubumbashi.

Date : **10/10/2018**

Nous avons été informés que **CONGO ACONDE Sarl** (ci-après dénommée «le Soumissionnaire») a répondu à votre Appel d'Offres **AAO N° N° 003/MARIE V. L'SHI/Cel-Techn-MP/2018 pour réhabilitation et addition d'ouvrage au bassin de la ville, Commune de Lubumbashi, près du stade de la Victoire dans la province du Haut – Katanga.** (Ci-après dénommée « l'Offre »)

En vertu des dispositions du dossier d'Appel d'Offres, l'offre doit être accompagnée d'une garantie d'offre.

A la demande du Maitre de l'Ouvrage, nous **AFRILAND FIRST BANK CD**, nous engageons par la présente, sans réserve et irrévocablement, à vous payer à première demande, toutes sommes d'argent que vous pourriez réclamer dans la limite de **$US 108.225 (Dollars américains cent huit mille deux cents vingt-cinq).**

Votre demande en paiement doit être accompagnée d'une déclaration attestant que le Soumissionnaire n'a pas exécuté une des obligations auxquelles il est tenu en vertu de l'Offre, à savoir :

a. s'il retire l'Offre pendant la période de validité qu'il a spécifiée dans la lettre de soumission de l'offre ; ou

b. si, s'étant vu notifier l'acceptation de l'Offre du Maitre de l'Ouvrage pendant la période de validité telle qu'indiquée dans la lettre de soumission de l'offre ou prorogée par l'Offre ou prorogée par le Maitre de l'Ouvrage avant l'expiration de cette période, il :
- ne signe pas le Marché ; ou
- ne fournit pas la garantie de bonne réalisation du marché, s'il est tenu de le faire ainsi qu'il est prévu dans la clause 38 des instructions aux soumissionnaires.

La présente garantie expire (**a**) si le marché est octroyé au Soumissionnaire, lorsque nous recevrons une copie du marché signé et de la garantie de bonne exécution émise en votre nom, selon les instructions du Soumissionnaire ; ou (**b**) si le marché n'est pas octroyé au Soumissionnaire, à la première des dates suivantes : (**i**) lorsque nous recevrons copie de votre notification au Soumissionnaire du nom du soumissionnaire retenu, ou (**ii**) vingt huit (**28**) jours après l'expiration de l'Offre.

Toute demande de paiement au titre de la présente garantie doit être reçue à cette date au plus tard. La présente garantie est régie par les Règles uniformes de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale (CCI) relatives aux garanties sur demande, Publication CCI no : 458.

Le Chef de Guichet — **Michael BAZODILA**

AFRILAND FIRST BANK CD — AV.SENDWE N°92 VILLE DE LUBUMBASHI — Agence de SENDWE

Le Chef d'Agence, — **Lévi's LEMA**

Figure 2. Notification of Contract Award by the City of Lubumbashi

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
PROVINCE DU HAUT KATANGA

VILLE DE LUBUMBASHI
BUREAU DU MAIRE

[redacted]

Lubumbashi, le 23/02/2019

N° 091/BUR-MAIRE/VILLE/L'SHI/2019

TRANSMIS copie pour information à :
- Madame le Maire Adjoint ;
- Monsieur le Mandataire du Budget;
- Madame le Comptable Urbain ;
- Monsieur le Chef de Service Urbain de la Décentralisation et Réformes Institutionnelles;

(TOUS) à LUBUMBASHI.

Objet : Notification d'attribution de marché public des travaux pour la réhabilitation et addition d'ouvrages au Bassin de la Ville de Lubumbashi.

A Monsieur le directeur Général de la Société CONGO ACONDE à LUBUMBASHI.

Monsieur le directeur Général,

J'ai l'avantage de porter à votre connaissance que le marché susmentionné en marge, vous a été attribué.

Vous serez invité à mon office pour la signature du contrat aussitôt les formalités administratives terminées.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Directeur Général, l'expression de ma franche collaboration.

LE MAIRE DE LA VILLE

Ghislain Robert LUBABA BULUMA

Annex 86: Request by Congo Aconde to lift the Surety Bond

CONGO ACONDE SARL

N. Réf ; 009/19/CA

Lubumbashi, le 18 Avril 2019

A
Monsieur le **Chef de l'Agence**
De l'Afriland First Bank CD
A
LUBUMBASHI

Objet : **Levée de la caution de soumission**

Monsieur le Chef de l'Agence,

J'ai l'honneur de venir auprès de votre haute autorité, solliciter la levée de la caution de soumission à l'appel d'Offre N°003/MAIRIE**V.L'SHI/Cel**-Techn-MP/2018.

En effet, je suis votre client sous le numéro de compte [redacted] USD au nom de CONGO ACONDE dont le montant de caution est $US108,225 (Dollars américains Cent huit mille deux cents vingt-cinq).

En attendant une suite favorable, veuillez agréer, M. le Chef, l'expression de nos considérations distinguées.

Le Directeur Général
M. Pak Hwa Song

CONGO ACONDE SARL

Adresse: Avenue Ulindi, Lubumbashi/Golf N°RCCM: CD/LSH/RCCM/18-B-00029
TEL: +243 851 217 131 E-mail: congoaconde@gmail.com N°Compte AFRI: 00019000030203064850 1-21

Annex 87: Hwang Kil Su at a project site in Kolwezi, dated 22 November 2019

Tweet

Mairie de Kolwezi
@MairiedeKolwezi

L'autorité urbaine Madame Véronique UPITE KAMINA a effectuée une visite d'inspection sur l'avenue Laurent DESIRE KABILA dans la matinée de ce vendredi 22 novembre 2019 en fin de s'imprégner de l'évolution des travaux exécutés sur la dite avenue.

8:40 AM · Nov 22, 2019 · Twitter Web App

2 Retweets **12** Likes

Annex 88: The Mole: Undercover in North Korea

The Panel has written to several Member States and entities concerning scenes portrayed in The Mole. The Panel is continuing its investigation.

Cambodia

For the Panel's enquiry and Cambodia's response, see para. 90 and annex 43.

Canada

Canada has responded to the Panel concerning a scene in The Mole.

Denmark

Denmark has provided information concerning scenes in The Mole to the Panel.

Jordan

One scene in the film depicts Mr Hisham al-Desouki — a Jordanian national — describing a scheme to violate UN sanctions through a proposed joint venture between Korea Narae Trading Corporation and Aktham Trading.[156] In response to the Panel's inquiry, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan described Mr al-Desouki as an "infamous swindler" who maintains a small office with no staff and has never shipped any goods to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Jordan also supplied the Panel with the pro-forma invoice and contract (figure below) that was portrayed in the film and noted that "... the deal was never implemented, and al-Desouki's goal was to obtain money without implementing his part of the deal…"

Sweden

Sweden has provided information concerning scenes in The Mole to the Panel.

Uganda

The Panel noted that the documentary suggests that international arms dealers from the DPRK and nationals from a European country discussed the construction of a facility on an island in Lake Victoria in Uganda in 2017. The suggested facility, while to be disguised as a hospital or resort, was potentially for the manufacture of Methamphetamine and arms from components sourced by or from the DPRK. The documentary also depicted subsequently negotiating with the representative of the island's owner and local officials about purchasing the island and constructing the facility. The documentary suggests that the project was never realized. The Panel has not yet received a reply to its enquiry from Uganda (see para.150).

[156] According to documents obtained by the Panel, Mr Hisham al-Desouki is the owner and operator of Aktham Trading.

Figure: Copies of invoice and contract

مؤسسة اكثم التجارية
Aktham Trading Est

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// Performa Invoice //
No.EX 02/2017

TO ;

Date; NOV 11 . 2017

Government of the DPR of Korea
Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos
Special Delegate ,
Government of the DPR of Korea

Sr. No	Description	Price MT USD	Qty M/T	Total Price USD
1	Diesel fuel – EN 590	345	5000	1.725.000.00
2	Gasoline – 95 Octanes Country of Origin; Russia Federation - Physical & chemical indicators according to attached specification	280	5000	1.400.000.00
				3.125.000.00

Total Price	Three million and one hundred and twenty-five thousand US dollars Only.

TERMS & CONDITIONS:

1-Prices quoted are CIF Prices and valid for 30 days from the date of Performa Invoice .
2- Payment terms : In USD to be made by MT 103 .
3- Inspection : from any accredited company at the cost of sellers .
4- Supporting documents for the consignment: Invoice Certificate of origin - Transfer Certificate- Certificate of Inspection - Bill of landing & Product Injection Report/ Vessel details .
5- Delivery within a period not exceeding forty days at Nampo port from the date of receipt of your Payment .

6- Bank details:-
BANK NAME ; ARAB BANK , AMMAN – JORDAN
ACCOUNT NAME ; AKTHAM TRADING ESTABLISHMENT
ACCOUNT NO ; 0135 / 030979 / 500
IBAN ; JO11 ARAB1350 0000 0013 5030 9795 00

General Manager
Hisham Aldasouqi

Attached annexes

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مؤسسة أكثم التجارية
Aktham Trading Est.

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SUPPLY AGREEMENT

Sale Contract No . PI.EX 02/2017

July 2018

Narea Trading Corporation

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

A.T.E

مؤسسة أكثم التجارية
Aktham Trading Est.

Ref: PI, No. EX 02/2017

Date: 4/07/2018

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SUPPLY AGREEMENT

BETWEEN:

Aktham Trading Establishment . a company existing under the laws of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordar and having its registered office at 481 Prince Hassan Street Amman.

[Hereinafter referred to as the Seller Party A]

AND

Narea Trading Corporation . 2-1 Ponghwa-dong , Pothonggang District , Pyongyang , DPR Korea

[Hereinafter referred to as the Buyer Party B]

The Buyer and the Seller are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Parties "and individually as the "Party".

Whereas:

(A) The Seller is engaged in the business of marketing and selling petroleum products including lubricants and has offered to sell certain Products (as defined below) to the Buyer during the term of this Agreement;

(B) The Buyer is engaged in the business of purchasing and trading petroleum products;

(C) The Buyer is desirous of purchasing the Products from the Seller and the Seller has agreed to supply the Products to the Buyer on the terms and conditions as set out in this Agreement.

QUANTITY, Total Purchase Order is 5000 metric Tons Diesel Fuel & 5000 metric Tons Gasoline
ORIGIN, Russia Federation

THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. DEFINITIONS

In this Agreement, unless the context requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed against each:

"Agreement" means this Petroleum Products Supply Agreement;

"Bill of Lading" means the lading record made at the time the product is loaded into originating ships, tanks .

"Delivery Location" means **Nampo port or Songrim port**

"Consignment" means each monthly volume of **GASOLINE 5000 metric tons** +/- 10% and **DIESEL FUEL 5000 metric tons** +/- 10% delivered in a single consignment monthly , for twelve months ;

"Effective Date" means the date on which the Agreement comes into force;

"HSSE" means health, safety, security, and environment;

SELLER

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"Incoterms 2000" shall mean the international commercial terms published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and titled Incoterms 2000;
"Off Spec Fuel" means any fuel supplied or offered to be supplied by the Seller that does not conform to the Specification;
"Product" or "Products" means Diesel fuel – EN 590 & Gasoline – 95 Octanes that conforms to the Specification in Diesel fuel , EN 590 & Gasoline – 93 to 95 Octane
"Quantity" means 5000 + 5000 metric tons of diesel fuel & gasoline +/- 10% in total;
"Specification" means the technical specification as EN 590 & Gasoline – 95 Octane
"Surveyors" shall mean SGS or other third party surveyor as Seller and Buyer may mutually agree;
"Working Day" means any day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or any day on which banking institutions in UK / USA & China, are authorized or required by applicable law to close for business.

2. SUPPLY OF PRODUCT

2.1 The Seller agrees to supply to the Buyer, and the Buyer agrees to purchase from the Seller, the Product.
2.2 The Seller shall deliver the first Consignment in thirty days from the Effective Date .
2.3 All Consignments shall be delivered by the Seller at the tanks, ship,, or tanker trucks at the Delivery Location.
2.4 The Parties represent that they shall comply, and shall cause their authorized representatives and personnel to comply, with all safety procedures and the HSSE standards and procedures as observed in the industry.

3. SPECIFICATIONS, RISK & DELIVERY OF PRODUCT

3.1 The Seller shall deliver each Consignment (which shall, unless otherwise instructed by the Buyer, be of equal proportions of the Quantity) CIF to the Delivery Location.
3.2 The Seller shall obtain at its own risk and expense any export license and other official authorization or other documents and carry out all customs formalities necessary for export of the Product and for its transit through any country en route to the Delivery Location.
3.3 The Seller shall, at its own expense, provide the Buyer with the delivery order and the applicable transport documents which the Buyer may require in order to take delivery of the Product.
3.4 The Seller shall provide the Buyer with all documentation required Within fifteen days of receipt of the advance payment. Documents required are:
™ *Bill of Lading
™ *Commercial Invoice
™ *Certificate of Quality
™ *RTC numbers and volumes
*Copies of the Refinery consignment note confirming the date and time of loading ,the quantity of Fuel loaded, the location where the Fuel was loaded, and the designated delivery location.
*Statement and Composite Quality Certificate (C+ test) and the Composite Quantity Certificate whereby Surveyors confirms that the Fuel has been found to comply with the Specification for the volume and quality shipped from the Supply Point up to the Delivery Location .
* All permits, licenses, approvals and other documentation required for the export and transit of the Consignment from the Refinery to the Delivery Location .
*A duplicate of the insurance policy
3.5 The Seller shall at all times adhere to and comply with the Quality Plan.

4. NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSED DELIVERY

Seller shall notify Buyer in writing no later than Five Working Days prior to the first day of the proposed delivery of each Consignment at the Delivery Location, (the "Delivery Date"). Buyer

SELLER BUYER

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481 Prince Hassan Street Tel. +962 79 5372004 Email: aktham.com@gmail.com Amman Jordan

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shall, no later than two Working Days after the date of receipt of such delivery notice, confirm in writing its ability to accept the consignment on the Delivery Date and shall ensure availability of a tank, ship, or tanker trucks to download the full Consignment in accordance with its obligations in paragraph 5.

5. BUYER'S OBLIGATIONS ON DELIVERY

5.1 The Buyer shall deposit each Consignment into the Buyer's tank, ship, , or tanker at the Delivery Location.

5.2 The Buyer shall bear the cost of testing of the Products by the Surveyors in Accordance with the procedures set forth under the headings "RTC Testing" and "Storage Tank Testing".

5.3 The Buyer shall accept the Seller's Notification of Proposed Delivery, as described in Paragraph 4 of this Agreement.

5.4 The Buyer shall, subject to compliance by the Seller take all necessary steps to transfe fuel at the Delivery Location.

6. PRICE

6.1 The unit price per metric ton CIF to the Delivery Location shall be calculated as follows to the Delivery Location ;

A. **Diesel fuel EN 590** **Price MT 345 USD – CIF**

B. **Gasoline 95 Octane** **Price MT 295 USD - CIF**

7. PAYMENT OF PRICE

(30% of the contract value TT advance payment and 50% of the contract value TT after copy of Bill of landing Send by email to buyer and 20% of the contract value by MT within 5 working days after the consignment is arrived at the delivery location.)

7.1 Within ten (10) days after the Effective Date of this Agreement, Buyer shall obtain the issuance of an made (30% TT advance payment and 50% TT after copy of Bill of landing Send by email to buyer and 20% by MT within 5 working days after the consignment is arrived at the delivery location.)

7.2 Payment shall be made for each Consignment amount of the Unit Price multiplied by the amount of fuel in metric tons certified in the Composite Quantity Certificate. Payment shall be made at sight agains presentation of the following documentation in original or by electronically signed email.

(i) Commercial invoice stamped by Buyer's agent, three originals or copies, signed by the Seller indicating the date, the quantity of the fuel in metric tons, and the Specification of the fuel;

(ii) Duplicate of the bills of lading showing quantity of fuel in metric tons dispatched;

(iii) Composite of Quantity Certificate .

(iv) Composite of Quality Certificate.

7.3 In the event that the Issuing Bank, Advising Bank, or Confirming Bank fails or refuses to pay the sight draft presented by Seller, Seller has full rights to sell the Consignment to any other party at Seller's discretion.

7.4 Buyer may only transport a Consignment from the Delivery Location after payment in full of the sight draft is received by Seller.

7.5 All amounts payable under this Agreement, or any portion of the Price, shall be payable by the Buyer in United States Dollars (USD) by electronic funds transfer without any offset, deduction or counterclaim.

8. TERMINATION

8.1 If the Seller shall commit any breach of this Agreement and does not remedy the breach within 10 days after the notice of default from the Buyer, the Buyer may terminate this Agreement. In the event of such termination by the Buyer, the Buyer shall have no obligation or liability to the Seller other than to pay the Seller for amounts due in respect of Product delivered at the Delivery Location.

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8.2 The Buyer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement by giving 60 days prior written notice to Seller. Such notice cannot be given within 60 days of the Effective Date. Such notice shall provide the Seller with the option to deliver and receive payment for three further monthly Consignments after the date of such notice.

8.3 The Seller may terminate this Agreement with immediate effect and without prior notice if Buyer breaches any of its obligations and/or violates any of the provisions of this Agreement.

9. NOTICES

9.1 If there is a state of emergency was paramount to prevent the entry and exit of ships to the Korean ports The delivery and discharge of the tank shall be in(free alongside ship) terms in international waters . Without any modification in the contract and without any additional expenses.

9.2 All notices and other communications given under this Agreement must be in writing (electronically signed email and fax acceptable), in the English language, and shall be deemed to have been properly given and delivered to the other party hereto at its address listed below. Any such notice given will be deemed to have been given or received at the time of delivery, or the next Working Day following the date of sending, if sent by facsimile on a day that is not a Working Day.

Seller:
Aktham Trading Establishment
Mr. Hisham AL Dasouqi
General Manager

مؤسسة اكثم التجارية
AKTRAM CORP. FOR TRADING
A.C.T

Buyer:
Narae Trading Corporation
Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos
On behalf of the President of the Narae Trading Corporation

10. INCOTERMS

Incoterms 2000, including the provisions therein under the heading "CIF", are hereby expressly incorporated into and form part of this Agreement. In case there is any inconsistency between a term(s) herein and the applicable term in Incoterms 2000,the term(s) of this Agreement shall apply.

11. FORCE MAJEURE

If Buyer or Seller is affected by a Force Majeure Event which prevents, hinders or delaysit from or in performing any of its obligations under this Agreement then the affected party shall as soon as reasonably practicable after and in any event after the commencement of the prevention, hindering or delay due to the Force Majeure Event, notify the other party in writing giving details of the nature of the Force Majeure Event, the date on which it began to effect the affected party's obligations and its likely effect on the affected party's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement. Provided that the affected party has notified the other party pursuant to this clause, the affected party shall be excused from performance of, and shall not be liable for any delay or failure to perform under, this Agreement to the extent that the performance is prevented, hindered or delayed by the Force Majeure Event.

For the purposes of this Agreement, "Force Majeure Event" means, with respect to any obligation of a party (the "Affected Party") under this Agreement any event or circumstance that:

(i) is beyond reasonable control of the Affected Party in performing such obligations and is not the result of the fault or negligence of the Affected Party (including the Affected Party's Affiliates and any of its or their employees, directors, officers, agents, or contractors) and which by the exercise of reasonable efforts under the circumstances, the Affected Party could not reasonably be expected to avoid, and which prevents the Affected Party from performing such obligation;

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(ii) is not the direct or indirect result of the failure of the Affected Party to perform any of its obligations under this Agreement;
iii) materially or adversely affects the ability of the Affected Party to perform any of its obligations under this Agreement;
(iv) the occurrence of which the Affected Party has provided notice of to the other party hereto in accordance with this section;
(v) is not due to the negligent or intentional acts, errors or omissions of, or material or negligent or intentional failure to comply with any requirement of an applicable governmental authority by, the Affected Party or any affiliates, contractors, agents or employees of the Affected Party;
(vi) which is of an extraordinary nature; or
(vii) is a direct or indirect result of the action or omission of an applicable governmental authority which materially adversely affects the ability of the Affected Party or any of its affiliates to perform ar of its obligations under this Agreement

12. GOVERNING LAW

This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales without regard to its principles of conflicts of law that would require the application of laws of another jurisdiction.

13. DISPUTE RESOLUTION

(i) Mutual Discussion. If any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relatingto this Agreement or breach thereof arises, including any question regarding its existence, validity, or termination (a "Dispute") the parties hereto shall attempt to settle such Dispute, by mutual discussions.
(ii) Arbitration. In case of any Dispute not resolved by mutual discussion, either party hereto may, by giving the notice to the other party hereto, refer to the Dispute to binding arbitration at the London Court of International Arbitration (the "Court"). The arbitration will be conducted by a sole arbitrator chosen in accordance with the Rules.
The arbitration fee shall be borne by the losing party hereto unless otherwise awarded by the Court. The arbitration shall take place in London, United Kingdom. The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be English.
(iii) Arbitration- Final. An arbitral award shall be final and binding upon both parties hereto and shall be immediately enforceable. Judgment on the award may be enteredand execution had in any court having jurisdiction or application may be made to such court for a judicial acceptance of the award and an order of enforcement and execution, as applicable. Any damages which may be awarded by the arbitrator shall bear interest from the date of any relevant breach or violation to the date of full satisfaction of such award at a rate equal to the lesser of (i) the ten percent (10%) or (ii) the maximum rate permitted by applicable law.

14. MUTUAL REPRESENTATION & WARRANTIES

Each party hereto represents and warrants to the other party hereto as of the Effective Date:
(i) It is duly formed, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the state and Country of its organization;
(ii) It has all requisite power and authority to conduct its business, to own or lease its properties, and to execute, deliver and perform its obligations under the Agreement;
(iii) The execution, delivery and performance by it of this Agreement and the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby have been duly authorized by all necessary action on its part, and do not and will not violate any provision of its governing documents, any indenture, contract or agreement to which it is party, or any applicable law; and
(iv) The Agreement is a legal, valid and binding obligation of such party hereto enforceable against such party hereto in accordance with its terms.

15. SELLER'S REPRESENTATIONS & WARRANTIES

Seller represents and warrants to Buyer, as of the date of delivery of the Product:
(I) Seller has good title to the Product , and the Product is delivered free and clear of all liens, security interests, adverse claims, privileges or encumbrances;

SELLER BUYER

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(ii) Seller has the right to sell and deliver the Product to Buyer under the terms of this Agreement;
(iii) The Product conforms to the Specification; and
(iv) Seller has all necessary licenses and permits to supply the Product pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

16. ENTIRE AGREEMENT

This Agreement comprises the full and complete agreement of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof, and replaces and supersedes all prior communications, understandings and agreements between the parties hereto, whether oral or written, expressed or implied, with respect to the matters addressed herein.

17. SUCCESSORS & ASSIGNS

This Agreement is binding and enforceable on the parties hereto, and their affiliates, succes s, assigns, and legal representatives.

18. SEVERABILITY

Should any part of this Agreement be held invalid or unenforceable for any reason, such holding will not affect the remaining parts, which will continue in full force and effect.

19. COUNTERPARTS

This Agreement is executed in two (2) originals in the English language, each of which will be deemed an original but all of which will constitute one and the same instrument, one (1) such original for each party hereto. The Parties acknowledge this Agreement may be translated into a language other than English. Should any discrepancy arise between the English language version of this Agreement and any such translation, the English language version of this Agreement shall prevail.

20. WAIVER & AMENDMENT

None of the terms and conditions of this Agreement will be deemed waived or amended by either party hereto unless such waiver or amendment is executed in writing by a duly authorized agent or representative of each of the parties hereto. The failure of either party hereto to exercise any right hereunder will not waive or amend any right of such party hereto under this Agreement or otherwise. The right of either party hereto to require strict performance will not be affected by any previous waiver, action or course of dealing.

21. ASSIGNMENT

Neither party hereto may (i) assign this Agreement or (ii) assign its rights or delegate its obligations under this Agreement in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of the other party her , excepting that Seller shall have the right to assign its rights, but not its obligations, without the wr en consent of the Buyer.

22. CONFIDENTIALITY

22.1 This Agreement, the information that it contains, and all information exchanged relating to it, including without limitation any pricing information, are confidential between the Buyer and the Seller. Neither the Buyer nor the Seller shall, without the other's written consent, discios such information on any basis to any person other than its directors , officers, employees, agents or professional advisers who need to know the same for the purposes of this Agreement and who shall be bound by the same obligation of secrecy.

22.2 Notwithstanding the above, if a Party receiving confidential information is required by law or in the course of any judicial, arbitral or administrative proceedings or in the course of any other compulsory process to disclose any information which it is obliged to keep confidential, the Party concerned may to that extent and for those purposes only disclose such information provided always that such Party shall (if it is lawfully so permitted) first give to the other Party a prompt notice of the requirement to disclose.

23. LIABILTY AND INDEMNIFICATION

23.1 The Seller shall protect, defend, indemnify and hold harmless the Buyer and its Employees, contractors and agents (the "Buyer's Indemnified Parties") from and against any and all

SELLER BUYER

A.T.E

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Aktham Trading Est.

claims, demands, losses, damages, costs, actions, suits, liabilities, judgments and expenses (including but not limited to legal fees and court costs), and any fines, penalties and assessments, that may be asserted against or incurred by the Buyer's Indemnified Parties, arising out of, resulting from, or otherwise connected with the negligence or intentional wrongful performance or non-performance of this Agreement by the Seller

The Buyer shall protect, defend, indemnify and hold harmless the Seller and its employees contractors and agents (the "Seller's Indemnified Parties") from and against any and all claims, demands, losses, damages, costs, actions, suits, liabilities, judgments, and expenses (including but not limited to legal fees and court costs), and any fines, penalties, and assessments, that may be asserted against or incurred by the Seller's Indemnified Parties, arising out of, resulting from, or otherwise connected with the negligence or intentional wrongful performance or non-performance of this Agreement by the Buyer.

23.2 The Seller and Buyer shall take out with reputable insurance companies such insurance as is reasonably required to satisfy any obligations they may have arising out of this Agreement.

23.3 Any cargo insurance obtained by the Seller in respect of this Agreement responsibility shall:

(a) Contain a waiver of subrogation by its insurers in favor of the Buyer with respect to liabilities arising out of this Agreement.

(b) Name the Buyer as co-insured or additional insured with respect to liabilities arising out of this Agreement.

23.4 The Seller shall, as and when required by the Buyer, produce to it such evidence as may reasonably be required of cargo insurances it is required to take out under this Agreement.

23.5 If the Seller falls to supply, the seller undertakes the following ;

1- Refund of the advance payment to the buyer.

2- (Performance Bond 2%)The seller shall pay 2% of the value of the contract to the buyer as compensation for the expenses .

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have met together in person and caused this Agreement to be executed as of the Effective Date.

FOR SELLER:
Aktham Trading Establishment
Mr. Hisham AL Dasouqi
General Manager
Date

مؤسسة اكثم التجارية
AKTHAM CORP. FOR TRADING
.C.T

FOR BUYER:
Narae Trading Corporation
Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos
On behalf of the President of the Narae Trading Corporation
Date

Alejandro Cao de Benos

ndon, U.K; Barcelona , Spain)

Special Delegate
Committee for Cultural Relations

President
Korean Friendship Association

KFA

Tel: +34 616.496.994
korea@korea-dpr.info
http: www.korea-dpr.info

A.T.E

مؤسسة أكثم التجارية
Aktham Trading Est.

Appendix A – Seller's and Buyer Bank information's

Seller's Bank Co-ordinates to receive LC and T/T

BANK NAME ; ARAB BANK , AMMAN – JORDAN
ACCOUNT NAME ; AKTHAM TRADING ESTABLISHMENT
[redacted]

Buyer Bank

BANK NAME ;
ACCOUNT NAME ;
ACCOUNT NO ;
IBAN ;

The shipping address of the buyer

Shipping address billing address
Korea Narea Trading Corporation
2-1 Ponghwa-dong
Pothonggang District
Pyongyang,
DPR Korea

A.T.E

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Aktham Trading Est.

Appendix B – Specification:
UNLEADED MOTOR GASOLINE
PREMIUM EURO-95 (АИ-95-4) Evaporation Class E

Technical Regulations (TR) "On requirements to motor and aviation gasoline, diesel and marine fuel, jet fuel and fuel oil" and GOST R 51866-2002 (EN 228-2004)

Item No.	Parameter	TR Specified Value	Specified Value GOST R 51866-2002 Evaporation Class E
1	Octane number, min.		
	MON	-	85.0
	RON	-	95.0
2	Lead concentration, mg/dm³	absence	absence
3	Iron concentration, mg/dm³	absence	absence
4	Manganese concentration, mg/dm³	absence	absence
5	Density at 15 °C, kg/m³		720 ÷ 775
6	Sulphur concentration, mg/kg, max.	50.0	5.0
7	Oxidation stability, min., not less than		360
8	Gums concentration washed by solvent, mg/100 cm³ of gasoline, max.		5.0
9	Copper corrosion test (3 h at 50 °C), scale unit		Class 1
10	Appearance		transparent and clear
11	Hydrocarbons, vol. %, max.:		
	- olefins	18.0	18.0
	- aromatics	35.0	35.0
12	Benzene, vol. %, max.	1.0	1.0
13	Oxygen, wt. %, max.	2.7	2.7
14	Oxygenates, vol. %, max.:		
	- methanol	absence	absence
	- ethanol	5	5
	- isopropyl alcohol	10	10
	- isobutyl alcohol	10	10
	- tert-butyl alcohol	7	7
	- ethers (C_5 and higher)	15	15
	- other oxygenates	10	10
15	Reid vapour pressure, kPa,		
	min.	50.0	45.0
	max.	100.0	95.0
16	Distillation:		
	evaporated gasoline, vol. % at:		
	70 °C (evap. at 70)		22.0-50.0
	100 °C (evap. at 100)		46.0-71.0
	150 °C (evap. at 150), min.		75.0
	Final boiling point, °C, not higher than		210
	residue, %, (vol.), max.		2.0
17	Maximum vapour lock index (VLI)		not specified
18	Monomethylaniline, vol. %, max.	1.0	1.0

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DIESEL FUEL EURO
A, B, C, D, E, F GRADES
GOST R 52368-2005 (EN 590:2009)

Item No.	Parameter	Specified Value
1	Cetane number, min.	51.0
2	Cetane index, min.	46.0
3	Density at 15 °C, kg/m³	820.0 ÷ 845.0
4	PAH, % (wt.), max.	8.0
5	Sulphur, mg/kg, max., Type I Type II Type III	 350.0 50.0 10.0
6	Flash point in closed cup, °C, higher than	55
7	CCR of 10% residue, % (wt.), max.	0.30
8	Ash, % (wt.), max.	0.01
9	Water, mg/kg, max.	200
10	Total contamination, mg/kg, max.	24
11	Copper corrosion test (3 h at 50 °C), scale unit	Class 1
12	Oxidation Stability: total sediments, g/m³, max.	25
13	Lubricity: corrected wear scar diameter at 60 °C, micron, max.	460
14	Kinematic viscosity at 40 °C, mm²/s	2.00 ÷ 4.50
15	Distillation: at 250 °C, % (vol.), less than at 350 °C, % (vol.), min. 95% (vol.) distillated at temperature, °C, not higher than	 65 85 360

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491 Prince Hassan Street Tel: +962 79 5272004 Email: aktham_corp@gmail.com Amman Jordan

Annex 89: Han Ulaaan LLC

Mongolian authorities noted that Hanne Ulaan and Mr Choi controlled twelve bank accounts but only two were active. While in Mongolia, Mr Choi deposited USD 200,000 into Hanne Ulaan's accounts. According to the Member State, Hanne Ulaan LLC transferred USD 19,665 to Russia in April 2019, USD 69,000 to Hong Kong in July 2019, and USD 89,300 to Malaysia in August 2019 to purchase "refined sugar and soybean oil." Mongolia determined that in at least one case — the transaction to a Malaysian company — the Malaysian company's stated business activity did not match customs records and documentation. Although the transac-tion was purportedly for the purchase of "soybean oil", the Malaysian company only manufactures automotive and industrial types of oil.

Mongolia further noted that Mr Choi requested a funds transfer to a bank in Poland, which was ultimately blocked because the correspondent bank identified the receiver as a Democratic People's Republic of Korea national. Further investigation revealed that the receiver's address matched the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's embassy address in Poland. Based on these financial activities, Mongolian authorities have preliminarily assessed Mr Choi and Hanne Ulaan LLC to be a Democratic People's Republic of Korea front company for the purpose of evading sanctions. Furthermore, Mongolian authorities have taken decisive action to freeze approximately USD 13,800 in bank accounts linked to Hanne Ulaan LLC and Mr Choi.

Annex 90: Information about Kim Su-Il

1. Mr. Kim Su-Il:

- Date of Birth: 4 March 1985.
- Passport:

  + (i) Official Passport No. 745220480 issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), on 2 June 2015, valid until 2 June 2020;

  + (ii) Passport No. 108220348, valid until 18 May 2023.
- Head of the Representative Office of Korea Puhung General Trading Corporation from 15 March 2017, currently has no work permit in Viet Nam.
- Residence: Apartment 1213, B2 Chung cu An Loc 2, Vu Tong Phan street, An Phu ward, District 2, Ho Chi Minh City.
- Family:

  + Wife: [redacted] official passport No [redacted]

  + Child: [redacted] official passport No. [redacted]

2. Korea Puhung General Trading Corporation;

- Business registration certificate: No. 069, issued on 13 February 1999 by the Ministry of External Economic Relations of the DPRK.
- License for establishment: Expired on 31 December 2019 (No. 79-04842-01 issued by Ho Chi Minh City Department of Industry and Trade, first-time issued on 15 March 2017, renewed on 1 March 2018). Ho Chi Minh City Department of Industry and Trade sent the notice of 26 June 2020 to terminate activities of this Office.
- Address: Floor 23, A&B Tower, No. 76A Le Loi street, Ben Thanh ward, District 1, Ho Chi Minh City.
- Scope of business: food, pharmaceuticals, footwear, coffee, dried fruits, textiles, furniture and equipment from Viet Nam for export.
- The total value of export contracts from the Office ranged from $120,000 to $787,827; the Office had transactions with a number of Vietnamese partners, such as Richy Food Souther JSC, Baohung Candy Import Production and Trade Co., Ltd., Laiphu Corporation, Annie's Farm Co., Ltd., Namviet Beverage Manufacturing and Service Co., Ltd., Haviet Investment Trading and Ex-Import JSC. In 2019, the Office did not have a report on its operation as required.

3. Travel information of Mr. Kim Su-Il

- 15 August 2019: Exited Viet Nam.
- 15 September 2019: Entered Viet Nam (04.10am, flight CA741 from Guangzhou, China to Noi Bai, Ha Noi, then travelled to Ho Chi Minh City).
- 1-2 November 2019: Presence noticed in Vung Tau city.

Source: Member State

Annex 91: MCM International Trading Company Limited

Juristic Person Information

MCM INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED

Registered No :	0105558186070
Registered Type :	MCM INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED
Registered Date :	24/11/2015
Status :	Operating
Registered Capital (Baht) :	4,000,000.00
Address :	PHRA KHANONG NUEA VADHANA BANGKOK
Industry group in registered document :	70209 : Other management consultancy activities, not elsewhere classified
Industrial group in latest financial statement :	70209 : Other management consultancy activities, not elsewhere classified
Fiscal Year (submitted financial statement) :	2559 2558
Board of Directors List :	1.CHOL MINMYONG
Authorized director :	นายโช่ มิน เมียง ลงลายมือชื่อ และประทับตราสำคัญของบริษัท/
Tel. :	023815204
Fax. :	
E-mail address :	
Note :	

Remark(s)

1. Juristic person information: This information is for general use which is open for the public benefits only. It cannot be used as legal references.

2. Financial statement: The financial information is derived from financial statement submitted by juristic persons. The fact shall be further considered by users.

3. In case the financial statement is never submitted, the system will display an industry group according to the registration record or the company's certificate.

4. "Industry group in the latest financial statement" means the business type as specified in the document when the latest financial statement was submitted to DBD.

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URL : http://datawarehouse.dbd.go.th/bdw/company/profile/ **29/10/2020 00:38:02**

Juristic Name : MCM INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED

Registered No : 0105558186070

Amount and proportion of Shares by Nationality (For The Year 2016-2020)

Thai	2.04 MB.	3 persons
N. Korean	1.96 MB.	2 persons
All Nationalities	4.00 MB.	5 persons



No	Nationality	No of Shares (share)	Investment Amount (Baht)	Investment Proportion (%)
1	Thai	20,400.00	2,040,000.00	51.00
2	N. Korean	19,600.00	1,960,000.00	49.00
	All Nationalities	40,000.00	4,000,000.00	100.00

Remark(s) : The capital investment by nationality is referred to the latest submitted shareholders list.

Source: https://datawarehouse.dbd.go.th/company/profile/5/0105558186070

Annex 92: DPRK cyberattacks against a Chilean bank

Based on an open-source report, the Panel is investigating alleged Democratic People's Republic of Korea attempts to hack a financial institution in Chile. In response to the Panel's request for information, Chile's national authorities stated that, "the Office of the Public Ministry in Chile, Specialized Unit for Money Laundering, Economic and Organized Crimes (ULDECCO) has indicated that the criminal investigation initiated in connection to the cyber-attack against [the bank] is still a non-formalized investigation..." The Panel continues its investigation

Annex 93: Adverse impact of the Security Council sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK and China's endeavors in facilitating humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, non-paper by China

1. Sanction measures have caused adverse impact on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK.

As a result of Security Council sanctions, the humanitarian and livelihood situation in the DPRK has been facing grave challenges. Serious problems exist in the fields of food, health, sanitation, employment and basic economic industries.

There is a severe shortage of food. The DPRK is beset by poor agricultural production, low-level mechanization, old seed technology, aged water conservancy facilities and other infrastructure, insufficient natural disaster preparedness, and low yields of grain. Under the Security Council sanctions, the DPRK does not have enough foreign currency to procure agricultural material; the import of agricultural machinery and equipment has almost suspended; the DPRK is less able to fight natural disasters such as drought, flood and typhoon; and the country's food production is even more difficult. According to media reports, the annual food production of the DPRK stood between 4.1 million tons and 4.8 million tons from 2009 to 2019, with an annual food shortage of several hundred thousand tons. According to the OCHA, among the DPRK's 25 million population, 10.1 million suffer from food insecurity and are in urgent need of food assistance. According to the UNICEF, nearly 20% of children of the DPRK show signs of stunting; around 1 million children under the age of five suffer from diarrhea resulted from malnutrition; and about one third of childbearing-age women suffer from anemia which affects infant health.

The medical condition is poor. Lack of medicine is common among hospitals in the DPRK. Tuberculosis, hepatitis, and malaria remain high-incidence diseases, with tuberculosis causing around 16,000 deaths each year. According to the OCHA, more than 8.7 million people have limited access to quality health service; around 9 million people are at risk of being malaria infected. Nearly all medicines and medical devices in the DPRK are imported. There is a serious shortage of vaccines, antibiotics, nutrients, anthelmintics, infusion bottles, injectors, and X-ray films. Import of some medical devices is prohibited as they fall into the category of electrical products. Rural families mainly rely on herbal medicine in addition to some basic medicine they get occasionally from doctors. The sanitation and hygiene facilities are backward. Sanction measures prohibit the DPRK from importing water purifying equipment, pipes and valves made of iron and steel. So far, a sound tap water pipeline network has not been set up in the DPRK. According to the OCHA, about 8.4 million people have no access to safely managed water sources. Due to insufficient power supply, 24-hour water supply is not available in the DPRK, and families use buckets to store water, worsening water quality. Waste water and garbage disposal systems are lacking. In rural areas, the underdeveloped methods of disposing excrement and waste have caused further deterioration of water and soil pollution.

The industries directly related to people's livelihood are barely surviving. Affected by Security Council sanctions, basic industries, including coal, metal, mechanical manufacturing, are unable to import mechanical equipment and parts, and many factories cannot maintain operation. Chemical industry finds it difficult to update technology and equipment; chemical industry is making little progress; the supply of livelihood-related materials such as fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural films cannot be guaranteed.

Moreover, sectoral sanctions prohibit the DPRK from exporting textiles, mineral ores and seafood, causing an estimated loss of at least 200,000 jobs.

2. The Chinese government always attaches great importance to humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.

The Chinese customs authorities have established standard operational procedure and working method, and actively solved problems during customs clearance of humanitarian goods to the DPRK. Personnel and posts are designated for the job. With these efforts, the efficiency of customs clearance has continued to improve. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the DPRK has carried out strict prevention measures, and the normal transportation between China and the DPRK has almost suspended. Under such circumstances and meeting pandemic prevention requirements, the Chinese customs authorities have made great efforts to overcome difficulties, and provided as much convenience as possible to humanitarian aid to the DPRK through special arrangements and simplified procedures.

Dalian customs is the main customs dealing with cargo transportation between China and the DPRK. From January to October this year, Dalian customs has conducted customs clearance for 47 batches of humanitarian goods, including 27 batches from the UNICEF, 2 batches from the WHO, batches from the WFP, 3 batches from the ICRC, and 7 batches from other NGOs.

While strictly implementing sectoral embargo measures of the Security Council resolutions, the Chinese commerce authorities have provided expeditious grant of temporary export permits for humanitarian goods procured in China to ensure their timely arrival in the DPRK. The goods include one refrigerator vehicle for vaccines transportation procured by the UNICEF, and two aquaculture vans procured by the French NGO TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANITAIRE.

Annex 94: Non-paper from a Member State, "Negative impact of the UNSC sanctions against the DPRK on the humanitarian situation in the country"

The UNSC sanctions designed to eliminate the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs caused a huge negative effect on the humanitarian situation in the country.

Massive repatriation of working North Korean migrants only aggravated internal socio-economic problems, led to the drop of the standard of living of dozens of thousands of people. For many Korean families income earned by their relatives abroad was the main source of their subsistence. According to estimates each overseas DPRK worker provided financial support to ten family members at least. Furthermore, the decreased money turnover damaged the market elements of local economy, nullifying the progress achieved in the recent years.

Due to the discouraging effect of sanctions against Pyongyang the UN OCHA failed to raise sufficient sum for the implementation of humanitarian aid programs in the DPRK (25,1 million USD (23,5%) out of required 107 million USD were gathered by September 1, 2020). Similar dynamics was in 2018 (29% raised) and in 2019 (27% raised).

North Korean national healthcare problems grow out of import restrictions on medical equipment and its supplements related to coercive measures and of a deficit of foreign currency due to export restrictions. This led to the closure of the unique high tech dental hospital in the country. Many other hospitals ceased to perform various medical services, e.g. biochemical blood tests, chemotherapy and radiotherapy for cancer patients because of the absence of necessary precursors. With breast and womb cancer being among the most widespread diseases in the country, such scenario makes Korean women especially vulnerable.

A difficult situation has developed in the energy sector. Amid growing scarcity of hydrocarbons in the country many thermoelectric power stations suspended their operation, for example Sonbong county power plant. Carbon-operated power plants lowered their output as they require certain quantities of liquid fuel in order to operate efficiently. As a result, Pyongyang and the majority of DPRK cities experience rolling blackouts on a regular basis (electricity is turned on during 2-3 hours per day). Rural areas are devoid of electric power almost completely. The locals have to rely heavily on firewood (e.g. to fuel cargo trucks), the latter leading to even bigger damage to forests in the peninsula.

The agricultural sector suffers from acute fuel shortages as well. Unable to use the fuel-consuming farming equipment, Korean farmers are forced back to implement less effective methods (up to using draft cattle and manual labour). This leads to decreasing food security.

Source: Member State

Annex 95: Statement by a Member State on the economic and humanitarian situation in the DPRK

Today, sadly, I must report to you that the economic and humanitarian situations in the DPRK have not improved since our previous meeting, and today we are probably seeing the worst economic conditions in the Kim Jong-un era, though for reasons we are all aware of, it remains impossible to say precisely how much ordinary North Koreans are suffering.

Despite the growth of hardship, the DPRK continues to prioritize the stability and continuity of the Kim family regime over all other national priorities. This policy trajectory requires the KWP, the state, and the KPA to pursue policies of economic and diplomatic isolation; to prioritize politically directed state-development over economic/market-driven development; and it requires the DPRK to prioritize WMDs and repressive internal security controls over higher general living standards and global integration.

The DPRK's policies have also led the UNSC to unanimously adopt increasingly stronger international sanctions resolutions against targeted individuals, organizations, and sectors to halt the DPRK's illegal WMD programs and preserve a regional security balance that is in the interest of all responsible stakeholders. These sanctions have probably slowed the development of DPRK's WMD programs by cutting off vital sources of foreign currency and raising the costs of illicitly obtaining funds and resources. They may also have some small cost in terms of affecting the livelihood of the North Korean people, but these effects pale in comparison with the costs resulting from the North Korean system itself, and in the absence of credible mechanisms that can assure financial flows and materials can be delivered directly to the North Korean people, rather than being coopted by the regime for its own illicit purposes, there is simply little we can do to mitigate these costs, especially if our primary objective is to slow the growth of the DPRK's WMD programs.

This year, unfortunately, in addition to the predictable difficulties the North Korean people face, times have been particularly challenging for additional reasons: First, we assess declines in consumption and production resulting from the DPRK's response to the spread of coronavirus in neighboring countries—policies which have brought unprecedented isolation and control in the KJU era. Second, destruction wrought by three successive typhoons to agriculture production and infrastructure (which I am happy to discuss in detail if you are interested). Third, prioritization of the celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the KWP and the upcoming 8th KW Party congress has led to a number of wasteful "white elephant" projects and massive labor diversion this year.

These political choices have saddled the North Korean people with economic and social policies that have made them significantly poorer, more isolated, and more repressed than all other people in the region. I suspect it is not controversial to assert to this group that the DPRK people on the whole are victims of their regime, not beneficiaries. However, despite the growing toll that these developments are taking on the lives of the people of the DPRK, the leadership has shown no sign of changing course, altering its core policies, or changing its posture towards international assistance and diplomacy—A change which we still welcome and continue to encourage and seek out despite the DPRK's disinterest in responding to our multiple offers.

1. SANCTIONS AND ECONOMIC REFORM/DEVELOPMENT

The burden of domestic economic policies, multiplied this year under the added strain of coronavirus mitigation, typhoon recovery, and white elephant projects are the clearly costliest short- and long-term drivers of economic hardship in the DPRK. Under the DPRK's countless wasteful economic policies, GNI has fallen behind regional partners for decades, and with each year the gap gets wider. At the end of

2019, the DPRK's GNI per capita stood at 1.408 million KRW ($1,200), approximately 1/27 (4%) of that of South Korea. This gap is so wide now that it should be obvious that no realistic amount of humanitarian aid or sanctions relief is going to eliminate the economic gap between the DPRK and its neighbors in the region, particularly the ROK. This can only come from a fundamental transformation of the DPRK's economic system which puts growth and productivity ahead of propaganda and credibly protects a wide range of decentralized economic activity from political interference—and these policies must be carried out for decades.

However, the DPRK leadership probably assess that these kinds of policies are not yet in the best interests of the Kim family system as they would likely undermine the regime's ideology and legitimacy, require a devolution of some of Kim's authority to collective leadership, and weaken Kim's control over the fiscal levers he needs to sustain the personalized regime. In other words, the kind of policies that would increase growth could be destabilizing or even regime-threatening to the Kim family if not implemented carefully and properly. It is these internal dynamics that are probably the best explanation for why the DPRK has been so reluctant to boldly implement significant changes, and why instead they fall back onto policies of general isolation, state-led economic development, and nuclear deterrence.

Some have raised the argument that robust sanctions enforcement and a corresponding loss of hard currency earnings by the regime has been a significant driver of the DPRK's recent turn away from economic reforms--because a lack of hard currency in official coffers will blunt enthusiasm for reform efforts among officials, or decreased capital flows will restrict private sector entrepreneurship and mute beneficial social changes.

In response to these arguments, I would like to say first of all that the economics literature shows overwhelmingly that dwindling official coffers are a more robust predictive variable of substantive economic reforms than growing official coffers. In most cases it is dwindling coffers that force officials to reinvent their agencies and policies so they are no longer loss-making enterprises. Full coffers tend to delay structural reforms because they relieve political pressure to fix broken systems. I don't think there is any dispute to this among development economists. I think we were seeing this to some degree in the DPRK, but eventually the public desire to expand decentralized economic incentives was becoming a growing political problem for the regime, and it halted this trend with traditional repressive mechanisms.

But what about the second argument that sanctions are hurting grass-roots entrepreneurship? To paraphrase the argument, "what if overseas workers cannot come home with savings and training gained abroad, won't it be more difficult for them to start private businesses and promote social change with their knowledge?" This is an interesting "bottom-up" model of reform, but misses many key facts relevant to the North Korean case. First, many overseas workers come from "middle-class" and relatively privileged families in Pyongyang (according to published reports and to my own personal conversations with some of them), so they are not from among the downtrodden with low "songbun." They already have capital to pay bribes and fees required to get sent abroad in the first place, so they are probably already able to start small businesses if they are so inclined and properly connected (a condition that is probably more important than obtaining investment capital).

Second, the vast majority of the income that North Koreans earn abroad is retained by the state-owned enterprises that employ them—so the regime is the primary beneficiary of their labor, not themselves. Third, while abroad NKs live highly controlled and monitored lives with little time off, so the little unauthorized information they do obtain is explained away with propaganda indoctrination or workers are ordered to keep this information secret when they are debriefed on their arrival back home. Consequently, the "social loss" to the DPRK of minimizing the number of overseas workers is dramatically smaller than

advertised by this school of thought. Now would North Koreans prefer to live abroad and earn more money? Sure. So would I, but in the absence of a credible mechanism to make sure that the funds these workers earn can be kept away from the DPRK's WMD programs, we have no other choice other than to restrict their deployment. The UNSC has already unanimously determined this.

Also, if we look at the trajectory of economic reforms in the Kim Jong-un era, they appear uncorrelated with any sanctions enforcement. Agricultural and enterprise reforms were publicly launched months after KJU took power (spring 2012) and rolled back almost immediately afterwards—nearly five years before the UNSC unanimously implemented sectoral sanctions and bans on overseas workers in 2017. However, after the DPRK rolled back its first attempt at agricultural reform in 2012, it continued to experiment quietly with economic adjustment measures under the slogans of "our style economic management, plot responsibility system, and socialist enterprise responsibility management system" even as international sanctions were tightened. Eventually these new economic policies were formally added to the DPRK constitution in April 2019, well after the implementation of sectoral sanctions in 2017. This reinforces that domestic concerns are the primary drivers of economic reform in the DPRK, not international sanctions.

But we still don't know many details of the DPRK's changing economic policies or how much they boost output. It appears, however, that the regime's desire to preserve the ideology and legacy of the previous leaders has probably played a role in constraining reform and protecting poor economic institutions. For example, the organization of cooperative farms around Kim Il-sung's "Sub Work Team Units" has probably hindered the regime's ability to implement economic incentives in agriculture which could significantly increase the amount of food produced domestically.

The third pillar of reform in the North Korean system, apart from agriculture and enterprise management has been the adoption of Special Economic Zones. North Korea has continued to try and drum up support for its Special Economic Zones throughout the KJU era, however, the government appears to have stopped prioritizing the creation of SEZs after the death of Jang song-thaek, who, along with his entire patronage network and some of their families, was purged and executed for insufficient loyalty to the leader and mismanaging state resources. Since Jang's execution, only a handful of SEZs have been announced. International sanctions may play a role in making the DPRK's SEZs less economically desirable, but it is impossible to separate this impact from the effects of poor location, poor infrastructure, corruption, and North Korean bureaucracy—particularly in light of the fact that investors can shop around for the best SEZs to fit their needs. But SEZs that did launch in the DPRK also have had a limited impact on the North Korean population or the DPRK's economic policies. These SEZs generally import all their inputs and export all their final goods to another country with few forward or backward linkages to the DPRK. Additionally, the DPRK retains most earnings of its workers just as if they were deployed overseas.

2. FOOD SECURITY

I don't think it would be controversial to assert to this group that the primary cause of the DPRK's perennial food shortages is its own inefficient domestic agricultural and economic policies. Food shortages are not a failure of overzealous sanctions enforcement or a failure of international assistance.

If the DPRK implemented meaningful reforms to cooperative farming, like the leadership in People's Republic of China did in the 1980s, the DPRK probably would not need to import staple grains to feed its people. It is the DPRK's stubborn refusal to eliminate agricultural quotas; failure to invest in agricultural equipment and fertilizer production; and inability to offer long-term, tradeable leases in land management (among other policies); that have resulted in chronic food shortages and frequent need for supplemental imports.

Despite the annual poor performance of DPRK's agricultural policies, it still does its best to discourage effective humanitarian assistance, even in dire years like this one where the country has been more thoroughly isolated than at any time in its history (due to the coronavirus lockdown) and while at the same time suffering unusually harsh weather (three typhoons).

3. The DPRK does not publish reliable or comprehensive data on adverse events with humanitarian consequences. The data they do release is intended to facilitate their policy goals, not reflect real observations. Consequently, messages sent domestically and internationally are frequently contradictory and this hinders our ability to assess the reality of the situation.
4. The number of aid workers and diplomatic staff in the DPRK is probably at an all-time low (at least since the 1990s), and the prospects of increasing their numbers are nil in the current environment.
5. The aid workers that are in the DPRK face increased restrictions on their movement (even more than usual), so they cannot conduct their programs or independently monitor the true status of humanitarian conditions in the country. This significantly raises the cost of providing humanitarian assistance and this cost has been a disincentive to providing more assistance.
6. The DPRK has politicized humanitarian assistance. It is only accepting aid in areas that the KWP considers a priority, and it is only accepting aid from countries that do not pose an ideological problem for the regime or demand procedures that minimize diversion.
7. That said, the aid that the DPRK has received has almost certainly been diverted to meet the needs of the leadership, relieving pressure on them to reform their systems or open a door to diplomacy with other countries that seek to help the North Korean people.

Despite the negative assessment I have given you today, Rodong Sinmun has reported on this year's harvests of corn, rice, and potatoes in neutral to mildly-positive terms, which indicates that the KWP is not yet worried about a severe food shortage this year. They report that harvesting is done and threshing is underway and that many farms are overfulfilling their requirements under the 80-day battle for production. In addition, media reports of food prices remain well within observable norms even though there was some short-term volatility related to coronavirus lockdown. However, neither of these sources address the variety of foods that are available, and this has almost certainly declined owing to coronavirus mitigation policies on imports and restrictions on internal movement. But again, since the number of humanitarian and diplomatic staff in the country is at a relatively low and their ability to travel, especially out of Pyongyang, is even more constrained, it is difficult for us to acquire detailed information on the actual status of ordinary North Koreans, many of whom the regime considers expendable.

8. HEALTH CARE

With regards to the provision of health care assistance, many of the same criticisms apply. The DPRK's approach to improving health care this year is the "white elephant" model. This is exactly the wrong approach to employ. The regime has focused all its energy on hastily building a showcase hospital in the heart of the capital city. Construction was started, apparently, without a comprehensive plan for even completing the building. Construction was rushed to meet an artificial political deadline (which it did not meet). Also, the regime began construction without securing the equipment and supplies needed to run it. Staffing the hospital will also be an issue once it is completed. No doubt the doctors will eventually be pulled from other exclusive hospitals in Pyongyang such as the Ponghwa Clinic, the Pyongyang College of

Medicine under KISU, or the Red Cross Hospital. The DPRKs ability to scale up production of highly skilled doctors still remains severely constrained by their own budget priorities and travel restrictions.

Meanwhile DPRK's coronavirus mitigation policies and political concerns have made the provision of health care much more difficult:

1. Import restrictions and have likely reduced the flow of medical supplies from China. International aid projects that have been approved by this committee have been unable to carry out their projects on time and most have had to request extensions. In addition, the regime's quarantine measures have probably reduced smuggling as well.
2. The DPRK refuses to talk to or negotiate with the ROK on aid projects that this committee has approved.
3. There are relatively fewer aid workers and NGOs in the country to evaluate conditions and coordinate assistance. The aid workers that are there are restricted to Pyongyang.
4. DPRKs focus on white elephant hospital diverts resources from where they could do more good, such as the elimination of chronic diseases such as TB, typhoid, cholera, and malaria. It would probably be more meaningful, from a health perspective. International aid organizations are happy to help with this work, but the regime remains fearful of foreign intervention.

So in summary I want to reiterate that the DPRK has plenty of "low-hanging fruit" when it comes to policy options that will improve the livelihoods of its people. These policy options remain unexploited not because of international sanctions but due to fears of instability among the ruling political coalition.

To blame the enforcement of international sanctions on the status of the DPRK's economic and humanitarian situation it to miss the target. If we do actually care about the North Korean people and their livelihoods, then our policies must rest on the shared knowledge that it is the regime that is to blame for the plight of its people, and we should focus our policies on the regime to offer it the incentives to give up its WMD programs and join the global community. If we don't do this, we will run the risk of subsidizing the regime's current policy priorities which means funding the development of the WMD programs we are trying to curtail and sustaining the isolation of the North Korean people.

Source: Member State

Annex 96: Information provided by a Member State on the humanitarian consequences of sanctions

A Member State provided the following points to the Panel:

1. Since the start the COVID-19 outbreak, the North Korean regime has implemented highly restrictive and intrusive sanitary measures under the direction of the ad hoc inter-ministerial committee for the fight against the epidemic led by the Ministry of Health. [the Member State] assesses that the spread of COVID-19 in North Korea is perceived by its leadership as the most imminent and acute threat to its survival considering the almost non-existent health infrastructures.
2. In addition, [the Member State] assesses that North Korean authorities have seized the opportunity of the pandemic to further isolate the country from the rest of the world by closing the Sino-Korean border and emptying the country from all international presence, with the departure over time of both humanitarians and diplomats.
3. While official data claim that there is no death so far from COVID-19 and the supreme leader has congratulated the people, the army and the Party for successful victory against the virus, local newspapers such as the Rodong Sinmun regularly mention the active mobilization of different units in the fight against the virus. Considering the lack of reliable and transparent data.
4. With regard to the health situation, [the Member State] is not able to provide information on the actual death toll, which remains, highly uncertain. Nevertheless, in July, Kaesong City underwent lockdown after the return from a former defector who happened to be COVID-19 positive. In the following months, other cities and provinces also went under lockdown: the city of Sinuiju in September, the city of Manpo in October and the entire province of Chagang in November. At the moment, according to open sources, around 54,000 soldiers are said to be quarantined.
5. [the Member State] assesses, that the policy followed by North Korean authorities, in particular the closure of the border with| China, has consequential impact on its economy. In particular, the lengthy blocking of imports for quarantine by North Korean customs at the border has resulted in food shortage and rationing of staple food such as oil and sugar, causing major disruption of supply chains, even in Pyongyang. Moreover, increased volatility in currency trading has been reported over the past weeks, probably underpinned by greater economic imbalances.
6. This shutdown greatly impaired the humanitarian work of international NGOs and United Nations agencies. Due to the complete ban to leave Pyongyang, NGOs were forced to put all of their projects on hold (projects being carried out outside of the capital city) and got deprived of any kind of monitoring capacity. Also, several NGOs reported to us that their equipment had been blocked sine die at the border for the reasons mentioned above. Finally, considering the impossibility to pursue their mission and the extremely difficult living conditions in Pyongyang, the two [NGOs] had to suspend their projects and evacuate their international personnel (3 people) last August. For the same reasons, almost all humanitarians were forced to leave the country in the following months, only three of them remaining beginning of December.
7. [the Member State] assesses that sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council have had no significant impact on the humanitarian situation in North Korea and that the framework of the international sanctions regime effectively takes into consideration the humanitarian exception.

8. UNSCR 1718 (2006) and following are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of North Korea or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, includeing economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance that are not prohibited by resolutions.
9. [the Member State] recalls that the humanitarian situation in the DPRK results first and foremost from decisions taken by its leadership. While neither food nor pharmaceutical imports are forbidden by international sanctions, the population continues to greatly suffer from malnutrition and medicines shortages. North Korean authorities also have yet to provide free, safe and unrestricted access to humanitarian actors in order assess the situation in North Korea in an independent manner.
10. [the Member State] supports the important work of simplification and transparency undertaken by the 1718 Committee in the past years to facilitate humanitarian aid as displayed by the recent adoption of the updated version of IAN7 2.0 which is helpful in improving equipment routing procedures. The exemption mechanism created by UNSC 2397 (2017) has been a useful addition to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations, including […] NGOs active in North Korea. Thanks to the work of successive 1718 Sanctions Committee presidencies, the timeframe for examining requested exemptions was dramatically reduced, including for COVID-19 related exemption requests, which have all been approved within a few days.
11. Additionally, [the Member State] supports the ongoing efforts by the 1718 Sanctions Committee and the Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to reestablish a banking channel in support of humanitarian activities in North Korea.

Annex 97: Estimated DPRK petroleum products demand by sector









Source: David von Hippel, Peter Hayes, "UPDATED ESTIMATES OF REFINED PRODUCT SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE DPRK, 2010 – 2020", NAPSNet Special Reports, September 2, 2020, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/updated-estimates-of-refined-product-supply-and-demand-in-the-dprk-2010-2020/

Annex 98: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the 75th session

*The following are excerpts from the "*Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*," available at:* https://undocs.org/A/75/388. The Panel does not take a position on the statements and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein.

"The Special Rapporteur regrets that he has not been invited to conduct an official visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Owing to travel restrictions, he has also been unable to undertake any official missions to the Republic of Korea or neighbouring countries since his visit to Japan from 2 to 4 December 2019 and to Thailand from 28 to 29 November 2019. Limitations on the availability of first-hand information and the lack of opportunities to hear the voices of people from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea bring additional challenges to a comprehensive review of the human rights situation in the country. The Special Rapporteur held a series of online meetings with victims of human rights violations, their family members, civil society organizations, United Nations agencies and governments. Through that engagement, he learned of the worrying human rights situation of people impacted by the COVID-19 preventative measures, the effects of sanctions on economic and social rights, and human rights violations relating to the existing labour system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." [p.3]

[…]

"The increased implementation of sanctions has started to seriously affect the entire economy of the country, which is having adverse consequences on the exercise of the economic and social rights of the people. The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)considered that the four new sanctions adopted in 2017 "could exacerbate an already difficult situation in the country for those employed in sectors directly or indirectly affected by sanctions", including through loss of employment and increased restrictions on commercial activities (S/2020/151, annex, para. 209). The textile sector, one of the export-prohibited sectors, and informal commercial activities, for instance, are dominated by women, and any detrimental consequences on those sectors have a particular impact on women's rights. Since the adoption of additional sanctions in 2017,1exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have significantly decreased, from $2.63billion in 2016 to $1.65 billion in 2017 and $200 million in 2018.2The country's exports to China experienced a 90 per cent decrease in 2018 compared to 2017 and its tradedependence on China increased to 95.2 per cent in 2019. Foreign currency reserves have been decreasing and ordinary citizens in the country have been suffering from the failing economy and increasing demand from the Government to provide monetary and labour contributions." [pp. 3-4]

[…]

"In January 2020, when the global COVID-19 outbreak began, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had to contend with difficulties relating to the pandemic in conjunction with one of the most severe sanctions regimes imposed on anycountry in the world, as well as systemic economic problems and unusually bad weather conditions. Since January 2020, the authorities have suspended all travel in and out of the country, imposed travel restriction between cities and regions and introducedstrict quarantine measures. In August and September 2020, the country was hit hard by a series of natural disasters resulting in damage to infrastructure, including roads, railroads and bridges, and houses and crops. Owing to strict COVID-19 preventative measures, the international staff presence of the United Nations humanitarian

agencies in the country has fallen below 20 per cent, which will have an impact on their response. Several Political Bureau meetings of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea were held to discuss issues involving COVID-19 and typhoons.

On 19 August, at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman Kim Jong Un reportedly admitted that the authorities had failed to improve the lives of citizens. The adopted decisions stated that the "economy was not improved in the face of the sustaining severe internal and external situations and unexpected manifold challenges, thereby planned attainment of the goals for improving the national economy has been seriously delayed and the people's living standard not been improved remarkably". That realistic assessment of the economic challenges in the country should be the basis for a new five-year economic plan to be announced in January 2021." [p.4]

[…]

"Farmers suffered from a lack of necessary agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and gasoline at a critical time when they were planting seeds, growing seedlings and transplanting rice. In the first half of 2020, the import of fertilizer totalled $4.38 million, which is one ninth of the import of the previous year. Access to agricultural supplies, which was already negatively affected by sanctions prior to the implementation of COVID-19 preventative measures, was further limited owing to the border shutdowns and movement restrictions. The lack of supplies is likely to impact the harvest in September and October 2020, which constitutes 90 per cent of the country's food production. On 19 May 2020, a research institute report estimated the amount of annual rice production of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be 1.36 million tons,1418,000 tons less than the 2018/2019 production estimate. If the estimate is accurate, that will be the lowest harvest since 1994 (about 1.5 million tons),which saw the Arduous March and the onset of famine. Furthermore, flooding caused by heavy rains in August and September 2020 left thousands of hectares of crops damaged. As a result of the pervasive discrimination in the public distribution system, ordinary citizens, including farmers, do not receive rations. Prospects of a further deepening of food shortages and widespread food insecurity is a serious concern, not only owing to the danger of starvation, but also concerning the health and well-being of large segments of the population due to poor nutrition. The Special Rapporteur urges the Government to invest the necessary resources to overcome that serious food insecurity and to break the cycle of isolation. He also calls on the international community to reassess the implications of the measures being taken, including sanctions, that impact the right to food." [pp. 7-8]

[…]

"In a briefing paper issued by the Korea Institute for National Unification in August 2020, the author argued that while China might provide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with support to mitigate the crisis resulting from COVID-19, such support would not be sufficient to offset completely the shocks that the sanctions cause to the country's economy. The sanctions imposed on the country make it difficult to enjoy the basic human right to an adequate standard of living. The negative impact of the sanctions on the people is particularly worrying when the country is further isolating itself and information received from within the country is further limited with the reduced presence of the international community and only a trickle of escapees arriving in the Republic of Korea. Under the unprecedented situation of the COVID-19 pandemic, the need to re-evaluate parts of the sanctions regime is more compelling than ever. The Special

Rapporteur welcomes the swift response of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to provide humanitarian exemptions. He recommends that the Security Council study the policy on a standing exemption for humanitarian organizations. He also urges the Secretary-General to conduct a study on the humanitarian impact of sanctions, as recommendedby the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)(S/2019/171and Corr.1, annex, para. 180). The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is further isolating the country from the rest of the world and the authorities are slowing down the acceptance of humanitarian aid. That is a dangerous trend and the Special Rapporteur encourages the Government to reflect on that policy and urgently reverse it. The measures to contain the outbreak of COVID-19 must not compromise programmes aimed at advancing basic human rights such as the rights to health, food, water and sanitation and housing, which are equally necessary to combat the COVID-19 pandemic in the short and the long term." [p.9]

[…]

"The Special Rapporteur recommends that the international community:

> (a)Urgently reassess the implications of measures being taken, including sanctions, on the right to food of the people in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." [p.21]

[…]

Annex 99: Survey to NGOs on the effects of COVID on humanitarian operations

In order to assess the impact of COVID-19 on humanitarian organizations operating within the DPRK, the Panel sent a survey of questions to 38 organizations. Eleven organizations (29%) responded to the Panel's inquiry.[157] These included both UN organizations as well as non-governmental organizations that applied for exemptions either directly to the 1718 Committee, or through a Member State or the UN Resident Co-ordinator in the DPRK. At the outset, the Panel clarified that responding to the its inquiry was optional and that it had no bearing on the exemption approval processes within the 1718 Committee. The following questions were sent to the organizations.

QUESTION 1: Please provide detailed information and data on whether your organization experienced delays in shipments or reductions in operational capacity due to issues related to quarantine measures in the DPRK and/ or (please specify) implementation of UN sanctions. To what extent have COVID-19 related delays impacted your humanitarian operations, including monitoring?

QUESTION 2: Do you anticipate further delays or reductions in operations, and if so on what grounds?

QUESTION 3: What is your assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic within the DPRK, and in what way has it influenced the overall humanitarian situation? Please include details of the evidence on which your assessment is based.

QUESTION 4: If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What, if anything, could be improved upon in the exemption process, or in the implementation of UN sanctions, to better meet your operational needs and objectives?

[157] Two organizations rescinded their responses due to security concerns.

Table 1. Humanitarian organizations' responses to the Panel's survey

Org. No.	Response Summary
1	● The border controls and travel restrictions enacted by the DPRK Government beginning in January 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have had a significant impact on the shipment of supplies and movement of personnel in support of its humanitarian operations. ● Essential medicine, nutritional supplements, and water purification tablets, which were cleared for shipment by the 1718 Committee, were delayed for nearly four months at the border. Climate-controlled storage resulted in additional costs. ● In-country personnel and those returning have experienced difficulties accessing target populations to deliver humanitarian assistance. ● The organization is currently unable to engage directly with the government and fully expect border closures and travel restrictions to continue through 2020. ● Due to COVID-19 related restrictions, the organization assesses that, "...that approximately 440,000 children and pregnant and lactating women will not receive micronutrients, approximately 95,000 acutely malnourished children will not receive necessary treatment and approximately 101,000 kindergarten-aged children will not receive fortified foods. Furthermore, approximately 89,500 people will not have access to safe drinking water." The organization further notes that, "The restricted movement of people is a concern especially for those requiring medical treatment be it for chronic conditions, be it for severe acute malnutrition (children) or tuberculosis. The schools have been closed for extended periods, leading to a lot of missed classes. The shortage of imported goods in Pyongyang is a clear pointer that other external inputs (for example for agriculture) may be in short supply as well. The strict border closure will affect the livelihood of small traders and industries relying on cross-border trade." ● The organization notes that IAN 7 has been an important step in clarifying the procedural processes. Although the six-month timeframe to ship items has helped, additional flexibility with shipping timeframes is "critical due to the ongoing delays resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic."
2	● COVID-19 related travel restrictions "severely restricted work," which has resulted in the delay of drilling water wells that provide clean water to vulnerable populations. ● Unable to conduct cross-border transfers of needed materials and the travel restrictions have hampered overall implementation and monitoring efforts. ● The ability to continue operations will depend on whether travel restrictions and border closures are relaxed.

	● "The exemption process has met our organizational needs. We recently received a one- year exemption extension instead of the standard six-month. The one-year period is greatly appreciated." The organization recommends that the Committee adopt a one-year standard in order to help organizations working in-country to better utilize resources.
3	● The organization has experienced a temporary suspension of activities due to travel restrictions. ● Beginning in March, the organization has withdrawn most of its international staff located in Pyongyang. The office is currently operating with reduced staffing levels. ● Shipment delays are hindering operations. Disinfectant kits, which were approved for delivery in March, were not delivered until June. The organization has additional shipment in pending status. ● Will likely continue to experience delays as long as travel restrictions remain. The domestic travel ban has made independent monitoring and assurance activities "impossible." ● "... the humanitarian impact of COVID-19 is going to be severe and threatens to undo much of the progress made in areas such as food security, nutrition and health. However, it has to be noted that any assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic within the DPRK is based on assumptions rather than evidence at this point." The hardest hit will be those requiring medical treatment for chronic conditions, severe acute malnutrition, or tuberculosis. ● Noted significant improvement over the last 1.5 years in terms of the application process, but would prefer to have exemption extensions valid up to one year. The organizations also reiterates the need for a stable banking channel and recommends a "green-list" of items eligible for multi-year extensions (e.g., water pipes, plastic sheeting for agricultural needs, and personal protective equipment).
4	● COVID-19 has significantly increased procurement lead times and has contributed to delivery delays. Reproductive health kits, for example, were procured in the first quarter of 2020 but were delayed in transit. ● Storage of temperature-controlled items have led to increased overall costs. ● The continued lack of a banking channel has disrupted the organization's cash-flow. ● Travel restrictions have diminished the ability to conduct field visits and the lack of rotating staff and recuperation since January 2020 has increased fatigue and reduced operational capacity. ● Because of limited cash availability, reduced staffing, and in-country restrictions on travel, the organization anticipates further reductions in implementation activities. ● The organization notes the need for "special guidance on customs clearances at the operational level, particularly

	in transit countries" in order to reduce lead times. The organization goes on to suggest that "that the Committee consider the provision of IT equipment and supplies to the DPRK government, which could strengthen and enable statistical agencies responsible for data production and analysis."
5	● The organization explained that applying for sanctions exemptions took, in some cases, more than six month, but noted that most of the delay was due to local authorities that needed additional time to review requests. ● Even after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea lifted some of the border closures, the organization experienced challenges and delays with importing goods because of a growing back-log and prioritization for medical supplies and equipment. ● Travel restrictions and restrictions on the movement of in-country personnel has hindered monitoring capability and capacity, as the organization is unable to bring in new personnel or supplies. ● The organization does not expect a change to its circumstances in 2020 and notes that, "...restrictions may have affected humanitarian results, but the extent cannot be known because of lack in-country personnel and monitoring capabilities." ● Recommends that the Committee continues to streamline the application and approval process.
6	● The organization has experienced significant delays due to measures imposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and measures imposed by third-party countries. Shippers and freight-forwarders remain in short supply and there continues to be a dearth of "feeder-vessels" to carry goods from Dalian, China to Nampo Port, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The lack of sufficient feeder-vessels is due primarily to the closure of land border crossing and the country's request that all supplies be sent via sea. ● Travel restrictions have negatively impacted both implementation and monitoring efforts. ● The lack of a banking channel and international flights have led to cash-flow problems that are now affecting local implementation activities. "This has hampered [the organization's] ability to conduct in-country activities such as technical workshops, cascade training to the provinces, and joint technical monitoring with the Ministry of Public Health. The absence of international flights has also prevented [...] international experts from training and coaching government counterparts on different technical areas." ● Sustained border closures and global travel restrictions will continue to hinder operations. The organization notes that "humanitarian work has literally come to a standstill." ● In terms of recommendations, the organization suggests "extending the approval time from 6 to 12 months, especially during the pandemic, which would help mitigate procurement and shipping challenges related to the

	redacted shipping/ freight-forwarder options.”
7	• Although the organization’s exemption was approved in April 2020 none of the humanitarian supplies could be procured in time given the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s COVID-19 related border closures and travel restrictions. These supplies included agricultural equipment, food processing equipment, and “critical materials” for water supply activities. • Implementation and monitoring activities by the international teams have been restricted since January 2020 and the majority of the organization’s budget for DPRK activities is suspended. This has impacted the delivery of food security, agricultural, and water and sanitation activities that would benefit more than 67,000 people. • The organization has had to reduce its financial portfolio for 2020 and has had to make substantive programmatic changes to DPRK activities. “The technical support required to maintain and sustain previous operations will be significantly disrupted. The restrictions might also affect future programming activities and normal operations.” • In terms of recommendations, the organization notes that COVID has “increased the complexity of the operating environment” and that six-month extensions are too short. The organization also advocates for “blanket waivers” for specific items and highlights the continued need for an operational banking channel
8	• Measures put in place due to COVID-19 have resulted in the schools being closed. Consequently, school-aged children may not be receiving proper nutritional requirements and meals. Due to COVID-19, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had refused shipments of food items, which the organization was forced to store at the Chinese border. These food items were damaged or sold off, resulting in a financial loss to the organization. • Due to border closures, shipments of children’s winter clothes (e.g., coats and boots) will not arrive. The organization is concerned that many children are not prepared to endure a long and cold winter without warm clothes. Stalled shipments of vinyl sheeting, which is used for greenhouses and subsistence farming, are also stuck at the border, further jeopardizing food security. Medical supplies, such as dressings, heating equipment, and syringes, are delayed and the hospitals in need have run out of supplies. Other medicines were held at the border in climate-controlled containers, which has resulted in increased expenses for the organization. • Due to in-country travel restrictions, the organization is unable to monitor several of its agricultural projects. In the second half of 2020, the organization had to cease all monitoring activities. • The organization describes difficulties with transferring funds — noting several experiences with banks that blocked humanitarian-related transactions.

	• The organization makes three relevant recommendations: first, that the 1718 Committee establish a stable banking channel and second, that the 1718 Committee work with banks to ensure humanitarian-related transactions are not impeded. Finally, in order to coordinate more effective procurement and delivery, the organization recommends the 1718 Committee establish and publish a "white list" of goods that can be exported to the DPRK without first seeking Committee approval.
9	• The organization claims that "the sanctions on North Korea most influence the North Korean civilians. In various humanitarian sectors, such as health care and agriculture, the sanctions impact the North Korean people directly or indirectly. As for the health care sector, export bans are imposed on some medical equipment under HS Code 90, including ultrasound machines, respirator, stethoscope, thermometer for pregnant women and under the HS Code 79 through 89, including medical sterilizer for the prevention of mycobacterium tuberculosis complex and machine of dental prosthesis, dental scanner, so that they cannot be provided to North Korea without the Committee exemptions approval."[158] • The organization "has seen donations sharply reduced and many sponsorships canceled. In 2019, donations decreased by 72.9% compared to the previous year (2018), and in 2020 (from January to November), they decreased again by 27.7% compared to the previous year (2019). The current situation brings our future projects to a head with no hope for resumption."

[158] The Panel notes that medical items mentioned are not covered by sectoral sanctions and that member states should ensure their customs clearance processes and procedures avoid "over enforcement."

Annex 99 (a): Statements from NGOs regarding UN sanctions

The following quotes have been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs. The Panel does not take a position on the statements and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein.

NGO 1

"We can arguably say that the sanctions on North Korea most influence the North Korean civilians. In various humanitarian sectors, such as health care and agriculture, the sanctions impact the North Korean people directly or indirectly. As for the health care sector, export bans are imposed on some medical equipment under HS Code 90, including ultrasound machines, respirator, stethoscope, thermometer for pregnant women and under the HS Code 79 through 89, including medical sterilizer for the prevention of mycobacterium tuberculosis complex and machine of dental prosthesis, dental scanner, so that they cannot be provided to North Korea without the Committee exemptions approval. The same goes for the agricultural sector. Fuels, fertilizers, and agricultural tools and equipment are subject to export limitation, which have severely impacted on food security in the country. Humanitarian assistance to North Korea is highly influenced by relations between North Korea and the international community and political conditions. Now North Korea is increasingly challenged by climate change and natural disasters. The North Korean people are the hardest hit by the challenges. WFP said the sanctions on North Korea have disrupted the humanitarian supply chain and delayed the delivery of supplies. It takes months for goods to be delivered to North Korea. Shipping companies are hesitant to carry humanitarian goods to North Korea, given the strict and complicated inspection, penalty, and possible entry restrictions into other ports"

NGO 2

"UN Security Council says that UN sanctions are not applied for humanitarian operations but it actually hinders humanitarian operations. As an international NGO we purchase goods for humanitarian aids in China and send them to DPRK through NK-China border. We have partners in China who handle from purchase to delivery of goods to DPRK. We need to send project expenses to them but when we disclose the purpose of transfer is to help DPRK, banks in [a third country] reject it, and even they accept, intermediary banks [...] reject to handle it. In conclusion, money transfer is very difficult resulting in humanitarian aids is not available on time. If the sanction is really exempted for humanitarian operations, money transfer problem must be solved firstly."

"We appreciate 1718 committee to approve our exemption in a short time, but the application for approval process was not easy. To find out HS Code, specification, manufacture and manufacturing company of all goods were really tough. That's why many NGOs give up send goods to DPRK. Moreover many NGOs provide same goods to DPRK such as soybean produce equipment and greenhouse building materials but we usually do not know which organization sends which goods to DPRK because we do not disclose it in public. So it will be very helpful if 1718 committee makes a list of goods approved exemption and, disclose it to NGOs, and allow organizations sending them to DPRK without further approval."

NGO 3

"UN Security Council says that UN sanctions are not applied for humanitarian operations but it actually hinders humanitarian operations. As an international NGO we purchase goods for humanitarian aids in China and send them to DPRK through NK-China border. We have partners in China who handle from purchase to delivery of goods to DPRK. We need to send project expenses to them but when we disclose the purpose of transfer is to help DPRK, banks in [a third country] reject it, and even they accept, intermediary banks(usually US banks) reject to handle it.

NGO 4

"There are other multiple challenges for UN Agencies due to the closure of international banking channels which has resulted in a disruption of cash flow to continue day-to-day programme and operations; and the COVID-19 prevention measures that restrict capacity building initiatives and in-country monitoring field visits. Only disbursement of essential life-saving medicines through the government channel could be managed without the presence of international staff and using alternative monitoring mechanisms."

Annex 99 (b): Summary of suggestions from NGOs

The following list of suggestions has been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs. The Panel does not take a position on the suggestions and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein.

1. In order to prevent the indiscriminately and unreasonable use of sanctions, encourage, at a request from humanitarian aid actors, their suppliers of food, medicines, children goods to apply for exemptions.

2. To send information of exemption to the shipping companies, appointed by consigner for delivery of humanitarian cargos and to recommend a trusted banking channel to the humanitarian aid actors when granting the exemption.

3. To consider measures to ensure DPRK civil populations' access to humanitarian assistance and safe delivery of humanitarian aid and to prevent obstruction and the delivery of, or access to, or distribution of humanitarian assistance.

4. To provide special guidance on custom clearances at the operational level, particularly in transit countries. This would speed up the process and reduce the lead-time for humanitarian deliveries.

5. To consider introduction as a condition of granting exemption for a longer than usual period of time request to the humanitarian organization to report to the UNSC every six months, on its the implementation, and on any impediment to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

6. To consider adopting regulations which would make it easier for humanitarian groups to bring laptops, ambulances, and other aid-related items into the DPRK. Allow the humanitarian programming through provision of IT related equipment and supplies.

7. To return to the idea of a "green list" of humanitarian goods for which multi-year exemptions could be granted at lease for a limited range of general-purpose commodities (for example: water pipes, plastic sheeting for agriculture, personal protective equipment etc.)

8. To study the idea of adoption of a "white list" of entities, sort of accredited companies, who were for more than once approve for exemption for DPRK humanitarian aid and share it with banks worldwide to facilitate the transfer for the humanitarian aid purposes and to appoint specific banks in the exemption process so that NGOs can use these banks to transfer money to purchase commodities under exemption.

9. To study a suggestion on obtaining general clearances from the Committee for commonly procured medical items and supplies at one time, which would avoid repetitive submissions for the same items.

Annex 100: Consolidated list of recommendations

1. The Panel recommends that the Committee to consider issuing a new list of WMD and ballistic missile-related items to which measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) apply.

2. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise vigilance in screening international academic exchanges with scholars of the DPRK by verifying both subjects and sponsors to comply with paragraphs 10 and 11 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 17 of 2270 (2016), and paragraph 8 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006).

3. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States report any known transfers of refined petroleum products to the DPRK in full conformity with resolution 2397 (2017).

To the Committee

4. The Panel recommends the designation of the following vessels for violation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017):

- ***An Ping* (IMO No. 7903366), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged**
- ***Heng Rong* (IMO No. 7913098), unknown-flagged**
- ***Rich United* (IMO No. 9129213), unknown-flagged**
- ***Run Da* (IMO No. 8511172), formerly Mongolia-flagged**

5. The Panel recommends the designation of the following vessel for violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), and reiterates its recommendation for designation of the vessel for violation of paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):

- ***Xing Ming Yang 888* (IMO No. 8410847), unknown-flagged**

6. The Panel continues to recommend the following vessels for designation for further violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):

- ***Diamond 8* (IMO No. 9132612), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged**
- ***Hokong* (IMO No. 9006758), unknown-flagged**
- ***New Konk* (IMO No. 9036387), unknown-flagged**
- ***Subblic* (IMO No. 8126082), unknown-flagged**
- ***Unica* (IMO No. 8514306), unknown-flagged**
- ***Yun Hong 8* (MMSI No. 413459380), China-flagged**

7. The Panel recommends the designation of the following vessels for violation of paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):

- ***Enterprise* (IMO No. 9153331), formerly Togo-flagged**
- ***Ri Hong* (aka *Klausen*) (IMO No. 9162318), formerly Sierra-Leone flagged**
- ***Tae P(h)yong* (IMO No. 9018751), DPRK-flagged**

To Member States, on best practices with regard to the activities of the DPRK

On due diligence measures related to the evasion of sanctions

8. The Panel recommends that Member States continue to foster industry-wide awareness on the challenges posed including new tactics in sanctions evasion by culpable individuals and relevant steps to mitigate these risks. This can be disseminated in the form of industry-wide advisories and circulars.

On due diligence measures related to ship-to-ship transfers

9. The Panel recommends that parties engaged in ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum in areas where such illicit transfers are known to occur authorize the ship captain or an assigned crew member to send an email to the relevant flag registry providing notification of the event, ship identifiers (name, IMO and MMSI) of the vessel involved, the material and volume of the transfer, the date and time of the start and stop of the transfer, and the location of the transfer.

10. The Panel recommends that relevant counterparties in the maritime supply chain to consider implementing controls that allow for proper verification-of-origin checks for ships that conduct ship-to-ship transfers, particularly in areas where illicit transfers are known to occur. Such steps could include requirements for complete, accurate shipping documentation, including bills of lading that identify the origin and destination of cargo and copies of export licenses, where applicable.

11. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise vigilance to identify and prevent the illicit operation of vessels obtaining DPRK fishing permits, which may use various methods to obfuscate their activities and identities.

12. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise vigilance in inspection of cargo, including luggage of individuals traveling to or from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as required by paragraph 13 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016).

13. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise vigilance concerning the transfer of artworks of the designated entities to comply with the asset freeze requirements of relevant resolutions.

14. The Panel recommends designation of the Korea Paekho Trading Corporation and Paekho Art Studio.

15. The Panel recommends that Member States streamline their export control lists to reflect the list of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent

with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope taking care not to restrict the supply of ordinary civilian-use goods to the wider population nor to have a negative humanitarian impact.

16. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent resale to the DPRK.

17. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States and relevant organizations encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide thorough systems for checking consignees, bearing in mind the risk of transshipment.

18. The Panel recommends that Member States continue to exercise vigilance in screening the visa and residency status of nationals of the DPRK in order to prevent the circumvention of the obligations contained in the resolutions.

19. The Panel notes the DPRK's reliance on corporate service providers to facilitate its sanctions evasion activities and encourages Member States to continue to address opaque corporate registration rules and regulations that may afford anonymity to sanctions evasion activities.

20. The Panel recommends that Member States conduct enhanced due diligence on contractors and subcontractors for development projects, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa that involve municipal loans, grants or foreign direct investment.

21. The Panel recommends that Member States work with freelance IT companies to promote and enhance sanctions compliance implementation capacity and capability.

22. The Panel recommends Choe Song Chol and Im Song Sun for designation by the Committee.

23. The Panel recommends Pak Hwa Song and Hwang Kil Su for designation by the Committee.

24. The Panel recommends that the Committee review the NGO responses to the Panel's survey to help inform future decision-making and to better assess humanitarian aid needs and impact (annex 99).

25. The Panel notes the importance of the arrangements for re-establishing the banking channel.

26. The Panel notes the usefulness of biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.

27. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on the civilian population of the DPRK and on humanitarian aid operations to benefit the vulnerable population of the DPRK and overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

28. The Committee should continue to streamline the processes and procedures for applying for humanitarian exemptions.

29. The Panel recommends that Member States submit their reports in full con-formity with resolutions 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).